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PRESS CONFERENCE: Operational Update: Maj. Gen. Perkins, Maj. Gen. Atta, May 24, 2009

Multi-National Force-Iraq

Maj. Gen. David Perkins, director for MNF-I Strategic Effects, and Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, Iraqi military spokesman, provide an operational update.

PRESS CONFERENCE
Major GENERAL David Perkins, Director for Strategic Effects, CJ9, MultiNational Force-Iraq and MAJOR GENERAL QASSIM ATTA, SPOKESMAN, OPERATION FARDH AL-QANOON

DATE: 24 MAY 2009

TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL

PARTICIPANTS:
MG DAVID PERKINS AND MG QASSIM ATTA WITH VARIOUS REPORTERS FROM IRAQI AND WORLD MEDIA

(PH) = PHONETIC
INT = INTERPRETER
REP1-10 = REPORTER 1 -10
(INAUD) = INAUDIBLE

MG PERKINS: Well, good afternoon, everybody. I thank you all for being here along with Major General Qassim Atta. And I'd like to provide you an update today on recent Coalition operations that we've been doing in support of the Iraqi Security Forces.

As we work together, we continue to benefit from shared information and techniques, and it's great to see the Iraqi Security Forces continue to grow in capacity, capability and professionalism. The operations that we're going to be discussing here today are combined operations in compliance with the Security Agreement, and these operations sustain pressure against and neutralize extremist networks.

Since January, Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces have conducted more than 40,000 combined patrols together throughout Iraq and more than 1,600 combined company-level and higher operations. I'd like to tell you about one operation we're working on together right now. Operation Bashaer al-Kheir that began the 1st the May, this is a joint operation in Diyala involving the Iraqi Army, Iraqi police, Peshmerga forces and Coalition Forces. The goal of the operation is to improve security and stability for the Diyala people and strengthen the rule of law and the infrastructure in the area to improve quality of life. A Joint Operations Center, the Diyala Operations Center, run by Iraqi Security Forces, coordinates the work of approximately 10 satellite centers across the province where both Iraqi Security Forces Diyala police, National Police, Coalition Forces and Peshmerga liaison officers all work together.

The groups are tasked with finding and removing security threats from the area. Warrants are used to carry out the operations based on evidence compiled from the forces operating in the region. Since the beginning of the month, the combined forces have arrested over 100 individuals and seized weapons in over 25 caches. Included in the weapons seized were over 200 AK-47 rifles, enough -- which is basically enough to arm seven U.S. platoons -- and over 10 IEDs and mines were found and cleared as well. The combined forces will continue to focus on clearing and securing key urban areas and terrain in the Diyala Province.

The next phase of Bashaer al-Kheir is to invest more than $31 million in the infrastructure in the region. The funding comes from both the Government of Iraq and Coalition Forces. The money will be used to pave roads, refurbish schools, improve factories, install water treatment facilities, improve sewage treatment areas as well as social services.

An important element of keeping pressure on the enemy here is counterterrorism operations. All of these operations are conducted in compliance with the Security Agreement which allows us to conduct counterterrorism operations in coordination with the Government of Iraq. On the 1st of May the combined operations targeted individuals who were developing and employing magnetic attached IEDs in Tikrit. Magnetic attachment IEDs have a common initiation system that includes cell phones with washing machine timers on them and timed-initiated devices. The Tikrit High Crimes Court issued a warrant for their arrest. These two suspected terrorists were killed during the operation. Intelligence reports indicated that these individuals worked with JRN (ph) to conduct attacks against innocent civilians in Tikrit.

In another recent operation several key al Qaida members were taken off the streets. They were Nazir and Kamis Ishas Salouman (ph), two senior al Qaida leaders who were operating out of Salahudin. Both are facilitators of the network there and the Wali of Salahudin and the military emir. Majid Hammad Mashinsala (ph), a member of al Qaida accused of kidnapping in the Fallujah area and involved in large-scale VBIED attacks on the Iraqi Army, Iraqi police and Coalition Forces. Al Qaida vehicle-borne IED network leader Nazir is also suspected of being a Sharia judge tied to the execution of an Iraq policeman. Since being detained, he has admitted to involvement in more than 50 assassinations and has provided information on other cell members. Intelligence indicated that the second captured individual, Sayeed Mohammed Juwada al-Simili (ph), a Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups leader from New Baghdad is the suspected leader and founder of The Revolution, a Jaish al-Mahdi splinter group which is dedicated to attacking American and Coalition Forces in Iraq. Sayeed's capture provided valuable information concerning the organization and operations of the Jaish al-Mahdi Special Group network in Baghdad. The capture of Sayeed has provided insight into the inner workings of the Jaish al-Mahdi Baghdad network and has greatly disrupted the Jaish al-Mahdi Special Group activities here in New Baghdad.

Finally, a significant weapons cache found in Maysan Province further destabilized enemy operations. Members of the Amarah Tactical SWAT Unit fusion cell and the Special Weapons and Tactics Team discovered this extensive collection in the southern province on the 5th of May. There were over 300 different types of material found dating from 2007 and earlier. Some of the items include approximately 150 explosively formed penetrator plates, 70 passive infrared devices, 50 rocket rails, 49 hand grenades, 36 .60-millimeter high explosive mortar rounds, 16 rocket propelled grenades, four .107-millimeter rockets, three rifles, two aiming stakes, mortars, documents and communication devices. So it was a fairly large weapons cache that is used to facilitate terrorist operations here in Iraq. These items were found during an operation conducted by the Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi Security Forces units are partnered with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division in Maysan to rid the region of illegal weapons and criminal activity. Coalition Forces will continue to work closely with Iraqi officials to assure these terrorists are brought to justice under the Iraqi justice system. Those captured were brought to Iraqi authorities and are currently being processed in the Iraqi judicial system. We will continue to support Iraqi Security Forces in applying pressure against and neutralizing extremist’s networks. These continued efforts between Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces are netting results that we're proud to help provide a safer environment here for all Iraqi citizens.

