Press Roundtable: Maj. Gen. Perkins, April 2, 2009
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Maj. Gen. David Perkins, MNF-I, speaks with members of the media.
I/PA MEDIA ROUNDTABLE WITH MAJOR GENERAL DAVID PERKINS, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC EFFECTS, CJ9, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ.
DATE: April 2, 2009
TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
PARTICIPANTS:
Major General David Perkins and Rashal[ph] [Unintelligible] and Hisham Rikabie, Al-Mada Newspaper; Zinah Sami Hamad, Az-Zaman Newspaper; Naseer Hussein al-Ali, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper; and Haddad Salih, BBC Arabic (TV) [REPORTERS 1-6].
REP1 = REPORTER 1
INT = INTERPRETER
[PH] = PHONETIC SPELLING
MG PERKINS: Well, I appreciate you all taking the time out of your busy day to come speak with us today. The main focus I’d like to discuss about is some of the recent events, some of the issues with regards to Mashadani and Sons of Iraq and the arrests and all that and put it into context.
As you know, the SOI have been a critical piece in the reconciliation process here in Iraq. And they have worked very closely, initially with the Coalition, in standing up and protecting Iraq from al-Qaida and other terrorists. And they made great sacrifices for the sake of their country. And then last fall we began the process of transferring the control of the SOI from the Coalition to the Government of Iraq. And beginning in November the Government of Iraq actually started paying them. So it’s really been a pretty smooth process taking the SOI from underneath the Coalition and transferring them to the Government of Iraq. And so they’ve...the government has shown great commitment to them.
And there’s between 90[000] and 100,000, so it’s a very large number. But when you have such a large number of people, like in any population, you’re probably going to have some people that don’t want to operate according to the law. Even in the U.S. Army we have soldiers who stray from the rule of law and get into trouble, so they are dealt with according to the rule of law. So if there is a soldier in the U.S. Army that is committing crimes, he is put into custody and tried. But that doesn’t mean that we are going against his military unit, it’s just that soldier.
And I think that’s a similar situation we have with Mashadani. There are a number of warrants—the most recent one...recently, in 2008—which accuse him of a number of criminal activities including extortion, using violence to coerce people, ties to al-Qaida and other terrorist incidents, ties to IED networks, and misusing his position of authority to intimidate people underneath him. We estimate at least $160,000 a month he would extort from people and local businesses. So clearly the Government of Iraq and the people of Iraq cannot let people abuse their position and take advantage of people like that.
So there was an operation planned to take him into custody. It was Iraqi planned and Iraqi led. And it focused on not only making sure that Mashadani could be taken into custody, but also to limit unnecessary damage in the neighborhood, and also to limit any unnecessary injury to innocent civilians. And so when he was taken into custody, it was interesting to note that some of his close supporters went to the mosques on the loudspeakers and asked for hundreds of people to take up arms to help defend him and attack the Iraqi Security Forces. So it’s interesting to note that the people in the local neighborhood did not act on those calls to violence and, therefore, did not take up arms against the security forces. In fact, over 100 local Sahwa in the area peacefully turned in their weapons after his capture. So even the people that lived with him in the neighborhood knew that he was someone that they did not want to have around. So again, to make this clear, this...the Coalition Forces as well as the Government of Iraq are still very committed to their promises to the Sons of Iraq, but also cannot tolerate people who are going to blatantly break the law.
So I think that sort of gives a good explanation of that particular incident since we have had a lot of questions on that. And probably the best thing is just to open it up to questions from you all. Sir.
REP1: Rashal[ph] [Unintelligible] from Al-Mada Newspaper.
MG PERKINS: Yes.
REP1: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: My question is the...when the Sahwa groups were first formed, the Iraqi government’s taking a position of, you know, being conservative about the whole thing.
REP1: [Continues speaking in Arabic.]
INT: In the time that the American or U.S. government and the U.S. forces here, they put a lot in order to put...for this project to be implemented and they called the Sahwa groups as a...its own or an American...as an American project.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP1: [Continues speaking in Arabic.]
