Daily Press Briefing
John Kirby
Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
July 8, 2016
Index for Today's Briefing
SECRETARY KERRY TRAVEL
DEPARTMENT
CHINA/PHILIPPINES
IRAN
INDIA
BANGLADESH
CHINA/PHILIPPINES
CHINA/SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA
MIDDLE EAST PEACE
RUSSIA
RUSSIA/SYRIA
CHINA/SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA
CHINA
TRANSCRIPT:
2:06 p.m. EDT
MR KIRBY: Good afternoon.
QUESTION: Good afternoon.
MR KIRBY: Happy Friday to everybody. Just a real quick travel update for you. As you know, the Secretary is in Warsaw today participating in the NATO summit. He's there, obviously, with President Obama at what the President himself has called the most important moment for our transatlantic alliance since the end of the Cold War. Today the Secretary met with UK Foreign Minister Hammond to discuss Brexit, the President's leaders summit on refugees in September, and our ongoing coordination related to the Middle East and Ukraine. He also met with Polish Foreign Minister Waszczykowski and discussed the strengthened U.S. presence in NATO's east, transatlantic ties, Russia, support to Ukraine, and the situation in Syria. He also met with the presidents of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to reiterate the need for the sides to uphold the commitments reached at the Vienna and St. Petersburg meetings, and to reaffirm the United States support for substantive talks leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In addition, the Secretary participated in the President's meetings, obviously, with the EU leaders, NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, and Polish President Duda. The Secretary will depart Warsaw later tonight and return to Washington.
With that, Brad.
QUESTION: Just following up on the internal review that you've reopened. Can you say anything more about what exactly the review is focusing on particularly?
MR KIRBY: Well, it's going to focus on what we said it would focus on at the time when we first talked about it, and that was the degree to which email traffic was properly handled, sensitive – the degree to which email traffic was classified or sensitive at the time it was transmitted, the degree to which it was properly treated as such at the time it was transmitted. And that's what we said back when – in January, when we had originally intended to start.
QUESTION: And I know you call it a review, this review has – as you said this week, it has the ability to determine possible infractions at the end of the day, whenever it completes.
MR KIRBY: It's a review into these issues. As a result of information that the review uncovers, there could be outcomes, but the review is to actually determine the degree to which information was handled appropriately, not to determine specific outcomes. There are outcomes that could come from what we learn from the review.
QUESTION: I won't ask about any of the officials who worked under Secretary Clinton per se, but about the secretary herself, there are some calls from the Hill about stripping her security clearance. Is that – as a former official, albeit the top official in the department, is that something that is even possible as the end of this review?
MR KIRBY: Well, again, without speaking to any individual or to – and certainly not to get ahead of this review, which is now just beginning, obviously, as I said before, the process can result in a variety of employment and/or security clearance outcomes from both current and former employees.
QUESTION: So when you say former employees, that – does that include the former Secretary of State, or is she not actually a former employee since she was essentially the employer?
MR KIRBY: I'm not going to speculate any more. Again, the process could result in a variety of employment and/or security clearance outcomes for current and former employees.
QUESTION: And then lastly, since you did have two months, I think, before you suspended the review, can you give us an idea of how much work or how far along you got at that time when you suspended it?
MR KIRBY: To be quite honest with you, Brad, we didn't get that far along, actually. And I wouldn't even say that it was suspended, because shortly after making the decision that we needed to proceed with a review, we got into consultation with the FBI, and as a result of that consultation, at their request, felt it was prudent to not move forward. So there wasn't really any traction had at the outset. So now we're going to – we're going to go ahead and start.
QUESTION: I had one more I remembered. Now that the FBI probe, Department of Justice has made its – is over and the Department of Justice has made its decision and the IG is done here, do you expect the former secretary and any officials who come under your radar as part of this review to participate with this internal review, or are you not going to be asking them?
MR KIRBY: I'll tell you we're still working through the logistics and the mechanics, and I'm just not in a position to go into any detail today in terms of actual mechanical process here. I just don't have that level of information today.
QUESTION: That's – just one thing, to be clear – the review. The statement that you guys had under your name yesterday said that you intended to resume the review. Have you actually begun that yet, or not really?
MR KIRBY: Well, I mean, this decision just got made. So have they as of today, 2 o'clock, rolled up their sleeves and working through documents? No. As I said to Brad, we're still working through the logistics and the organization of this effort. And to the degree that I'm in a position in the coming days to give you better insight into that process, I'll do that. But our focus – since this decision literally just got made yesterday, the focus today is on setting it up and establishing it and trying to determine the proper parameters.
