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Military

Daily Press Briefing

Mark C. Toner
Deputy Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
May 26, 2016

Index for Today's Briefing

DEPARTMENT
IRAQ/SYRIA
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/INDIA
SYRIA
YEMEN/SAUDI ARABIA
MIDDLE EAST PEACE
DEPARTMENT
EGYPT
RUSSIA/GEORGIA

 

TRANSCRIPT:

1:37 p.m. EDT

MR TONER: Everyone, happy Thursday. Welcome to the State Department. I don't have anything at the top, so I will hand it over to you, Arshad.

QUESTION: Can we start with emails, please?

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: So now that the report is public and everybody has access to it, I'm hoping you can address a few more things more explicitly. I noted in the report that the under secretary for management said that he was never asked to approve the personal email system. And it also says that he didn't have – or that he said that he didn't have full kind of understanding of it. What I continue not to understand is why this wasn't looked into and why any of the people who did have even partial knowledge didn't raise the issue so that the security of the former secretary's emails could be preserved and the records management requirements could be met.

MR TONER: Well, a couple of things, Arshad. First, you're right in that in his interview for this report, Under Secretary Kennedy did state that he was not asked to approve nor was he – nor otherwise review the use of Secretary Clinton's server, and in fact, he does say that he was unaware of the scope or extent of Secretary Clinton's use of her personal email account. He also said and maintains that he had very little knowledge or insight into Secretary Clinton's email practices, including how frequently or infrequently then-Secretary Clinton used email.

To speak to your additional question, look – and this isn't speaking specifically to Under Secretary Kennedy's role – but across the board, and we have acknowledged this, there was only a partial understanding of how much Secretary Clinton relied on personal email and we just did not have a complete picture. And because of that, I think no one undertook the steps to address that. And we have said also that – or acknowledged, and not just with Secretary Clinton but with previous secretaries – that we did not do a good job in onboarding or processing in senior leadership, especially the secretaries of state, and making sure that they understood the rules regarding personal email use.

QUESTION: So I understand the point that across the – well, you state that across the board --

MR TONER: Right.

QUESTION: -- there wasn't – you didn't have a complete picture.

MR TONER: Right.

QUESTION: Right? But there are a significant number of people who did have a complete picture, right? I mean, surely that has to include not only the secretary but also her chief of staff, at least one or perhaps both of her deputy chiefs of staff, and Mr. Pagliano, who established the system and who was a mid to senior-level IRM official.

MR TONER: So – sorry, go ahead, finish your --

QUESTION: So my question is: Is there no obligation on any of those people, from the secretary to Mr. Pagliano, to know the rules and raise them to the appropriate level to have the rules be followed?

MR TONER: So this is going to be an unsatisfactory answer, but the people you were referring to just now, the people who may have had a broader knowledge or a fuller appreciation of – to the extent at which Secretary Clinton was using her personal email are no longer here at the department, and so they are now, many of them, with Secretary Clinton and, frankly, I would just have to ask you to ask them to answer that question – whether – how much they knew and if they knew that she was relying significantly or solely on personal email, why didn't they make this – others aware of it. I just can't answer that question.

QUESTION: And one other thing, and we've talked about this many months ago.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: The department had implemented a system called SMART, which was designed to make it easier to archive material. Correct?

MR TONER: Yes.

QUESTION: And that was --

MR TONER: Well – okay.

QUESTION: That was rolled out, I think, in 2009. Correct?

MR TONER: Yes. Hold on one second. I believe it was rolled out in 2009, that's correct.

QUESTION: And so the report says that the secretary – that the Office of the Secretary – and it doesn't say which secretary and it doesn't say when in 2009, but that the Office of the Secretary in 2009 decided not to use that system, and instead to print and file (inaudible).

MR TONER: So – okay.

QUESTION: Did they print and file anything during that time?