I'll now be followed by Major General Qassim Atta with his statement.

MG ATTA: Shukran jazilan. (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: Thank you very much. As Salamu 'Alaykum. I want to assure that the BOC ready to receive the security case and all throughout Baghdad, and that's occurred in accordance to the agreement of withdrawing the security -- the foreign forces from Baghdad by June, the end of June, also the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to get rid of all the remaining (sic) of those terrorist groups; although there were some terrorist groups who try to, to destabilize the security situation that has been in -- and the security achievement has been achieved by the Iraqi Security Forces as like we seen in three days ago in Shula area, the events in Shula area that was Iraqi -- where Iraqi people or civilians were targeted.

Second, BOC, they're working on resolving the Awakening groups, a file also in the upcoming two months with coordination with the IFCNR. The Committee has met last Tuesday with commanders of al-Sahwa, the Awakening groups, and the BOC was there, and also the IFCNR -- the Committee was there as well. And this is the second meeting for the Awakening groups' leaders, and we talked about the details that related to the transition of the Awakening group members and transitioning them from the BOC and from the security sectors to the governmental sectors. And we want to remind everyone that the Secretary General of the Ministerial Council, they issued an order to all the ministries. According to their memo No. 11 -- 1 -- 11,0342, and on the 19th of April, that included that the Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, ordered through his Ministerial Council, of the cabinet meeting on the 14th of April, 2009, to contain all the contractors and the volunteers from the Awakening groups and all the ministries according to the timetable that's been put together, and also the Ministry of Interior should be paying their salaries. And I think this meeting was a very fruitful meeting, and the Baghdad Operation Command and the IFCNR, they listened to all the complaints and the hurdles and the challenges. And also we, we reached to a solution to -- actually as a result they have a meeting that we're going to resolve -- they're going to resolve the problems of al-Sahwa and the Awakening groups, and hopefully we'll be walking -- working within the timetables that we have put together in order to transition the Awakening groups to the ministries.

The third dynamic or the third point here is to the implementation of the Ministerial Order No. 101st in 2008 which in regards to the return of the displaced families to their homes and to evacuate the houses that occupied by other people and, and prepare to the return over the displaced to their homes. And the BOC is working on their e-mail -- and the websites, and you see through their statements, prior statements, that Baghdad is witnessing tens -- the return of tens -- on tens of families back to Baghdad, and the return process is continuous and there is a joint coordination with the Ministry of Displaced and Displacements, and, and also with the National Reconciliation Committee, we have opened two centers to receive those people or families who wants to -- in Karkh and Rusafa centers, to receive those families who wants to return back to their homes. And Baghdad's witnessed 26,000 families returned to -- displaced families to return to their homes in Baghdad. And we are committed -- the BOC, and the related officials, we're committed to end this case by the end of this year. We have to remind that the Commander-in-Chief office is supervising now the final stages of the rehabilitation -- road, the rehabilitation of the road between Rashid Hotel to -- through the tunnel, the Azara (ph) tunnel, and the Zeitun (ph) intersection. And I think that some of the people here, the audience here, have noticed the stages that we have achieved so far, and the committees, what they've done so far, and this is one of the vital roads, and this is going to be open for the first time after -- since the collapse of the former regime. and I think the opening of this road is an important message that whoever that suspects or doubts the security improvements that we've achieved so far, and this is a very important message that, that the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief and his instructions about opening those roads and rehabilitation of the roads -- rehabilitations of the roads, and this is an important message. And this is one of the important roads inside the IZ, and we have achieved like 80 percent of the opening of this road. And in the past three days we went on a field visit and we've seen a lot of tremendous efforts by the Baghdad Amanat and the Ministry of Electricity and the Highway Patrol and the BOC as well also the efforts from the Multi-National Forces and American forces assigned to coordinate with the Commander-in-Chief's office, and we expect that in the next week, probably in one week or two weeks from now, this road will be -- we'll witness the opening, and we will -- and formal opening, and we will invite all of you to attend this ceremony. Also we want to assure that the BOC is committed to opening all the closed roads and the streets. And we have few roads or streets -- we have opened -- that is still closed. We have opened 77 percent of the closed roads in Baghdad, and we have a few left. The opening of the roads of course is because of the security improvements that we have achieved and of course because of the, the, the capability, the increased capability of the Iraqi Security Forces. And there are some events and accidents and attacks, and we say that on the media and it's -- that's because of some terrorist pockets and groups, and there are some Ba'ath party elements; these are -- we call -- we call these our terrorist pockets or criminal pockets and organized crime pockets, and they try to affect the security improvements that we achieve so far, the successes that we achieved so far. But you see our forces in continuous development, and they're developing and they're continuing their development without getting affected by those events and those attacks. And if you see those people working in -- they do their -- conduct their attacks in markets and streets and attack -- and that's an evidence or indicator of their failure and their inability of facing our forces. We have not witnessed any direct confrontation since 2007 of those terrorist groups with our forces, our security forces -- Iraq Security Forces. But they always try to conduct their attacks by IEDs, attachment IEDs and by, you know, limited indirect fire. And all people are seeing in the beginning of 2007 the number of Katyusha rockets that was fired or launched towards the IZ, 47 rockets per day. And now you see the, the status and you see the improvement in the combat skills of our security forces and we're proud of that.