QUESTION: And who will conduct the review?
MR KIRBY: These are typically conducted – in this case will be conducted by our Diplomatic Security directorate.
QUESTION: Okay. And does the director general's office have any role in such a review, either as part of the investigatory part of it or as part of the implementation of any – should there be any – employment or other consequences?
MR KIRBY: Again, I don't have additional details on the organization and the structure. That's the kind of stuff that we're working through right now.
QUESTION: And does – last thing – who ultimately is the arbiter of the outcome or any consequences, if there are any? Is it the Secretary of State who makes that determination? Is it a panel that makes that determination? Who is the ultimate arbiter of whether or not there should be a consequence for whatever is found as a result of this?
MR KIRBY: Again, as I understand it, each of these sorts of internal reviews are tailored to the circumstances. And that's what we're working through right now, is the parameters and the organization and that kind of thing. I just – we don't have – I don't have enough information to answer that question today.
QUESTION: Could you take that one? Because it would be useful to know who – where the buck ultimately stops in terms of making a determination on what consequences, if any, there would be.
MR KIRBY: I will see what we can do, but I can't assure you that I'll know that certainly any time soon. Again, each one of these sorts – there's a range of guidelines and procedural guidelines that help guide us on the way, but we – as we typically do in internal reviews, you want to tailor it to the circumstances. And so not every one is cookie-cutter, not every one is approached the same way, and I suspect that the outcomes of each are sort of – are reviewed and decided upon at different levels depending on the scope. So we're working our way through all that. As I said, to the degree that I can give you better insight on organization, process, parameters, I'll do that. But I am loath to promise anything specific here today as we just work our way through it.
QUESTION: I think it's an – one of the judgments that the FBI director made was that it was in his view important that he come out and talk publicly to a far greater degree than is normally done about what he found so that there would be transparency. And it seems to me that it would be – I understand that internal reviews and internal personnel matters often are kept secret or are not widely discussed, but it does seem like it would be reasonable for the public to know who ultimately would make a decision – if there is ultimately a decision – on consequences.
MR KIRBY: It's a fair question. I think to some degree that could depend on what's learned.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR KIRBY: So that may not even be something that I'll be able to discuss with any specificity until the process is over. We just have to work our way through this.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Change of subject?
MR KIRBY: Sure.
QUESTION: No, no, we stay on this.
MR KIRBY: You want to stay on this topic?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MR KIRBY: Okay.
QUESTION: The FBI director, he gave three points. One was he called the people involved extremely careless. He said something about your department which you have said that you don't agree, and then he had a conclusion. His conclusion has been accepted by the Justice Department. In this review, are you going to take into consideration what his assessment was – like, extremely careless and all – because you had kept your review on hold – as you said it's not suspended – because of the FBI investigation? Now, will – this investigation will be taken into consideration? What are their internal findings? Will it be taken into consideration, or no, you will not just even look at that?
MR KIRBY: Again, Tejinder, that's – those are the sorts of issues that we're working through right now. I just don't have any more specific information about the parameters here of this review to talk about today. And as I said earlier, to the degree that I'm in a position to describe with better detail in the coming days, we'll do that. But I'm not going to promise a set of specific details that I'm going to be able to provide one way or another.
Arshad, I think, spoke to it well when he said that these reviews are largely administrative in scope – in fact, not largely, they are. And there are real limits and legal considerations that we have to consider in terms of providing detail. I can tell you that we will be as transparent as possible, but there will be limits and restraints on us in terms of transparency because of the nature of this as opposed to a full-on FBI investigation, which this is not.
QUESTION: But during his testimony on the Hill, the FBI director said that in case this was a person in the FBI, there will be serious consequences. So that's what I'm trying to see – that internal review means it will be an internal review and it will be all hush-hush – we won't know anything – or will there be consequences?
MR KIRBY: I'm not going to – your – those questions are absolutely two different things. I'm not going to prejudge outcomes when we're still putting the effort together. Number two – again, as I said, we'll be as transparent as possible about the process and about the outcomes, but we have to comply with various legal obligations. So I'm not going to be able to make commitments today one way or the other about what we're going to be able to disclose. Sorry.
QUESTION: Thanks.
MR KIRBY: Yeah.
QUESTION: On South China Sea.