MR TONER: Did --

QUESTION: During the – did the Office of the Secretary, the executive secretariat widely, all the people up there on the seventh floor, print and file any of her emails during her time in office?

MR TONER: So the first part of your question, about SMART – so SMART was in use, I believe, as of 2009/2010. It's one of several department tools used to capture records and it doesn't, frankly, represent the full range of efforts that we're using now to manage records. We also at the time had, as you mentioned, print and file as well as now we have – and we've talked about this in terms of Secretary Kerry's use of email – we now have automatic archiving, which obviously is the gold standard. There has been very limited adoption, as the OIG report notes for – of SMART for email records management across the department. And we did – the executive secretariat actually chose not to install SMART for senior officials in part because that the system would allow users – many users to access sensitive records. The other thing and problem with SMART – and this is by no means an excuse – but that it's very time-consuming. And part of what we've learned out of this whole incident is that we need to provide employees, senior officials on down, with better tools, easier to use tools to do this. As I said, now with Secretary Kerry has automatic archiving. That's the gold standard.

In response to your second question, which I think was the meat of your question, which was there no effort to print and file – you're talking specifically with Secretary Clinton? I'll have to take that.

QUESTION: Specifically Secretary Clinton's emails during the period that she was Secretary of State.

MR TONER: Right. I'll have to take that question. I just don't have a good answer for you right now.

QUESTION: Because I've done back and I've looked at what she said in her United Nations news conference.

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: And it doesn't sound like there was an effort to print and file things. It sounds like she took everything with her, then made a decision about what to print and file. And then only in response to the letter that the department sent more widely to I guess five Secretaries of State --

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- did she then produce them, having failed to meet the – keep in line with the rules during her time.

MR TONER: Right. Right. No, absolutely. No, I have the same understanding. That's why I want to just make --

QUESTION: Can you take that one?

MR TONER: Absolutely. Yeah.

QUESTION: And answer it today?

MR TONER: Yes. We will do so.

QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.

MR TONER: Cool. Thanks.

QUESTION: Oh, yeah. And sorry, one last thing.

MR TONER: Yeah, sure.

QUESTION: So if – I guess it raises the question of – well, no, that's okay. I'll wait until I get that answer and then I'll --

MR TONER: Got it. Thank you.

QUESTION: I've got a question on Syria.

QUESTION: Can we move --

QUESTION: I want to follow up on that.

MR TONER: Okay. One quick follow-up just to --

QUESTION: Yeah. You said that the department – or whoever was respond – did not do a good job in – so did these people know what they are supposed to communicate to the Secretary of State or his or her office? Did the State Department reach back to NARA for clarifications? Because I have seen the very detailed way that NARA has provided the outlines and the deadline for 2016, 2019. So where do we stand for that?

MR TONER: Well, we've made, obviously, a lot of improvements. And we talked about this yesterday. I gave an on-the-record statement earlier in the day, where we talked about specifically how we met or are already meeting the OIG's eight recommendations. And the OIG, in fact, has said that we're on our way – have already met or are on our way to meeting the eight recommendations that they made.

Look, in answer to your first question, or the first part of your question, we have acknowledged that we did not do a sufficient job in either preserving emails and records of secretaries of State and their senior staff, going back not just to Clinton's tenure here, but several administrations. And also that as much as the regulations existed back then discouraging the use of personal email, we did not, as a department, do a good enough job or a sufficient job in ensuring that from our senior-most staff on down understood those procedures or those guidelines. So we said many times it wasn't prohibited to use personal email, but it wasn't encouraged. And to the extent that we failed to --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) cases.

MR TONER: Right.

QUESTION: In occasional cases.

MR TONER: Correct. And I – and we've said that.

QUESTION: It wasn't prohibited to use them in all cases for business.

MR TONER: Correct. It was not encouraged to use it. But we acknowledge that in some instances personal email could be used, even in business cases, where --

QUESTION: Right.