The BOC has to commend the efforts, the great efforts of the supporting sides here, the ministry of the municipality here, of Baghdad Amanat, and they've -- we commend their efforts. Also we commend efforts of the Multi-National Force by providing the support to the Commander-in-Chief's office and the Prime Minister's office. We -- God is willing, our security forces are improving in their continuous -- continuing the improvements. And although some people try to affect the way things are going, but we always say and repeat that our security forces are capable of undertaking responsibility or security responsibility and take over security responsibility in Baghdad and other areas. We say this with high confidence and absolute confidence and trust. And God willing, we will receive all the security areas, and of course we expect to face some challenges and some difficulties, and these challenges are probably by some terrorists groups are trying to prove themselves and prove that they still exist. And, and some people try to trigger some ethno sectarian violence in, in certain days and certain areas. And some people try and they keep trying on getting back on the Iraqi streets. And people understood the message and they understood that those terrorist groups are trying to focus on certain areas that has a certain majority of certain sects. Why focusing on Sadr City, for instance, or Khadamiya, holy Khadamiya City, or Shula area, for instance. This was for a reason, for a certain objective, that to return back to the sector -- the ethno sectarian violence. Again, but Iraqi people realize, understood those conspiracies against them, and they've disclosed all those conspiracies. There's no return to ethnosectarian violence, and we're not going to go back to where we were before; we are going to move forward. And thank you very much.

REP1: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: My question is two dynamics: The first dynamic is two days ago Iraqi people were happy about rumor al Baghdadi capturing, and this was denied by the Pentagon. The second -- We're trying to know, are you confirming or not confirming the capturing of this terrorist? The second thing is we always hear about capturing terrorism (sic) and groups, and terrorists, they do not have certain havens or sanctuaries. But we, we don't know what's the reason. We talk about the capturing of terrorism groups, but we don't know -- we don't talk about the reasons behind terrorism. Can you talk about the reasons behind terrorism -- terrorist activities and terrorism groups?

MG PERKINS: The first question with regards to al Baghdadi. The Pentagon did not say that they were denying that; they were just saying it has not been completely confirmed. And I think the important thing with regards to this, and we're working very closely with the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces, that as we take a look specifically at al Qaida, it is a networked organization. And within that organization, there are cells, there are leaders of cells, and there are facilitators that move resources and personnel around. And so -- And those leaders are given names and titles from time to time. So what we focus on is the person that's actually doing the activity, that's actually running the cell, that's facilitating movement of personnel, money, explosive material, and take those leaders out of the operation. And now the case that you're talking about here recently was an Iraqi Security Force-run operation. They detained the individual; they are gaining -- continuing to gain intelligence on them. We have nothing that would contradict the intelligence they have so far. They are sharing it with us. And what we are doing is trying to determine -- regardless of what his name is -- what role did he play in the network. Now that he's out of the network, how is that going to affect it? Is somebody else going to take his place? We find routinely in these networked organizations that when you remove somebody, somebody else gets moved in. Sometimes they are less experienced and less capable. So the, the title given to the person is not nearly as important as to what role did specifically that person have, and when that person is pulled out of the organization, how does the organization then compensate for it, how do they change their activity, and then how can then we continue to go after that organization. So that really is the focus of our intelligence and our cooperation with Iraqi Security Forces, to determine exactly what did this person do, how did they do it, and how is the organization going to adapt with them being out of it. And so I think that's the most important thing to understand, that we're looking at capabilities of the organization, how does it work, and then how do we affect that. Sir.

REP2: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: I have two questions: The first question is to Major General Qassim Atta. Yesterday the Prime Minister, he indicated something, the Amnesty Law, he said that most of the people who's been released are criminals and they have, you know, previous criminal activities. My question is did the Iraqi Security Forces capture some of them? Have they captured some of those who's been released under the Amnesty Law?

My second question is to Major General Perkins: We heard General Qassim talking about the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces and the readiness to receive the security case in Iraq -- in Baghdad. Did the Iraqi Security Forces or the government, the Iraqi government ask the American forces to use some of the American -- or American units after, after the 30th of June to support the Iraqi Security Forces?