QUESTION: Sorry, just one more on this. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, it's something called DS/IS/APD that is the final – that, quote, "performs the final adjudication of all security incident investigations including administrative, i.e. non-criminal investigations," closed quote. Can you check if that is who actually has the final call?
MR KIRBY: I think I'm going to leave my answer the way it was. We're still establishing the parameters. Not every one of these is done in a cookie-cutter approach. And I'm just – I'm certainly not at liberty today to be able to describe to you how things will be adjudicated at the end of this. And when – if and when I have the ability to be – to provide more detail, I will, but I'm just not able to do that right now.
QUESTION: Okay. No, no, I get that. I'm not asking how it would be adjudicated – meaning what the outcome is going to be – but one, in terms of fairness – right? – people in similar circumstances should be treated the same way. So normally one would imagine that there would be a process that prescribes a set series of steps, appeals, judgments, and where the buck stops. If you guys don't have those processes, and I'd be very surprised that you – if you don't, that would be very odd. So I – I'm going to keep asking you this question because I think it is worth knowing who ultimately makes the call on this. Is it a political official? Is it a panel of officials? Is it officials who include other agencies whose equities may have been involved in the disclosure of – in the transmission of classified information on an unsecure private network? I mean, I think it's a fair question to ask when you have that information.
MR KIRBY: I didn't dispute that it's a fair question to ask, Arshad. I can assure you that this will be done in the most professional and independent manner possible. And there are a range of procedural guidelines that we have to pull from here as we work through this process, but we will do it in strict accordance with those guidelines and we will do it fairly and we will do it efficiently. And to the degree that I can be transparent about process, and to the degree that I can be transparent about outcomes, we will. But there are going to be restrains on that, I'm afraid.
Yeah.
QUESTION: On South China Sea, next week the International Court of Arbitration will come out with a judgment on South China Sea. China has taken a position of non-acceptance and non-participation. Do you think this position of China will impact the regional situation after the verdict is out?
MR KIRBY: Well, look, I'm not going to get ahead of a tribunal decision. We've said all along that we support the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea, including the use of international legal mechanisms such as arbitration. And as provided in the Law of the Sea Convention, the tribunal's decision in this case will be legally binding on both parties, the Philippines and China. It's our expectation that both parties will comply with their obligations and exercise restraint.
QUESTION: But China has already said it's not going to accept this order. By doing so, do you think that China is – this is a case of China defying international order?
MR KIRBY: I've stated what our policy is and what our expectations are.
QUESTION: Yesterday at the congressional hearing, one of the State Department officials accused China of double standards – China trying to accept international order where it suits its needs and – or in this case saying it's not accepting this. Why do you think, sir, China, has taken such a move?
MR KIRBY: You'd have to ask officials in Beijing what their motivations are for whatever statements they're making. I've made clear what our expectations are. We've made clear to Chinese leaders what our expectations are. But let's not get ahead of a decision that hasn't been rendered yet.
QUESTION: I have a specific one on Iran. German intelligence has this report that's saying that Iran tried to acquire technology that could be used for a military nuclear program even after it signed the nuclear deal. The incidence report is from the German Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution or some such. And in addition, the UN is also kind of raising questions about that Iran's nuclear activity might not be consistent with the deal. You also have the Institute for Science and International Security issuing a report yesterday Iran's Atomic Energy Organization is trying to acquire carbon fiber. So kind of taken together, it might suggest that Iran is not living up to its nuclear commitments.
MR KIRBY: We have no information to indicate that Iran has procured any materials in violation of the JCPOA. More generally, the IAEA has reported that Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the deal. We understand that Germany shares this view and is not suggesting that Iran has violated its JCPOA commitments.
As for the --
QUESTION: Well, it seems like it says that it is. I mean, it's saying that Iran sought to acquire technology that could be used for a military nuclear program even after it signed the agreement. So how is that not saying that Iran is not living up to its --
MR KIRBY: We understand the BFV report is mainly about missiles; and while it does mention nuclear dual-use technology, it covers all of 2015 and makes no distinction about whether the reported activities occurred prior to the JCPOA coming into effect.
QUESTION: Okay. Now, what about this international – this Institute for Science and International Security saying that Iran is attempting to acquire carbon fiber, which we know --
MR KIRBY: I haven't seen that report and therefore wouldn't be proficient enough to speak to that finding. But I'd go back again to what I said, that we have absolutely no indication that Iran has procured any materials in violation of the JCPOA.