MR TONER: -- we can talk about some of the --

QUESTION: But was it permissible to use personal email for official business purposes in all cases? Because my understanding is no, it wasn't.

MR TONER: Exclusively?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR TONER: It was – no. And it was, in fact, discouraged to do so.

QUESTION: Well, wasn't it not just discouraged, it was --

MR TONER: I don't know if it was – sorry. I don't know if it was specifically prohibited, but it was strongly discouraged to do so. And we recognize that that was not communicated well. And we've talked about this. In on-processing and secretaries of State, we've done a better job, obviously, in ensuring that Secretary Kerry understands the importance of recordkeeping and importance of using official email, and he does so.

QUESTION: Just a quick – no, just a --

MR TONER: Sure. That's okay, Tejinder. Go ahead.

QUESTION: -- quick – now you mentioned it. Has Secretary Kerry used private email for any official business --

MR TONER: Again, I think on a relatively very few occasions, he has, and those have been automatically --

QUESTION: Transferred?

MR TONER: -- transferred to a recordkeeping. We're very cognizant of our responsibilities now and obligations.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on the email issue?

MR TONER: Let's go – okay.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

QUESTION: What is so profoundly new in the inspector general's report? In your view, something that we really have not talked about in the past and so on?

MR TONER: Look, I mean – sure.

QUESTION: What is so profoundly and fundamentally new that is really earthshaking?

MR TONER: Well, look, it's a fair question. I think – and Secretary Kerry, let's be clear, did ask the inspector general to look at our records management, specifically the use of nonofficial email, and to see – really do forensics on what went wrong and how we can do better, and to make recommendations. And I think – so what I think we're taking away from it is a forward-looking attitude that – and we've already been doing this, certainly, under Secretary Kerry, where we've been trying to revamp how we conduct our records management and how we conduct business via official email. And this is – I hate to say it, but it's a learning experience. We have learned important lessons. We're not the only federal agency, frankly, that is also addressing these challenges. But we're trying to move forward and we're trying to address it. So thanks.

David.

QUESTION: There are two offensives underway in the war against ISIS currently. The Iraqi forces are closing in on Fallujah, and Kurdish forces are operating north of Raqqa, in both cases with U.S.-led coalition support.

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: If – and obviously, hopefully, if these offenses are successful in dislodging ISIS from these two centers, you'll essentially have brought a Shiite force into Fallujah and a Kurdish force into Raqqa. Both of these cities were formally largely populated by Sunni Arabs. Is there any concern that, on a broader strategic position, this would cause concern in the Sunni Arab world? And particularly among the communities in these towns, who are presumably looking forward to being liberated from ISIS but don't necessarily want to fall under the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- or the Kurdish YPG?

MR TONER: Let me start with Raqqa. And we have, speaking more broadly – and I cannot speak specifically to the force composition that is now engaged outside of Raqqa. But more broadly, we have been working to diversify the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF. And what we've seen on the ground is frankly indicative of that. I can say that the force that successfully took Shaddadi I think a few weeks ago was 60 percent Kurd and 40 percent Arab and other elements. And this reflects some of the training that we've been doing, DOD – the Department of Defense, has been conducting that has seen greater influx of Arab fighters. I think they just graduated a class of 200 additional Arabs who are joining this fight. There's another class poised to be – graduate that's another additional 200.

And so in answer to your – the first part of your question is yes, we're cognizant of the need to have diversified forces conducting these kinds of operations, given the sensitivities of the communities that they're liberating. And then specifically on Raqqa, we have seen – I think the Kurds themselves have said publicly that they understand the political dimensions of this fight and that it would need to be an Arab – a predominantly Arab force liberating Arab areas in Syria.

So we are cognizant of that. We're trying to work around that with the forces that we have. We're trying to make them more diversified, but we're certainly sensitive to the viewpoints and the sensitivities of these populations. And the same goes with Iraq and Fallujah. I think the government is well aware that this community in Fallujah is concerned about who their liberators are.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) that the Kurds have said publicly --

MR TONER: Right.

