Daily Press Briefing
Mark C. Toner
Deputy Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
September 13, 2016
Index for Today's Briefing
SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE
SYRIA
IRAN
BURMA
TRANSCRIPT:
1:22 p.m. EDT
MR TONER: And I know we weren't able to answer all your questions about bilats or about possible other discussions, as you mentioned, about – concerning Syria and other – I think all this will take shape over the next few days, so just bear with us.
QUESTION: Are you going to announce them piecemeal or will there be another meeting like this with more details?
MR TONER: We'll probably put out, for planning purposes only, a media note. But we'll also – as we get closer to Saturday we'll let you know what the set-in-stone bilats are.
QUESTION: Thanks.
MR TONER: Yep.
QUESTION: Really, there isn't a single one that's set in stone right now? I just – I don't believe that.
MR TONER: You find that hard to believe? Well --
QUESTION: No, no, I don't find it hard to believe. I find it impossible to believe. (Laughter.)
MR TONER: When we have something to announce, as you've often heard, then we'll announce it.
Go ahead, Matt.
QUESTION: You don't have anything to start with? How about a preview of the upcoming General Assembly session? (Laughter.)
MR TONER: Check.
QUESTION: Yeah. So as your previous briefer just said, yes, the Secretary did speak quite a bit about the Syria deal yesterday. Unfortunately, not all of it was 100 percent accurate, apparently. I have a couple of questions.
MR TONER: Sure.
QUESTION: I just want to see how far – how much more we can clarify what this deal does and what it doesn't do --
MR TONER: Yeah.
QUESTION: -- if, in fact, we get to seven days of reduced violence.
MR TONER: Right.
QUESTION: So the first question is: Under the terms of the deal, as everyone knows, if there is this seven days of reduced violence, the U.S. and Russia will set up this Joint – the JIC.
MR TONER: Right.
QUESTION: Does that – is that – does that exist, or will it exist as soon as people have confirmed the seven days of reduced violence? Or is it – does the seven days, confirmation of the seven days of reduced violence, merely mean that the process of getting the JIC stood up begins?
MR TONER: So you are right that we need to see the seven days of reduced violence. At that time, once that assessment is made – and let me just clarify as well, when we talk about seven days of reduced violence, we're also talking about sustained humanitarian access as well, and too often that's left off the – left out of the discussion or not emphasized enough. But we need to see both.
At that point in time, my understanding is that the JIC, Joint Implementation Center, will begin to be set up. It's not – my understanding, again, is that there won't be an "open" sign hung out on a door immediately; but that once we get to that point in time – seven days of reduced violence and humanitarian access – at that point in time, we'll set the JIC up. Now, how long that will take before it's operational, I don't have a solid answer for you. I'll try to get you more clarity on that.
QUESTION: Okay, well, what needs to be done – I mean, what needs to be done between you and the Russians should we get to the seven days and the sustained humanitarian access to set up the JIC? Have the rules of engagement or the decisions about how much and what kind of intelligence sharing – have those details been arranged, or is that something that is still TBD?
MR TONER: Sure. I don't want to get into too much --
QUESTION: And will be still TBD --
MR TONER: Sure. I don't want to get into too much detail and get too far down this hypothetical road, because we're just one day into this. But I think, in response to your question, we have been, obviously, throughout the past several months now been talking and coordinating closely and trying to – in trying to reach this agreement with the Russians. So to an extent, these channels are already established. And indeed, as we've talked about a lot from this podium and elsewhere, there are these groups working in Geneva already.
So in terms of what needs to be done to set up the Joint Implementation Center after we reach the seven days of calm or reduction in violence, my impression is it's not going to be a tremendously heavy lift because, again, we've already established a lot of this and done a lot of the legwork in just getting to the point of agreement. But there will have to be a certain level or certain degree of coordination ongoing. We'll have to establish processes. We'll have to establish a means of communication. And we'll have to, as you mentioned, talk about the mechanisms by which we share information and intelligence and how that works.