QUESTION: Also, apparently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also voiced concerns in a new report saying that Iran's actions under the missile program were, quote, "not consistent with the constructive spirit" of the nuclear deal. So I mean, again, taken together would you say – yes, I can see you saying on a – technically maybe they're not violating their commitments, but are they living up to the spirit of the deal, would you say?
MR KIRBY: They – we have no indications that they are in violation of the JCPOA.
QUESTION: I didn't say --
MR KIRBY: No, let me --
QUESTION: Violation of the terms or in violation of the spirit?
MR KIRBY: Violation of the JCPOA. They're not violating the JCPOA. We have no indication that they are, Elise. Now, on the separate and distinct ballistic missile activity, support for terrorism, obviously we still have very valid concerns in that regard. We've made no bones about that.
QUESTION: Can I just ask real quick --
QUESTION: Can I have a follow-up? You said it had no – you had no information that Iran has procured equipment in contravention of the JC – do you have information that Iran has sought to procure equipment, or are you just not aware of the times it succeeded?
MR KIRBY: I have no information to indicate Iran has procured any materials in violation of the JCPOA.
QUESTION: Yeah, but --
MR KIRBY: And as I said, the IAEA reported – has reported that Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.
QUESTION: I'm not asking about the IAEA, which doesn't really have an intelligence capacity. I'm asking specifically about whether Iran has sought to procure equipment for its nuclear program that it shouldn't.
MR KIRBY: I've answered the question.
QUESTION: No, you said --
QUESTION: No, you haven't.
QUESTION: No, you --
MR KIRBY: Yes, I have.
QUESTION: Whoa, whoa, whoa.
MR KIRBY: Yes, I have.
QUESTION: I asked if they have sought, and you have – and which is specifically it talks about in that German intelligence report that it tried a variety of ways to get stuff it's not supposed to have. And you're just saying we don't know if – but we have no information if they got it or not.
MR KIRBY: There's no --
QUESTION: That's a big difference from saying, well, we know they're not trying to do this; they're living up to the deal.
MR KIRBY: Living up to the deal means not procuring --
QUESTION: Oh --
MR KIRBY: -- and not attempting to.
QUESTION: It also means not trying to procure.
MR KIRBY: And not – not procuring.
QUESTION: So you're saying flatly they're not procuring --
MR KIRBY: So if I'm procuring a car, I'm trying to buy a car, right? It's the same thing.
QUESTION: No, if you procure a car --
QUESTION: Well, if I know that you're not allowed to get the car and I'm a responsible citizen and I say, "No, I will not sell you that car" --
MR KIRBY: Matt – Matt --
QUESTION: -- that's a completely different thing.
MR KIRBY: Brad, Brad, Brad --
QUESTION: That doesn't mean you're upholding the law because you were forbidden.
MR KIRBY: Do not parse my words. There are no indications that Iran is violating the JCPOA. The IAEA is – continues to find the same to be true. And as we've said all along, we've got enough monitoring in place to know if they're going to try to cheat. We have no indications that they are doing so.
QUESTION: You have no – wait.
MR KIRBY: And I am not going to talk about intelligence matters in any more detail than that.
QUESTION: Well, no, no, no, no. But I just – you said that he's parsing, but I respectfully think that you're parsing. The question is: Have you – do you have any information that they are trying to obtain material that would not be consistent with their commitments in the deal? Not that they have it; that they've tried to get it.
MR KIRBY: No.
QUESTION: Yes or no?
MR KIRBY: No.
QUESTION: Okay, thank you.
QUESTION: So one other question. Is it not a violation – if the German report is correct that they have tried to get nuclear equipment that could be used for a military program, is that not a violation of at least the spirit of the JCPOA?
MR KIRBY: I'm not an expert on what the spirit is regarding a certain deal. I'd refer you to German authorities who wrote this report to speak to their conclusions. I think I've answered the question about our views on Iran meeting their obligations under the JCPOA, and I'm not going to begin to have a dialogue about the spirit of it and what that means.
QUESTION: I mean, surely it's not that difficult to understand that if you spent more than two years negotiating an agreement whose entire purpose was to prevent a state from obtaining a nuclear weapon, it's surely not that hard to say that if they're off buying dual-use or trying to buy dual-use technology that might violate the spirit.