MG ATTA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: Our secure -- Our role as the Security Forces is we implement the orders of the -- our references and superiors here. We know that Iraqi Security Forces captured some of those who's been released and they started working with terrorist groups, and they were captured doing some terrorist activities. And we also captured some of those who's been captured -- released under the Amnesty Law and they -- we have a warrant, warrant arrests against them. And they've been put on trial -- and they're under investigation. Some of them has been -- some of those who's been released, they were innocent people, but there is some wrong messages or negative messages has been sent outside, tried to affect the authenticity of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government. They had released some statements and statements -- irresponsible statements that the Iraqi Security Forces to -- they issued orders to recapture all those who's been released under the Amnesty Law from Iraqi security -- detention facilities or American detention facilities. But I want to say that whoever second-guessed the Iraqi government's orders, we'll just say those -- Iraqi government only ordered -- arrests the people who has -- the judicial system has arrest warrants against them. We have celebrated this Amnesty Law and the release of those innocent people. We took media people with us, and the people who started working again, who's been released and started working again with terrorist activities and terrorist groups, if -- whether they were from the Special Groups, they were an al Qaida networker or from the former Ba'ath party elements, they all equal in front of the justice here and the law and they were all been treated in a professional manner, but we are very sorry to know that some of the political entities try to, to reflect a wrong message and convey a wrong message in that there are some news agencies, they actually put a false statement, that they actually prepared false statements and said that some of the -- that the Iraqi government has distributed pictures of all the people who's been released by the -- by -- under the Amnesty Law. We denied this, denied this thing when we said that we have captured 50 people who has been released because -- and they were recaptured because they were found doing terrorist activities. And this is something that we have showed on the media and everyone knows now the difference between the truth and the false statements. Thank you.

MG PERKINS: In following up your questions about the 30 June, I think it's important -- it's important to understand exactly what does that mean with regards to the requirements laid out in the Security Agreement. What will it look like in Baghdad and other cities and what events will occur. Come 30 June, the requirements of the Security Agreement is that combat forces are, are out of the cities. And that is what we are working towards right now and working it very closely with the Iraqi Security Forces, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, the Prime Minister, on how that occurs, how do Coalition Forces hand over responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces, where do we move our personnel to, and all the complicating logistical issues that go along with that. That does not mean that there will not be U.S. personnel in the cities. There will be people that remain here that are not combat forces, those that are involved in training the Iraqi Security Forces, those that are involved in providing logistical support. So they are not considered part of the element that has moved out of the cities, because their mission is not a combat mission, it is one of support and training and logistical activity with the Iraqi Security Forces.

The other part of the Security Agreement allows for the Iraqi government to at any time request the assistance of Coalition Forces to conduct operations in the cities or anywhere in Iraq. So we very may well have combat forces that are billeted outside of the cities. But the Iraqi Security Forces from time to time may request U.S. forces to conduct combat operations with them in the city. It's just that at the end of that combat operation, the U.S. forces would go back out to where their operating bases are located outside the city. And so that is in full compliance with the Security Agreement, and in fact was considered one of the important aspects of the Security Agreement. I think it's important to understand the purpose of the Security Agreement is to provide an outline by which the United States and the Government of Iraq can cooperate, can further the strategic relationship and continue the increase in security. The focus of the Security Agreement was not to make a list of things that you can and cannot do. The really -- The purpose of the Security Agreement is to outline the process, the organizations that are stood up, on how we formalize our relationship, how do we formalize and institutionalize the way that we cooperate, one of the parameters that we are using to execute this cooperation with. So I think it's important to understand the purpose of the Security Agreement.

And then lastly, we -- again, we are doing a joint security assessment with the Government of Iraq specifically looking at some of the key cities as to initially what assistance do they want, will it require some temporary lodging or facilities in the cities to support those operations? So again, this is an ongoing process, a continual process of analysis. It will continue well past 30 June. There will continue to be changes made. We will continue to redeploy our forces. We'll readjust our forces on the battlefield. And again, we will use the Security Agreement, which has a series of committees set up underneath it -- the Joint Military Operation Coordination Committee -- other logistical committees -- and then we conduct our coordination and synchronization through those committees in accordance with the Security Agreement. So it is not come 30 June there's a dramatic change, and then nothing changes anymore until next year, August, et cetera. It's really a continuum of changes, of adjustments, of cooperation, and we do that all within both the letter of the law and the spirit of the Security Agreement. Sir.

REP3: Muhammed Tawfeeq with CNN. I have two questions for you, sir. Follow up on the loony who shoot the five U.S. troops. Is there a motive? Why did he do that? And where are they in the investigation? This is my first question.

And second question: According to the Interior Minister Bulani, Jawad al-Bulani, he said that the -- he believe that the attack will be increased after the U.S. troops' withdrawal from the city. What do you -- What do you think about this? Thank you.

MG PERKINS: Yes, sir. The first question, it is a criminal investigation now. And so now since it's moved into the criminal investigation area, it is being conducted in accordance with all of the laws that pertain to that. And so there will not be a continual flow of information because it's a criminal matter and it will go through the investigation. Eventually it will go into the Uniform Code of Military Justice's judicial system, and it will be handled in that manner.

With regards to the violence: This, I think is a key aspect of the previous answer I gave with regards to the Security Agreement in that we are very much intent as we work with our friends in the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces, to have the transition be a very smooth and orderly one so we do not see a spike in violence. We understand that periods of transition are periods of vulnerability. And we know that you have ways to mitigate that vulnerability. And that is what the Security Agreement does, it provides you a mechanism by which you can have orderly transition of responsibility for security from one group to another, from one nation to another. As you know, we really began this transition the 1st of January when we handed over the Green Zone. In fact, General Qassim Atta ran the ceremony that day. I remember being out there with him, and it was a great historical day, a great celebration of the sovereignty of Iraq being brought to the highlight, really, of the whole world. And as you've all seen and experienced, as we have transitioned the security of the Green Zone from U.S. control to Iraqi control, the total number of attacks continues to decrease. It's important to understand that we've already returned over 20 percent of our force from the height of the surge. And at the height of the surge we were averaging 190 attacks a day. In the mean- -- Since the height of the surge, we've returned over 20 percent of our force, we've handed over the control of the security apparatus and the responsibility for security to the Iraqis, and we handed over the Green Zone and most of the country on 1 January. Through that entire period, security incidences have decreased by 90 percent. So we have a proven model. We know how to go from U.S. control to Iraqi control. We know how to downsize the U.S. forces. We know how to do that and turn it over to the Iraqi Security Forces because we've been doing it for the last eight months. And while we've been doing that, attacks continually -- continue to decrease. Now, we don't take this for granted; we're very vigilant about this. We know that people are looking to take advantage of it. But again, this is not the first time that we've done this, and we're paying a lot of attention to it and we spend a lot of time coordinating with the Iraqi Security Forces to make sure it is a seamless process. So while people make statements and that, and they are probably just -- it is justified to be concerned because historically transition is a difficult period; we are taking extraordinary efforts to make sure the terrorists cannot take advantage of that transition period. Yes, ma'am.

