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PRESS CONFERENCE: Brig. Gen. Lanza, MNF-I, Oct. 12, 2009

Multi-National Force-Iraq

Monday, 12 October 2009

Brig. Gen. Stephen Lanza, director, CJ-9, Multi-National Force - Iraq, holds a News Briefing to discuss the MNF-I security environment

PRESS CONFERENCE:
BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN LANZA, DIRECTOR OF CJ-9, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ

DATE: October 12, 2009

TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL LTD.

PARTICIPANTS:
Brigadier General Lanza and reporters

*REP1 = REPORTER 1

[PH] = PHONETIC SPELLING

BG LANZA: As-Salāmu `Alaykum and good afternoon. Thank you very much for joining me today. And today I want to provide you an update on Multi-National Force—Iraq’s activities as we partner with the Iraqi Security Forces under the security agreement, discuss the current security environment, and where we are on today’s very important issues such as efforts to reduce Arab-Kurd tensions. And finally I’d like to discuss what lies ahead as we progress under the security agreement to support our Iraqi partners for Iraq’s national elections and the U.S. force’s responsible drawdown.

In line with the security agreement on 30 June, 2009, the Iraqi Security Forces assumed primary security responsibilities within the cities, and U.S. combat forces departed the cities to work with the Iraqi Security Forces to establish a defensive depth across Iraq. U.S. combat forces today are conducting partnered, full-spectrum operations in the belts surrounding the cities and borders to deny extremists safe havens and to reduce the flow of lethal aid and foreign fighters into Iraq.

The 120,000 U.S. troops in Iraq today continue to push hard. They push hard day and night to preserve the hard-fought freedom won for the Iraqi people and to continue to secure their safety. They continue to train, advise, and strengthen and support the Iraqi Security Forces. They continue to secure the borders and belts to reduce violent extremism and to reduce the flow of foreign fighters and weapons into Iraq. And finally, they continue to provide strategy development and support to reduce the ongoing Arab-Kurd tensions in the North. Our combined forces remain focused to secure the Iraqi population and to enable Iraq to continue to move forward.

Nine months after we have implemented the security agreement and three months after U.S. combat forces turned over responsibility for security in Iraq’s cities, we do see continued improvement in Iraq’s security environment through the combined efforts of Iraq and U.S. forces. Our combined efforts have significantly reduced security incidents and attacks. Although the bombings in Baghdad on the 19th of August were a lapse in security, we do believe this was an isolated incident and are encouraged by the quick response of the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces to make necessary adjustments. The Government of Iraq reassessed its security measures, adjusted, enhanced, and increased its security operations, and continually assesses its security posture and readiness. We are confident that the Government of Iraq is doing the right things in these areas.

Although the gains in security continue to be reversible, the hard-fought work of our Iraqi partners and U.S. forces continue to yield positive and tangible results towards continued improvement of security and stability in Iraq. For example, nationwide attacks were [inaudible] before January of 2004. This represents a decrease in attacks of more than 85% since the surge in operations began in June of 2007. And most recently, the level of violence normally seen during Ramadan was noticeably lower than in many of the previous years and the lowest since we first came here in 2003. High-profile attacks also continue to decrease. In fact, nationwide, 51% fewer high-profile attacks have occurred in 2009 compared with this time in 2008. Across Iraq, Iraqi civilian deaths have decreased more than 90% since the surge, with a decrease of more than 90% for civilian wounded. Nationwide, attacks against civilians have decreased more than 80% since the surge, and more than 65% are lower than the 2008 weekly average. U.S. forces casualties have also decreased more than 90% since our surge in operations in June, 2007. And finally, Iraqi Security Force casualties have decreased more than 80% since the surge operations in June of 2007.

The 663,000-strong Iraqi Security Forces now lead the way to secure Iraq. The Iraqi Army and the federal employees continue to grow and mature as they improve counterinsurgency implementation, planning, and execution. In many cases, police primacy has been established in Iraqi cities. And we continue to work closely with our Iraqi partners to increase this presence and extend this positive trend.

Since the transition of security responsibilities in Iraq, U.S. force leaders state that the combination of U.S. technology and Iraqi Security Forces human intelligence has indeed enhanced their effectiveness for denying insurgents the opportunity to foment sectarian violence among the Iraqi people and to discredit national government institutions.

Certainly challenges remain. We assess Arab-Kurd tension as the number one driver of instability in Iraq. We are working very hard to help reduce tensions in Northern Iraq centered on what’s often referred to as the disputed areas. We are encouraged with the continual political dialog between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq. The United Nations, with their high-level task force, has begun a process for dialog; and we, the United States, fully support this effort.