MR KIRBY: If that was the case, then it would violate the deal, wouldn't it? But as I said, we have no indication that they are violating the deal. And the deal has never been about trust. It's never been about spirit. It's never been about how we feel about Iran. It's been about them meeting their commitments, and they are meeting theirs. We are meeting ours. And there are multiple regimes in place to allow us to examine the degree to which they are meeting their commitments. And as long as they meet theirs, the international community --
QUESTION: So --
MR KIRBY: This is not about touchy-feely. This is about monitoring, it's about verifying, and it's about holding --
QUESTION: So going back to the fact that you said that the Germans are kind of looking at this from the whole 2015, not when they actually kind of signed the agreement, so you're – are you saying that, like, they might have tried before the deal was actually signed, or are you casting doubt on the whole report itself?
MR KIRBY: I think I've responded --
QUESTION: No, you didn't respond.
MR KIRBY: Yes, I did. I responded as far as I'm going to respond on this. And I would respectfully recommend you speak to German authorities about this report.
QUESTION: Well, no, I mean, of course we've spoken to them and we have the report. I'm just --
MR KIRBY: Okay.
QUESTION: But you are kind of casting doubt on the report itself or on the timeline?
MR KIRBY: No, I'm not. All I'm noting is – I'll say it again – that while it does mention nuclear dual-use technology, it covers all of 2015 and makes no distinction about whether the reported activities occurred prior to the JCPOA coming into effect. And for more detail about that, I would recommend that you speak to the report's authors.
QUESTION: So you're not doubt – so you're not casting doubt on the fact that they might have tried to obtain dual-use technology, just not since the deal was signed?
MR KIRBY: I am saying that they are in compliance with their JCPOA commitments.
QUESTION: It's just it's a little confusing because if the policy is indeed distrust and verify, and you have a report that casts question, why --
QUESTION: And trusting without verification.
QUESTION: Why aren't you then ascertaining as hard as possible to find out exactly when these alleged infractions took place, before or after the deal?
MR KIRBY: The Germans can speak to this report --
QUESTION: Yeah, but --
MR KIRBY: Brad, wait a second. The Germans can speak to this report. We have ways of monitoring their compliance with the JCPOA and those measures are in place, and every indication we have since the deal was implemented is that they're meeting their obligations. And the IAEA – which, by the way, in terms of the deal is responsible for doing that compliance verification – has said the same thing in numerous reports. That's what matters. What matters is once the deal got implemented, are they complying? And every indication that we have right now is that they are. That is the deal.
QUESTION: I dispute the notion that the IAEA is doing export controls in Germany on dual-use --
MR KIRBY: I didn't say they were doing export controls. But they – but the – under the deal, the IAEA --
QUESTION: Well, they wouldn't have the ability to get this information.
MR KIRBY: Under the deal, the IAEA is responsible for monitoring compliance, and they are.
QUESTION: Yeah, but they do not have the capacity to examine exactly what this report is talking about. So if you're relying on the IAEA, they could get whatever they want and --
MR KIRBY: Brad, I'm not an expert on their capacity to monitor --
QUESTION: Well, I am.
MR KIRBY: I think you'd have to talk to IAEA officials about that.
Goyal, go ahead.
QUESTION: South Asia?
MR KIRBY: Sure.
QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Two questions. One, as far as U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement is concerned, so far only one U.S. company, Westinghouse, signed for to build at least six nuclear plants in India. More may follow. My question is as far as U.S. Government and Indian Government is concerned, is this deal done between the government-to-government, or there are still issues pending?
MR KIRBY: As far as I know, there's – we're still in discussions with India about this. I don't have any more details. We'll have to try to see if we can get you something on that.
QUESTION: And second, if I may quickly on Bangladesh, as far as so much has been said about bombings and troubles and killings in Bangladesh. What type of help you think Bangladesh have sought from the Secretary or from the U.S. or what sort of help you think U.S. is going to provide to Bangladesh to fight this terrorism, ongoing terrorism in Bangladesh?
MR KIRBY: Well, I mean, the Secretary did speak to the prime minister. He offered our assistance in their investigative efforts. I don't have any updates for you in terms of any help that they've accepted. I'd point you to Bangladeshi authorities who are actually still investigating this. And we obviously, as a nation, continue to stay fully committed to fighting terrorism there and around the world with our partners. Obviously, this is a threat which doesn't know borders and it's a group that is trying to export terrorism to sow fear outside Iraq and Syria. And it's – that's why there's 66 countries arrayed against this particular group.
QUESTION: Thank you, sir.
MR KIRBY: Yeah, go ahead.