QUESTION: -- that they are cognizant of the risk, as you say. The Kurds also say publicly – and here I'm speaking directly about the YPG – they have said publicly that they are being directly armed by American forces. And that's a thing that you from this podium, I believe, have denied, that the YPG is itself receiving direct help.

MR TONER: Right. We are playing an advise-and-assist role. But assisting is not specifically providing arms.

QUESTION: These 60 percent Kurds who make up the SDF – they're YPG, aren't they?

MR TONER: They are, yeah. That's correct.

QUESTION: The fact that – if I could follow up on this point?

MR TONER: Go ahead.

QUESTION: I mean, I asked you the day before yesterday, I believe, on – there were reports that the United States has agreed to arm the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is the YPG, directly, and in fact today they were using TOW missiles, which is an American-supplied weapon. They also were seen with armored vehicles that are American-made. Also, American soldiers wearing uniforms and so on were actually with them, so they basically are in the front, although you keep saying that you're not in combat. Could you just give us something to make sense of all this?

MR TONER: Sure. In response to your – the first part of your question about what we've seen in terms of equipment and weaponry on the battlefield, I think what we've said before holds, which is that there's fortunately – or unfortunately, rather, there's a lot of liberated, shall we say, equipment that's being used on the battlefield. It's impossible for us to say where that equipment has come from or where it's sourced from. We just don't have the clarity on that.

In response to your second question, I think you're talking about some photos that we saw today appear. I'll let Department of Defense speak to those specific photos. I would only say that we acknowledged several weeks ago that Special Operations Forces would be present in northern Syria in the capacity of the advise-and-assist role that we have clearly laid out that they're playing on the battlefield in coordination with the SDF.

QUESTION: And you're completely ruling out any kind of coordination with Russian forces or regime forces in --

MR TONER: That's right. Yeah. I mean, that's correct, and we talked about this a little bit the other day --

QUESTION: Right.

MR TONER: -- about the fact that our focus right now on – with Russia is coordinating on how to implement or – sorry, not implement, but reinvigorate or reinstall – whatever verb you want to use there – the cessation of hostilities so that it's up and running again and durable.

QUESTION: In the current campaign that speaks of --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- something like 25,000 Kurdish forces or something like this that is ongoing to liberate Raqqa or the countryside and so on, would you sort of frown upon or advise against, let's say, an independent effort by the Russians, by the regime forces to do the same thing from another area? Would you want them to do things on their own or would you prefer that they don't do anything?

MR TONER: No, I mean, look – and we didn't do this when they – we didn't say they shouldn't, for example, liberate Palmyra. All we simply said was that exchanging ISIL for the Syrian regime is I guess a little bit better, but look, we fully recognize that the one enemy where we all agree on, frankly, in Syria is ISIL or Daesh. And as much as Russia – Russian efforts are focused on Nusrah and Daesh and striking them, we don't have a problem with that.

QUESTION: And finally, David asked you about Fallujah and what's going on, and you didn't really have anything to say on Fallujah.

MR TONER: Yeah, sorry, I was just --

QUESTION: And you were just – yeah, so --

MR TONER: Yeah. I mean, I don't have any great updates. I mean, look, it's – we talked about this the other day. The Government of Iraq has announced this offensive to liberate Fallujah. I think what's important is that it's not going to delay ongoing preparations for Nineveh operations. That includes Mosul, which is another crucial city. In terms of battlefield updates, you're much better off --

QUESTION: Should the people of Fallujah be any more or any less concerned about being liberated by the Iraqi army than the people of Palmyra were about being liberated by the Syrian army?

MR TONER: Yes. I mean, I – look, I would – we have emphasized from the beginning of these operations that the Iraqi forces must make concerted efforts to protect local populations and property and to secure human rights of all Iraqi citizens, as the Iraqi constitution requires and as Prime Minister Abadi has pledged. And so we believe that message has been conveyed and we believe that they're making an effort to do so.

