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Backgrounder: France's New Military Vision

Council on Foreign Relations

Author: Michael Moran, Executive Editor, CFR.org

June 24, 2008

Introduction

In normal times, the publication of a "white paper" on French defense and security policy would not draw enormous attention outside the world of military analysis and European relations. But, as President Nicolas Sarkozy noted on June 17, 2008, in announcing sweeping changes in French strategy, these are not normal times. "Today, the most immediate threat is that of a terrorist attack," he declared in announcing a sweeping reorganization of the French military. The new plan reverses decades of French security policy, which has focused on a Cold War-style invasion scenario as the nation's primary challenge. Instead, the new emphasis highlights counterterrorism and intelligence, reintegrates France with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for purposes of European security, and arguably draws Paris closer to Washington, in doctrinal terms, than any time since liberation.

Details of the New Policy

Strategically, the changes echo moves that have been recommended (if not wholely undertaken) by U.S. and British defense policymakers since the end of the Cold War—what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld often referred to as the "revolution in military affairs." Mobility—and in France's case, the ability to deploy and sustain up to thirty thousand troops in a far-off land—is a key goal. To achieve this, resources will be shifted away from French ground, naval, and air units, as well as weapons systems designed for the Cold War environment of state-to-state warfare. This means slimming down armored units, artillery, and infantry divisions, along with some elements of the French navy and air force designed primarily for defense against conventional attack. The decision whether to construct a second nuclear aircraft carrier, for instance, has been put off for five years. But construction of more nuclear submarines is prioritized.

Read the rest of this article on the cfr.org website.

Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.