• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Daily Press Briefing

John Kirby
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
September 12, 2016

Index for Today's Briefing

SYRIA/TURKEY/SAUDI ARABIA/RUSSIA
CHINA/RUSSIA
PHILIPPINES
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA
TAIWAN
NORTH KOREA
PAKISTAN
SYRIA

 

TRANSCRIPT:

2:37 p.m. EDT

MR KIRBY: Okay, everybody. I had to give them time to lower this thing. (Laughter.) I don't have anything to open with, so Matt, do you have anything more?

QUESTION: I don't have anything on Syria. So if there's anyone left who wants to ask about Syria, go ahead.

MR KIRBY: I'm shocked that you want to ask about Syria. Go – why don't we go to you and then you. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay, I have two questions on Syria. Russia has said that this ceasefire which the Secretary just discussed, or cessation of hostilities, also applies to the YPG and the Free Syrian Armies. Is that correct, it would also involve stopping the fighting between essentially the Turks and the Kurds in Syria?

MR KIRBY: Again, remember what this is. It's not changed in character. The cessation of hostilities which was put in place in February applied or supposed to apply to everybody but those groups designated by the UN as terrorists inside Syria, and there are two. There's Daesh and there's al-Nusrah, which the Secretary made very clear is al-Qaida. It's al-Qaida in Syria. And so if the cessation of hostilities is implemented, if it's observed, then the only two groups that may continue to be targeted by anybody are those two.

QUESTION: So the cessation of hostilities would include Turkish-Kurdish confrontations?

MR KIRBY: Well, we've – we have long said that we don't want to see – and I said this a couple of weeks ago – that we don't want to see violence or clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish forces. What we've said, and I'll say it again today, is that we want them, as members of the counter-Daesh coalition, to fight Daesh, that that's where their – we want their energies to be applied.

QUESTION: And my – thank you. And my second Syria question is that the Kurdish National Council of Syria as well as the Assyrians have protested a document that was issued by the – put out by the Saudi-backed opposition, the HNC, and that's their framework for a transitional period in Syria. The complaint is that it's Arabist-based and Islamist-based and doesn't take account of the interests of minorities in Syria.

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Do you have a comment on that? And are you concerned that leaving so much to countries like Saudi Arabia we're reproducing the problem that we had in Afghanistan after the 1980s, the war with the Soviets, and Pakistan was in charge and the result was not something very pretty?

MR KIRBY: I'm not quite sure what you mean by the last part of your question, but I will say we continue to be grateful for Saudi Arabia's leadership here in working with the HNC and the moderate opposition to help them coalesce around guiding principles.

Now, look, I haven't seen the protest specifically. I'm aware of it. I'm aware of the basic gist of it. I haven't seen it, and it wouldn't be right for me to go through it line by line. What I would tell you is this: Nothing's changed about our view here in the United States, and I think I can say the same for members of the ISSG, that what we want to see in Syria is a country that's unified, that's whole, that's pluralistic, that includes and is representative of all Syrians no matter what their walk of life, no matter what religion they practice or what ethnicity they represent. That's what we've said from the outset, and that is the goal that the United States and the international community is going to continue to pursue.

QUESTION: I guess my question that wasn't clear, and I apologize – after the Soviet – war against the Soviets ended in Afghanistan in '89, the United States left it to Pakistan to kind of craft the government for Afghanistan, and we have what we're all familiar with. And essentially what Pakistan was doing was exporting its own problematic ruling principles to Afghanistan.

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: And if you let the Saudis do the same thing, you could end up with the same result. And my question is: Shouldn't the United States, perhaps, should be more involved and less left to the countries like Saudi Arabia?

MR KIRBY: I think the United States is very involved here in what we want to see for the future of Syria. We are co-founders of the International Syria Support Group, and the Secretary, you just heard him talk about how deeply engaged we're going to continue in this process going forward and about having – about trying to reach a political solution here.

So first of all, nobody is talking about ceding American leadership here. Number two, I would say that nobody is talking about having Saudi Arabia as sort of a lone, single custodian of the future of Syria. We want the future of Syria to be determined by Syrians. That's why we're working so hard to find a political solution to this civil war, so that the Syrian people can determine what their government looks like at the end of this transitional process.

And an important point that the Secretary made earlier is that the whole reason we're working through these kinds of arrangements now with the Russians isn't just to get a ceasefire for a ceasefire's sake; it is to create the kind of space and the conditions that will allow Staffan de Mistura to bring the sides back to the negotiating table in Geneva and try to get the political process started. We all – nobody wants to see what we've seen the last three iterations where nothing got resolved. And why did nothing get resolved? Because there was still violence and innocent people were still being killed. So this isn't about ceding the leadership or the direction of Syria to any one country, except for Syria itself and the Syrian people.

Okay? Yeah.

QUESTION: Just a few on Syria and also on the Philippines, which I can ask --

MR KIRBY: How many is a few?

QUESTION: -- ask later. Two. Two on Syria.

