Press Roundtable: Maj. Gen. Perkins, March 31, 2009
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Maj. Gen. David Perkins, MNF-I, speaks with members of the media.
PRESS ROUNDTABLE CONVENED BY MAJOR GENERAL DAVID PERKINS, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC EFFECTS, CJ9, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ.
DATE: March 31, 2009
TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
PARTICIPANTS:
Major General David Perkins and reporters Fredrick Pleitgen from CNN, Karim Talbi from AFP, Hamza Hendawi from AP, Tim Cocks from Reuters, Rod Nordland from the New York Times, Leila Fadel from McClatchy, and Ned Parker from the Los Angeles Times.
REP1 = REPORTER 1
INT = INTERPRETER
[PH] = PHONETIC SPELLING
MG PERKINS: ...and Amy said, unfortunately, I am way over schedule but we wanted to spend some time, you know, we can follow up onyou with any questions.
Specifically, to sort of clarify, there’s been a lot in the press about the Mashadani arrest on the 28th and to clarify what generated that as well as, you know, sort of the atmospherics behind it. He...this was a warranted arrest; there was an Iraqi warrant out. It was an Iraqi planned, Iraqi led, Iraqi decision to do that. We supported in that we have embedded trainers with the unit. We provided some quick-reaction force capacity, some aerial observation, etc., like that. But again, it was mainly an Iraqi operation. And really the focus was on Mashadani who, as the warrant reads out, was involved in an extensive amount of criminal activity. He happened to have been a previous SOI leader but it had nothing to do with him being an SOI, just as in many countries, people are arrested and they work for various companies or organizations, it has nothing to do with that company or organization; it has to do with their actions.
Specifically, he was really abusing his position as a leader there in the SOI and amongst the community. Extortion—we think at least about $160,000 worth a month from businesses, from people, things like that, to sort of have permission to operate involving kidnappings, robbery. Basically strong-arming the Fadhil community there to his own advantage. And that is clearly activity that, you know, the Government of Iraq cannot condone, and then obviously, we here in the Coalition do not condone. And that’s not what we want leaders to do, whether they’re Sons of Iraq or anything else. Also, evidence linking him to IED cells, indirect-fire cells, ties to al-Qaida in Iraq, I mean just all kinds of activity which is, you know, terrorist in nature as well as just basically criminal in nature, like I said, extortion, strong-arming, things like that.
You know it’s interesting as you take a look at some of the reaction already. Of course some of this is...media supporters were involved in the initial altercation with Iraqi Security Forces. But in the last day or so, we’ve seen a significantly sort of compliant neighborhood. And in many cases, people are very grateful because they know what he was doing there in the neighborhood and glad to have a criminal out of the neighborhood as anybody is. You know it’s interesting that during his arrest, some of his closest supporters went out and made calls for neighborhood people, other Safwa, to take up arms and, you know, engage Iraqi Security Forces, all that, and, you know, resist by the hundreds, etc. And that didn’t happen. So there was...even though there was sort of a call to arms by some of his closest supporters, the people did not respond to it. And in fact, the Iraqi Security Forces said if people turn in their weapons peacefully, they’ll be reconciled with, etc., like that. And they’ve had over 100 people just voluntarily come in and turn in their weapons, etc.
So obviously it’s a volatile situation. It’s a very...these things can get tense. There have been, you know, obviously a long history between some of these people and the government, and in some instances, issues with the Sons of Iraq. But, you know, I think we’re trying to be very clear about this: this is not a Son of Iraq issue, this is a criminal activity issue with Mashadani.
