PRESS CONFERENCE: Operational Update: Maj. Gen. Perkins, Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, March 25, 2009
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Maj. Gen. David Perkins, MNF-I, and Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, Iraqi Army, provide an operational update.
PRESS CONFERENCE AND OPERATIONAL UPDATE:
DATE: March 25, 2009
TRANSCRIBED BY: SOS INTERNATIONAL LTD.
REP1 = REPORTER 1
INT = INTERPRETER
[PH] = PHONETIC SPELLING
MG PERKINS: As-Salāmu `Alaykum. Good afternoon to everyone. I’m pleased to be joined today by my good friend, General Qassim Atta, and we’re going to give you an update of the situation here in Iraq, some updates specifically focused on security activities, operations that are going on underneath the security agreement. And also some discussions about the way ahead this year.
Some significant improvement has taken place across the board; I’ll get into some specifics of that. The first one...a discussion...this...we’ll discuss the security situation. If you take a look at the chart that we’re showing right there, you can see that currently, right now, the attacks are at their lowest level since August of 2003, and this represents a decrease in attacks of over 90% since June of 2007. One year ago, for instance, we were averaging 130 attacks a day. And this year, the week of 14 to 20 March, we only averaged 10 a day. At the height of the violence, we were seeing 1,250 attacks a week. And now, many times we have less than 100 a week. And for instance, in the last two weeks, we have had no ethnosectarian attacks reported in Iraq—and many times those are the most deadly and they tend to lead to a spiraling out of control of violence. So it’s very good news that ethnosectarian violence is at such a low level.
Another very important factor is we take a look at attacks against civilians. Again, if you take a look at the graph here, since the height of the surge, Iraqi civilian deaths have decreased by over 90%. And again, if you could take a look at just recent data, two weeks ago we had 56 civilian deaths throughout Iraq, and last week we only had 4. So we had a reduction from 56 to 4 in just the last two weeks alone.
If you take a look at military deaths—again, which are an indicator of the violence and lethality out there—U.S. combat deaths are at their lowest levels since the war began six years ago today; a decrease, again, of over 90%. Iraqi Security Force casualties have decreased by more than 80%. If you take a look at the period of January to February of 2007, there were 148 U.S. military killed. However, if you look at January to February of this year, 2009, there were 19 U.S. military killed.
There’s also been a significant decrease in high-profile attacks. Again, if you take a look at the graph here, the high-profile attacks had dropped 67% nationwide when you compare 2009 to the same period last year, in 2008. High-profile explosions have decreased just in the last couple of weeks. Two weeks ago we had five in Iraq, and just last week we had one. Another significant point to take into consideration when you take a look at high-profile attacks is the time between each attack, and as the time increases, the ability to respond to them, and the ability to bring society back to a normal-type sense of operation is greater. And so, again, if you take a look at the time between high-profile attacks, last year at this time it was 1.9 days between them. That time has now doubled and we are at 3.8 days per...between high-profile attacks. Again, this is important for a number of reasons: It shows the enemy is unable to maintain a high rate of attacks. They don’t have the resources available. They don’t have the personnel available to do that. And it also, again, provides us along with the Iraqi Security Forces more time to respond to the attacks, more time to spend intelligence resources to take apart where the attacks came from, where are the networks responsible for them. And so, again, this tends to continue the trend of success.
A key factor in all of this is the ability for us to get at the networks, the terrorist networks which facilitate high-profile attacks, they precipitate the violence, and they add to this spiraling of one attack after the other. We’ve had success against some key leaders that I’ll mention. Three of them here from al-Qaida: Abu[ph] Qasra[ph], the senior al-Qaida leader of Northern Iraq was killed last year. He was responsible for directing movement of foreign terrorists into Northern Iraq. He also organized and led al-Qaida in Iraq in the northern part in operations against Iraqi Security Forces as well as Coalition Forces in Mosul. And he also, reportedly, would kill foreign terrorists who would come into Iraq, who would change their minds in wanting to leave; he would kill them in order to prevent them from leaving Iraq.