We all know globally how this works, right? We're going to have an agreed upon area that – and then the regime would not be able to fly anymore within that area, that consolidated area that we've talked about. And once we get to that point, then we will begin coordinating with Russia on airstrikes specifically targeting Nusrah in a strategic and a very calculated way.
QUESTION: Well, the reason why the timing --
MR TONER: Yeah, go ahead.
QUESTION: -- of all this is important is because it is not the creation of the JIC that is the trigger for Assad having to ground his air force over the designated area, correct? It's actually when the U.S. and Russia begin the joint operations that they will be – according to what was said yesterday and repeatedly over and over again, it is not the JIC being established that is the trigger. It is the commencement of joint U.S.-Russian strikes. And what you laid out just now and noted that it's taken several months to get just to this point without any of the details of how this cooperation or coordination is going to take place, you're looking at potentially weeks more where Assad's air force isn't grounded while the two sides try to hash out exactly what and how the JIC is going to do – what it – how it's going to do its job. Right?
MR TONER: So a couple of points on that. One is we all recognize that – the urgency of putting the JIC up and running, getting it up and running as quickly as possible. Once we get to that seven-day mark of a reduction in violence along with sustained humanitarian access, we all recognize that that is a key to the agreement of – or Assad's forces no longer being able to fly missions within that designated airspace. So I don't think it's going to be a matter of weeks. I can't put a specific day or time on it, but it's not going to be a matter of weeks.
QUESTION: But is it correct that it's not the creation of the JIC that stops – that grounds the air – the Assad air force? It is the commencement of the joint operations, or is that not correct?
MR TONER: I'll try to get clarity on that. That's a good question. I'm – I believe it's the former but – or the latter, rather, but I'll get clarity on that.
QUESTION: The former and the latter?
MR TONER: The carrying out of – no, I said I believe it's the latter.
QUESTION: The latter. So it is the commencement of the airstrikes that does it?
MR TONER: Let me double-check. I'll take the question.
QUESTION: So – so in other words, there is another period of time after the seven days during which Assad's forces can do whatever they want essentially.
MR TONER: Again, nobody is talking about certainly – that was the other point I wanted to make, and thanks for bringing it up, is we are talking about a sustained period where there is – sorry, a period where there is a sustained reduction in violence. What we have seen time and time again – and it's what caused the last cessation of hostilities to fray and ultimately collapse – was the fact that the regime carried out airstrikes saying it was going after Nusrah but, in fact, was taking out civilian targets.
So to say – to make the claim or to ask the question of whether the regime can continue willy-nilly to carry out airstrikes in the name of going after Nusrah, that's not the case. We're already looking at who is abiding by this reduction in violence since yesterday, and we're already assessing when there's – when there are allegations of violations who's responsible for that and whether they're legitimate violations are not. So that part of that process is already going on.
QUESTION: There are legitimate violations?
MR TONER: I said where there are legitimate violations.
QUESTION: Right. Do --
MR TONER: We haven't seen that thus far. But I'm saying it's not like we – sorry, just it's not like we're saying to the regime, sure, do what you want for the next seven days or until a JIC is set up. That's not at all --
QUESTION: Does the clock reset or is it – is this coming Monday a one-time-only deal? In other words, if there is a violation tomorrow, a serious one, do you start again on counting seven days from Wednesday?
MR TONER: So, in theory, how this works is – and I can just say that over the last 24 hours, while we have seen some violations, and I think Secretary Kerry spoke to this yesterday that this isn't going to be a clean start to this, there are going to be some ongoing incidents of violence. But so we have seen, as I said, some reports of sporadic violence, but thus far the arrangement as a whole seems to be holding --
QUESTION: (Sneezing.)
MR TONER: -- and the violence – God bless you – is lower in comparison to previous days and weeks. But as I said, we anticipated an uneven start to the cessation of hostilities.