I mean other reports that are out there, there have been challenges paying the Sons of Iraq because of the budget issues. You all know the budget is not yet law for 2009. I personally was in the minister of finance’s office about two hours ago and he showed me a...basically what you would call a deposit slip depositing the money in the Rafidain Bank for the Sons of Iraq to be paid. That was done today. Quite honestly, the minister of finance and others in the government had to go out of their way and use some sort of extraordinary conditions to get the money. It’s about $30 million was deposited today in the Rafidain Bank. They...I mean they had to do extraordinary legal and financial arrangements, all of which are legal, but to sort of overcome the fact that the budget is not yet passed so it makes it very difficult for them to execute it. But they realized how important, from a security point of view, the Sons of Iraq are and, therefore, like I said, I was there. My appointment was at 1:00 P.M., 1300, and when I walked in, he had the deposit slip in the Rafidain Bank. So we’re obviously working very closely with the minister of interior, which is where the money is coming from now as a temporary measure, to pay the Sons of Iraq.
There were other reports initially that the street fight that was taken part in Fadhil were, you know, disgruntled or recalcitrant American-released detainees that were released without the approval of the Iraqi government. First of all, that is not how the system works. Since the security agreement was signed, we have a Detainee Committee on which you have senior members of the Iraqi government, as the Coalition Force, sit on that committee. Each and every file has gone through that committee. All of the evidence is given to the Government of Iraq and they make the final determination as to the disposition of the released detainee and make the final decision. So we lay out all the information we have; the committee takes a look at it, but the Government of Iraq decides, okay, this detainee, we want to release now. We want...they have legal jurisdiction over all the detainees. They have given us physical jurisdiction temporarily of the ones we have so we can let them be released in a safe and orderly manner because their system can’t handle a large influx at once. But our physical authority is only at the request of the Iraqis as they have legal jurisdiction over all the detainees. And so they would determine whether they want us to continue to detain for awhile, whether they need to be transferred to a Government of Iraq security facility, whether they will go through the Iraqi judicial system based upon adequate evidence, or do they just get released back to their neighborhoods. And again, those are all decisions where the final decision is made by the Government of Iraq. So again, what went on in Fadhil had nothing to do with that and was not involved in any released detainees at all. But I think it’s important to clear that aspect up.
So I think with that, that sort of gives you a good background of where we are, and some of the, you know, pressing issues that we’ve all been concerned with in the last couple of days. And I’ll just open it up to questions now. Yes.
REP1: If we [unintelligible] beyond [unintelligible], also last week a top Sons of Iraq leader in Ghazaliyah was detained...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP1: ...[unintelligible]. And when you talk to some of the Iraq leaders, they talk about how the American[s] implemented a successful experiment and now are withdrawing their support and betraying them. And a lot of them see it as an unfulfilled promise.
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP1: You [unintelligible] insurgents come into the fold, stand up, fight, and we’ll help you and support you. And the guys that are getting arrested are the first guys that stood up.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP1: So how do you respond to this?
MG PERKINS: Well, obviously it is a big priority for us – the Sons of Iraq. Hence, like I said, I spent a large portion of the last few days working with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance to figure out how we get them paid, do all those kinds of things. We have worked very closely, for instance, with the Iraqi Security Forces as this operation was planned to make sure that, in fact, it was targeted on one individual, there was adequate warrant, there was evidence, there was not colla-...mass collateral damage. It was done in a very precise and disciplined way so that, you know, I mean it’s a very densely-populated area so there wasn’t a lot of other collateral damage. And again, it wasn’t a big roundup of all the SOI in the area; it was after one individual person.
So I think I can assure you a lot of effort goes into making sure this reconciliation process goes smoothly, to make sure that promises that were made are fulfilled, and at the same time, working with the Government of Iraq to make sure that the rule of law is in fact the way that things are run. And of course, again, they are exercising their sovereign right and, as of 1 January, they are in the lead for this. But we engage with them daily to ensure that promises that were made and that, you know, commitments and sacrifices of the Sons of Iraq were in...are in fact...are very important to them.