Abu[ph] Gazwan[ph] was a senior al-Qaida leader as well. He commanded numerous terrorist cells in Taji in the Tarmiya area. He also financed other terrorist cells throughout Northern Iraq. And he also was a main facilitator when it came to connecting al-Qaida networks, both between Northern and Southern Iraq, and also was responsible for numerous attacks against Iraqi civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Coalition Forces.
And Abu Rami was a Baghdad emir, responsible for terrorist activities in the Rusafa District here in Baghdad. He was the mastermind of the 2006 car bomb in Sadr City that killed over 200 people. He was linked to numerous kidnappings and executions. He was also personally involved in the June, 2006 assassination of four Russian diplomats. He also reportedly advocated going after specifically civilian targets and inflicting civilian casualties on the Iraqi population.
Another key element is the al-Qaida media networks. This is one of their major venues by which they recruit terrorists, they raise funds, and they facilitate their operations, not only here in Iraq, but worldwide. And as we’ve targeted the al-Qaida network, we’ve had a series of successes such as we’ve seen a decrease, for instance, from more than 120 al-Qaida in Iraq Internet postings in June of 2007 to this year, June of 2008, there were only 20 of those postings. It creates a difficulty in them[sic] ability to recruit terrorists and operatives. It also severely diminishes their propaganda capabilities and does not allow them to message outside of Iraq and into their networks. And it also prevents them from using the Internet as a means to finance their terrorist operations.
Another important aspect is we’ve focused on the terrorist facilitators here in Iraq. A couple of key individuals here that we have removed from that system and it, again, hampers their ability to move terrorists in and out of Iraq: Mohammed[?] Hassan[ph] was a terrorist facilitator who was responsible for moving terrorists in the Mosul and Ninawa area in and out of that area. He was also responsible for moving terrorists in reaction to Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, that as we would conduct operations, he would facilitate their ability to move out of that area. So again, a major person when it came to being able to facilitate movement of terrorists.
Again, another person who was a key factor in that was Mohammed Kalaf[ph], who was a senior courier in the Northern Jazeera Desert area. Again, a high profile foreign terrorist facilitator. He also served as a courier for al-Qaida in Iraq with their senior foreign terrorist facilitators, and was extremely influential in facilitating foreign terrorists in and out of the Ninawa/Jazeera area, in and out to Iraq from Syria.
The affect of these efforts have been a significant decrease in the number of foreign terrorists that come in and out of Iraq. When we had between 50 and 60 in the September, 2007 timeframe—so we had 50 or 60 a month coming in and out, we are now down to less than 10 a month. The foreign terrorists in Iraq are already trying to flee the country again because they are being cut off and not resupplied. And this allows...this prevents al-Qaida in Iraq from bringing experienced terrorists into Iraq. And that forces al-Qaida to have to use much younger and much inexper-...much more inexperienced people to carry out their terrorist activities.
The criminal groups have been another focus throughout this last year. We have disrupted Qata[ph] Hezbollah, which is a terrorist group believed to receive funding and training and logistical and material support from Iran to conduct attacks here in Iraq. During the past 12 months, we’ve captured 82 Qata[ph] Hezbollah terrorists. We’ve also dismantled the Baghdad Qata[ph] Hezbollah special operations cell. This limits their ability to gather intelligence on Iraqis, on Coalition Forces, on Iraqi Security Forces. It diminishes their ability to bring in and execute some of the most lethal attacks with explosively-formed penetrators and RPGs. And also has significantly reduced their ability to conduct rocket attacks here in Baghdad.
So in conclusion, the Coalition Forces have significantly degraded al-Qaida’s leadership, their foreign terrorist facilitation, their media networks, as well as the effectiveness of these nefarious outside groups such as Qata[ph] Hezbollah. And the partnership between the coalition and the Iraqi Security Forces has dramatically reduced violence during a period of U.S. downsizing—I think that’s important to note that while the U.S. has downsized and Iraqi Security Forces have increased, you’ve seen this progress take place. And we’ve also had a major impact on their ability, again, to go after some of the most vulnerable aspects of Iraqi society: Innocent Iraqi civilians. And again, we see these trends continuing as we continue the strategic partnership between the Iraqi Security Forces, the U.S. and Coalition Forces, now operating under the umbrella of the security agreement.