So as we move forward, just to answer your question directly, every day we continue to work within the U.S. Government, but also consulting closely with the Russians, assessing, as I just talked about, where there are credible reports of violations. We're assessing those jointly. If we get to a point then – if we get to a point where we believe that there is a credible series of violations or a credible incident of a violation of the cessation of hostilities, we do reserve the right to make the decision to say we're setting the clock back to zero.
QUESTION: So the clock can reset?
MR TONER: The clock can reset.
QUESTION: All right.
MR TONER: And then – sorry, just to finish my answer – we also reserve the right, if this goes on and on and on to a point where we believe it's no longer in anyone's interest to continue this, to simply walk away and say --
QUESTION: All right.
MR TONER: -- the agreement is null and void.
QUESTION: Last one.
MR TONER: Please.
QUESTION: A lot of this confusion could be cleared up if you guys would just make this deal public. Foreign Minister Lavrov said earlier today that he saw no reason not to make it public and that, in fact, it should be made public so that people could judge for themselves whether or not it was being violated. And he said that it put the onus on you guys to make it public. So what's going on? I mean, will you make it public so that --
MR TONER: Well, we certainly appreciate his commitment to transparency. I mean, look, Matt --
QUESTION: Really? Did I sense some sarcasm in that or were you being serious?
MR TONER: Not at all. Look --
QUESTION: Let the record reflect that even the answer, quote, "not at all," was also sarcastic.
MR TONER: (Laughter.) Thank you, James, for your commentary.
No, look, let's be very clear. So we were and have been very clear about saying that, given the level of detail of this agreement, there are some operational details, areas of sensitivity that we believe we don't want – or would not be in the interest of the agreement or in anyone's interest to share. The Secretary alluded to yesterday the fact that there's a lot of would-be spoilers out there who want to bring this deal and take it apart and make it fail. We're mindful of that. So it's still our assessment that we don't want to share this thing publicly, but that assessment is ongoing. We're still continuing to look at it and if we get to a point where we believe we can share the details, we will.
QUESTION: Mark, I have some follow-up.
MR TONER: Yeah. Please, Lesley.
QUESTION: So yesterday we heard the Secretary said that were some violations, but what are you seeing today?
MR TONER: So, as I said, it was an uneven start, but what we saw over the first 24 hours was the fact that – or we believe that the arrangement as a whole appears to be holding and that violence is lower than it was in the previous weeks and months. I'm not prepared to say this is – check the box that this is day one of seven days. I think we're going to continue to assess that as we go forward and, as I just made clear to Matt, we can always see a significant violation in the days ahead that force us or force the Russians to reset the clock. And so going forward, we're just taking this day by day, hour by hour really, and assessing that this is meeting the criteria. But the other thing is, just the fact that we've seen a reduction in violence isn't enough. We need to see access for humanitarian assistance. Now, we believe that's moving. We've seen some signs that that's moving, but we still haven't seen the access. We need to see that concretely take place.
QUESTION: And are you – for this access, are you talking about Aleppo specifically? Because that seems where it seems to be targeted.
MR TONER: It's one of the critical areas, but there is many besieged areas in Syria. And I wouldn't say that it needs to be 100 percent, but we need to see a significant and sustained humanitarian access.
QUESTION: And then I have a follow-up on --
MR TONER: Sure.
QUESTION: -- what this deal is about. So several senior U.S. officials told us that Assad's forces had to be grounded. That was the U.S. push. Now, over the last few weeks, things started developing in which we saw the U.S. saying, well, Assad's forces can continue to fly even after the JIC is formed in certain areas where Nusrah and Islamic State are operating but that the opposition is not there. What happened in between? Was that a concession that happened on the U.S. part?
MR TONER: No, I don't think so at all. I mean, I think we've been very clear how we envision this arrangement to work, which is that the – once the JIC is established, it would cover a designated area. In that area, the regime's air forces would no longer be able to fly. The intent here is to take that element out of the equation, because what we saw with the last cessation of hostilities – by far, the preponderance of violations of the cessation were on the part of the regime and the preponderance of those violations were the regime saying we're just striking Nusrah targets when, in fact, they were going after opposition targets and in many cases hitting civilian targets. And as we all saw, what was a credible ceasefire in the initial weeks and even months frayed and deteriorated rapidly because of that.