The goal of course is to ensure the Iraqi people are provided a secure and stable environment. Iraq is a very strategically important country in the Middle East, as you all know. Iraq’s neighbors have a keen interest in the events inside Iraq and are watching very closely as events unfold. Stability here underpins regional security. There are some who are attempting to influence events in Iraq, namely the upcoming national elections. Disruptive external influences complicate the security situation in Iraq through direct support to violent extremists or indirectly with proxy groups that are now inside Iraq. This situation highlights the importance of our mission in the belts and borders to ensure security for the population and an environment in which Iraq’s elections can be conducted credibly and legitimately.

Iraq is now moving forward towards national elections in January of 2010. National elections, with the successful completion of voter registration update[?] in September, have showed a vastly improved security environment, enabling the elections to occur. Voter registration occurred in a vastly improved security environment. Nearly 300 political entities have also registered to participate in the upcoming elections. These are very encouraging signs that the Iraqi public is indeed embracing representative government and is eager to participate in choosing their governmental leaders. This is indeed a new era and a new opportunity for Iraq.

Iraq’s electoral process is benefitting from the experience of five previous elections such as the recent Kurdish parliamentary and presidential elections in July and the provincial elections held in Iraq in January. Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission, or IHEC, is the lead agency for conducting the elections. We are confident IHEC will conduct the elections in a fair and impartial manner. Furthermore, international observers from the United Nations and other international organizations will be present to ensure the national elections are credible and legitimate, with its results ready for certification by the Supreme Court of Iraq.

At the request of the Government of Iraq and in accordance with the security agreement, U.S. forces may assist to ensure a security environment that allows for a safe, credible, and legitimate election. We remain fully neutral in regards to parties and outcomes of these elections.

As we move forward, our force is in transition to a planned composition of six advise-and-assist brigades, the first of which arrived last month and is now operating in Anbar Province. These brigades retain combat capability, but are tailored to support development of Iraqi civil capacity. The transition to advise-and-assist brigades is just another example of how the United States military continues to adapt to the changing operational environment as we provide support to the government and the people of Iraq.

In terms of our responsible drawdown, we remain on plan and in accordance with the security agreement. First and foremost, our forces remain mission focused. Any reduction in our forces to include our brigade combat teams is based on an increased Iraqi Security Force capability and our assessment of the security environment. The reduction of our force levels is happening responsibly and deliberately. Our responsible drawdown timeline includes flexibility contingent on our assessment of the overall security improvements, operational requirements, and the capabilities and capacities of the Iraqi Security Forces. This allows retention of these troops’ experiences and valuable relationships that allow us to enhance our support for the Iraqi government and its security forces during this critical election period.

Our plan to decrease the number of U.S. forces from roughly 120,000 to approximately 50,000 during 2010 is on track. Much of this drawdown will occur after the newly elected government is seated. Throughout our responsible drawdown, we’ll remain closely partnered with the Iraqi Security Forces as they mature and grow in capability and capacity.

On the near horizon, an Iraqi investment conference will be held in Washington, D.C. next week to bring together businesses and Iraqi businesses and government leaders to discuss investment opportunities that will help diversify Iraq’s economy. This is truly an encouraging step made with the confidence in the improving security environment here in Iraq.

We continue our focus on security of the Iraqi population with the Iraqi Security Forces, working hand in hand with them as they have the lead across the country. U.S. forces do continue to advise, assist, and enable these operations in the cities, and provide full-spectrum operations outside the cities. As a result, our combined efforts have reduced security incidents and attacks. And finally, under the tenants of the security agreement, we are implementing our flexible, responsible drawdown.

I thank you very much for coming this afternoon, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Shukran jaziilan.

Sir.

REP1: When you say that the U.S. forces will be involved in security for the elections, [unintelligible].... Yes, sir. [Unintelligible], AFP. When you talk about sec-...U.S. forces in...helping with security in elections, does that means there will be American troops in Iraqi cities patrolling the streets? Can you give us an idea of what that might entail?

BG LANZA: Sure. Let me give you an idea of what that will entail. We’re involved to enable the Government of Iraq. The lead for security of the national elections is the responsibility of the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. We provide enabling capabilities; we provide partnership; we provide the ability to train, coordinate, and advise them as they prepare for the national elections. But the Iraqis have primacy for the security of these elections, and it is the Iraqi Security Forces that will lead the Government of Iraq through these elections in January.

Let’s get one from Iraq. Sir.