At this time, I’d like to pass it off to General Qassim Atta to continue on.
MG ATTA: Thank you very much.
INT: Thank you very much.
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: As-Salāmu `Alaykum. Because of the security improvement and based on the instructions of the prime minister, the commander in chief, the commander-in-chief office started holding meetings... preparation meetings to reopen major roads in [unintelligible] area and International Zone that was closed before sec-...because of security procedures. And the technical committees started including Baghdad Operation Command and MNF-I, minister of electricity, Baghdad Amanat, and traffic police directorate; they started working on rehabilitating the road #1, starting from Al Jamahariya[ph] Bridge going through the Al Rashid Tunnel and Al Zora[ph] Tunnel and az-Zaytun Street going towards Al Faras[ph] Square and Al-Nousur Square. And we hope that’s going to be rehabilitated in the upcoming two months.
And I can show it to you in the slide that you see. This is the Al Jamahariya[ph] Bridge and this is Al Rashid Hotel, and this road goes through Al Rashid Tunnel and then the Al Zora[ph] Tunnel towards az-Zaytun Street, Al Faras[ph] Square, and then through the tunnel again towards Al-Nousur Square. I think the reopening of this road will contribute, of course, in the...solving the traffic jam problems that we are suffering from and would make the citizens feel that we are going back to normalcy in Baghdad.
We assure the readiness and the capability of our security forces to undertake responsibility of security and...from the Coalition Forces according to the security agreement. And the BOC is working right now, currently, to provide enough forces to fill in the sectors that used to be under the responsibility of the Coalition or Multi-National Force. And the area of responsibility now is within the area of responsibility in Baghdad. And they’re working in 19 sectors. And after...it used to be...the work used to be only included in 10 sectors since the Baghdad Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan started.
Third, the official reports that we’re getting from MOI and MOD and the BOC, the continuity of the decrease in the terrorist attacks, an average of 1 terrorist attack against 17 activity of our forces. And the last week was...we registered the lowest number in the...in attacks since the fall of the former regime. And although that some of those desperate groups are trying desperately to do terrorist attacks to prove their existence and to effect or influence our security and morale. But I can show you a small or simple model of the activities of the terrorists into the year of 2007 and 200...2006, 2007, 2008. And I think it’s clear that during 2006, we had 232 car bombs; and 2007, it was 60...78 or 87; and 2008 there was less than that. And the direct fire, it was...in 2006 it was around 1,000 and in 2007 it was.... Kidnapping also. You can see it; you can read the figures and the numbers. The results of that, it was...we got rid of the issue of the unknown dead bodies. Before the 2006 Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan, we used to have this—and it’s registered with the Ministry of Health—we used to have between 50 to 100 unknown bodies, dead bodies on a daily basis. Now, thanks to God, and I mentioned last week it was the lowest number of...we had the lowest number in terrorist attacks, and the health area...department, did not register any of unknown dead bodies for last week.
The media agencies were talking about kidnapping and spikes in kidnapping and hijacking...car hijacking and terrorist attacks. And the government, also, given up on the SOIs and Sons of Iraq and Awakening Groups. And I want here to clarify one thing: First, because of the decrease that we are seeing in the traditional terrorist attacks, clearly the media is focusing now on organized crime that used to happen before as part of the terrorist organiz-...crimes and it’s still within its average. But we’re putting plans together in order to follow up on those crimes by the MOI, MOD, and the commander in chief and the BOC through getting our forces deployed and put...trying to ambushes...and ambush those terrorists or criminals. And we have had about 17 kidnappings att-...kidnappings last month, about 21 kidnapping cases. And we rescued around 17 of them by the Iraqi Security Forces. And we arrested the kidnappers and they were put on trial.
As far as the Sons of Iraq Awakening Groups, the BOC is continuing on issuing or paying salaries to those guys, and that’s with coordination with the reconciliation committee...the National Reconciliation Committee. And also trying on working with the related...relevant ministries. And there are no...nothing true to what the media has been saying about the government giving up on those guys.