MR KIRBY: Two. All right, all right.

QUESTION: Two that I came up with --

MR KIRBY: Okay.

QUESTION: -- listening to Secretary Kerry. And later on the Philippines, will you take my Philippines questions as well? I just want to make sure.

MR KIRBY: Fire away.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you very much. So on Syria, how many groups to your knowledge have refused to abide by the ceasefire?

MR KIRBY: I'm not aware – at this point, we're not aware of any groups that have outright refused.

QUESTION: I saw reports that Ahrar al-Sham refused to abide by the ceasefire. Does the U.S. have influence with that group?

MR KIRBY: Yeah, I mean, I've seen those reports as well. But again, I'd go back to what I said before. We're in – two points. We're, as you might expect, in constant contact with the moderate opposition and have been throughout this process, up to the meeting in Geneva and then certainly in the hours and days since then. And again, we're not aware of any single group that has come out rejecting it or in opposition.

Now, that said – and the Secretary talked about this as well – we understand that certain of them have doubts, have concerns. We recognize that. That's why we're in constant contact with them. We also are taking a pretty clear-eyed approach here. I mean, nobody is saying for a moment that this isn't going to be difficult.

QUESTION: You said you were in contact with moderate opposition. Is this specific group considered to be moderate opposition?

MR KIRBY: The – again, I don't have the list of every group here. But Ahrar al-Sham is not designated as a terrorist organization inside Syria, and so therefore it is a group that we have maintained a level of contact with in terms of discussing what this arrangement means going forward. Okay?

QUESTION: Actually, I do have one on Syria. Sorry. Based on what the Secretary just said now, is it – he seemed to say – well, he didn't seem to say, he did say, that if and when you get this weeklong reduction in violence and the JIC takes effect, that the United States and Russia could agree on places where the Assad where Assad's air force could bomb or go after Nusrah. That's what he said – he said, "He is allowed and will be able outside of that area if the JIC gets set up to target Nusrah, but that will be on strikes that are agreed upon with Russia and the United States in order to go after them."

MR KIRBY: Yes.

QUESTION: Are you comfortable with that? I thought the whole idea was to ground the air force completely.

MR KIRBY: No, Matt. The idea was not to --

QUESTION: And that the only people who would be flying combat operations after the JIC got set up would be the U.S. and Russia, except for in the areas where ISIS is.

MR KIRBY: No, actually, that was not the understanding and was not part of the discussions throughout the process. The idea was not to quote/unquote, "ground" Assad's air force everywhere all the time. The objective was to --

QUESTION: Right --

MR KIRBY: -- the objective was to limit their combat operations in such a way that they could not hit opposition targets or civilian targets, but that -- if they were able, willing, intending to target Nusrah, which is outside the cessation of hostilities, that would still be permissible. But the whole person for the JIC is to allow for a measure of compliance and monitoring and pre-coordination of strikes that they would do against Nusrah so that it's not done without visibility of both Russian and U.S. planners[1].

QUESTION: Yeah, but two and a half weeks ago in Geneva, before the meetings in China, the idea – at least I thought it was the idea and maybe I got this wrong but I – it was that, with the except of ISIS, Assad's forces wouldn't be allowed to go after anybody, and that the only people who would go after Nusrah in the safe zone, for lack of a better word, would be the U.S. and Russia. That's clearly wrong, right?

MR KIRBY: I think you were incorrect in surmising that. I think --

QUESTION: Or someone was incorrect in telling us, not just me, that; correct?

MR KIRBY: (Laughter.) I --

QUESTION: Or it changed? I don't know. Maybe --

MR KIRBY: No, I don't – and I don't believe --

QUESTION: Maybe something changed between the --

MR KIRBY: I don't believe there's been any change to that. I mean, the understanding – well, as we worked through this now for many weeks, the understanding was that – that's why we wanted maps of designated areas, areas where we knew Nusrah was predominant, areas where we know the opposition is predominant, and areas where they're marbled and mixed. And inside those three types of areas, Assad would not – that --

QUESTION: Yeah, he wouldn't go after anyone.

MR KIRBY: He wouldn't go after opposition and he wouldn't go after areas where it's mixed, where – because he's not capable of discrete, discriminant targeting. But as the Secretary said, in accordance with the JIC and the work of U.S. and Russian planners, it – we're not ruling out that Assad would be able to strike at Nusrah. Again, Nusrah is a UN-designated foreign terrorist organization. They are not party to the cessation. And so there would – there's really no grounds, and frankly, little purpose, in trying to completely limit and restrict the Assad regime from hitting Nusrah. The idea, though, is that if and when they did, there would be visibility, there would be transparency over that inside the Joint Implementation Center.

QUESTION: Yeah, but you guys already say that he's not actually targeting Nusrah.

MR KIRBY: Well, exactly. I mean --

QUESTION: Well, what happens if the Russians come to you and say, okay, here's a target that we want to hit and the Syrians want to hit it, and you guys say, well, no, it's mixed? Is it a two-to-one vote, or you guys have --

MR KIRBY: Well, that's --

QUESTION: -- you can say no?