REP2: [Asks question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: The question is in relation to the high-profile attacks that are occurring and our ability, with our capabilities, to mitigate those high-profile attacks, I think that was the question and it’s a very good question.

Let me be frank to say that we’ve always said that challenges will continue to persist in Iraq. It’s important to know that the high-profile attacks that occurred on 19 August and the attacks in Ramadi yesterday are designed to do two things: One is to foment sectarian violence in Iraq and amongst its people. As most of you know I was here a few years ago and I saw exactly how devastating those high-profile attacks could be when you have sect on sect, when you have those attacks that are in retribution to attacks that have occurred. The second reason for those attacks is to fracture the national government. It’s the breakdown of the national unity that the political parties are trying to gain as they move towards the national election.

So indeed those high-profile attacks did occur, but the purpose of those high-profile attacks were not achieved. The minister of foreign affairs, Minister Zabari, was conducting operations in that building after the attack. The minister of finance moved to a different location to continue to run the Ministry of Finance to support this country. This is indeed a crucial point. So that while the high-profile attacks occurred, this government, this country and its security forces remain committed to not only running the government, but taking care of its people. More importantly, the Iraqi Security Forces remained in the cities. The Iraqi Security Forces stood their ground. And the Iraqi Security Forces learned from that event. So on 19 August, there was a small lapse in security. Indeed, for those attacks to happen there has to be a lapse in security. But the Iraqi Security Forces matured and grew from that attack and they have indeed gotten better.

The attack in Ramadi yesterday was designed once again to attack the government and the legal institutions that have made Ramadi, Fallujah, and Anbar Province much better than it was a few years ago. The provincial governor, as you know, has done tremendous things in Anbar Province. He was just elected Foreign Direct-Investment Man of the Year. He’s initiated policies; he’s initiated a plan to move Anbar forward. That does not bode well with certain violent extremist groups that want to continue to fracture this country, and that attack in Ramadi was a reminder of that.

But I caution everybody again to remember that while the task of that attack occurred, that provincial governor, who was in that building yesterday, remained in his job, the security forces in Anbar remained committed, and Anbar will continue to move forward. Our enablers are designed to continue to help the Iraqi people. They will not stop every attack. But certainly the attacks are much lower in 2009 than in any time since we have been here in 2003.

There are some other metrics that are important about what the security environment in Iraq has been...has enabled the Iraqis to do. Because of the increased security in Iraq, we have the opportunity now to increase private investment in this country. The private investment conference that’s going to occur in Washington, D.C. is another opportunity for the Iraqis to bring in private investment to stimulate the economy, to deregulate the economy, to increase jobs that increase stability and employ people. Iraqi has conducted bilateral negotiations with many of its neighbors. Iraq has had a conference in Istanbul to look at how we’re going to conduct security with its neighbors. Iraq is moving towards a conference for bids, the second one they’re going to have in December, to discuss how we’re going to do...or how Iraq is going to do oil and gas.

So while we focus on the high-profile attack and it’s very easy to do that, I want to put that high-profile attack in context that the purpose of those attacks has not been achieved, and we continue to remain supportive partners of this country and remain committed to the Iraqi Security Forces as they build capability and capacity.

That’s a great question. Thank you very much for asking it. Yes, sir.

REP3: John [Unintelligible] with Fox News. You’ve talked about some outside forces attempting to influence the national election. Could you perhaps be more specific about which of these outside forces...where are they coming from, what are they doing, where are they doing it? Are they involved in these high-profile attacks, August 19, for example? Do you know more about who is behind that?

BG LANZA: Going back to your question, your question, the attacks on 19 August and the attacks in Ramadi yesterday have all the signatures of a high-profile attack planned by al-Qaida. We have seen those high-profile attacks before. We have seen the high-profile attack where there’s the initial initiation of the VBIED, followed by another attack against first responders. And that was truly a heinous thing that happened in Ramadi yesterday.

And I just want to highlight that as the first responders did come to help people yesterday, the firemen and the police in Ramadi, they were then attacked by another explosion. And to make it further worse is that the hospital where these people were being treated was attacked. There is no more disruptive force, there is no more heinous force in this country than those that would attack people in that manner. And I just have to be on the record to say that is heinous, it’s disgraceful, and it’s something that we believe that the Iraqi people no longer desire to move back to, and I think this has galvanized the support of the Iraqi people even more.