INT: And in fact today we’re seeing that the American government and the American forces are reconsidering the Sahwa groups and they’re reconsidering their opinion, the first opinion of the Iraqi government when they fir-...when we were first considering about the whole thing and...because of the ties that they...that’s been discovered or unleashed, ties that the Sahwa groups has with al-Qaida and other terrorist groups.
REP1: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: So my question is where the Iraqi government tried in the beginning, when they were feeling or taking the conservative approach in office[?]....
REP1: [Interjects in Arabic.]
INT: So what is also the future? What do you see of the future for the Awakening Groups, especially putting in mind that Adel Mashadani’s been captured or arrested also and that the leader or the commander of the Awakening groups in Hor Rajab also has been captured and the Ghazaliyah Awakening groups’ leader has been captured, too. So we are feeling that this whole project is going to collapse pretty soon.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm. Good question. And I think, like anything, you have to put it in a broader context. Sahwa at one time were over 120,000 people and they have been transitioned to other jobs, transitioned to other places, and are now down to about 90,000. And the great majority of them have been transferred over—over 50,000 in Baghdad alone. And it was a very deliberate process because I think we shared the concerns of the Iraqi government as well that we wanted to do it right, not just quickly.
The discussions of how to transfer the Sahwa over to the Government of Iraq went on for months, it started last spring and we didn’t even transfer the first group until October or November, so it was over six months of preparation. So we sat down with the IFCNR committee and went through all of the lists and registered everybody and vetted their backgrounds and all of those kinds of technical screening that went on. And in the great majority of the incidences, tens of thousands of Sons of Iraq, we’ve had no problems with whatsoever. But there have been a couple of incidences such as Mashadani as there is in any large organization and they must be dealt with according to the law. But that doesn’t mean the program is not...was not worthwhile and is not going to continue in the future.
So we are continuing to move on with the transitioning of Sahwa from the Coalition to the Government of Iraq through the same processes. And if in that process we find that there are people who are breaking the law, I imagine that they will be arrested. But the vast majority of them, as like in the vast majority of the people in any population, are law-abiding people and I think will continue to do well just as they have these last few months.
Did you have a question?
REP2: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: I want to briefly ask you a brief question. I know...I am sure you heard about money laundering. And my question is similar, is trying to bring some illegitimate money or trying to make it legitimate...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: ...and legal. I think...do you...don’t you think that the Awakening Groups or forming the Awakening Groups was kind of similar? Is to bring some people from al-Qaida, illegitimate people, and trying to transform them into...and give them a legal coverage as of like in part of a legitimate group of for-...legitimate forces for the government.
MG PERKINS: Yes, I mean I think it was one of the first steps in reconciliation that the Sahwa realized that al-Qaida was trying to impart on them a very brutal way of life and that what al-Qaida wanted was not what was best for Iraq. And so the Sahwa said we are Iraqis and so we want to do what is best for Iraq. And so in many instances they put they and their families at very great risk. And they then took up arms with the Coalition and with the Iraqi Security Forces to fight al-Qaida.
There was a Sahwa leader recently over in the American Hospital here in Baghdad and he has four sons. Three of them have already been killed by al-Qaida and his remaining son was in the hospital because he had been shot and very seriously injured. So his whole family had put themselves at risk to stand up for the Iraqi people and fight al-Qaida, and he had given up three of his four sons’ lives. So I think that shows a very large commitment when a family is willing to give up three of four sons’ lives to defend their nation. So while they are compensated for their service, as they should be, it obviously shows a deep-down commitment to be able to give that many members of your family up, much more than whatever any amount of money you get paid.
REP3: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Some of the Sahwa members—and I’m not talking about the Sahwa leaders, I’m talking about the regular members...
MG PERKINS: Yeah, yeah.
INT: ...in the Sahwa groups, they have concerns that they’re going to be arrested one after the other, especially now the American forces have pulled their hands...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: ...out of the deal and it’s only the Iraqi government who is dealing with the Sahwa groups.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: And they’re worried and they’re concerned that this...that they’re going to be arrested.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP3: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: We heard a lot of members of the Sahwa Groups, because of this concern, they stopped working and they even moved to another area.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: They moved to another place to live somewhere else because of the concerns of being arrested and all of that.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: In addition to that, there are only a small percentage of those Sahwa groups that have been transitioned to the national police or the Iraqi Security Forces.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
INT: And the rest, they really have no clue about their future.