And I can tell you, for instance, that the Government of Iraq, the one thing that they have sort of, if you want to say gone off budget and gone out of the way to make happen, are these payments. There are any number of unfulfilled financial obligations for the Government of Iraq right now because the budget has not been done, and the only one that has had that level of activity applied to it has been to pay the Sons of Iraq. So I...you know, I can assure you that a lot of effort is put forth on the Coalition’s side as well as the Government of Iraq.
REP1: [Unintelligible] why was he detained in Ghazaliyah?
MG PERKINS: Well, I mean it was, again, a warrant for his arrest. The Iraqi Security Forces have him. What we are most engaged with on these, as Mashadani or others are taken into custody, we will pay particular attention to make sure that due process is afforded them; that they are treated humanely, they are in safe custody, and that they are afforded due process like anybody else.
REP2: Just to follow up...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP2: ...I’ve spoken with people from the embassy before...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP2: ...and the issue of—and even the U.S. [coughs] military—about due process in Iraq. I mean I think it’s fair to say that due process is a challenge here at times.
MG PERKINS: Right.
REP2: And I think in these cases it is as well. You have secret informants. Is that a concern at all with cases like Raad Ali?
MG PERKINS: Yeah. I mean obviously Iraq is a very young democracy; it’s a very young country. They are standing up all their system: They are standing up their democratic institutions. They are standing up their judicial institutions. They are standing up, you know, their Ministry of Oil. I mean everything. And so that is why we pay particular attention to these critical things. That’s why we put so much effort into partnering with them and working alongside them. So I...across the board, there is no aspect of the Iraqi government, Iraqi society that is where we would like it to be, that is necessarily where it needs to be, but it’s a lot better than where it was. And so we generally have a full day of work every day here in Iraq.
REP2: But I mean a message of reconciliation, I don’t.... I mean there’s clearly a difference between someone like Mashadani and...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP2: ...Colonel Raad Ali. I would...I don’t know. It seems that detaining someone like that who is going to engage in the system...
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP2: ...sends a message that perhaps, you know, reconciliation isn’t coming forward.
MG PERKINS: Well, again, we work very closely with the Iraqi government on that to make sure that there is...that the right signals are sent when it comes to reconciliation, when it comes to working through these issues. And some things are done better than others, and so it’s just...it is a continual challenge.
REP2: [Unintelligible] Sheik Brashir from Diyala, who was probably tortured. There’s a video, drilled holes in his body. Is there...I mean I...we’d spoken back in January, even with American officers there. I mean no one’s been detained or arrested from the police.
MG PERKINS: There...I can tell you there is an ongoing investigation that we have gone back to the Iraqi government repeatedly to sort of find out the status of that and what is going on. So again, our concern with that case as all the others, is due process being followed? What is it? What are the parameters with regards to the investigation? And all those kind of things. So we are engaged continually on....
Those are high profile ones, but I can tell you in a very wide spectrum, we have a program where we visit...go around and visit all the various detention centers, prisons in the Iraqi system, make comments about what needs to be changed, etc. So we don’t focus on just these high profile ones. They’re the ones that get the attention.
REP2: But is there a sectarian double standard?
MG PERKINS: Well, I wouldn’t say a double standard. I think there are...it is just a very complicated process of which there are many different players and some are much better at really moving in the direction that I think the Iraqis would like things to move in. And there is a concerted effort on the part of the prime minister and others. You’ve seen actions with regards to corruption. I think the Ministry of Interior, I think, has released 62,000 people, is the number they used, for corruption and things like that. So there’s a lot of work to be done, very complicated issues. But there are...is a certain amount of significant activity ongoing with regards to these things.
Sir.
REP3: Yeah, I’m going to get back to what happened yesterday.
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP3: Two questions. The first: You spoke about trainers, U.S. forces.
MG PERKINS: Embedded, yeah.
REP3: Yeah. I may be naïve, but what do you have to drive on Iraqi [unintelligible] beware[?] inside Fadhil. I mean what [unintelligible]?
MG PERKINS: Say again?