QUESTION: Yes. Back on South China Sea, the foreign secretary of the Philippines stated today that the Philippines would be willing to share natural resources with China regardless of whether or not they won at the tribunal next week. Is that something you would welcome?
MR KIRBY: I haven't seen that report, and look, these are decisions that sovereign nations have to make, so I don't know that we'd have a view one way or the other of that.
QUESTION: Also on China – sorry – the Chinese Government summoned Ambassador Baucus over the issue of the THAAD deployment, and I was wondering if you had details of that meeting or a response to Chinese concerns over the deployment.
MR KIRBY: I can tell you that Ambassador Baucus did have a meeting with his Chinese counterparts about this, and again, we've made very clear that because of the ongoing, continued threat by the North that this was a capability that we would be exploring with our South Korean allies. And you saw the announcement last night that it's going to move forward. And it will add to and improve our abilities to better defend our South Korean allies and the South Korean people from what continues to be a significant threat.
And I would just remind that it is a purely defensive system, and that is a – we have made that clear to Chinese officials in the past and we are more than happy to continue to have a conversation about the purely defensive capabilities that this system represents.
QUESTION: Isn't it a concern that --
QUESTION: Were the Chinese informed --
QUESTION: Sorry. Isn't it a concern that the deployment of THAAD complicates the relationship with China when you need their cooperation the most over the North Korea issue?
MR KIRBY: We continue to need – as the Secretary said yesterday, continue to need Chinese leadership and Chinese influence in a productive way with respect to North Korea. There's no reason why this deployment should be of concern to Chinese leaders since it is a purely defensive measure and because the North Korea – because the North continues to pose such a real and significant threat to South Korea.
QUESTION: John, on the – on the THAAD issue again – deployment of THAAD in South Korea – when will the plan be placed THAAD in South Korea? Do you have a timeframe?
MR KIRBY: I don't know, Janne. That's a decision that – those are decisions that still have to be made. They announced that they're going to move forward. I have no visibility. And I would actually point you to the ministry of defense and to DOD to speak to whatever plans are. As far as I know, those discussions are ongoing and I'm not aware of any final decisions in terms of timing and placement. All that is downstream and will be determined between the two ministries of defense.
QUESTION: So you don't know any timeframe for the --
MR KIRBY: I do not.
QUESTION: All right.
MR KIRBY: Yes.
QUESTION: Oh, one main concern from the Chinese side is a readout system of THAAD deployment. They claim that it might jeopardize China's national interest. Do you listen to China's concern and do you think their concern is legitimate?
MR KIRBY: We have certainly listened to their concerns and we have offered to provide informational briefings for them on the way the system works. Again, this is a purely defensive system that we wouldn't have to talk about and wouldn't have to consider if the DPRK had proven, in recent weeks and months, willing to take a different, more peaceful path.
QUESTION: And yesterday, the Chinese foreign ministry was asking the United States and South Korea to stop the process. Once a decision has been made and then you're going to move forward, is it possible to go reverse the whole process?
MR KIRBY: I'm not going to speculate. Look, the announcement was made last night to move forward and it's my understanding that the Defense Department is going to do exactly that in concert with the ministry of defense. This is a Defense Department to ministry of defense issue that they are now going to move forward on the necessary planning, and that's the focus.
QUESTION: And last one: Are you concerned this move may reinforce the mistrust between U.S. and China?
MR KIRBY: There's no reason why it should. Again, we've – we have certainly listened to their concerns, we've – we tried to address those concerns. We've offered to be as transparent as possible about the capabilities of this system, which, again, is purely defensive – purely defensive. And it is about protecting – because we must, we have obligations to help protect our South Korean allies and that's why we're having this discussion, that's why this decision was made. There should be no reason why the Chinese or anybody else needs to be concerned about what is a purely defensive system.
Said.
QUESTION: Could I ask a Gaza question, on Gaza?
MR KIRBY: Sure.
QUESTION: Amnesty International issued a very critical report on the situation in Gaza regarding reconstruction and so on, citing the passage of two years. There was, back in October 2014 a donors conference in which the United States also participated. Can you update on what is your – if you are doing anything in terms of injecting aid or the delivery of aid to Gaza at the present time?