We have the average or total of activities in...starting in January 1st until the 20th of March. You see the pictures of the weapons that we have captured and tons and tons of the TNT and C-4 material. For one day...during one day, the 3rd Brigade and National Police was able to find one ton of C-4 and TNT material and it was hidden in Abashdiya[ph] area, near to Digla...or Tigris River. And two days ago we were able to discover 1,147 IEDs. And also the Karkh command were able to find over than 18 storage or warehouses for weapons and munitions and explosives. And we took some of our media friends on field tours to see what the Iraqi Security Forces had discovered so far in Baladiyat area and in Kamaliya and M’amid[ph] area. And it was the 8th Brigade of National Police and also in the Abu Ghraib area.
Our security operations are escalating now and the average...the numbers that we have is showing that our security forces is advancing and capable. They’re also showing that the terrorist cells are not capable of doing any terrorist attacks. Through the period from January 1st and March 20th, there’s about 1,036 displaced families, they came back and returned back to their homes. And we also arrested 586 suspects, and we rescued 36 people. And we also seized a factory to create IEDs. And we have CDs that has all the information on it.
And this CD has this one person who is trying to make...a video of one person who is trying to make IEDs and rockets that’s similar in its effect and...to the RPG. And this is a factory...a local factory and is using TNT material. It was found in a shack in Madhart[ph] in Abu Ghraib area. And this terrorist, who has been involved in terrorist activities, he confessed that he has been providing or supplying the terrorist groups with rockets. And he also confessed his future plans to manufacture the weapons, and after...to...provided to the Abu Ghraib area and their terrorist groups there. And this isn’t[?] evidence on and a reflection on the terrorist activities that the terrorist groups actually are running out of material and running out of weapons. And we are under...everything under our control and we are able or capable...our security forces are capable of undertaking the security responsibility. Also, we’ve found 1,449 IEDs or rockets in Baladiyat area and around.
I think everyone here has seen or watched the Turkish prime minister...president to Baghdad and it was done in a peaceful manner. And the BOC had cooperated jointly with the Presidency Council and the head...prime minister’s office and the Multi-National Force here in order to provide security to or secure the roads and the streets so the...provide security for the Turkish president. And also, the foreign minister of Syria has arrived today, too. And Baghdad is receiving delegations on...and presidents and ministers and officials and investment committees every day. And I think if it wasn’t for the security’s ability and if it wasn’t for security improvement, we wouldn’t have had anyone and no one would have been able to reach to Baghdad.
Also, you’ve seen a reflection of the Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan and...on the situation in Baghdad on the normalcy and the flow of investment companies and the opening of diplomatic offices and embassies; all that is reflected because of the security and also the economy in Baghdad and after the Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan.
And now I can...thank you very much. And now we can take your questions.
REP1: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: As-Salāmu `Alaykum. After the successes that’s been achieved under Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan, and that was because of the security...Iraq Security Forces and that was able to disrupt the terrorist groups, we think the rest...the remaining of the terrorist groups, that’s the only ones that can blow themselves up and commit suicide. So what’s your strategy to face those ones, those remainings of those terrorist groups? And we don’t think they’re going to form a danger or a risk on you. But what’s your strategy to work or to deal with those criminals?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Good for you, the way you described it in Iraq and Baghdad, the situation here. We are continuing on our work to get rid of all those...the terrorist pockets and the remaining of those groups, and through the activation of the intelligence work and to set ambushes to those terrorist groups. We have security plan. We have also ideas on their...what they’re thinking about, they’re plans and they’re future plans. And it’s all being worked by the BOC, MOD, MOI, the commander-in-chief’s office. And last week we had a meeting in the Ministry of Defense, the Crisis Cell Committee, and we discussed all the details about the enemy’s plans—their current plans, their future plans—and also our current plan...our security force’s plan and the future plans and work on all the things that we can put in our advantage in order to control the security in Iraq.