REP3: Yesterday in Fadhil, during the operation...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP3: ...there were Iraqi forces, U.S. forces—and U.S. forces embedded inside humvees...Iraqi humvees. You know they weren’t obviously driving. And...I mean is that procedure?
MG PERKINS: Well, I mean there’s a...there are embedded trainers to do any number of things. I mean we have embedded soldiers that train other soldiers. We have embedded officers that lead officers. So we are embedded at multi-echelons training those various echelons on what their roles are. So it’s...we don’t just have an embedded trainer at one echelon, it’s really the entire chain of command.
REP3: [Unintelligible] on the weapons. [Unintelligible] about that...a kind of [unintelligible] again that the weapon would only be given back to the Safwa, but at the same time the Safwa from [unintelligible]...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP3: ...would join the Iraqi forces. You[?] don’t have any weapons so they can’t join the Iraqi forces.
MG PERKINS: Well, I’m sure that the Iraqi Security Forces will work out the posi-...the procedures for transitioning them into the Iraqi Security Force. We have done tens of thousands of them already so the process of going from a Sons of Iraq member under the control of the Iraqi Security Forces, we have that pretty well established and they’ve done it fairly well.
REP4: So does that mean that the Sons of Iraq are not going to be reconstituted in Fadhil?
MG PERKINS: Well, of course the long-term plan is—and we’re probably 80% there already—is the Sons of Iraq all initially go into the Iraqi Security Forces and, in fact, the ones that we’ll be paying this month from Diyala, from Baghdad, etc., like that, they are initially...starting last November were paid by the Iraqi Army. Starting this month, the funds – because of the financial challenges in the budget happen to be coming from the minister of interior’s account because he has the money in his account – are being paid for from them. But eventually they go under the Iraqi Security Forces; some will be in the police, some will be in the Army. The end result will be about 20% of the current number of Iraqi Security Forces, which totally, throughout the country is around 90,000, high 80s, 90,000. About 20% will be in the Iraqi Security Forces. The other 80% will be transitioned either into other ministries – the Ministry of Construction and Housing, Labor and Social Affairs, things like that – or there is a significant number of civilian job training programs like the vocational-technical training, employment centers, things such as that.
So they initially go into the Iraqi Security Forces so they come under the control of the Government of Iraq, not under the control of the U.S. or somebody else. And then once under the Government of Iraq control, they are then transitioned into other ministries or civilian job or training programs.
REP4: But you said 80% of the way there. It’s more like 5% of the way there, isn’t it? Only a few jobs have come to these guys.
MG PERKINS: Yeah, you mean 80%...well, no. About 80% of the total....
REP4: A long way to go.
MG PERKINS: Yeah. I guess I need to clarify that. Eighty percent is of all the Sons of Iraq under the Government of Iraq’s authority...
REP4: Oh, right.
MG PERKINS: ...are being paid right now.
REP4: Mm-hmm.
MG PERKINS: The...so we’ve got 80% of all of them are under there. Now the intent is to take 80% of the...
REP4: Mm.
MG PERKINS: ...100%, once we get them, to go out to the other ministries.
The initial plan was, starting in March, we would start taking the 80% of the final number and start putting them into other ministries. The first phase was to basically go through with all the Iraqis. You have to understand, we’re talking tens of thousands of Sons of Iraq. And a...for lack of a better term, a resume was put together on them: What is your education? What is your background? Etc., like that. And they were all entered into a database. So we worked along with the Government of Iraq and the IFCNR committee, and created a huge database of all the Sons of Iraq, and what are your skill sets. And then Zoohir[ph] Schlabi[ph] is in charge of now taking this database with all of these skill sets and then going to the various ministries. And quite a few have come online already: The Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Construction and Housing. And it’s starting to give a list. Okay, I need, you know, do you have any ex-teachers? Do you have any carpenters? Do you have any welders? Do you have any plumbers? Etc., like that. And the intent was in March—of course the budget challenges have prevented this a little bit—is to now start taking these and moving them out of the Iraqi Security Forces into the other ministries.