So we're trying to take Assad's air forces out of the equation. That's the goal here, and if we get there, then we can have coordination between the U.S. and Russia deciding what targets are legitimate targets – are Nusrah targets – and then agreement on who hits those targets between us – the U.S. – or Russia. So again, it's also about strategically going after Nusrah, and we've talked a lot about, in this room – and how previous weeks and even months there was this marbleization, however we want to refer to it, in and around Aleppo, where you may have – regime forces or Russia's may have said we're going after Nusrah, but in fact they were hitting opposition forces – moderate opposition forces – who were intermingled. What we're talking about now is a much more strategic approach.
And at the same time, concurrently, there is an effort to disaggregate these forces. We have made very clear to the opposition that it is in their interests to, where they are intermingled or commingled with Nusrah, to disengage. Sorry for the long answer.
QUESTION: And then – so Assad's forces can continue to fly in those areas outside that designated --
MR TONER: Designated area.
QUESTION: Even through this week and continuing into the next months?
MR TONER: That's my understanding, yes.
QUESTION: Mark, well – first of all, will the JIC have like a physical address, like CENTCOM? Is it going to have --
MR TONER: That's a very good question. I'll have to look at that.
QUESTION: And who will be in command --
MR TONER: I don't know. I mean, in this day and age that's important, but so much can be done, obviously, through the wonder of cyberspace and other connectivity that I can't say that they'll actually be cohabitating a specific building.
QUESTION: And this area that is in effect a no-fly zone for the Syrian air force, if, let's say, a Syrian air – fighter jet violates this rule, who's going to shoot it down, the Americans or the Russians? Or both?
MR TONER: So fair question. I don't necessarily want to talk about rules of engagement or how these violations will be dealt with except to say that just as we have taken on the responsibility of ensuring that the moderate opposition abides by the cessation of hostilities, Russia has agreed to take on the responsibility of ensuring that the regime abides by its responsibilities, one of which is to adhere to this no-fly zone.
QUESTION: And my last question on this.
MR TONER: Yeah, please.
QUESTION: Now as a result of this agreement, are, let's say, the lines delineated a lot better? Do we know who's who in what area? Do you have, like, all the groups laid out and so on? Do you have a map of all --
MR TONER: I think there's a much clearer understanding, and that was – again, a lot of the legwork of the past weeks and months was in trying to establish who was where. But I think also in the coming days, as we communicate with the moderate opposition and they understand that it's, as I said, not in their interest to remain commingled with Nusrah, we are going to see a separation.
Please, James.
QUESTION: To this point of how only fairly recently we have been able to acquire a better sense of who exactly is where, by what means? Have we placed chips or other electronic tagging devices on the fighters we like?
MR TONER: I would really defer to the Department of Defense to talk about some of the operational aspects, and I'm not even sure to what level of detail they would be able to get into, since it does touch on intelligence assets and other ways and means by which we gather information about who is where. But – but – but --
QUESTION: How is it that our (inaudible) --
MR TONER: Sorry, just to finish my response, but recognizing the fact that this has been a challenge and remains a challenge. And that's part of the reason why we made an effort to work out with the Russians where – or a mechanism by which we can share information about, if we get to that seven-day period and get to the point of establishing a JIC, whereby we can share information – again, not based on trust but based on a very sober assessment of who is where and located where so that we can avoid, as we – what we saw in the previous weeks and months and indeed years, which is indiscriminate attacks that hit hospitals, hit schools, hit civilians.
QUESTION: I just – I am curious about --
MR TONER: Please, yeah.
QUESTION: -- a state of affairs in which a given conflict involving multiple parties has been underway for over five years, but you are telling us here, now, that only very recently, as in the past week or so, we have suddenly been able to acquire a much better ability to discern one combatant set over another.