Yes, those pockets are...terrorist pockets are working and they...but they would not affect our security plans and aren’t going to even affect our morale. Some of those security or attacks or terrorist attacks, they’re in order to affect our morale or the people’s morale. But you see life is going back to normal and we don’t have any fears or concerns that we’re going backwards. But we are only looking forward to getting for...or moving forward and defeating the enemy.
What we have now remaining of those terrorist groups are, thanks to God, we don’t have any significant incidents. And like what General Perkins said, that enemy is trying to gather what they have left with them and trying to work or do terrorist attacks here or there and.... But here in Baghdad now, Baghdad streets are improving and developing continuously.
REP2: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: Major General Qassim, there are some political people and politicians and some of the people are talking about those people who got released from the ter-...the detention facilities, American detention facilities, have started working again against the people and started doing terrorist actions. And not...why we haven’t seen our...the investigation or process of those terrorist members or...?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: We...last week, through talking to the media, we said that the BOC has captured or arrested over than 40 terrorists that was released previously, and they were under the...released under the amnesty law. But of course we are going to double their punishment now. And try to study...now we’re going to study those people and their cases and study....
As far as their confessions, even our...through our press conferences, we are trying to move from security to building, to constructing. We want to focus on what’s happening on the ground. We have moved from all security incidents towards building, to constructing. So even if we show those confessions on TV or in the press conferences, this is not going to do anything. People are tired of seeing the scenes of killing terrorists and these things. We want to...we always have a great deal...a number of terrorists and criminals who has confessed and they’ve received their...they’ve been sentenced and they’ve received their punishment. But we want to...if we want to do that, it will take probably eight hours to do all this. But we have overcome this period, we have overcome this stage, and we are moving to a different stage and a different phase. But we will consider that, though, in the future.
REP3: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: My question is to.... Now that security improvement and we are moving from chasing terrorists and we are...to building the country, the phase of building or reconstructing the building...the country. As we know that the command of Fardh Al-Qanoon is an independent entity; it’s not...it doesn’t belong to the MOI or MOD. My question is, in the transition period of time, is this command going to be part or under...report to a different...to a certain entity or certain ministry? Or is it going to be...stay independent, as independent entity? We know that the MOI is going to receive some jet fighters to use it during our situation here. Is it...is the Fardh Al-Qanoon or command going to be involved or included with this whole thing?
And also, you and...you watch the street and you know what people are saying on the street. The Karkh and Rusafa areas, the streets are...were closed and were...was blocked because of...I think some visit was going on. But you know is people are frustrated.
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: As you know, yesterday and we...all the streets were closed and blocked and because we had a visitor yesterday, and he was the president of Turkey, and we were trying to make this visit a success, and we were trying to provide all the right circumstances and the peaceful atmosphere for that visit to be a success. So this road from Palestine Street and the Turkish Embassy.... And his wife was with him. And we were trying to provide the security to the Turkish president. We were all trying to work together in order provide security to him. And I want to apologize if we...that was frustrating to the people.
Also, the BOC is working very hard to provide security to Baghdad and to Iraq. And they report directly to the commander-in-chief office. And we get all our resources from the MOI and MOD. We got...we get all the security forces and the resources from the MOI and MOD. It is an independent entity and command and it’s going to continue its work until provide security completely to Baghdad and reach to what we are expecting.
As far as the turn...or the transition of responsibility, yes, we do have the security responsibility. We’re going to turn over the responsibility to the MOI. Of course after we reach to the level where we are.... We are in an advanced stage right now and we have future plans to complete what we have started.
REP4: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: Major General...
MG ATTA[?]: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: If you want to ask General Perkins, maybe also he can help us with answering questions.
REP4: [Continues speaking in Arabic.]
INT: Lately or recently we’ve seen that in some areas there are some abnormal things are going on like, for instance, two...six or five days ago, we heard about abnormal things going on or abnormal incidents.