At the same time, MOSA has set up a series of vocational training centers and they are partnering with both ministries and civilian companies that have requirements. And then the ministry and civilian company will say I need graduates that can do this, you know I need welders, I need electricians, or whatever. And then they will sponsor a vocational training center, and then that center will then sort of adjust its curriculum to generate that output. And then MOSA has established a series of employment centers and co-locating them with the vo-techs.
So then if you...that’s one of the problems right now. There is...if you are an employer and you want to hire somebody, there’s no place you can go to to say I, you know, I need this kind of person with this skill. And so we’ve worked very closely with them to set up this system that you train people, you then have a hiring center, and then people...employers can go to the center and hire things. So I mean very...what we’re trying to do is set up a long-term, enduring system, not just makeshift jobs—here’s a broom, sweep the street. I’m not saying that that’s not an important job, but we want to have something that is enduring, that builds...that isn’t just focused on Sons of Iraq, although they are a party[?], but builds the base of employable and skilled people throughout all of Iraq, and so you have this sustaining capability to build an economy.
REP5: Sir, when did you first become aware of Mashadani’s criminal activity?
MG PERKINS: Well, I think the Government of Iraq had been looking at it for awhile. They had been collecting evidence. They had been, you know, kind of determining when do they have enough material such that it could proceed through a court of law. Obviously, you know tactical things come into place: When do we know that...where he is? When is the time right so that we could get him with minimal collateral damage? I mean all those things. So there was a sort of legal aspect of it, there was a tactical aspect of it. There was an attempt to do it with the least amount of, again, damage and unnecessary violence because obviously he was, you know, heavily protected and had a lot of very close associates.
REP5: This long list of criminal activities that he was supposed to have been involved in, I assume the Fadhil SOI was under direct...of the direct supervision of the U.S. military at one point before he was handed over to the Iraq government.
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP5: I guess my question is at what sort of timeframe did this man allegedly commit all these crimes?
MG PERKINS: Well, it’s...as they were sort of collecting the evidence, a lot of that I looked at was 2008 timeframe. You know fairly recent, quite a bit of it. And that’s another thing though at work with the Iraqis. I mean—and you had just asked about reconciliation. There’s a definite I think focus on making sure that we’re...that in the process of reconciliation that if warrants are out there, they are recent warrants, they are current and, therefore....
REP1: But the Iraqi government told me that he’s also charged for things that are pre-SOI.
MG PERKINS: Well...
REP1: Killings, pre-SOI.
MG PERKINS: Yeah. There’s a very long list of things. I know I have the whole list; I don’t have the whole legal issue. But I know that the warrant was a 2008 one and there are a series of recent events. And again, from the legal aspect, what they end up charging him with and then what evidence they have, I mean we’ll have to see how the legal case develops.
REP1: If he was committing all these crimes in 2008, the U.S. military was paying him and supervising him. Why didn’t they know about it?
MG PERKINS: Well, I mean...you know it’s like any other thing when you’re building a legal case and you’re, you know, you have to make sure that these things will stand up in court, that you have proof of these various things, and that you are, you know, weighing all these various things out. I mean none of these things are sort of clear cut.
REP1: We have 13,400 people in Bucca and Cropper who have no huge cases against them, but are [unintelligible] a threat. Why wouldn’t we just put him in Bucca? You know that’s what I don’t understand about this program is that all of the SOIs are saying the U.S. made us a promise. Yes, we might have been bad guys, but they told us that if we come into the fold, they’ll help us, they’ll protect us, and this government that hates us...
MG PERKINS: Mm.
REP1: ...they’ll help us. And now...
MG PERKINS: Mm.
REP1: ...they’re feeding us to the sharks. What can we do to [unintelligible]?
MG PERKINS: Yeah. Well, I’ll tell you, there’s a—and I don’t know if I have it, but we can give it to you. There’s a point sort of...when they come into the fold, there’s I think 13 points, so to speak, that they’re expected to follow. And a number of his.... Pardon?