MR KIRBY: That was the – but that was the purpose for poring over the maps --

QUESTION: So you can stop it?

MR KIRBY: -- and the technicalities of those areas. Absolutely.

QUESTION: Okay. How exactly do you do that?

MR KIRBY: Well, look, I don't – I'm not going to go through chapter and verse of the way the JIC is going to operate, for one thing because their teams are discussing it, as the Secretary said, right now in Geneva to set up --

QUESTION: Yeah, but basically --

MR KIRBY: -- the kinds of processes and procedures that the JIC would use.

QUESTION: You have no – you have no recourse, though. If they – they could bomb an area that they say is Nusrah and you guys say is marbleized, and there's zero consequence.

MR KIRBY: No, I didn't say that at all, Matt.

QUESTION: No, I know you didn't say that, but that's what the effect is.

MR KIRBY: No, no it's not. It's not. Look, again, I don't want to get too much in the details here on procedure because, again, those procedures are being worked out. But the whole idea of having designated areas and sharing information, targeting information, in those areas – areas where there's marbleized and areas where there's opposition – is to do exactly that, to limit, to restrict, to stop Assad from being able to go after opposition groups where they are.

QUESTION: Yeah, but the whole --

MR KIRBY: And --

QUESTION: My understanding of the entire thing was that you were going to ground Assad's air force in areas that – in these so-called permissive safe – no-fly zones, and that's clearly not what's happened here because they are still going to be allowed to attack in areas that are – that may be opposition-held but with marbleized components.

MR KIRBY: No. No.

QUESTION: They won't?

MR KIRBY: It's not quite that simple. They will be permitted if – again, if there is consensus here inside the JIC that – to hit a designated, a known Nusrah target. There's no prohibition under this arrangement for them to do that, but it will be with the visibility of both the United States and Russia beforehand.

QUESTION: Yeah, but already --

MR KIRBY: But on – but wait a minute now. But on areas where they're mixed and marbleized, where we know there is – we know there is opposition nearby or intermingled with, they won't be allowed to do that. That's the whole reason why we've got these designated areas where we know Nusrah is dominant, where we know the opposition is dominant, and where it's mixed. The whole idea for having a discussion with the Russians about this such as we have to this point and will continue to have if the JIC gets set up is to provide a level of certainty and visibility on where Assad would be able to fly. But there was never a point at which we said – at least I can't remember a time where we said – that they were going to be grounded permanently, forever, and not allowed to fly. It's about flying combat missions against opposition and civilians that we want to restrict.

QUESTION: It was never that they were going to be entirely grounded.

MR KIRBY: Right.

QUESTION: It was, though, after the Geneva meeting three weeks ago, unless I was misinformed – and that's possible – that they would not – they would only be allowed to fly combat missions against ISIS, and that areas where – and areas that are out – and against Nusrah and ISIS outside of these safe zones. But inside the safe zone, the understanding was that they wouldn't be able to fly at all, that the only people who would be able to strike at Nusrah targets in the safe zone would be the U.S. and Russia.

MR KIRBY: You keep talking about safe zones, and maybe that's where we're getting hung up. I don't know what you mean by "safe zone."

QUESTION: The area where – that's held by the opposition, which you say --

MR KIRBY: Or it's marbled.

QUESTION: -- includes marbleized. Right.

MR KIRBY: Which would – yes, they would not – that's right. That is correct. They would not be able to strike in areas where we know the opposition is dominant, or opposition-controlled, or where there is marbling, the intermingling, the mixing, because they're not capable of being discrete and discriminant about that.

QUESTION: Well, then that's different than what – than what you said before. Because what the Secretary seemed to say was that inside the safe zone – are we – is that the right term?

MR KIRBY: No, it's not.

QUESTION: What – okay, what's the right term then?

MR KIRBY: Those are predesignated areas.

QUESTION: The predesignated areas, okay. Inside the predesignated areas, is the Syrian air force allowed to target what – Nusrah?

MR KIRBY: In those areas that we know are Nusrah-dominant and where there is no opposition present, then yes, but it will be – but it will be on a case-by-case basis.

QUESTION: But then they're not in the predesignated area, those people are not – then that --

MR KIRBY: There are three types of predesignated areas.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR KIRBY: The whole reason that we've had this --

QUESTION: Opposition, marbleized, and Nusrah.

MR KIRBY: And Nusrah. In the areas where we know Nusrah is dominant since Nusrah is a foreign terrorist organization, since they're not party to the cessation of hostilities --

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, okay.

MR KIRBY: Okay. They'll be able to – they'll be able to target Nusrah. But it won't be without --

QUESTION: But it --

MR KIRBY: It won't be – it won't be unilaterally without the – without the visibility of the joint implementation cell.