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: What are you talking about, the abnormal things? What do you mean? I don’t want...I...as military person here, and I have all due respect to you guys as reporters, I want you to...I don’t want you to talk about the return of the terrorist activity to the Iraqi streets. I am a military person, I’m a military man, and when I talk about military assessments, if any terrorist activity comes back on the streets and like, for instance, an average of 40 terrorist activities a day, then I can agree with you, and I can say that means that the terrorist activities are back on the Iraqi streets. But the battle is still...the battle is still on and...with the terrorist groups and we’re still fighting.
REP4: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: But what I mean, was it by the...those terrorist activities were from the terrorist groups that parts of...that Mohammed al Dayni belongs to or were you able to arrest those guys?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: I think I’ve answered your question as the first part of your question is that there are no returns to terrorist activities to the Iraqi streets and there are some of media channels are talking about. And I don’t want to mention names, but they’re trying to work or play the stone[?] which is...and this is...these channels are trying to only reflect negative scenes and trying to get ethnosectarian violence back on the street. And this is not good.
But Mohammed Al Dayni’s issue: We actually arrested 11 of his PSDs and they gave some information...important information to us and it was beneficial information and it was helpful information to the investigation. And we are still trying to.... He’s wanted now, Mohammed Dayni is wanted and to the.... And we have...we are trying to...we’re chasing him by the Iraqi Security Forces and when we...he gets arrested, he will be put to justice and to trial to....
REP5: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: My question to General David Perkins. You talked about the cells...the...or talking about the cells that were the Hezbollah cells. And is it Hezbollah in Baghdad or Hezbollah in...or recruits from outside of Iraq, the ones that were captured in Iraq? Also, Major Qassim Atta, those barriers...the concrete barriers that has not been lifted in some of the streets in Baghdad, concrete barriers such as streets like Abu Nuwas Street. And some of the streets still have concrete barriers. Do you have any plans...future plans to lift them or remove them from the street?
MG PERKINS: The Qata[ph] Hezbollah cells that I was talking about and the people involved are Iraqis.
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Barriers. We have put a plan in the beginning of this year and this plan was before the commander in chief. And we said that the year of 2009 is going to be a year that will witness the opening of all the streets in Baghdad. And yesterday, late at night, the Baghdad...the BOC commander was on a tour with...a field tour with the Multi-National Force. We were trying to open the al-Qanat Road and, God willing, starting from today, we started working on the plan of removing those T-walls or concrete barriers. The road that we just displayed or showed is an important road and is going to help with the traffic jam and the cars’ movement from Karkh to Rusafa and vice versa. And we also have another plan to rehabilitate and opening the road between...by Aran[ph] Square and al-Qanat towards the Ministry Of Interior and also remove all the concrete barriers. Hopefully the end of this year we will not have...and we will not have any closed streets.
There are certain security procedures, like for instance, Abu Nuwas Street is open and anyone can go to Abu Nuwas Street. But also the...to protect the street and protect the people, we need or requires the Iraqi Security Forces to take some of security procedures for personal protection. But I’ve been to that street before and I’ve seen a great deal of...a number of people in there in Abu Nuwas Street and also Al Zara[ph]. We had the spring feast also on the 21st of March and we had unexpected number of people or presence of people in that area, too. So....
REP6: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: Major General, you talked about security improvement in Baghdad. What is your assessment to security in Abu Ghraib area? My other question is what are the updates on the investigations about the latest terrorist activities or attacks in Abu Ghraib area that...?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Abu Ghraib area is a very interesting area as far as security. We have put a plan together to redeploy forces in that area. And for past four days we discovered or unleashed about four weapon caches in there and that was a new...breaking news, also. We also arrested or captured three suspects involved in the attack...in the Abu Ghraib attack.
Of course when military operations are in some areas or going on in some areas—we started with Abu Ghraib area—we start to identify the reasons behind the existence of or some of those, for instance, al-Qaida groups or cells in that area. They are still there and they’re working and they’re active. And they need to be cleansed from that area, they need to be removed. And they...we are working with the tribes there, and there are different sects, to see the reasons behind the presence or existence of those terrorist groups and to co-...to get the cooperation of the people in that area. Of course the cooperation of the people with the security forces will help a great deal.