REP1: [Unintelligible], right?
MG PERKINS: Yeah, we’re [unintelligible]. A number of his infractions are since he came into the fold and saying he did not go along with things that he had agreed to as coming into the fold. So I mean that is part of the big problem. These...it wasn’t like he was doing things 10 years ago, reconciled with it, and came in. These are very recent things post that agreement that he did not live up to.
REP6: So you would object if there was someone who had been clean since that agreement and they were being [unintelligible] for stuff they’d done before?
REP1: Which people are in Diyala [unintelligible].
MG PERKINS: You mean if...
REP6: I mean if they commit...if they’d committed...done whatever bad things when they were insurgents, but then they’d switched to change sides, joined you, SOI force[?], under the promise of, you know, we’ll protect you.
MG PERKINS: Mm-hmm.
REP6: And then they stick to this agreement and they don’t do anything bad since then. If they are then pursued for things they did before, do you object to that in principle?
MG PERKINS: Yeah. I mean I think we’ve been very clear with the Government of Iraq that if agreements are made with any group and there’s times associated with it, that all sides have to live up to those agreements. Now, as in everything, there’s two sides to most stories, and that’s why it’s important that these things are done according to the rule of law. And so that if there are arrests made, it is done with a warrant, it is done with evidence. That evidence has to stand up in court. It has to stand up with regards to previous agreements that were made, etc., like that. So, you know, each case, as it is in our judicial system, each case is unique and each case needs to be based on the merits of that individual case based on the current law that they are being held to and the timeframes as outlined by that.
So, you know, I...having been a general court martial convening authority many times in my career, I am very well aware that is...there are no two cases that are the same, and that each one has to be looked at according to the evidence. And it’s very difficult to make an overarching statement that everybody that does this, this is what happens to them, and everybody that does that... In fact, you’re not supposed to do that. You have to judge each one on its merits.
REP6: I mean just [unintelligible]....
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sir, we have about five minutes.
MG PERKINS: Okay.
REP6: Actually, can I ask quickly, were there some managers of local TV station calls...they’re called [unintelligible], something like that, that were arrested by U.S. forces that [unintelligible] Freedoms Committee has gone and, you know, had a big statement about it and so has the local TV station, but we haven’t got anything from you guys.
MG PERKINS: Let me follow up. Do you have the names?
REP6: No, I can’t recall the names.
MG PERKINS: If you could follow up on that, we’ll let you know.
REP2: How did you know [unintelligible] detained in Fadhil or did the authorities...the Iraqis detain?
MG PERKINS: In Fadhil?
REP2: Yeah. In addition to Mashadani and his...one of his aides.
MG PERKINS: Yeah. I mean I’ll have to get the exact numbers because, of course, we don’t have them, they have them.
REP2: Mm-hmm.
MG PERKINS: So I’ll have to find out exactly how many at the end of the day they’ve detained. I think they may have detained some this morning.
REP3: And [unintelligible] Mashadani [unintelligible] Mashadani cases [unintelligible] that you’re going to discover in the next few days and [unintelligible] operations for the Iraqi, U.S. forces, for arresting someone, I don’t know [unintelligible] or someone else? I mean....
MG PERKINS: You mean are there a lot of them?
REP3: Well...
REP2: Interesting how they [unintelligible] start making more arrests.
REP3: Yeah. Well, through the weekend, could it happen again?
MG PERKINS: Well, I mean...I think.... To be clear, they’re...arrests are made every day all over Iraq for various, you know, previous[?] terrorist cell, like that.
REP6: Yeah.