QUESTION: But you're – you have visibility now, or at least you say you do, because you – because you claim that they're not – that they're hitting the opposition, the moderate opposition, when they claim they're hitting Nusrah.

MR KIRBY: Exactly. We --

QUESTION: That visibility exists now. I just don't under – I'm not sure that I understand what the point of this whole thing is. I mean, they can't --

MR KIRBY: Because – because we can --

QUESTION: They can still fly --

MR KIRBY: That's exactly --

QUESTION: -- and attack and areas where – that are in dispute --

MR KIRBY: But the reason --

QUESTION: -- and there's – without any punishment.

MR KIRBY: But right now, Matt, they're doing it – they're claiming they're going after Nusrah and they're really not. Okay? By and large – and you know this – the bulk of their military activity, whether it's on the ground or in the air, has been against opposition and it's been against civilians. And on the rare occasion when they have hit a Nusrah target, because they have been coming under attack by Nusrah so I'm not saying they're not doing – they're not hitting them at all. But on the occasions when they have, they've been doing it unilaterally or with sometimes the support of the Russian military, and there's been no – certainly no visibility on our side in terms of how they're doing it, when they're doing it, or how accurately they're doing it.

So what the JIC will allow us to do – again, if it gets set up, and I'm not saying it will. There's two purposes here, and I think one is the coordination and sharing of information, but the second thing is compliance and enforcement of the cessation of hostilities. So once, if we get a JIC, it will give us, certainly the United States, much more visibility than we have right now into where those Nusrah targets are and what Assad is going to be allowed to do to target them.

QUESTION: How does it give you guys more visibility into what Nusrah targets are?

MR KIRBY: Because we'll be – because the Russians have influence over the regime, and the Russians will be able to share information with us inside the JIC.

QUESTION: But you know where they are already, don't you? Or at least you say you do.

MR KIRBY: Which is why we had – which is why we had a discussion about designated areas.

QUESTION: All right. Well, if and when we get to next Monday and the JIC gets set up, I guess we can revisit this when – because I --

MR KIRBY: I would be happy --

QUESTION: Now I'm completely confused. I have no idea what – but anyway.

QUESTION: Just a quick – sorry.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

QUESTION: By visibility, do you mean that you are going to know in advance where the Syrian Government is going to hit?

MR KIRBY: The idea is --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR KIRBY: The idea is to coordinate information, the U.S. and the Russians to coordinate information on targeting, in advance of operations. And while we don't have, obviously, any communication directly with Assad's military, nor do we intend to, we know that the Russians have influence over what they – what they do, considerable influence. And I would point you back to what the Secretary said, that the Russians have assured us that Assad will abide by this arrangement. And we'll see.

QUESTION: And so my last one then. Until – until next Monday, the regime, Assad's air force, can continue to do what it's been doing, right?

MR KIRBY: No. No, not at all.

QUESTION: But the penalty is only that the JIC doesn't get set up if they don't, right?

MR KIRBY: If we don't see a mutually satisfactory level of reduced violence – and there's some discretion in there as the Secretary said – then the joint implementation cell doesn't get stood up and the arrangement doesn't get completed.

QUESTION: And that is a consequence for the regime how?

MR KIRBY: Because the civil war --

QUESTION: They want to continue to --

MR KIRBY: The civil war will continue.

QUESTION: -- go after what they say are terrorists.

MR KIRBY: And as the Secretary said, it's hard to see that that's in anybody's interest.

QUESTION: All right. Okay.

MR KIRBY: Nike.

QUESTION: Can we change the subject?

MR KIRBY: I'm sorry?

QUESTION: Can we change the subject? Are we still --

QUESTION: No, I have some questions. No.

MR KIRBY: Okay, all right.

QUESTION: I've got a question about this issue of the Assad regime's air force or airstrikes and if – first of all, what are the consequences if he does hit some of these marbleized areas and says that he's going after Nusrah? I mean, what's the --

MR KIRBY: Well, the idea – the idea of having the Joint Implementation Center is so that that can't happen.

QUESTION: No, I understand that the idea is to prevent that from happening. But what if it does?

MR KIRBY: Well, then, as we said and is written right in the arrangement that at any time either side here can render the arrangement null and void, and it will be over. And if – and I don't want to get into hypotheticals here. I appreciate the desire to run through all the hypothetical situations. I don't think it's wise here at this very early stage to engage in that.

QUESTION: I mean --

MR KIRBY: Hang on a second.

QUESTION: Will the planes be shot down or prevented from --

MR KIRBY: I'm not going to engage in military --

QUESTION: It seems that (inaudible) provision. What is the provision?

MR KIRBY: I'm not going to engage in military hypotheticals. What I can tell you is that there is a provision in here where either side, the U.S. or Russia, can pull out of this arrangement if we're not seeing it genuinely complied with by the other side and by the parties that each side influences. So we'll see. We'll see where it goes. But I'm not going to engage in hypotheticals about what if or what if that.