MG PERKINS: A couple of good points. One, all of the ones who have been transferred are currently...are working for and are being paid by the Iraqi Army. And the intent is to have about 20% of them stay in the Iraqi Security Forces, and then the others will go to other ministries or civilian jobs.
I think again it’s instructive to see the commitment of the Iraqi government with regards to the Sahwa pay, that right now, as you know, the budget has not been passed—the Iraqi federal budget. And therefore, a lot of bills that the government owes to various people are not being paid. However, the one bill that they have worked a special program for to go around the normal processes and ensure that gets paid is the bill for the Sahwa. So the Government of Iraq has put together a fairly complicated manner to make sure there is money in the bank and that they can distribute the checks for the Sahwa even before the budget is passed. This is the only large bill that I know of that that special provision has been made yet.
So if the Government of Iraq was going to turn their back on them, they would have ample opportunity to do it already since there is no budget. But the fact that they have worked out a special way to pay them I think is another indication of the commitment they have.
The transfer of the Sons of Iraq to other ministries was supposed to begin in March. But since the budget hasn’t been passed yet, they do not yet have the budget to pay the Sons of Iraq in the other ministries. So it was determined the best thing is to keep it like it is right now and develop the special pay program, and then once the budget is passed, start moving them to other ministries.
REP3: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: What about their concerns as far as the arrestment...the arresting by the...?
MG PERKINS: Well, again, if you take a look at the large numbers of them out there, we do not see evidence yet that there are vast numbers being arrested. There are over 50,000 in Baghdad alone, and we have only confirmed a couple of arrests. But in the same time, there are probably Shi’a criminals that are being arrested, too. So what we are interested in is really a disproportionate share and a long-term trend that that is happening and we don’t yet see that. But we watch it very closely and we are working very closely with the Government of Iraq. And General Odierno met with the prime minister today, again, to just reaffirm our support for the program.
REP4: Haddad Salih from BBC. Should I ask the questions in English?
MG PERKINS: Fine.
REP4: [Unintelligible] so my colleagues...
MG PERKINS: I’m much better in English.
REP4: ...don’t understand.
INT: [Laughs. Speaks briefly in Arabic.]
REP4: Oh, okay. Well, I’m afraid that my colleagues asked many of the questions I wanted to ask.
MG PERKINS: Okay.
REP4: But, you know, I’m sorry I have to repeat some of it...
MG PERKINS: That’s alright.
REP4: ...because...if you don’t mind. The main question is that the arrest of Mashadani, is this going to be the end of the story? Are there going to be any further arrests for some of the Sahwa leaders, you know? You know...I mean these guys, they weren’t dangerous you know. I mean there was a call for the armed groups to lay down weapons...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP4: ...and come join the Sahwa, be good citizens...
MG PERKINS: Right.
REP4: ...you know. So are there any other hidden issue...hidden files against some of the other Sahwa members, somebody that’s...? Do you want me to continue and ask...?
MG PERKINS: I’ll answer that one. Well, I mean the...obviously now, since 1 January, the Iraqis have the lead for security here in Iraq and they are operating under a sovereign responsibility. We of course work very closely with them and coordinate with them. So I am sure that there are oth-...there will be other arrests throughout Iraq for people breaking the law, whether they are Sons of Iraq or anybody else. And again, Mashadani wasn’t arrested because he was SOI, it was because he was breaking the law.
So there’s not a file of SOI people that they’re going after, it is really people who have broken the law. So like in every country, every day people are arrested that break the law, and I assume that will continue throughout Iraq regardless if they are Sons of Iraq or not. So you can’t really say as of today, no more Sons of Iraq will be arrested. If there are Sons of Iraq who have broken the law or who have issues associated with them, they will be arrested I am sure like any other citizen is.
REP4: [Unintelligible]. When you say he was breaking the law, you mean he was breaking the law while being a Sahwa leader?
MG PERKINS: Yes.
REP4: Or that’s before...
MG PERKINS: Yes.
REP4: ...he became a....