MG PERKINS: I mean and some.... For whatever reason, they...depending upon, you know, the charac-...the personality of the person or the history behind it, you know, generate more interest than others. So I mean to say [laughs]...you know to say, well, is this a Mashadani case or is this not a Mashadani case. I mean there’s a number of cases out there – people conducting criminal acts, terrorist acts, etc., like that – and people are arrested every day. And again, that is why.... I know we tend to look at these things as discrete events, but believe me, someone that works with this every day, and we work 24 hours a day and there...and these are just.... You know to us, it’s a continuum of activity to continue to go through whether it’s reconciliation, whether it’s anti-terrorist activity, whether it’s anti-criminal activity. This is...you know this is just part of the process, quite honestly.
[Overlapping questions.]
REP1: Just on Sheik Brashir, the SOI in Diyala told me that they believe that there are three arrest warrants out for police officers involved but the police wouldn’t talk to me about it at all in Diyala. And I was wondering if you had any updates in that respect, that there’s actual arrest warrants out for police officers.
MG PERKINS: You’re saying arrest warrants that have not yet been executed?
REP1: Arrest warrants for police officers involved in the death of Sheik Brashir.
MG PERKINS: Oh, I see what you’re saying, men that were involved with that. I mean I don’t have any visibility on that. Did the Iraqi have warrants?
REP1: I’m not sure exac-...I’m assuming.
MG PERKINS: Well, they would be. Yeah. I mean I don’t have it. I’m not saying it’s not true, I’m just saying....
REP1: Yeah.
MG PERKINS: I mean Iraqis don’t share all their arrest warrants with us.
REP2: Do you...?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We’ve got to get you to the next event.
REP2: Just quickly...
MG PERKINS: You haven’t asked a question.
REP7: [Unintelligible].
MG PERKINS: Oh, you’re [unintelligible]. Okay, then the last one.
REP2: You don’t need though to reassure the other SOIs...
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
REP2: ...that are being targeted? And is that what the pay thing was about, your [unintelligible]?
MG PERKINS: Well, you know, it’s inter-...that’s a great question. And we do feel a large responsibility to reassure the SOIs that this is not about SOI. I can tell you I...we’ve been working the pay thing for two weeks, before the decision was even made to do Mashadani. And so it occurred at...I mean it’s coming to fruition at the same time. But quite honestly, what happened was the budget, as you know, I mean their fiscal year ends in December and they still have[?] been going through this. The Council of Ministers, I think last Monday or last Tuesday, made the decision to pay this way[?] and trying to figure out where to get the money from. And so the minister of finance has been working through this whole week. So it just happ-.... You know...I mean they made the decision on Tuesday and at that time they didn’t know that the Mashadani decision hadn’t been made yet, so it just...I mean it occurred simultaneously, at the same time.
But to get back to your point, we, the Coalition, the folks at the embassy are contacting senior Sunni leaders and we are making a major effort to go out and reassure the Sunni Committee, the SOI Committee that we have every intent to live up to the promises. But probably more importantly, the Government of Iraq does. And again, these get looked at sometimes as discrete events, but there are any number of things that are always going on simultaneously that don’t get the light of day. Like I said, all this work we’ve been doing with the Ministry of Finance to get them paid and so all of this stuff.... And, again, I’m sort of trying to paint the big picture, but we spend a lot of time and effort—as does the Government of Iraq—on these things and, you know, they are very...they are difficult issues out there, no doubt.
REP2: So you feel that Mashadani is a real rock-solid criminal case, this isn’t something...a matter of secret informants and [unintelligible].
MG PERKINS: From the information I’ve seen, yeah, this is not petty crime.
REP2: Mm-hmm.
MG PERKINS: You know it’s pretty substantial kind of stuff.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sir, thanks for your time today. We’re going to have to…
MG PERKINS: Yeah.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: ...close this. And I appreciate everyone coming.
MG PERKINS: Yeah. I appreciate you all coming, sort of last minute and so like that. And hopefully this clarified a little bit and, you know, we’ll have more of these. [Unintelligible] find these hopefully useful; a little bit more discussion than just the [unintelligible] Q&A.
Thank you all. I appreciate it.
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