REP4: (Inaud) -- was talking about a decreased -- sorry -- a decrease in the number of attacks, but in the last several weeks since the end of April there have been some of the mass casualty bombings --

MG PERKINS: Right.

REP4: -- and, you know, disturbing because they do indicate planning, logistics, money --

MG PERKINS: Right.

REP4: I mean, what can you say about that, and who's behind it?

MG PERKINS: Yeah. Yeah, great question. We tend to look at things, especially at the strategic level, by patterns and put it in perspective in the long-term because when we come up with a strategy, it's a long-term strategy; we don't change our strategy day by day by day. So when things occur, they get our attention like the recent high-profile attacks with the IEDs and VBIEDs and suicide bombers. We look very closely at a number of things basically to answer the questions you just asked. What are the trends? Who is doing them? What is their motivation, and what are they trying to accomplish by it? Just to put it in perspective from a trends point of view, from a year ago, March '08 to this year, the number of what we call high-profile attacks, which are the IEDs, the mass casualty-producing ones, have decreased by 58 percent. So we have 58 percent less attacks than we did a year ago. If we look more recently at the areas that we're concerned with: In April, we had 28 high-profile attacks in April. These, again, are the mass casualty-producing ones. As of the 23rd of May, this month, we've had 13. So while unfortunately there were a couple in the last couple of weeks that have gained our attention, just from April to May we are already at less than 50 percent than we were last month. So again, from a macro point of view, the trends continue down. But we are concerned when they occur at all because of the innocent lives that are killed. So then we take a look at what are the targets, and if you take a look at what the targets have been, they have been generally innocent civilians: Women, children, very easy targets; they have been some of the Iraqi Security Force targets out there. And the civilian targets have been predominantly in Shia areas, shrines or markets. So what you then take a look at, well, what is the purpose of going after those targets? When an attack occurs, there is two parts to it. There's a task and the purpose. The task of these attacks is to kill as many innocent people as they can. So when they conduct an attack and if they kill people, they have accomplished the task, unfortunately. They have killed a number of innocent people in the last couple of months. The purpose, you can tell very -- by examining the target. When they attack large numbers of civilians, Shia going on pilgrimage, things like that, the purpose is to generate ethnosectarian violence. What they want is retribution attacks; they want to pit Iraqi against Iraqi. They then want to start this downward spiral that we saw at the height of the surge when we were averaging 190 attacks a day, and that was ethnosectarian violence. The good news is the Iraqi people have rejected that bankrupt philosophy. We have had none of these retribution attacks. Again, when we take a look at the trends, we take a look not only in what happened on the day of the attack, but what happens the next day. If you -- Do you get 50 Shia killed one day and the next day 50 Sunni killed because now you're getting this ethnosectarian violence occurring. We have seen none of that. In fact, if you look historically in the last couple of months when you would have a high-profile attack, the next series of days you would have almost no attacks. It would drop off precipitously. So the good news is they have rejected that bankrupt philosophy. The second thing is they have attacked a number of Iraqi police, Iraqi army security forces. Clearly they are attacking what I call signs of progress. They are going after Iraqis who are dedicating their lives to bring peace and security. Al Qaida does not want peace and security to come to Iraq. They want chaos, they want violence. So they attack those elements that are working against them, mainly the Iraqi Security Forces, to try to prevent them from working against al Qaida, to try to prevent them from suppressing their terrorist acts. But again, it is not having the intended purpose. Because as I said, the attacks are already down over 50 percent from just last month to this month, high-profile attacks. So while unfortunately they have accomplished the task when the attacks occur, that is to kill innocent people, so far they have failed to accomplish the purpose, which is to either generate ethnosectarian violence or to dissuade the Iraqi Security Forces from continuing to pursue al Qaida.

So again, good question. We look at it very closely; we take a look at the trends and then we take a look at the results, and we work very closely, again, with our Iraqi friends, security forces, Government of Iraq, to make sure that we're all seeing the same thing. Yes, please.

REP5: Gina Chon, Wall Street Journal. General Perkins, in regards to what you are talking about past June 30th that there will still be adjustments and changes --

MG PERKINS: Right.

REP5: Can you talk a little bit more in detail about that? You mentioned possibly temporary lodging in certain key cities. General Odierno suggested there might be some exceptions made for places like Mosul where we are still seeing some volatility. So if you could just address that a bit more in detail.