I mean, the joint implementation cell has something for both. For the Russians it would, if implemented, give them a measure of coordination with the U.S. military that they don't have right now and that they have expressed an interest in. For us, it gives us a real shot at keeping Assad from barrel bombing and gassing his own people as well as the opposition; and more critically, if a cessation of hostilities can be maintained and reduced violence can be established and sustained, and humanitarian access, get the opposition back to the table with the regime in Geneva under the UN – under UN auspices and get a political process started. That's the real goal here.

QUESTION: Okay. So I also have a question about this issue of the opposition separating from al-Nusrah, because now you're saying that these marbleized areas, I guess that they can remain marbleized because they don't have to physically separate. But on Friday, Secretary Kerry said that if groups within the legitimate opposition want to retain their legitimacy, they need to distance themselves in a very – in every way possible from Nusrah and Daesh

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: And the people in the opposition are saying that in his statements on Friday, he talked about the opposition's legitimacy but never talked about Assad's legitimacy or Assad losing – having lost legitimacy, and …

MR KIRBY: We have made – we have been nothing but clear about Assad's illegitimacy to --

QUESTION: But they're pointing – they're thinking that this looks like a shift in a policy, and that now the U.S. is working with allowing Assad – expecting him to participate in this transition deal, and it looks like a policy shift. So is it?

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: But the problem is, is that if you have this situation where you and the Russians are going to okay – potentially okay Syrian air force strikes, then you're cooperating with a guy who five years ago – a little over five years ago the President of the United States said no longer had legitimacy to lead. How is that not a shift?

MR KIRBY: We're cooperating with Russia, which has influence over the Assad regime.

QUESTION: Yeah, but --

MR KIRBY: It's not that the United States is dictating the Assad air force's air traffic schedule. Okay? We're --

QUESTION: No, no, you're not dictating it, but you're allowing them – you're saying it's okay for them to launch military operations.

MR KIRBY: But Matt, it's always been okay under the cessation of hostilities that was agreed back in February to target Nusrah. Nobody ever said at any time, that I can recall, that it wasn't okay for air combat forces, be they Russian or be they Assad's, to target – solely target a group like al-Nusrah.

QUESTION: Yeah, but you put yourself in a position now where you're giving Assad the green light to launch military operations.

MR KIRBY: He's already had the green light to go after al-Nusrah.

QUESTION: So you guys have been cooperating with Assad --

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: -- for years --

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: -- while saying that he has lost legitimacy?

MR KIRBY: No. There's been no cooperation with Assad and there's not going to be cooperation with Assad. There's going to be cooperation and coordination with the Russian military, which has influence over Assad.

QUESTION: Right. And there are not – so there's no link at all. You've separated yourself at one degree --

MR KIRBY: I think I've responded.

QUESTION: I don't think I've heard a response to the part of my question about the marbleization and whether that was --

MR KIRBY: Yeah, actually, I wanted to come back to you on that. I think the Secretary – he said it again today, and there's – we're – we understand that there are places where the opposition are in proximity to Nusrah, and our message to the opposition hasn't changed at all. Obviously, we're going to continue to support them in their efforts, but we have been very clear about our concerns about physically co-locating themselves in or near Nusrah locations because Nusrah's not a party to the cessation, and obviously we don't want to see harm befall the moderate opposition. And as the Secretary said himself just a few minutes ago, we urge them to think carefully about where they are going to be geographically as – just as much as we urge them to comply by all the particulars of this arrangement.

QUESTION: So to the opposition, that sounds like they need to cede territory to the regime and to the operations against Nusrah.

MR KIRBY: No, it's not about ceding territory to the regime. It's about – again, if everybody abides by this --

QUESTION: But --

MR KIRBY: Hang on, just please let me answer one of your questions before you jump in. Okay? If everybody abides by the cessation of hostilities, there's not going to be any ceding or grabbing of additional territory. What we want to see over seven continuous days is a reduction in violence that does not include territorial grabs or the need for ceding territory. That's not what this is about. It's about getting a level of reduced violence that can lead to the standup – the establishment of the joint implementation cell.

QUESTION: So if you have a group that's marbled with Nusrah and you're saying basically that they need to either push Nusrah out or back away from that space where they're marbled because that area will become a target, then if they have to pull back, then they're ceding – they're backing up, they're retreating. Right?

MR KIRBY: If you're asking are we in support of them removing themselves geographically from where we know Nusrah is, absolutely, and we've been saying that for months now. There's nothing here. But if everybody's abiding by the cessation of hostilities, that shouldn't be a problem.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: So this is kind of hypothetical, but let's say that the cessation gets upheld and that the JIC is established. I'm curious about the manner of military cooperation between the U.S. and Russia that's being proposed. As – I mean, as you certainly know, and as you've condemned, the Russians have done some bad things, even in Nursah-controlled territory – I mean, hospital bombings, right?

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: So what procedures are in place to make sure they don't do that? Does the U.S. have a say in their targeting decisions?