MR TONER: Yeah, no, I wouldn't – and again, if I – if that was what I conveyed, then let me try to put it another way. I think that we have put great effort into trying to delineate because we realize how critical that is to any kind of sustainable cessation of hostilities on the ground. So we've put great effort into that through various assets. We also have, obviously, eyes and ears within the moderate Syrian opposition we've worked with over the past years.
And again, I think it's absolutely critical for the success of this agreement – which we're by no means ensuring the success of – there are a lot of challenges, but one of the big challenges is how do you separate the moderate opposition from Nusrah, where everyone agrees that Nusrah is al-Qaida-affiliated and is a common enemy and threat that we all can target.
QUESTION: Lastly, to Matt's question --
MR TONER: Please.
QUESTION: -- about the release of the plan, in addressing that, you cited the remarks of Secretary Kerry, who averred to the existence of some number of concerned parties who are very eager to see the plan defeated and collapse. And I just wonder if that isn't a recipe for never releasing any policy or any plan because there will inevitably always be individuals who look upon the policies or plans as promulgated by any administration and have a vested interest in defeating them or seeing them collapse.
MR TONER: Well, that's a fair point to make. I think at this point in this stage, it is still our assessment that it's too early to release the full details of this plan, but that's something we continue to assess. I'm – far be it from me to say never will we release it. I don't think that's the case at all. And certainly, there's a case to be made for being as transparent as possible. We've made efforts to explain what is, in fact, a very complex plan, but we'll continue to assess that going forward.
I think the concern is just that it's a very complex battlespace and we need to be very cognizant of the fact that given that complexity, there are a lot of spoilers, a lot of potential spoilers out there.
QUESTION: Can we go to Iran?
QUESTION: No, let's do a follow-up --
QUESTION: No.
QUESTION: Syria --
MR TONER: Let's finish up. Guys, and I apologize. I've got about five more minutes. I know there's a lot of questions. Please, David. I apologize.
QUESTION: Oh. Well, on the subject, then, of transparency, will the JIC, when created, be able to issue joint statements publicly? Or are we still going through the podium if we want to ask about their assessments? When the previous ceasefire came into effect, we were repeatedly told we don't want to litigate individual allegations of the ceasefire violations --
MR TONER: Right, right.
QUESTION: -- this is going on in private. Will the JIC continue that – with that? Will they – will deliberations of the JIC remain secret?
MR TONER: It's a good question. It's my understanding that they won't issue – become or have a mechanism within the JIC to issue statements, but I don't have a solid answer on that.
QUESTION: So we still ask you what the JIC thinks of the --
MR TONER: I think that's the – yeah, I think that's the – that's my understanding.
QUESTION: Okay. And --
MR TONER: But if that changes, I'll let you know.
QUESTION: And does it replace the de-confliction body that exists (inaudible) beforehand? Is it a development of that?
MR TONER: No, I would also – I would say it's somewhat separate because the de-confliction is about de-conflicting the overall airspace in Syria where you have U.S. fighters and other anti-ISIL coalition fighters operating and in that same airspace Russian jets operating. And that, as we made very clear, was simply a very straightforward logistical de-confliction mechanism to ensure that we weren't operating in the same airspace to ensure the safety of our crews.
QUESTION: But insofar as we – I mean, to follow up from the previous question, we don't know whether it'll have a physical address, but if it has one it's in Geneva?
MR TONER: That would be most likely, yes.
QUESTION: And is there a table with soldiers and spies and generals around it?
MR TONER: I'll try to get more color and context for you as we go forward.
QUESTION: Is it a buffet? (Laughter.)
MR TONER: I'd love that.
Please.
QUESTION: Just some clarification on the targeting. So is the idea that with this no-fly zone the Syrian air force would not have anything to target other than ISIS if it was – if it was airborne?
MR TONER: That's correct.
QUESTION: And would the Russians and the Americans also carry out joint operations against ISIS, or are you very much focusing on Nusrah?
MR TONER: In terms of joint operations against ISIS, I can --
QUESTION: Or like this – through this mechanism I mean.