And then General Atta, I was just wondering regarding some of the areas where we've seen some tensions rise, like in Diyala, some of the arrests with the Provincial Council members, and then in Mosul, the governor being supposedly prevented by some Peshmerga forces from going to an event. What is being done from the Iraqi government and the Iraqi military side to help defuse some of those tensions as rhetoric seems to increase around those areas? Thank you.

MG PERKINS: To answer your first question: Again, our goal is to comply with all provisions, both the letter and the intent of the Security Agreement. So we are going forward on a plan that has us in full compliance with the Security Agreement. We are working very closely with the Government of Iraq to make sure not only are we in compliance with the Security Agreement, but we also meet all of their needs. So I think it's important to understand that whatever happens on 30 June will be completely at the decision of the Government of Iraq. It is absolutely their final decision on what 30 June looks, who's in what location, what operations are being conducted, who's in the lead. It is completely their final decision. And so it is a joint process as we go through that. What we have done historically before, already, again, a proven model, is we have joint operating bases where we have -- maybe first it was Iraqi, then we brought -- correction -- first U.S., then we brought in Iraqis, put them in the lead and we became a tenant unit, and then eventually we pulled out and turned that facility over to the Iraqis. That's another aspect that needs to be taken into account that we're talking about large numbers of facilities, and so there's a lot of logistics of we don't want to just pull out of a facility and leave it abandoned because then it's prone to, you know, looting and various things like that. So we want to make sure there's an orderly hand-over, that if we pull out of a facility and it's one the Iraqis want to keep, they have a like unit that can come in or a unit that has capability to come in, that can take over that facility, that can run it and guard it. So it's not only just providing for the security requirements, but it's also making sure we can provide for the logistical requirements. And so that's a fairly logistically intense process and requires a lot of coordination. And so again, this is going to be a continuum process that we will work through -- again, not just till 30 June, but till the end of -- well, until we're finally out of here in 2011, quite honestly. As we continue to -- continue to reduce our footprint, we'll have another two brigades going back by September. So this is going to be an ongoing process, literally day-by-day. Sir.

MG ATTA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: I think -- This is not my field of specialty to answer. I think the people in the Ministry of Defense can answer this, but I think that security situation now in all the areas in Baghdad and Diyala and Ninewah Province are much better than it used to be a year or six months ago. And of course there is an improvement and we can't hide that the fact that we have some problems, our security forces facing some problems and challenges, and we think all -- most of those problems are getting resolved in a peaceful manner by sitting together on the table and the open dialogue and, and adapting the open dialogue to resolve problems. As far as Diyala or -- is concerned or Mosul, our security forces status and I'm always in touch with people in BOC and also in Diyala and Ninewah. And we have full control of the Iraqi Security Forces in those provinces, and they're pursuing the remaining of those terrorist groups in there. And if you look closely and focus that the enemy is trying to focus their terrorist activities, all of their ter- -- most of their terrorist activities in Baghdad in order to -- and they're putting, they're reviewing their strategic plans and having some high-profile attacks in Baghdad because if you succeed -- if they succeed in Baghdad means that they succeed in Iraq. And so the past two weeks, the BOC has putting -- or prepared a strategic plan, of course with the coordination with all the aspects and departments in the Ministry of Defense and the National Intelligence Department in Iraq to deploy as many elements as possible in Iraq and we -- in Baghdad and we capture tens -- every -- on daily basis we capture tens and tens of people who are involved in the terrorist activities -- and from the Ba'ath party and some of them are part or involved with organized criminal groups. And so our security forces now are working in action; they're not only -- they're not -- they're on the offense, not on the defense. Before they used to be on the defense. Now our security forces are on the offense and the enemy is looking for sanctuaries to hide. We are planning to have -- not to have any sanctuaries and safe havens for any terrorist activity, terrorist groups and including Baghdad which the terrorist has been focusing on in the past period of time, and they try to destabilize security in Baghdad, but the message was clear, and our security forces have proven themselves and they've succeeded in capturing those -- the implements -- the implement -- the people who implemented those terroristic activities and organized groups, criminals in Topchi area for instance, in eight hours our security forces were able to capture those people, terrorist groups or criminal groups who were involved in killings of our innocent Iraqis.

REP6: (Inaud) (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: We've seen pictures of terrorist groups who are part of al Qaida network, but we did not see the pictures of those criminal -- or terrorists or -- from Special Groups. So we want to see why they haven't been sentenced yet and why the delay in the sentencing?

MG ATTA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: We have seen that -- We have been accused that some people told -- said that we always show some certain terrorist groups and we don't show other groups. And we only show -- we show the outlaws. Those people who's been captured in al-Topchi area, three of them were involved before in terrorist activities and they were in Bucca. And we said that they were in the Special Groups, and they were outlaws as well, and we have put on the media and we have declared -- announced on the media the pictures and the names of the terrorist groups who launched Katyusha rockets and the areas of al-Kuber (ph) and Lazan (ph) area towards the -- towards the International Zone. We did that; we announced that without fearing anyone, and we also show those pictures and the names of the terrorists from al Qaida as well. We are -- We sometimes get letters from the Ministry of Human Rights to not to show the pictures of those -- of those terrorists or suspected terrorists before we get the final and put them on trial and they get sentenced for sure. When we capture people, I mean, if we try to show the pictures of the people who's been captured and the terrorist groups from the Ba'ath party elements and all those people, it will take 24 hours a day for us to show all those pictures and the information and the names that we have about those terrorist groups and outlaws, and the militias also who's involved in terrorist activities. Thank you.