MR KIRBY: Well, the whole – so a couple of things. Again, as the Secretary said, our teams are now beginning to have discussions about the modalities of how the joint implementation cell will operate, and I'm not going to get ahead of those discussions, and it really is more for the Defense Department to speak to than for us here at the State Department. So they're working our way through exactly how information – the physical nature with which – how the information is going to be shared and how it's going to be coordinated, and I just couldn't begin to speculate about what that looks like. The idea, though, is for two things: One, a level of information sharing and targeting information coordination so that we can be sure that military activities are designed to go against the two groups that the cessation of hostilities has always held outside the cessation, and that's Daesh and Nusrah, period.

Number two, to also help supplement current ongoing efforts out of Geneva on compliance and enforcement of this arrangement going forward. And as I said, and as the Secretary made clear, and it's written in the arrangement, that if at any time either side, the United States or Russia, believes that it's no longer a sustainable arrangement, it's no longer a sustainable arrangement, and it will cease to exist.

QUESTION: And one quick follow-up. You said that the map that outlines which zones are marbleized, which zones are Nusrah and so on was ironed out – the details – in negotiations. What are the plans for when that gets updated? How does that get updated when --

MR KIRBY: Well, the idea – again, the idea is no one gets a fluid battlefield; that if there's a joint implementation cell, there will be enough sharing of information in real time so that it's updated in real time. Okay?

More on this? Are we done with this? Go ahead.

QUESTION: The Philippines. The president of the Philippines has called on the U.S. to withdraw its Special Forces from southern Philippines, saying he fears they will be targeted by Islamist militants. What's the U.S. response?

MR KIRBY: I've seen the comments. I've seen them in press reporting, and what I can tell you is that we're not aware of any official communication by the Philippine Government to that effect and to seek that result. So we're going to stay in touch with our counterparts in the Philippine Government. More critically, we're going to remain committed to our alliance commitments in the Philippines and to that country. We have a long, productive history with the Philippines. I understand that it's not a history without its past troubles, but we're committed to our alliance with the Philippines, and we look forward to working our way through that.

QUESTION: Do I understand it correctly: You are not going to respond to this specifically until they make an official request?

MR KIRBY: Well, I don't think it's wise to try to make defense relationship decisions based on press reporting of comments.

QUESTION: Well, it's a direct quote; it's not just press reporting. He said it.

MR KIRBY: No, I know that, but what I said is I'm not – we're not aware of any official request by the Philippine Government for this, and so it would be premature for me to react one way or another to it.

QUESTION: Just a few more. Do you share Duterte's concern about the safety of U.S. troops in the Philippines?

MR KIRBY: We maintain concerns about the safety of our troops all around the world. It's one of the prime considerations of American military leadership.

QUESTION: Would it be correct to say that as you share Duterte's concern about the safety of troops, you think it is not good enough of a reason to withdraw troops from the Philippines?

MR KIRBY: Well, again, I don't want to get ahead of decisions that, as far as we know, haven't actually been made or certainly communicated to the United States Government. Secondly, this is really more of a matter for the Defense Department if and when such a decision would be transmitted by the Philippine Government, but as far as we know, there hasn't been. So it really would be premature to get ahead of that.

QUESTION: Just one last one. In the context of offensive remarks made by Duterte, how is the communication between the two countries. Have they affected communication?

MR KIRBY: I'm not aware that there's a specific impact on communication. I mean, we have an ambassador there and he stays in touch daily with his Philippine counterparts and with government officials. As far as I know, that communication continues unabated. I think we've already talked about, from the podium, some of the unhelpful comments that were made by the president. We've been honest about that and forthright as friends and allies should do. But again, this is a – we still believe in the importance of this bilateral relationship. We still believe in the commitments we have from a security perspective under that alliance and we're going to continue to meet those.

QUESTION: Have they affected relations at all?

MR KIRBY: I'm not aware that there's been a tangible, practical effect on relations. I think, as I said, we haven't been happy about everything we've heard and we haven't been afraid to talk about that and to be frank about it.

Yeah.

QUESTION: There's --

QUESTION: Could you update us on --

MR KIRBY: I'll come back to you in a second.

QUESTION: Could you update us on Brett McGurk's travels? Yesterday, he tweeted a photo of the sun setting in Syria. Was he recently in Syria? And last night, he tweeted that he was flying overseas. Where is he going?

MR KIRBY: That's a question we ask ourselves every day: where is Brett today? I actually don't have an update for his – on his schedule, so we'll see if we can get his staff to give us something we can provide to you. I just don't have the details on exactly where he is right now.

Nike.

QUESTION: Yeah, on China and Russia, do you have anything on the joint maneuver between Moscow and Beijing starting this week near South China Sea?

MR KIRBY: Well, we're aware of the exercises that they're conducting bilaterally. It's not unusual for nation-states to exercise their militaries or to do so in a bilateral fashion. We do it all the time. The only thing that we're mindful of is that, as exercises like this take place, they take place in accordance with international law and don't do anything to raise tensions. But really, these exercises are for the Russians and for the Chinese to speak to.