QUESTION: And are you confident that these Iraqi forces are all under government command? A lot of them are Popular Mobilization Forces.

MR TONER: Understand that. Yes, I mean, we are, because – and frankly, it's somewhat of a success story that we've – believe that Iraqi command and control has been strengthened. And frankly, all of our assistance does go through the Iraqi military, even assistance to some of these PMFs.

QUESTION: So you're not objecting to, let's say, a closely tied militia to Iran, like the Popular Mobilization Forces is, actually worked to liberate Fallujah, or that maybe Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian general, is basically running the show from behind the scene? You don't --

MR TONER: I'll just say that I've seen those reports too. We obviously can't confirm them. But look, the Fallujah operation is under the command and control of the Government of Iraq.

Please, Pam.

QUESTION: I have a couple of follow-up questions to what you said yesterday about the new leader of the Taliban.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: You said, "He does have an opportunity in front of him to choose peace and to work towards a negotiated solution. We hope that he makes that choice now." Does this mean that the U.S. is not going to target the new leader if he chooses to join negotiations?

MR TONER: I'm just not going to – and I said this yesterday, Pam – I'm not going to ever preview any operational activities we may take with regard to targeting any individual. And let's be very clear that the strike against Mansour was based on both his previous actions but also his intent to carry out additional strikes not only against Afghan forces, but against U.S. military forces on the ground in Afghanistan, and the fact that he was not playing a productive role or any role in leading us towards negotiations or a peace process – or talks, rather.

All I'm trying to say is – and by my remarks yesterday is simply that new leadership – they have an opportunity here to engage – re-engage on peace talks, and it's our hope that they make that choice.

QUESTION: Without getting into any future military – U.S. operations, can you say if the U.S. at this point is willing to offer him sort of an olive leaf if he makes gestures toward taking part in the talk – talks?

MR TONER: Well, look, I mean, I think our olive branch would be simply that we have long said that we support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process and reconciliation process, and we would welcome any efforts by the new Taliban leadership to engage.

QUESTION: Can I just kind of follow up on that?

MR TONER: Of course.

QUESTION: What makes you think – I mean, just killed their former leader. What makes you think that they're actually going to want to engage in talks? What --

MR TONER: Well --

QUESTION: Why wouldn't that just stiffen their opposition against engaging in talks?

MR TONER: Well, look, I mean, you can – and you can make that point legitimately, I think. But first and foremost, our action against Mansour was predicated on the fact that we believed he was going to carry out lethal attacks on U.S. servicemen and women in the field as well as against Afghan forces. That was – that was the clear and pressing, imminent threat that we were addressing by removing him from the battlefield. But we also hope that it sent a clear signal to the Taliban that really peace and reconciliation is their only option.

QUESTION: If there hadn't been an immediate threat of strikes on U.S. or allied targets, would it have been legal to take – to take him out?

MR TONER: I – well, I would think I would just answer that, David, by saying we have long said that as we in the national security interests of the United States, we reserve the right to carry out such strikes, and that criteria in some – well, to a large extent, does take into consideration the threat.

QUESTION: Look, I'm just – just --

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- cynically suggesting that maybe you decided that after taking him out for political reasons that you have to say there was an imminent threat against U.S. forces.

MR TONER: No. I can assure that these decisions are not made lightly nor are they made blindly without a knowledge that our forces or those forces that we support are in imminent danger.

QUESTION: And the risk has now been reduced thanks to his successful killing?

MR TONER: Well, again, I mean, no one can say that, obviously. And as Arshad said, this may – they may double down, but when given the opportunity to remove a bad actor from the battlefield, we took it.

QUESTION: Mark, just one more.

MR TONER: Yeah, Tejinder.