Now, back to your question about malign influences. Iraq as a sovereign nation is doing everything they can right now to move against the malign influence by some that would indeed like to fracture this country and some that would not like to see the elections occur in a credible and legitimate manner. It is no secret that foreign fighters have come into Iraq from Syria. But what’s important is that the Iraqi Security Forces and the border forces as they mature and grow in capability and capacity, we have limited the number greatly of those foreign fighters that have come in from Syria. More importantly, there is influence from Iran; there is malign influence in this country, whether it be in money, whether it be in training, whether it be in resources or weapons systems that have come into this country with the attempt to not only destabilize this government, but to cause problems during the election.

Iraq is now a sovereign country. Iraq deserves responsible partners. It deserves responsible neighbors. It deserves countries that surround it that want to contribute to the stability and economic prosperity in this region. And this government and these people have been through a lot in the last six years, and they certainly deserve responsible neighbors that want to move forward with everything that the government and these people have been through. And right now there is an opportunity for that to happen, and the will and the determination of the Iraqi people and their government will allow this to occur.

Yes, sir. And then we’ll go back here. Yes, sir.

REP4: As-Salāmu `Alaykum. [Continues asking question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: That’s a very good question. We’re talking about what we can do in the disputed areas as we move towards the elections, which is the question, and what we’re doing right now to help work that. So thank you very much for the question.

As you know, the seam in the disputed areas right now is a very contentious area with al-Qaida that operates in that area. And the one thing that is agreed on in that disputed area is the fact that al-Qaida has a seam by which to conduct operations to destabilize that area, attack soft targets, and to continue to try to get a foothold in that area.

There is a window of opportunity right now to start looking at how to mitigate and resolve Arab-Kurd tensions. And some of you may have heard about an initiative right now that the Prime Minister, Maliki, and President Barzani have looked at for MNF-I to help doing this. And what is being asked right now of us by the prime minister and the president is to look at an initiative and some exploratory meetings by which we can look at security in the disputed territories. And that is something where we’d bring the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army together for the good of the population there to close that seam where al-Qaida has had freedom of movement.

And right now there is an exploratory commission that is set up with key leaders from the Government of Iraq, key leaders from the KRG, and also the commanding general of MNF-I to look at initiatives on how this could be done. I just want to say right now that no initiatives have been put forth, and that the committee right now is still in the exploratory measures of doing this, and they are still looking at what initiatives they could recommend.

Any initiative that would be done in those disputed territories would have to do a couple of things. First of all, it would have to be approved by the prime minister and the president, by Prime Minister Maliki and President Barzani. Second, it would have to be in accordance with the security agreement. And third, that any involvement by the U.S. in that operation would be temporary in nature.

But to answer your question, we are going through every procedure possible right now to bring those two elements together for the good of Iraq. And right now, since the success of the Kurdish elections, there is an opportunity to do that. And we see movement on both sides and a desire on both sides to want to resolve this so that the Government of Iraq can continue to move forward, and that both Arab and Kurd can resolve these issues.

Kirkuk is still a contentious issue, it will remain a contentious issue, and we hope that it will not coincide with stopping the national elections that need to occur in conjunction with the constitution. But eventually the issue of Kirkuk has to be resolved, and it has to be resolved by the Government of Iraq.

This initiative right now that you have brought up, if indeed it would come to fruition, would be one means by bringing these parties together to not only resolve the disputed territories, but also looking at to resolve Kirkuk in the future, after the national elections.

Sir. Back here. You had a question.

REP5: [Asks question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: The question was about potential camps, speculating that there are camps that exist in Syria to train foreign fighters, and then what is the role of American intelligence with those camps. I believe that was the question.

As I said earlier, there is no doubt that foreign fighters do transit from Syria. As far as the Government of Iraq and their allegations or what they’re actually working on right now, I would not begin to speculate on the intelligence of what the Iraqis are looking at or our intelligence systems.

But we do acknowledge that foreign fighters do navigate from Syria and come into Iraq. What I can tell you is that the numbers have decreased dramatically. And I can tell you that there is obviously some enabling mechanism in Syria to do that. What I can’t really say is that the government of Syria is involved in that, and I would not begin to question the prime minister or the government in that...in his role in saying that. But suffice it to say, there is involvement by people who enable these forces to come through: they receive money, and they receive the capability by which they move through from Syria to Iraq. But as I said earlier, that is stopping...it’s not stopping, but it’s certainly slowing down on the flow of foreign fighters because of the work being done on the borders right now, specifically by the Iraqi border patrol enabled by some of our technological systems and the Iraqi human intelligence has made great improvements on the border. Thanks for that question.

Let’s go to [Unintelligible] and [unintelligible] you and Gina. So [Unintelligible].