QUESTION: In your estimation, is – do you see this as an aim to counter U.S. efforts when Washington is pursuing the so-called Asia Pivot Policy?

MR KIRBY: Well, again, I think the goal of the exercise is – I would – I'd have to refer you to the Chinese and the Russians to speak to what they're trying to get out of this. Are we – do we view it as a threat? No. Again, military's exercise, they exercise sometimes together; as long as it's done in accordance with international law and isn't threatening or being provocative to another third party or nation-state, then there's nothing that precludes them from doing that.

We will and have been and will remain committed to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, which, oh, by the way, Nike, isn't just about the military. It's not just about physical security in the Asia-Pacific. I mean, it's about economic development and it's about sustainable development goals. It's about diplomatic and political engagement. I mean, there's more to the Asia-Pacific rebalance than just moving most of the navy over there and being mindful of our security commitments, which are significant. Five of our seven treaty alliances are in the Asia-Pacific region – we take that seriously – including the one with the Philippines.

QUESTION: Hold on.

QUESTION: If I may --

QUESTION: Just – still on that?

QUESTION: Slightly different subject.

QUESTION: Can I just ask – I wanted to follow up on what you just said about how joint exercises are fine as long as they follow international law, and are not provocative to a third party. Is that right?

MR KIRBY: I think that's what I said.

QUESTION: So when the North Koreans complain about U.S.-South Korean exercises being provocative, they're – that complaint doesn't count?

MR KIRBY: No, it doesn't, because they're wrong. Their exercises are not provocative.

QUESTION: (Laughter.) So you decide whether or not --

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: -- someone else's complaints about provocation is valid or not?

MR KIRBY: Those exercises – you know darn well, Matt, those exercises --

QUESTION: Well, I just – I think you should be consistent. I mean, if any --

MR KIRBY: Well, there – we would – and it wouldn't have to be – there wouldn't – come on, now, there wouldn't have to be a regular exercising of military capabilities with our allies in the Republic of Korea if the North wasn't conducting nuclear tests and launching ballistic missiles, and continuing to destabilize not only the peninsula, but the region.

QUESTION: Yeah, but --

MR KIRBY: But they are defensive – they are by nature defensive exercises --

QUESTION: Yeah, but --

MR KIRBY: -- because unfortunately, that's what we need to focus on there.

QUESTION: Fair enough, I understand that, but, I mean, so it doesn't – it's not any third party? It's basically any third party, but North Korea, can claim provocation?

MR KIRBY: I don't think that – I almost can't even believe you are potentially defending North Korea.

QUESTION: I am not defending anything. I'm just saying the North Koreans consistently say that this is provocative and they – and over and over again. And you just said --

MR KIRBY: And they are consistent --

QUESTION: -- in terms of Russia and China not --

MR KIRBY: And they're consistently wrong when they say that.

QUESTION: Okay. All right.

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: If I may, can I --

QUESTION: Can we go to Syria?

MR KIRBY: Sure.

QUESTION: Right. Do you have anything on the reported arms sale to Taiwan? Do you have anything to confirm the veracity of the so-called HARM, which is a high-speed anti-radiation missile?

MR KIRBY: I know what it is. As you know, Nike, we don't talk about proposed arms sales one way or the other, so I'm not in a position to confirm that one way or the other.

Yeah.

QUESTION: North Korea?

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Secretary Lew said this morning at a Council on Foreign Relations event that, "We are going to do everything we can to try and keep the pressure on North Korea." Specifically, he was talking about increasing the effectiveness of sanctions. So my question is: What unilateral sanctions are the U.S. considering against North Korea?

MR KIRBY: I don't have any specific unilateral sanctions to speak to. As you know, we've raised this inside the UN and we support the UN exploring additional sanctions. But I won't get ahead of any U.S. unilateral decisions that I'm not aware have been made yet. But we are obviously deeply troubled by this most recent test, and we are going to continue to look and evaluate what options are available to us to increase the pressure on the North.

QUESTION: Are you looking at options just through the UN or are you also looking at unilateral options?

MR KIRBY: I simply am not going to speculate one way or the other. I'm not going to get ahead of decisions that we haven't made as a government, except to say that we have confirmed that we are going to work inside the UN to consider the pursuit of additional UN sanctions, and we'll see where it goes. Okay?

Yeah.

QUESTION: So the South Korean defense ministry said that the North could be ready for another test at any time. What is going to be the U.S.'s response if that gap becomes shorter and shorter between tests?

MR KIRBY: Well, look, I think you can understand I'm not, first of all, going to get into discussing intelligence matters here. I've seen those reports, and we're monitoring the situation as best we can, as closely as we can. We continue to urge the North to stop these provocative actions and to do what's right for their people, which is to feed them, to educate them, rather than to spend the resources that they're spending on these kinds of capabilities. But I wouldn't begin to speculate about what might or might not happen in lieu of – or sorry, in the wake of any future provocative actions that they might take. It's just not prudent for me to get ahead like that.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Where does the U.S. stand on Balochistan? Because the Indian prime minister has raised this subject. It is a part of Pakistan, but about human rights there, and about the fight for freedom from there? And this is – has been in the media and everywhere. So what is the U.S. stand on that?