QUESTION: That you just mentioned that and that was also given the reason for taking him out --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- that he was a threat to the lives of the U.S. soldiers, citizens. What about – it's eight years since the Mumbai attacks took place. Six Americans died. And what – and the actors, the masterminds, they are freely roaming around in Pakistan. So what are we doing about that?

MR TONER: Well, we continue to urge the Pakistani Government to cooperate with the Indian authorities to fully investigate these attacks. It was a terrible tragedy; you're absolutely right. We want to see justice done and we continue to urge Pakistani cooperation.

Please --

QUESTION: Why didn't we even urge Pakistanis to take care of Taliban leader?

MR TONER: Well, that's an ongoing conversation that we have with the Pakistani authorities. They need to address all groups operating on their soil – Taliban groups that are operating on their soil and their territory. We've urged them to do so in the past. We continue to urge them to do so and have worked with them on addressing the very real threat on their own soil.

Please.

QUESTION: Members of the Syrian opposition have made a proposal that de Mistura responded positively to: to appoint five vice presidents within the transitional government, and there would be two from the opposition, two from the government, and a neutral that would make up the five. What do you – do you support such a --

MR TONER: Michael, I haven't seen the proposal. What I would say to it, without having seen the substance of it, is if this is – you said this is the Syrian opposition that has put this forward to --

QUESTION: Yeah, the --

MR TONER: Members of.

QUESTION: Members of.

MR TONER: Okay. I mean, look – I mean, this is one of the reasons why we would like to see them get back to Geneva and talk about these kinds of compromises, these kinds of proposals that can hopefully lead to a peaceful political transition. And that's part of Staffan's role, is to mediate that effort. But as much as these new ideas can be shared and talked about and discussed, we would encourage that.

QUESTION: But the concept – so the concept itself you don't object to?

MR TONER: Again, this is really – and we've talked about this before – this is between the HNC and the regime to sit down, obviously under UN mediation, and to talk through this stuff. So we don't have any specific complaints or objections to this.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the resumption of the talks? I believe Mr. de Mistura came out today and said that the – he --

MR TONER: He – I haven't seen his – I know he was giving a closed briefing at the UN Security Council. We have said before, I mean, obviously it is for him to speak to when those talks would resume. We'd like to see them resume as soon as possible.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on a --

MR TONER: And with no preconditions, as he said.

Please.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on a separate proposal to give Germany a more prominent role with the ISSG? It would be sort of on the same tier with Russia and the United States as far as leading the process.

MR TONER: Pam, I honestly have not seen that – that proposal yet. Obviously Germany is a strong partner within the ISSG and beyond the ISSG, and a strong ally, so we would always take that – undertake any consideration of their playing a larger role.

Yes.

QUESTION: Yeah, hi. Alex Emmons with The Intercept. I wanted to ask about Yemen.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: And this is in light of a report that Amnesty International released on Monday.

MR TONER: Okay.

QUESTION: You have repeatedly called on all sides in that conflict to take proactive steps to protect civilians, correct?

MR TONER: Correct.

QUESTION: So should one of those steps by the Saudi-led coalition be to stop using U.S. and UK-produced cluster bombs?

MR TONER: Well, look, what we've talked about – and we do believe that the – Yemen – there is a UN-led process now, peace talks that are being hosted in Kuwait, and we are strongly encouraging those talks to continue. We do want to see the cessation of hostilities there deepened and strengthened and to be maintained, because we've seen far too much violence in Yemen, not only violence targeting civilians, but also violence – sorry, humanitarian crisis that that has exacerbated. Let me finish.

In terms of – in terms of what you're talking about, which is the use of weaponry or cluster bombs, look, I'd have to refer you to the Saudis to speak to the types of strikes that they did carry out in Yemen. And let's remember that they were responding to a threat by the Houthis in Yemen against their own security, but I think overall what we want to see is an end to the violence and a peaceful process, a peaceful political process that ends the fighting altogether and allows humanitarian assistance to get to those who need it.