REP6: [Unintelligible] is my coworker. Jonathan Blakely.

BG LANZA: [Unintelligible], my fault.

REP6: I’ll take it as a compliment though. I appreciate it. The U.S. has closed down a number of prison camps in recent weeks, either transferred or released prisoners such as...and closed down Bucca. Is there any evidence that you know of that any of the attacks are committed by folks who were recently detained? And also, if you could just describe the situa-...how would you describe the situation in Anbar Province today? Would you call it deteriorating, or would you just say this is...yesterday was just one of those, you know...?

BG LANZA: Let me answer your second question first. I would say—and for those of you who have been here before and understand just how contentious Anbar was—that Anbar is more stable now than it’s ever been. And I think the attack yesterday was certainly a high-profile attack. I’m not going to say it’s an anomaly. It’s certainly something very serious. It’s certainly something we’re very concerned about. But overall security in Anbar right now is the best it’s been.

There are some sporadic attacks, and there was that high-profile attack yesterday. But when you look at it in the context of the hundreds of attacks that occurred in Anbar, when you look at the battles we’ve had in Fallujah, when you look at some of the issues we’ve had in Ramadi, we have one advise-and-assist brigade there right now. And overall Anbar is the most secure it’s been since 2003.

Now, to go back to your first question, we are moving and making progress right now on our detention facilities. As you know, we closed Bucca, and that was instrumental on moving forward on what we want to do about closing down our detention facilities. I have no empirical data that those individuals that were released contributed to some of the attacks that you’re mentioning. What I do know is that as we transfer them to the Iraqis, it is the Iraqis that determine disposition. So they are transferred, they are delivered to the Iraqis, and then disposition of those, predicated on a warrant, is decided upon in terms of what the Iraqis want to do for disposition.

And certainly you could draw some inferences that obviously the more former insurgents you put into the security environment, that could have some kind of result. But I have no empirical data or, you know, data that would stipulate to say the fact that we’ve released X amount of detainees contributes directly to some of the attacks that you’ve mentioned.

And once again, I would go back to the fact that we are at the lowest number of high-profile attacks since I’ve been here. We’re half of what we were last year. Civilian casualties are the lowest they’ve ever been in the country; they’re roughly between 120 and 140. And that’s not me saying that, that’s the minister of health in this country saying that, and the International Commission of the Red Cross.

So we’ll continue to move forward. It’s a great question, but I can’t, you know, one to one ascertain that question that it’s directly attributable.

Let’s go to Gina, and then we’ll go back, and then we’ll go to [Unintelligible]. So Gina first, did you...? I’m sorry. [Unintelligible]. Which one? Gina, and then we’ll go in the back.

UNIDENTIFIED: [Inaudible].

BG LANZA: I thought you had your hand up. I’m sorry.

REP7: Gina Chon, Wall Street Journal. With the IA, Peshmerga, and U.S., this possible joint force or joint patrol plan, has there been any sense of who would actually be in charge of this group? Because I heard that was one of the things that may be still holding things up [unintelligible]. And then my second question was there is some worry among politicians here that the elections could be delayed or may even not happen because the sides are so far apart. Is that also a concern of the U.S. military? And what would be the contingency plans? Thanks.

BG LANZA: Let’s talk about the elections first. The government is entitled to have an election per their constitution. And as you know, by 31 January, the Government of Iraq needs to have this election as per its constitution. We’re encouraged by the debate that’s going on right now and the debate, obviously, that you’ve seen in the newspapers about the open versus closed list. But there’s an encouraging debate that’s going on makes this country show, indeed, signs of improvement in terms of people wanting to have representative government.

We do believe there will be an election in January. And we do believe there will be an election law. And we do believe that there will be some consensus in the Council of Representatives to indeed move forward to have the election. I can’t tell you, Gina, what kind of amendment they’re going to have, but they’ve already made significant progress with three major amendments to the election law that have already gone through the COR. The key one right now is the open versus closed list.

But we’re encouraged by this. We’re encouraged by the debate. And we’re encouraged by the fact that the people in this country do want an election. And I think the people you have talked to out in the streets, I think the political leaders want to see an election in this country. There is true desire for representative leadership.

And I think the impact of that election moving to the right is something that we, as the U.S. forces, would ascertain in our assessment of the security environment, because obviously as you move to the election to the right, there will have to be some decision points based on our assessment and based on what the prime minister would like us to do to continue our support.

Obviously we have our plan for responsible drawdown, it’s tied[?] for the security agreement. But our plan is flexible enough that we have certain decision points along the way based on assessments and based on what the Government of Iraq would ask us to do. Now, let’s go back to your first question again.