MR KIRBY: The government – U.S. Government respects the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan and we do not support independence for Balochistan.

QUESTION: And there are people and persons, groups, here who are working towards it. Do you support – do you tolerate them from the U.S. soil?

MR KIRBY: Support for?

QUESTION: Baloch independence.

MR KIRBY: As I said, the government policy is that we support the territorial integrity of Pakistan and we do not support independence for Balochistan.

QUESTION: So do you have any reaction to the Indian prime minister's statements on that particular subject?

MR KIRBY: I just – I think I just gave you our reaction to events there.

Okay. Thanks, everybody.

QUESTION: Wait, I got two very – they're very brief.

MR KIRBY: Almost out. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: But one of them does have to do with Syria and it goes back – this is – and this is JIC, it's a JIC question. You say that you can – if you and the Russians agree, then the Syrian air force can strike Nusrah targets, right? What about Hizballah and Iranian forces?

MR KIRBY: Well, so a couple of thoughts there. The Secretary has been in communication with Foreign Minister Zarif and the Iranians have come out and said that obviously they're in favor of arrangements that would lead to a political solution – I think is a rough gist of how they put it, which – and they have, as you well know, considerable influence over Hizballah and that group. They are – but purely, frankly speaking, they're not – they are not – they are – they are not outside the cessation of hostilities, as is Daesh or al-Nusrah, because the cessation of hostilities holds only to those groups that are designated as FTO outside of it. So our expectation is --

QUESTION: Well, wait a second – by the UN, because Hizballah is designated by the UN.

MR KIRBY: The UN – yeah, by the UN. But the agreement under the ISSG is UN-designated FTOs.

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah, right, okay. No, I understand that, but what I'm asking --

MR KIRBY: Yeah. But – I know what you're asking.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR KIRBY: Hang on. But our expectation is that Iran will use its influence over Hizballah in a way that is support – that is compliant with the cessation of hostilities and more specifically with the arrangement that we've reached.

QUESTION: Yeah, but what if Hizballah wants to go after what it says is Nusrah? Is the JIC going to be able – going to say --

MR KIRBY: I don't believe that that's --

QUESTION: -- "Okay, Hizballah, you can go ahead and -- "

MR KIRBY: Again, I don't want to get in – the JIC is – the modalities are still being established. I don't want to get ahead of that. I'm not aware that that --

QUESTION: Yeah, but you could be --

MR KIRBY: -- is going to be something that they're going to coordinate.

QUESTION: Yeah, but the – okay, but the – it goes to the point of whether the JIC is going to – first of all, you're saying that the JIC could greenlight air force operations by Syria, a country that is a designated state sponsor of terrorism, against another group that you say is a terrorist.

MR KIRBY: Through Russian influence on the Assad regime.

QUESTION: Yeah, exactly. So this goes to whether or not the JIC could also greenlight a military operation by Hizballah, which is a U.S. FTO, against Nusrah.

MR KIRBY: We're expecting Iran to use their influence on Hizballah to comply.

QUESTION: All right. Last thing – and this is a Mideast-Israel question – Israel-Palestine question. So on – your colleague last week, Elizabeth, was not too pleased with the video that Prime Minister Netanyahu released about ethnic cleansing and saying that the Palestinians wanted a – wanted to ethnically cleanse what would be their future state. Since that has happened, President Abbas has come out and accused Israel of ethnic cleansing, and I'm just wondering if you have any reaction to that, if you think this is kind of – is this just name-calling back and forth or do you have serious concerns about the rhetoric and what it means?

MR KIRBY: I think we would likewise say we don't find that sort of rhetoric appropriate or helpful, and what we would say – what we have said: We want both sides to refrain from provocative rhetoric and actions that are just taking us farther away from a two-state solution. So, yes, we've seen those comments and find them inappropriate and unhelpful as well.

QUESTION: So you do not believe that Israel is ethnically cleansing?

MR KIRBY: Absolutely not.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR KIRBY: Okay. Thanks, everybody.

(The briefing was concluded at 3:24 p.m.)

DPB # 158

[1] The following information is attributable to Spokesperson John Kirby:

"We have seen reports, based on the Secretary's comments -- and those of the spokesperson -- this afternoon, that the US and Russia could approve of strikes by the Syrian regime. This is incorrect. To clarify: the arrangement announced last week makes no provision whatsoever for the U.S. and Russia to approve strikes by the Syrian regime, and this is not something we could ever envision doing. A primary purpose of this agreement, from our perspective, is to prevent the Syrian regime air force from flying or striking in any areas in which the opposition or Nusra are present. The purpose of the JIC, if and when it is established, would be to coordinate military action between the US and Russia, not for any other party."