MR KIRBY: I think I would frame it this way: Obviously, we remain deeply concerned about the situation – the humanitarian situation – in Gaza. As you know, Said, unemployment remains as high as anywhere on the planet; often power is only available for a portion of the day; degradation in water quality and environmental conditions continue to threaten – to make the strip unlivable; the majority of the population is forced to rely on assistance from the international community to make ends meet. So what we're doing is going to continue to call on the international community to deliver on the pledges that were made in the 2014 Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Cairo. I can tell you that we have fulfilled 100 percent of the pledges that we made there, which is a sum total of $414 million.
QUESTION: Are you trying to persuade the Israelis to lift the siege, perhaps, or – and the Egyptians as well; both are your allies in terms of the siege of Gaza – or – as was suggested in the Quartet report?
MR KIRBY: I don't have anything more to update on this. Again, we're very, very concerned about the humanitarian situation there, and we're in constant conversation with everybody in the region about how to better address it.
QUESTION: Would you like to see the siege eased up?
MR KIRBY: I'm going to leave my answer where I did.
QUESTION: Quick ones on Europe. You have – firstly, do you have any information NATO websites going down --
MR KIRBY: I do not.
QUESTION: Okay. On the incident outside the Russian embassy, there's been more comments out of Moscow or wherever. Seems like they're bent on humiliating you over this incident. Do you have a response?
MR KIRBY: So I've been clear from the podium that we would prefer to deal with this matter in private government-to-government channels. However, because, as you noted, the Russian Government continues to make allegations about this incident, I am now compelled to set the record straight. On the 6th of June, an accredited U.S. diplomat, who identified himself in accordance with embassy protocols, entering the American embassy compound was attacked by a Russian policeman. The action was unprovoked and it endangered the safety of our employee. The Russian claim the policeman was protecting the embassy from an unidentified individual is simply untrue.
In addition to the attack on the 6th of June, Russian security services have intensified their harassment against U.S. personnel in an effort to disrupt our diplomatic and consular operations. We've privately urged the Russian Government to stop the harassment of American personnel in Russia, and as I said before, the safety and well-being of our diplomatic and consular personnel abroad and their accompanying family members are things we take very, very seriously.
QUESTION: All right. On the individual, the diplomat, there were some reports that he sustained injuries, including maybe a broken arm. Is that true, and has he since left the country, been PNGed, or anything like that?
MR KIRBY: Privacy considerations restrict me from speaking about health, and, as a standard practice, I'm not going to comment on the status of any of our employees serving overseas.
QUESTION: In Congress there's calls for an investigation. Do you support those? Will you undertake an investigation?
MR KIRBY: I'm not aware of any investigation that we are going to undertake. If that changes or something, I'll let you know.
QUESTION: And then what does this say about the broader U.S.-Russian relationship? Is it getting – if you can't even operate in normal manner in the country, is it getting to a level – a worse level than it's been in a very long time?
MR KIRBY: Well, I mean, I think it certainly speaks, as I said, of – to the kinds of harassment over the last couple of years – I mean, this is a very graphic example and a very violent one. But it comes on the heels of two years of increasing diplomatic harassment by Russian authorities that is also unprovoked and unnecessary. And as I said I think a week or so ago, Russian claims that they're getting harassed here are simply without foundation. So you want to have a conversation about in-kind treatment, it's time for Russia to treat our diplomats with – in the same manner in which they're treated here when they come to the United States.
And as for the broader relationship, the – our relationship with Russia is complicated, and we certainly don't see eye to eye on everything. There are areas where we have in the past and I think we'll continue to seek cooperation with them, such as on Syria and the political process there. There are obviously still areas where there's tension; Ukraine and Minsk implementation is one of them, and certainly this. There's no need for this when there's so many more important things for us to be working on with Russia and so much real, meaningful geopolitical progress that could be had. There's no place for this kind of treatment and there's no reason for it.
QUESTION: Are you prepared to make an official complaint about a Vienna Convention violation?
MR KIRBY: I don't have anything on that to say today.
QUESTION: And then lastly, are – do you have – are you considering any countermeasures against Russia in terms of diplomatic presence in the United States, whether it's expelling embassies, limiting movement, or otherwise responding to this incident?
MR KIRBY: So a couple of things on there. I'd say in – certainly in a sign of how seriously we take it, as I said earlier, the Secretary raised it directly with Foreign Minister Lavrov on the very day that it occurred.
(Ringtone plays.)
QUESTION: Sorry.
MR KIRBY: That's okay.