REP7: The Arab-Kurd [unintelligible].

BG LANZA: The Arab-Kurd, yes. As I said earlier, there is an initiative right now in terms of exploring what could be done to mitigate some of the tension in the Arab-Kurd area. There has been no proposals that have been put forward. But one of the things that would have to be discussed if a proposal is put on the table is how do you command and control this? How do you do this with the operations center? How do you do this with the provincial joint command and control center? And how do you do this in terms of who is actually going to be in charge of running the operation? And then as you bring the two parties together on the ground, what is the means by which one party would be in charge of the other, and how do you do that so that they’re complementary and mutually supporting? It’s a great question that has not been resolved yet, but certainly that’s one of the things that would have to be considered in any contingency or in any course of action that would be put forward.

Yes, sir. In the back.

REP8: [Asks question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: Yeah, the question goes back to what Gina said about our ability to do a responsible drawdown if indeed there is a shift in the elections to the right.

We are committed by the security agreement to be out of Iraq by December of 2011. Okay? We are committed to be out of the country, as everyone here knows. I think the key for us is our ability to be flexible in our responsible drawdown and to be able to look at the security environment, assess the security environment, and then have certain decision points along the way that allow us—not us—but that allow the commanding general to make recommendations on what he would need to do. And our plan is flexible enough to do that.

So once again, I don’t know what’s going to happen. Obviously we’re very supportive of having these elections in January. But anything that would move to the right would then have to be assessed and evaluated based on its merits of what indeed, as I said earlier, what the Government of Iraq would need, and then recommendations from the commanding general to the national command authority on adjustments in his responsible drawdown plan.

I will tell you we’ve been doing this for awhile now. We’ve already...since January, 23,000 troops have already returned back to the States; 150,000 pieces of equipment have already returned back to the States. So we’ve been making some inroads in doing this in conjunction with our normal operations here. And we have a plan right now, what we call “thinning the lines”, where we’re doing this so that we don’t lose capability and capacity throughout Iraq. But instead of sending brigade combat teams home, we would do it by battalions. This would still give us capability and capacity across Iraq, but we would make those assessments to actually pull battalions out collectively so that there would be a brigade equivalent, and then at a decisive point to be done with the commanding general, is send those organizations back to the States. But we’re on track to execute that and we’re certainly on track to implement the security agreement.

And I want everybody to be perfectly aware of this and be perfectly understanding when I say this, that we’re fully implementing the security agreement right now, and that anything we would do right now, whether it be Arab-Kurd and whether it be any decision points or anything to support the Government of Iraq is 100% in accordance with the security agreement. That is a very, very strong point and we are living up to our agreements by signing that document with the Government of Iraq.

Rob.

REP9: Yeah, Rob [Unintelligible], New York Times. You mentioned that we have 140,000 troops here now.

BG LANZA: It’s going to be 120,000 by the end of October.

REP9: OK. Actually that was my next question. But 140[000] now is pretty much what we had pre-June 30th if I’m not mistaken. And why haven’t we been able to move a little faster drawing down considering that the violence has gone down to such a degree?

BG LANZA: Well, I think we have, Rob. I think we’ve drawn down 23,000 since January. We’re roughly at 120,000 right now. I think there’ll be some decisions and some discussion about what we could be at for the elections. But I really think that the elections will be the point of departure by which we then look at assessment for a true drawdown and really start moving our numbers from, let’s say somewhere between 120[000] and 110,000 by the elections, to getting us to that 50,000 by August of 2010.

And I think right now the decision point would be is that we want to have the right capability to support the Government of Iraq as a sovereign partner, and we want to have the right capability here to continue to build civil capacity and to continue to build capability and capacity with the Iraqi Security Forces. Having that force here right now gives us that strategic capability. And this allows us to look at economic stability, it allows us to look at political support, and it allows us to look at security in terms of backing the Iraqi Security Forces with those enablers that this gentleman asked me about.

But I would envision, Rob that sometime after the election, perhaps 30 or 60 days, there would be another decision point based on another assessment of the security environment that would then look at moving more forces out of this country to get us to 50,000 by August of 2010.

Let’s go back...who did not ask a question yet? Sir, let’s go here, and then we’ll come back here and here. Yes, sir.

REP10: [Asks question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: Well, let me answer the ques-...that part first. First of all, the Government of Iraq has a government, there is a government of Iraq right now. There is a sovereign government in Iraq right now that was elected by the people. This is not a government that has been put in place by the Americans. And it is not a government right now that the Americans are continuing to have to prop up. The Government of Iraq stands on its own merits. The Government of Iraq is responsible as a sovereign nation to secure this country for essential services of the population and to protect the quality of life and to secure its borders.