QUESTION: Sure, but in the meantime you've called on all the sides to take steps. So – and in your human rights report last year on Saudi Arabia, you acknowledged seven ground-fired rocket attacks into Yemen. And according to the research you cite from Human Rights Watch, all seven of those attacks involved U.S.-produced cluster bombs. So you've already addressed this. Should Saudi Arabia have a policy of not using those internationally-banned weapons in the meantime until peace is achieved?

MR TONER: Well, again, what we always do in terms of that kind of weapons use and when there's credible allegations or reports of their use or their misuse, we do take those up with the Saudi Government, but I don't have any more for you on that.

Please.

QUESTION: Can I move on --

MR TONER: Sure, Said.

QUESTION: -- to another topic?

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Palestinian-Israeli issue.

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: I know yesterday you talked a little bit about the new Israeli Government.

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: I wonder if you just would elaborate a little bit on this considering that the new defense minister has made some amazing threats like reinvading Gaza, doing a lot of other things and so on. So I wonder if you would address that just --

MR TONER: Well, look, I don't know if I can elaborate on it any more than what I said yesterday, which is we've seen reports – we – or we've seen the agreement that has been reached to expand the coalition. We also know that this is the most right-wing coalition in Israel's history. We've seen – or we know that many of its ministers have said they oppose a two-state solution. And what I said yesterday is the same as what I'm going to say today, is this raises legitimate questions about the direction that it may be headed in, the new Israeli Government may be headed in, and what kind of policies it's going to adopt. But we're going to judge this government by the course it charts and the actions it takes going forward. But yes, we are concerned.

QUESTION: Let me --

QUESTION: That was almost verbatim what you said yesterday, but yesterday you said you'd seen reports that it's the most rightwing government in Israeli history. You just said it is the most rightwing government in Israeli history. Is that a meme that you're adopting from the podium?

MR TONER: No, I mean, I'm just – I said I have nothing to add to what I already said yesterday. I think all we're saying is some of the individuals in this new government have said, frankly, that they oppose a two-state solution, which is concerning, but yes, that it's – that we've seen reports that it's the most rightwing government in Israel's history. Sorry.

QUESTION: If this government proves to be more obstinate, as it is inclined to be, in terms of negotiations and perhaps it's playing a double game there and so on, or – will you support then any kind of international effort basically to get some sort of a peace process going? Because I think it was attributed to the Secretary himself, that he said he's not confident in Mr. Netanyahu's pronouncement that he wants direct negotiations and so on.

MR TONER: Look, Said, we're never going to abandon efforts to bring about a two-state solution. We said we support direct talks, obviously, but not for the sake of talking, only when both sides are ready to come and talk real issues. The Secretary – to your broader issue, I'll go back to what the Secretary said at – when he did his press conference in Brussels, which was he's going to work with other countries, other entities, other governments, and he's going to – if it can bring about new ideas – I mean, his exact quote was: I'll work with the French. I'll work with the Egyptians. I'll work with the Arab community. I'll work with the global community to see if we can find a way to help the parties see their way to come back to the negotiating table and hopefully reach a final status agreement. We're not there yet. We're not even close to being there yet. But --

QUESTION: Shouldn't --

MR TONER: -- we need to keep at it. And we're not – and I don't mean to say by my previous remarks – sorry, let me finish – that we've abandoned that. I only meant to say that we're concerned, but we will judge this new government by its actions.

QUESTION: So do you think that people ought to read the Secretary's statement as giving impetus to the Paris process or an alternative to it that is called the Egyptian alternative and so on?

MR TONER: Sure. I think what the Secretary is --

QUESTION: Which one is --

MR TONER: Sure. I think what the Secretary is trying to – or meant by his response is that he's working with the French, and indeed, he's going to Paris next week. He's working with the Egyptians; he was in Cairo just last week. He's in constant contact with all of these groups and looking at what the best course is going forward and what the best ideas are and how we can leverage the collective will of these different groups and entities or governments in order to encourage the two parties to get back to the table.