And I’ve said before, in Abu Ghraib area, that is a very interesting area, and it needs a great deal of security efforts in that area. And we need to redeploy forces and to focus our intelligence work in there in order to work on discovering and unleashing those weapon caches and plants and factories in Abu Ghraib or Anasro[ph] Salaam[ph] or the nearing[sic] areas.
REP7: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: My question...if you can both answer on this question. After June...next June, would we have any combat security or American forces inside Baghdad, specifically in Baghdad? And General Perkins, you mentioned that some of those al-Qaida group, they started fleeing outside of Bagh-...Iraq. Do you have any statistics of the number of the figures of them...the ones that are actually entering into Iraq? You said before that the number has decreased? Do you have also statistics?
MG PERKINS: Yeah. In reference to your last question, foreign terrorists coming into Iraq, last year we antic-...we approximated that it was between 50 and 60 a month coming in, and we now believe it’s less than 10 a month. So a significant reduction in those forces coming into Iraq.
With regards to U.S. forces and operations inside Baghdad, in the cities, as you know, the security agreement outlines a timeline which has U.S. combat forces moved out of the cities by the end of June this year. That is the plan that we are working with the Government of Iraq on right now with regards to where those forces will go.
As far as operating inside the cities, again, we will do that at the request of the Government of Iraq. While the U.S. combat forces will not be stationed in the cities, if there are operations that the Government of Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces want U.S. assistance with and they ask us, we will work with them and through them. So we probably will see operations going on in the cities. They will be partnered with and at...and with the approval of the Government of Iraq. But the U.S. forces will be billeted and stationed outside the cities.
REP8: Good afternoon. This is for General Qassim. This morning, I think some fairly large and more thorough checkpoints have gone up on entrances and exits into and out of the city that seem more involved—I don’t know when exactly—but seem more involved than the other ones and larger. Are these going to be put up all around the city? Are they permanent? And how universal are they going to be in terms of where they are?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Thank you very much. As far as the checkpoints...the current checkpoints and the future checkpoints in Baghdad, we have about 215 of them in Baghdad. In the beginning of Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan, we had 420 checkpoints in different areas in Baghdad. Now... and after we reached an advanced security stage, now we have a study to work on building a model or ideal checkpoints for the four entrances of the cities in Baghdad with the help of the MOI and MOD. We have 18 point of entries to Baghdad and it’s going to be secured also by the MOI folks. And it’s going to be provided with modern equipment and scanners and also good communication devices so we can withdraw after that, after we reach to a certain level of security. And then we’ll have a steady situation. And anyone would come to Baghdad, the capitol, would be searched and the four check-...big checkpoints, and then we’ll have ideal checkpoints in each area so we make sure that the terrorist groups and the criminals will not come back to those areas. And this is what we call the security barriers in our security term[?].
Some of the people were frustrated at the beginning, but after we have seen fruitful results and the decrease of the security incidents, everyone now is asking...requesting to have those T-walls and concrete barriers in...around their residential areas, around universities and markets. So this way we will deprive terrorist groups from moving around. Thank you very much.
REP9: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: This question is to General Perkins and General Qassim Atta. As far as the kidnapping and the robberies and hijacking that we’ve seen, we...I know that you’ve done an investigation...I’m sure you have done an investigation. Who are the...who’s in charge or responsible for those kidnappings? Are they terrorist groups or special groups or are they criminal or organized crime?
The other part of my question is is there any recommendation from the government to the military not to tell the interference or the level of interference of other countries in our...by bringing or smuggling weapons from other countries? We hear about these things, but we don’t investigate it or we don’t have the chance to investigate this.
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: As far as kidnappings and hijackings, this is part of the...or falls under the criminal crimes. But...and it’s not classified as of terrorist or activities. But some of those terrorist organizations, after they actually bankrupt and they don’t have any resources to finance them, so they started kidnapping people or hijacking or stealing or.... But there are some organized groups...criminal groups that are actually doing or kidnapping people just to get money for...and we have arrested a gang in certain areas. And I think my answer is clear. Some of them are linked to terrorist groups and they’re trying to get some money to finance their terrorist groups. And the rest or the other part or the other group, who are actually classified under organized crime, and they’re criminals. And I think our prisons were filled of those criminal...organized crime criminals. And we have this under control, and we have future plans to chase those gangs. And each day our security forces are arresting and capturing those people.