MG PERKINS: No, no, no, while he was a Sahwa leader. Did...I don’t know if I have it here; we can give you.... There are a list of 13 sort of points—we can email it—that when they agree to be a Sahwa leader that they will follow these points. He had broken many of them once he became a leader so this was even after he supposedly had reconciled.
REP4: So they’re not.... So, you know, we were...the BBC was there, you know, at Fadhil.
MG PERKINS: Yes.
REP4: And we interviewed his...one of his deputies...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP4: ...Khaled al Qaisi...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP4: ...an hour before the arrest. And he was talking about, you know, it appears they have...that these guys, the Sahwa guys, are underpaid, they’re not being paid on time. So there are fears that these guys might be recruited again by al-Qaida.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP4: How big a problem is that?
MG PERKINS: Well, I think, again, the efforts that the Government of Iraq have made to get them paid while other bills are not being paid, I think is pretty indicative of the commitment of the Government of Iraq. And so, you know, the Iraqi Security Forces have already reached out to the former followers in Fadhil already today. They are making commitments to pay people; the Coalition is working with them.
So I think it is pretty clear that this was not a sweep of SOI, but it was targeted against he and a couple of his key followers that were involved in this criminal activity. And so the others that are still free today and that will get paid today, I would say have no fear if they are law-abiding citizens.
REP4: Thank you. My last question...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP4: ...is about a report that was published on Al-Mada today. It was coming from Washington actually.
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP4: And that on the 20th of October, you know the pull out, the Americans might just remain, you know some of the combat, you know, forces stay in Iraq under another name. And the consultation and.... How true is that?
MG PERKINS: Yeah, okay. Are you...
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: June.
MG PERKINS: ...you’re talking June?
REP4: Oh, yeah.
MG PERKINS: June, yeah. The agreement right now is that June of this year that combat forces will be out of the cities. That is part of the security agreement. And in the security agreement it listed a number of other things that cannot be done without the approval of the Government of Iraq. For instance, right now we cannot conduct unilateral operations unless we have the approval of the Government of Iraq. And that is going to continue past June. We will...the plan right now is to pull out of the cities by the end of June. However, if the Government of Iraq wants us to conduct an operation in the city, if they approve it, we will join them and conduct an operation, but under their approval and under their leadership, and then go back to wherever we are stationed at that time. So even under the current agreement, when we say we’ll pull out of the cities by June, that means that we will pull our bases out of the cities, op-...live outside of the cities. But if the Iraqi Security Forces and the Government of Iraq want us to come into the city to conduct a joint operation with them, one that they have approved, then we will do that. And that’s part...and that’s according to the security agreement. So it’s really not that—if you read the security agreement, not that certain things won’t happen, but they cannot happen without the approval of the Government of Iraq.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sir, we have about five more minutes to get you to your next appointment.
MG PERKINS: Okay. One last one.
REP5: Okay. [Asks question in Arabic.]
REP6: I wanted to ask the same question. The timing.
INT: The timing of the...
REP6: Why now?
INT: ...the chasing of Adel Mashadani and the Awakening Group members. Why did it coincide at the same time with the withdrawal of the American forces from cities? Putting in mind, considering that Mashadani’s been breaking the law on the rules as like since 2007. Until now.
MG PERKINS: Yeah. The...there’s no relationship with us withdrawing from the cities with regards to that. What it was is, first of all, they had to get enough evidence to build a legal case that will hold up in court. In the United States, for instance, when we go after our organized crime rings, the FBI sometimes will conduct investigations that go on for years. And so they actually don’t arrest a person until they have plenty of evidence, plenty of material that will stand up in court so that when they arrest him, they have a very good legal case. In these very complicated ones, where a person is involved in so much illegal activity, it generally takes a long time, many times a couple of years.
And the other thing we wanted to make sure was that it was...he was in the location and it was done in a way that it could limit the collateral damage, so you had to make sure you knew exactly where he was, that he...you know, had information exactly where he was, you knew where other people were so that you could have a very precise operation because he travels around a lot, has a lot of bodyguards. So you have to wait until he’s in a vulnerable position so that you can get him and have the minimum amount of damage.
I really have to go because I’m late, but I appreciate all your time.
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