We stand here as sovereign partners with them, as strategic partners with them, excuse me, to help them in that endeavor. And our ability to be here until 2011 provides the physical and psychological support for the Iraqi government to help them build up capacity. So I would not say that the Government of Iraq is not capable of standing on their own. They truly are capable of standing on their own and they’ve shown they’ve been able to do that, specifically what the Iraqi Security Forces have been able to do in the cities since 30 June. And I would say also that with some of the indicators of stability that I talked about earlier such as where the country is going economically, such as some of the bilateral discussions they’ve had with its neighbors, some of the discussions they’re doing on bringing in private investment, I think the government is well ahead right now to move forward on its own.

Now, as far as the elections go, I think that’s the same question we discussed earlier. Indeed, the constitution stipulates that by 31 January they should have an election in Iraq. We stand ready with our capabilities to support the Government of Iraq.

But let me be perfectly clear, this election is planned, prepared, and executed by the Government of Iraq. And what’s important to understand is that what’s going on in Iraq with this election is indeed the responsibility of the Iraqi government to include its security. What’s very good to see is that the DEC right now, which is the Data Entry Center, is the only one of its kind right now in the Middle East. So everything right now for the elections is being done by, with, and through the Government of Iraq. And I think that’s a very important point and it’s certainly indicative of where this country wants to go in the future.

But I want to make it clear that we stand here to support the Government of Iraq with our capabilities, but they continue to stand on their own merits as a sovereign nation. And we need to remember that.

OK, yes, sir. Sir, right here, and then we’ll go over here.

REP11: [Unintelligible] again. Can you tell us what the status is of this...of the proposed referendum on the security agreement? As far as you know, is it going to happen? And if it does recommend that the security agreement not be adopted or if the referendum falls, how does that affect your plan to drawdown? And secondly, what is the status in terms of how much equipment the U.S. military will be leaving behind in terms of vehicles and things like that?

BG LANZA: The first part of the question is...let’s talk about the equipment first. We have 3.1 million pieces of equipment here right now. We have gone through a very laborious procedure, for those of you who’ve been associated with the military, for accountability of this equipment. The second part of this now, we have identified disposition of that equipment. We’ve identified what type of equipment is fully mission capable, what equipment needs repair, and what equipment right now is non-mission capable. So through our plan for responsible drawdown, there’s a very good assessment right now of that equipment. As part of that assessment, there’s also an understanding that perhaps some of that equipment that might be excess, and some of that equipment with our disposition instructions that can be left here to support the Iraqi Security Forces. And that’s part of what we’re identifying right now as we go through our procedures to do that.

Some of you may have talked to General Brown about this. The plan right now allows for that flexibility and it allows support, not only in identifying the readiness of the equipment, but also in the movement of that equipment by the various air and sea means to move it from the country. So we’ve gone through a very long procedure for that. But the key right now is to get accountability of it, to identify the readiness of it, and then determine disposition instructions for that equipment.

Now, the first part of your question?

REP11: About the referendum.

BG LANZA: About the referendum. The referendum and the referendum in terms of what he is talking about is the security agreement referendum. The referendum right now possibly could be part of the national elections in January, and certainly to do that would be under the purview of the Iraqi government. And to do that and the outcome of that would certainly be under the people that vote for the security agreement. The determination of the security agreement is obviously left up to the Iraqi people and we support whatever decision is made by the sovereign government of Iraq.

The execution of the security agreement should not have much of an impact on us in being able to execute our plan for responsible drawdown and also to continue for us to move forward with implementing the security agreement. The security agreement, indeed, if it was voted on in January, by the time it got through the different wickets to actually be gone through the COR and the Council of Ministers, it would basically be roughly three to four months, perhaps. And I say that without giving you empirical data or analysis, but I say that just looking at a quick timeline of what that would entail for us. But really, to be perfectly frank with you, it should not have much impact on our ability to drawdown, nor on our ability to execute the security agreement by December of 2011. And we’re prepared for whatever the desires of the Iraqi people are.

Yes, sir.

REP12: [Asks question in Arabic.]

BG LANZA: Let me back up and first put the context of just how far the Iraqi Security Forces have come. Six years ago when we started this, there really was no Iraqi Security Forces; we removed all of the security apparatus of this country. When I was here just a very few short years ago, we started to build the Iraqi Security Forces with capability and capacity. As some of you know, General Petraeus was the first major commander of MNSTC-I that started to do this. A few...a very few short years ago the Iraqi Security Forces did not remain in the cities, and the Iraqi Security Forces would be threatened and attacked and would not continue operations. The Iraqi Security Forces did not have an offensive stance. They were not very good at using intelligence.