We're well aware that such efforts against U.S. personnel are not always sanctioned by all elements of the Russian Government. So we're going to look to senior Russian officials with whom we engage to reign in those elements seeking to impede our diplomatic and consular activities in – I'm sorry – in Russia and our bilateral relationship. And again, this has been raised at the very highest levels – this particular incident – and I think you'll continue to see us do that.
QUESTION: Also on Russia. Yesterday, you criticized the Russians in the context of the Syrian violation of their own ceasefire. Was there any Russian response since then to that criticism?
MR KIRBY: I'm not aware of any.
QUESTION: Might Secretary Kerry raise it at – with the Russians?
MR KIRBY: As I said, he has – his last conversation with Foreign Minister Lavrov was Tuesday, at the beginning of the regime of calm. I don't have any additional communication between him and Foreign Minister Lavrov to read out at this time.
QUESTION: John, very quickly on this issue. Yesterday, your counterpart from the White House on the plane apparently told reporters that the President did not agree with Russian President Putin on anything regarding Syria. So are – are we to understand that now this coordination between the United States and Russia on Syria is on hold or is it frozen?
MR KIRBY: We are continuing to talk to Russian authorities about how to best move forward in Syria, to include getting a cessation of hostilities that's nationwide and that it's enduring. I don't have any specific decisions to announce or speak to today with respect to greater coordination or greater communication. There's already an avenue of communication between our Defense Department and the Russian military with respect to safety of flight and general situational awareness. As I've said many times before, to the degree that Russia is willing to take on fully Daesh in Syria, then that's a conversation we continue to be willing to have. I just don't have any updates for you at this time. But we are in constant communication with our Russian counterparts about the threat that Daesh and al-Nusrah continue to pose in Syria and about how their efforts can be better aligned with the efforts of the coalition with respect to those two groups and to getting a cessation of hostilities that, again, can be enduring and nationwide. And again, I just don't have – I don't have any final decisions one way or the other to talk to today.
QUESTION: Do you think that the kind of rhetoric we are hearing from the NATO summit, for instance, vis-a-vis Russia could in any way sort of alienate Russia, widen the gap where they can take sort of a hardened – more hardened position in places like Syria?
MR KIRBY: I also understand that there is going to be – maybe it's already happened, I don't know – a NATO-Russian commission discussion. Again, NATO's a purely defensive alliance, always has been, remains that way, and – and we're – we continue to have – as a NATO member, we continue to have conversation with Russian authorities about NATO capabilities and about NATO engagement on the continent and beyond.
Last one, I'm afraid. I've got to get going.
QUESTION: The South China Sea. So the announcement of the THAAD deployment was made right at five days before the South China Sea arbitration. Is there any reason behind it? And what does it have to do with the South China Sea situation?
MR KIRBY: I'm sorry, I missed the first part of your question. What was announced five days before?
QUESTION: The announcement of the THAAD system deployment – THAAD system.
MR KIRBY: THAAD.
QUESTION: Missile system.
MR KIRBY: The THAAD system – the THAAD?
QUESTION: THAAD missile system deployment.
MR KIRBY: You're – the announcement last night being five days --
QUESTION: Before the South China Sea --
MR KIRBY: -- before the tribunal?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR KIRBY: No, they're not connected whatsoever.
QUESTION: Not --
MR KIRBY: No. I mean, this is about – again, the THAAD deployment is about defending our South Korean allies from a real and growing ballistic missile threat from the DPRK.
QUESTION: Can we sneak in a couple more – no follow-up questions?
MR KIRBY: Yeah, I just have to – I do have to move --
QUESTION: Firstly, do you have any – I think it's the one-year anniversary of the Chinese crackdown on lawyers. Do you have any comment on that?
MR KIRBY: I don't right now. I think we'll have something a little bit later today.
QUESTION: And then anything you want to say about South Sudan?
MR KIRBY: South Sudan. Yes, as a matter of fact, I do.
QUESTION: I thought you might.
MR KIRBY: Hold on a second. So we are monitoring reports of gunfire and explosions today in Juba, including near the presidential palace. As of 1:15 this afternoon our time, Eastern Standard Time, we understand that the situation has calmed. The president, the first vice president, and vice president have jointly appeared on television there and appealed for that calm. I can tell you that all embassy personnel have been accounted for. At this time we do not have any information regarding exactly what led to the fighting. And again, we would note that the senior leadership there in Juba were in a meeting as the clashes started. Those leaders have assured us of their commitment to resolve the tensions that have escalated in recent days.
Okay, thanks, everybody.
(The briefing was concluded at 2:53 p.m.)
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