The second part is there is no ambiguity from the government or the Army to not to talk about the fi-...the resources or sources that financing terrorist groups or when we find or unleash those weapons caches, we take all the media.
REP9: [Speaks briefly in Arabic without translation.]
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: Your question is clear, just let me answer it. Yesterday we invited those media groups to go to Abu Ghraib with us and see those weapons that we found, and there were so many weapons, different weapons. Some of it came from the neighboring countries and some of it was from the old, dismantled Iraqi Army. Iraq has...there are so many weapons in Iraq that was part of the former regime. We had also factories that just...that are specifically for making weapons and for heavy and medium-sized and light weapons. And all...thousands and thousands of tons of the explosive materials. And we announced this clearly and frankly. We don’t have any limitations when we...when it comes to this thing. When we find anything, we just put it in a transparent way to all the media. With all due respect to other people’s opinions, this is what we have, this is the facts, and we’re trying to convey to the people, we’re trying to tell as far as weapons made[?] and smuggled from neighboring countries, and we say that clearly.
REP10: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: Major General, what’s your estimation or assessment to the southern part of Baghdad, especially starting from Rashid Camp to the northern village or Diyala Bridge, the old Diyala Bridge? I want to just tell you one thing, Major General Qassim. Some of the people or the political entities are getting assassinated in those areas. What’s your assessment of this whole thing?
MG ATTA: [Speaks in Arabic.]
INT: The security situation is good. There are some terrorists or retaliation, I may say, events or activities might happen here and there—and that happens in all countries. But we have to resolve the reasons behind the security situation and if there were any remarks it will be taken into consideration. And we—I said that before. We have a weekly meeting for Crisis Cell Committee in MOD, and we have a security map for the security situation. Only...also to include the criminals and gangs and the kidnapping groups and the.... This is all fixed and its...it gets resolved in...continuously.
And we always tell people we are not going backwards; we are not going to where we were before, before the start...or the beginning of the Fardh Al-Qanoon Plan. And I think everyone agrees with me now. We are standing a hard ground and we are in an advanced security situation, too.
Last question, please.
REP11: [Asks question in Arabic.]
INT: My question is to General Qassim Atta and General David Perkins. As far as detainees, detainees that were detained or they were detained for...by the American forces. Are they going to be tried under the Iraqi court or law or the American law? Also, some of them were confessed with crimes and they were released, and there were some of them that has not been yet convicted and they still are in prison. And why they’re still in prison? And how they going to deal with them?
MG PERKINS: Under the provisions of the security agreement, there is a detainee committee set up, both with Government of Iraq officials and U.S. officials. And each case, each detainee case for those that are now detained within U.S. facilities, it goes through that committee, their file goes before the committee. And in the end, it’s the Government of Iraq that makes the final decision. What happens according to the provisions of the security agreement is, as of 1 January of this year, the legal jurisdiction for all the detainees reverted to the Government of Iraq. So since January, the legal jurisdiction is with the Government of Iraq. They have given us permission to have physical jurisdiction until we can work through the process, because they don’t have the capacity to deal with all of them instantaneously.
So what we have is a standing detainee committee that meets regularly. Each file is gone over. The evidence is presented. And then the Government of Iraq decides what is the final disposition of that detainee, because at the end of the day, the detainee are handed over from the U.S. to the Government of Iraq. So we turn them over to the Government of Iraq, they make the final decision whether they are then put into the Iraqi legal system or they are released.
So, again, according to the agreement that both countries have signed up to, the final disposition and decision is with the Government of Iraq and it is done in consultation with us and we turn over all the evidence and all the files we have of all of our detainees to them. So it’s a fairly well thought out and well-executed process. It is not random.
I think that’s it. Well, thank you very much for everyone to be here. And I appreciate everyone’s time, and have a good day.
MAJ ATTA: Thank you very much.
MG PERKINS: Thank you.
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