MR TONER: Right. I'm not aware that ISIS targets are on the table. My understanding is that it's just Nusrah within that designated area.
QUESTION: And just finally, quickly --
MR TONER: I mean obviously, separately, we're obviously going to continue to carry out airstrikes against ISIL.
QUESTION: Right. But not – but not as part of this JIC.
MR TONER: But my understanding not coordinated and not part of the JIC.
QUESTION: Okay. And in terms of – you keep saying that Nusrah is clearly al-Qaida and therefore it's beyond the pale, but some of the arguments from the opposition is, A, Nusrah hasn't carried out attacks outside of the country so it should be looked at differently; and, B, Hizballah is also on the terrorist list of the United States and it wasn't designated in this – in the way the fighting is going on in Syria, so there are double standards. How do you respond to that?
MR TONER: Well, look, in terms of Nusrah, it's our assessment that they do have aspirations to carry out attacks on the West. And in response to your second question, I would just say that there is joint agreement that Nusrah poses a threat not just to Syria but also to the region and to the United States. I would also add that --
QUESTION: But there is a joint agreement --
MR TONER: I would also add that with Hizballah and other groups that Iran has signaled that it will abide by the agreement. And that this agreement, as much as it holds, is – it is incumbent on all the members of the ISSG to exert whatever influence they have on the various operators on the ground in Syria to abide by the cessation of hostilities. We've always said that. This cessation of hostilities is only as strong as the members of the ISSG, the stakeholders, exerting the influence that they have on the different players and factions and operators on the ground in Syria.
I want to very quickly, if we can just finish, and then I know you have a question and I'll take your question, Nike. I apologize.
QUESTION: Well --
MR TONER: Oh yeah. Yes, James. Yeah.
QUESTION: On Iran, we saw yesterday – we reported yesterday that on Saturday, September 10th, two U.S. Navy reconnaissance planes flying 13 miles off the shore of Iran received a warning from the Iranian military to either alter their course or be shot down by Iranian missile capabilities. First, most broadly, do you have a response to this sudden development?
MR TONER: My response would be in line with what we've said, because frankly there have been previous incidents much like this. I think we had one a week or so ago. And they're concerning, obviously. They escalate tensions – and needlessly escalate tensions, frankly – and our forces within the area or within the region are operating according to freedom of navigation standards. We have conveyed our concerns to Iran.
QUESTION: How?
MR TONER: I know the DOD has conveyed its concerns. First and foremost, I'm doing it publicly. I don't want to speak to other means of communications that we've had with the Iranian Government, but the fact of the matter is it is a matter of concern because we've seen a succession of these events over the past month or so. And – go ahead.
QUESTION: To that point, just this year we've seen the seizure of our sailors, we've seen a doubling according to the Pentagon's numbers in the number of naval confrontations over this time last year. Now they're threatening to blow our planes out of the sky. We've seen a very aggressive series of ballistic missile tests from the regime. There's more American hostages in Iran.
And so I just wonder how you can possibly assess the evolution of this relationship in which the landmark moment is the finalization of this nuclear deal and rule out the possibility that, in fact, one of the byproducts of this deal has been to embolden the regime to worse rather than better behavior.
MR TONER: Well, we always were very clear that their objective in reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran was to prevent them from obtaining a nuclear weapon, which we, I think, all agree would only exacerbate the threat in the region of Iran as well as exacerbate tensions in the region and pose a real national security risk to the United States. We never said that this was going to solve all of Iran – Iran's – excuse me – bad behavior. And in fact, we would like – as much as we would like to see Iran's behavior change in the region, we've not seen a significant shift.
QUESTION: In fact, you have seen a shift. It's gotten worse.
MR TONER: Well --
QUESTION: Am I correct about that?
MR TONER: Well, again, I don't have all the facts and figures in front of me, but we have seen some disturbing, as you cited, trends. And I think – two things. One is that, in our view, it only makes the significance of the nuclear agreement that much more important, because the last thing anyone would want to see in the region is a nuclear-armed Iran. But it also shows that Iran has a choice to make. And if it wants to engage further with the West, following on the engagement that led to the nuclear agreement, more productively and play a more constructive role in the region, or continue with, as I said, its bad behavior. Thus far we have not seen that shift to a constructive engagement.