MG PERKINS: In the pink shirt. Go ahead. If he's got the mike, go ahead.

REP7: Okay. Jonathan Blakely from National Public Radio. About the Friday's two incidents, you had the, the rocket and we also had an incident where someone was found dead in the, in the IZ. First the rocket. I wanted to double-check I heard General Atta correct, about 37 rocket attacks a day. Is that in the past or is that now? That's what I thought I heard earlier. What -- What are the status of rocket attacks on the IZ and other FOBs as well. And also what's the latest on that, the person found dead in the IZ, and has that ever happened before, something like that? It sounds like something domestic, but what have you -- what do you know about it?

MG PERKINS: I'll answer from what I know and General Qassim about (inaud). The rocket attack that occurred this week was a .107-millimeter rocket. That was just one attack that occurred. And it was -- so it's -- The volume is much less on that. With regards to the other person that was found dead, that was a civilian working for a civilian company here, a civilian contractor working for another civilian company, and it's under investigation by the appropriate authorities. It appears to be criminal activity. This is the first activity like this that I know of since I've been here on that. So again, it was a civilian working for another civilian company here. And so that is continuing to be investigated by the appropriate authority, and that's really all the details we have on that. Sir, I don't know if you have anything else.

MG ATTA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: Before the Fardh al-Qanoon plan and I think our Coalition friends are with us, we have put together the number of activities or status (inaud) of reports of numbers of activities for terrorist activities or -- that we have in Baghdad -- 400 to 450 activities a week in Baghdad only. That was before the Fardh al-Qanoon plan. We had 120 activity from our side, for our forces. But after the Fardh al-Qanoon plan, and this is an historical period in Iraqi history for the Iraqi people, now the activity -- the enemy's activities is between two -- 22, 25 activities a week. And our daily activity is 21 activities compared to our forces -- to -- compared to three activities a day for the enemy. So this is for you to know, the number of activities of the terrorists and our enemy has decreased from 450 to the number I gave you just now. That doesn't mean al Qaida is over, completely over, and that crime is completely over, no. We say that there are pockets still remaining, pockets from groups are trying work, they're trying to raise the morale of their members and they try to affect the trust or the confidence of the people and the Iraqi Security Forces. Now, before the Iraqi Security Forces were, they didn't dare to wear the security uniforms in Baghdad. And I was working there in the Ministry of Defense. They used to wear a mask. The Security Forces elements, they used to, whether they were police or army, they used to wear a mask and walk through the streets. And now the Iraqi -- on the contrary, the Iraqi Security Forces elements, they walk around in the streets with their face showing and they hold pride of being in the police or the army and they gain the respect and the confidence of all the Iraqi people. And they get tips from Iraqi people. Also we have a lot of achievements and we shouldn't say that there are not -- there isn't any challenges that we are facing now or in the future, but this is normal. Terrorist activities are decreasing. They -- But our, the activities of our security forces are increasing, and the Minister of Defense, four days ago he announced formally that we are doing 21 operations -- military operations or activity per day compared to three of the enemy, three activities per the enemy.

REP8: (Inaud) -- Baghdadi, recently some audio recordings were released that are apparently authentic, claiming to be him and saying that he wasn't arrested. And given the fact that we apparently have killed or arrested Baghdadi about three or four times in the past and he does claim to be the leader of al Qaida, isn't a fairly important issue to ascertain if indeed this is Baghdadi? And the Iraqis said they have DNA evidence; is that something that you've had a chance to review?

MG PERKINS: Yeah, well, and I think you brought up a great point in the question. It is important to determine who this person is and what their role is. And so as you said, there've been previous -- I guess claims before about who was the head of al Qaida, what role they played, did we get them. And so part of what we are doing now is taking a look at the evidence there to determine what role he played. Even -- Even if he is whoever you want to call Baghdadi, but he wasn't the key facilitator, then that's sort of irrelevant as well. So again, it's really not what he calls himself or other people call himself (sic), it is really, at the end of the day, what role did he play. Was he the key leader in Iraq? Is he the key facilitator? If he's out of that, has he been replaced? So again, the important thing is, as you asked in your question, have we taken -- have the Iraqis taken the key leader of Iraq out of the equation. And so that has yet to be determined because there's still a lot of evidence to go through. And we are seeing what is the response of al Qaida with him removed, is he being replaced. And so I -- I think that is what the focus is on with regards to that.

Again, we are working very closely with the Iraqi Security Forces on a number of pieces of evidence, and again, it's -- intelligence is like a puzzle: You get various pieces; you put it together and then all of a sudden it may lead you in a new direction that you had not even known, or it may open up a another area of activity and networks which we didn't know. And so we are in the process of putting all of that together because, as you said, it's very important to understand what role he and basically every other detainee that we have, what roles they play, how they are interconnected. A lot of times when we take in a detainee, he provides a very important piece to two other that we thought were unrelated people, now we find that they are all part of this. So each person is an important piece of the puzzle. We are very intent on making sure we accurately determine what they were and not get caught up in what name did he have or what title he had, because that can quite honestly be quite misleading.

REP8: So you're not sure (inaud)?

MG PERKINS: We are not sure of the complete role that this person played in the organization and what role he is playing now. Sir.

REP9: Tim Cox from Reuters. You mentioned this sectarian -- this, you know, militants trying to reignite sectarian conflict and not succeeding, and you also mentioned al Qaida. Are you saying that you're sure that these high-profile bombings that we saw in April and more recently were all the work of al Qaida and not one of a dozen other insurgent and militia groups? Because also there's some Shiite groups that might --

MG PERKINS: Right.