But look at where the Iraqi Security Forces have come today. The Iraqi Security Forces remain vigilant in every city in this country. The Iraqi Security Forces have been attacked, but more importantly, the Iraqi Security Forces remain in the cities, they remain to support the Iraqi people.

A very few short years ago the public did not support their security forces; there was a lack of confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces. But if you go out today—and I’ve traveled all over Iraq and you know...and most of you know I was in Ramadi yesterday—if you talk to the people in Iraq right now, they will tell you they have support for their security forces, and that support has been earned. Now, we have spent a lot of time training and enabling those security forces and that’s our mission, that’s what strategic partners do, that’s what allies do, that’s what friends do; they work with their partners and they train and they make them better. And we’re still committed to do that until 2011.

There still are those that would like to threaten this country. There are still some violent actors in this country that would like to see Iraq be drug back to some of the violent dark days we have seen in the last few years, where the country was on the precipice of civil war. And some of you in here know exactly what I’m talking about. Some of you in here have lived through those dark times. The people of this country right now do not want to revert back to those days. And that’s extremely important. And they have shouldered a lot of the attacks on them and they have been magnificent in how well they have done with their patience. And they know that in the end of the day, the Iraqi Security Forces will be there for them. More importantly, we think that the government will continue to mature and be there for them as well.

But I think...my personal opinion in the future is that we will remain strategic partners of this country, and that as long as the MNF-I force is here, we have a mission to fulfill, and we will finish this mission well, and we will continue our mission to support the Iraqi Security Forces until December of 2011. After that, once again, I’m sure we will support this country by executing the Strategic Framework Agreement to continue to build civil institutions in this country, to support this government politically and economically. And I know our embassy will be here to do that.

And I’m sure there will be many discussions in the future about what type of capability perhaps needs to be here to support the Government of Iraq. We certainly welcome these discussions, but suffice it to say that as long as we have a mission here, MNF-I until December of 2011, we will finish this mission and continue to support our Iraqi partners by training and coordinating and advising them in the cities, and then conducting operations in the borders and belts to help secure this country. But thank you for that question.

Rob, back to you. We have time for two more? One more...two more.

REP9: General, after August 19th, there was a lot of discussion that there needed to be more integration of U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly high-tech stuff like electronics and surveillance, with the Iraqis. And some Iraqi commanders have complained, too, that they’re not getting the sort of access to that product they had prior to June 30th. Has there been progress in addressing those concerns?

BG LANZA: Yes, there has been progress on addressing those concerns. And, Rob, we’ve moved towards transparency in targeting, and what you’re alluding to is to make sure that we have transparent targeting, that the intel that’s provided by technological means makes it down to the Iraqi forces.

Now, since we started this on 30 June, we’ve done a much better job on integrating our command centers, we’ve done a much better job in the provinces with our operation center, and more importantly, our provincial joint command centers. So we’ve done a very good job not only in integrating this with the Iraqi Security Forces, but in sharing intelligence. And I can personally attest to that because just in a visit I had earlier, just in Northern Iraq, I went into one of the op centers, that the feeds and some of the information that we were getting was directly going into the Iraqi operations center with American elements in there with them as partners.

So we’ve been much better in transparent targeting. And I think you can see that in some of the results of the operations that have gone on. And this transparent targeting that’s going on and the sharing of information is something that certainly contributed to the Iraqis being able to conduct operations and our ability to continue to enable and support them.

Yes, sir. Let’s do two more. We’ll do...let’s do here. Just one and one.

REP12: I just want to come back to the interference from abroad, or from the near abroad. You talked about the border with Syria and the level of...the number of foreign fighters coming in being reduced, therefore, are we talking about interference from the Iranian side? And can we be a little more specific...

BG LANZA: Sure.

REP12: ...about what exactly you’re seeing from Iran as you see a level of interference?

BG LANZA: Let’s be a little bit more....

REP12: ...increasing?

BG LANZA: OK. In Maysan Province, for example, we continue to find caches of weapons systems, some of those attributed to Iran. And if you’ve been out to Maysan Province, and I think some of you maybe went out to visit 41AD, we saw a large cache of weapons systems that can be somewhat attributed to coming in from Iran. Now, how they got there, we can debate that, but certainly they can....

[End of recording.]