QUESTION: But you can't rule out that, in fact, this deal has served as a cause for this more aggressive posture.
MR TONER: I mean, I can't rule that out. I just – we've – Iran, like many countries, has an internal political process that's defined by a lot of different dynamics. But I can't give an assessment one way or the other in that regard.
QUESTION: Are three more American hostages --
QUESTION: So is it correct that you're saying that the nuclear deal is important because Iran would be doing all the same stuff that it's doing now --
MR TONER: And pursuing a nuclear weapon.
QUESTION: -- and with a nuke. Is that what you're saying?
MR TONER: Right. Or possibly with a nuke, or at least pursuing a nuclear weapon.
QUESTION: But I think you're right that they have shown a willingness to engage with the West, but it's to engage militarily; is it not?
MR TONER: Well, again, I mean, they are a member of the ISSG, the International Syria Support Group. They have signed on to the goal of that organization, which is to end the conflict and lead to a political transition in Syria. We continue to look for signs that they're willing to engage constructively across the board.
QUESTION: Right. But if that's the only thing that they've done in terms of engagement or – except for the military stuff that you've been talking about --
QUESTION: Have you --
QUESTION: -- that's pretty slim pickings.
MR TONER: Well, again, I'm not here to advocate on behalf of the Iranian Government and their engagement with the West.
QUESTION: Can you clarify if more American hostages were taken? Because James suggested that more American hostages were recently taken.
MR TONER: I don't have a list in front of me, but there are --
QUESTION: But there are?
MR TONER: -- continue to be detained Americans, and we've expressed concern.
QUESTION: And how --
MR TONER: I don't have a number. We continue to raise their cases, obviously, with the Iranian Government at every opportunity.
Please, Nike, last question.
QUESTION: Yes, Mark, thank you. Myanmar, or Burma. The de facto leader of Myanmar is visiting, Aung San Suu Kyi.
MR TONER: She is.
QUESTION: What will be the focal point, and how should we expect the issues of remaining sanction to be discussed?
MR TONER: Well, you're right that she – we are very excited to welcome State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi on her first visit to the United States in her new role in government after Burma's significant steps in its democratic transition. I think much has changed over the past several years for the Burmese people, but our goal remains the same with respect to Burma, which is to see a peaceful, prosperous, democratic nation emerge in which all people can live in relative harmony and are able to fully exercise their rights and continue to build a close friendship between our two countries.
So I think we're going to talk about the gamut of issues – human rights, certainly, concerns, but also continued steps that Burma can take along the path towards a fuller and stronger democracy. Again, we've seen progress, but there's more work that needs to done. So that's going to be the – I think the focus of our engagement over the next couple of days.
QUESTION: Last time the U.S. announced the ease of some of the sanctions is on May 17. How do you address criticism and urge from the human rights groups that the remaining sanctions are critical to make – ensure the improvement of democracy in Burma?
MR TONER: Sure. I mean, look, we've always, as you posited in your question – the lifting of sanctions has always been in response to what we have seen as democratic progress on the part of the Burmese Government. We're not ready to pull back all those sanctions yet. Some remain in place. And we always retain the right to continue those, as long as we feel that they're useful.
Thanks.
QUESTION: In the past four months, do you see – what improvement do you see the lowest remain sanctions in terms of thwarting the human rights abuses?
MR TONER: In terms of?
QUESTION: Thwarting human right abuses and punishing the cronies and --
MR TONER: Well, again, I don't have anything to announce in terms of lifting additional sanctions. We continue to remain engaged with Burma. We continue to press them to make continued democratic reforms and certainly with respect to human rights.
Thanks.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR TONER: Thanks, everybody. I appreciate it.
(The briefing was concluded at 2:00 p.m.)
DPB #159
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