REP9: -- want to restart that. Also can I -- can we get just a little bit more on this guy who was, the Special Groups guy who -- JAM guy who you caught? I just want to know, when you say "Special Groups," do you normally mean that Iran is behind it? And do you have specific evidence that this guy is backed by Iran? And more generally, are these so-called Iranian Special Groups actually doing anything at the moment? Because you don't hear much from them.

MG PERKINS: Right. Back to the first question in reference to al Qaida. The recent high-profile attacks are definitely what we call al Qaida signature attacks. A lot of the forensics that we have gathered would lead us to believe that as well. And clearly, the intent of those attacks, as we take a look at the targets, they are very ethnosectarian in type of target. And so clearly that is the purpose of them. So we are very intent, as I said, not only in preventing the attack, but taking a look at what happens the day after that. And so we are focusing -- we have, we have captured a number of people that we think are responsible for that based on the forensics, have captured S-vests, S-vests operations, and so the pieces of the puzzle are coming together because when one of these attacks occurs, it does provide us evidence, it does provide us forensic evidence that we follow up on, and it does start putting the links together. And so we have -- we have connected a series of the dots, and they do still continue to lead us in that direction with regards to the Jaish al-Mahdi Special Groups, what we have seen since a vast majority of the leadership of those fled to Iran, that's a term that we use really in discussing a lot of the splinter groups that have splintered off. Many of them are somewhat independent in nature at times. They are not nearly as organized and coherent as they were a year and a half ago. Again, thanks to the ability to go after the networks, to go after the facilitators, to interdict their support coming across the border, and their activity is dramatically less than it was. What we are finding in many cases as I showed you with the cache we found in Maysan Province, is we are still finding caches that are there, that clearly people are building up supplies of munitions, many of these munitions are manufactured or come from Iran. And so we are well aware that there is still some support from there. And so we're very intent on tracking down these caches, at the same time going after the leaders who may be, as you said, dramatically less activity, but we don't want them to take advantage, for instance, of some upcoming transitions as one of our earlier questions brought to light, that as we do start to do these transitions in the next year, there are periods of vulnerability, and our concern that maybe some of these caches and leaders are moving into position to take advantage of that, so that's our focus with that area.

We have time probably for one more question. Sir.

REP10: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: My question is to Major General Atta. Is the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces are ready or enough to receive the -- or protect the borders, especially that the officials in the Ministry of Defense say that there is a lack of air support equipment?

MG ATTA: (Speaks in Arabic.)

INT: The first part is to actually withdraw from the cities; the second part of the agreement, of the withdrawal agreement, the end of the whole withdrawal will end or will be completed at the end of 2011. There are people in charge of these things, people in the strategic planning and they were accurate that the Iraqi Security Forces, and they were positive that the Iraqi Security Forces in this period of time that they are going to train of course, they are going to import weapons, and they are going to have continuous training. And of course, I think most of the countries said that -- that they are ready and willing to train the Iraqi Security Forces. The borders are much better right now. We have command -- borders command there, and Major General Abdul Qarim Kalaf (ph) and also General Abdul Mussin (ph), they said that the readiness of the secur- -- the borders forces also and the coordination of the neighboring countries as well as being -- has been better to not to -- to prevent the infiltration of weapons and explosives. And I think the time is enough to finish the readiness and the equipping also -- and the -- also to provide the system, the air support system also, in Yusufiyah area, I think it was for the first time being used, and the structure of the Iraqi army, the new Iraqi army, and we have said before that the Iraqi Security Forces are ready right now to undertake responsibility when the withdrawal of the security -- or the foreign -- or Coalition Forces. And we have certain people in charge and authorized to declare when the Iraqi Security Forces are ready and to -- ready to completely undertake the responsibility. Then we will allow the foreign forces to leave to their countries. But it's all been documented in the agreement. Thank you very much.

MG PERKINS: We're out of time here. Two quick things before we close: One, as we approach Memorial Day here, I think it's appropriate again, just to publicly recognize the young men and women, both U.S., Coalition and Iraqi, that have given their lives to produce the immense amount of progress that we've talked about here today. The fact that we can be sitting here in Baghdad without the threat of hundreds of attacks a day, the fact that we are sitting here with a -- with an open and free press asking questions in a young emerging democracy in this part of the world is a great testament, again, not only to the Americans who have given their lives both for the protection of freedom back in the United States, but here in Iraq, and again, the Iraqis, who are true patriots that have made the ultimate sacrifice.

And then the last thing: Just as time has gone by quickly here in this press conference, I have now been here a year, and have received orders to go back to the States to take another position in the Army there. So I will be headed back there. This is will be my last press conference here. I would like to say "thank you all" for what you do here every day. This is not an easy place to work, but to try to bring truth, enlightenment and just visibility to what goes on here in Iraq every single day. It's a testament to your dedication to a free press and the right for the people to know.

It's been a pleasure working with you all. It's been an honor working with my Iraqi friends. I am honored that one of the first press conferences I did, I was joined by Major General Qassim Atta, and on my last press conference, I am joined by him, and Brigadier General Steve Lanza is here to take my place -- a great soldier, a great professional, and I am sure he is equally looking forward to working with you all. But again, I appreciate this great support and partnership we've had in the last year. Thank you.

(END)