QUESTION: With your indulgence and my colleagues' --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- I have a couple more questions.

MR TONER: Yeah. Sure.

QUESTION: The only human rights organization in Israel that has reported on the abuses of the occupation forces, B'Tselem, issued a statement saying that they will no longer submit or file complaints and so on because it just hits a brick wall and doesn't go anywhere. So I wonder if you have any comment on that. And what should the alternative be?

MR TONER: Sure. We've seen the reports, obviously. I'm going to let them – their words stand for themselves or speak for themselves. I'm going to let them speak to the rationale behind their decision. We have said that we always are concerned about credible reports of excessive use of force. We always urge fair and transparent investigations by the appropriate authorities, and that's Israeli. We expect the Israeli authorities, when there are credible allegations, like those, that we expect the Israeli authorities to address them.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR TONER: Yes, sir, Tejinder.

QUESTION: Yeah. Fully understanding that you do not from the podium comment on the individual visa cases --

MR TONER: Right.

QUESTION: -- I have a question about the transparency in the H-1B lottery system, the visa lottery system. There is a case that has been filed by two major Americans organizations against the U.S. Administration to bring out what goes on in that lottery system.

MR TONER: You're talking about the H-1B visa?

QUESTION: H-1B visa.

MR TONER: So hold on one second. You know what, I don't have it in front of me. I can get you something on that, Tejinder. I apologize.

QUESTION: The question is actually about that – one of them in their statement said that you put that application and that it goes into a kind of a black box and then comes out some – so the State Department is very transparent --

MR TONER: That – I'm sorry, that the allegation is that what? It goes into some kind of black box? I mean, look, I can assure you that our H-1B visa process is the same as – it's run the same in India; it's run the same around the world. There's no kind of subterfuge. It's a very transparent process.

QUESTION: Yeah, but the lottery system, where – how it is like – do they put it in a box, draw the – lottery or how --

MR TONER: Well, I don't know if it's – I can't speak to, like – it's a lottery system. I mean, it's – I don't know that it's quite they drop it into a box and somebody reaches in, but it is a lottery system, and so by its very nature it is not fixed. It is – it's a very open process. So I don't have anything more to add to it than that.

QUESTION: Can I ask a question about Egypt?

MR TONER: Except I can't the points on it.

QUESTION: Can I ask about Egypt?

MR TONER: Of course you can.

QUESTION: Are you aware of Muslim-Christian violence that occurred today and yesterday in upper Egypt that might bring back similar episodes as we have seen in 2011 and '12 and so on? Are you aware of that?

MR TONER: I'm not aware of those reports, Said. But of course we're concerned about any interethnic or interreligious violence.

QUESTION: When you check out these reports, there's another element of them --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- is that the Egyptian journalist who first reported on the violence has been arrested for reporting the violence. So there's two things to comment on there --

MR TONER: Okay.

QUESTION: -- when you've checked it out.

MR TONER: Well, I think you know where --

QUESTION: They've --

MR TONER: I think you know where we stand on the arrests of journalists trying to do their job.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR TONER: Michael.

QUESTION: I've got one on Russia.

MR TONER: Okay.

QUESTION: Did you see the statement from the president of Ossetia that they want to – they're looking to conduct a referendum to join Russia in 2017?

MR TONER: Yes, I think I do. Hold on. I mean, obviously, you know where we stand on this.

QUESTION: I don't, no.

MR TONER: Well, sure you do. Our stance on Georgia – we support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, and that includes South Ossetia. So we do not recognize any attempt for – by South Ossetia to break free or to claim sovereign – or claim its --

QUESTION: So it's definitely something you're not supporting?

MR TONER: It's definitely something we're not supporting.

That's it, guys? Thanks.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:20 p.m.)



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