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Military

Analysis: A Naval Makeover

Council on Foreign Relations

October 31, 2007
Prepared by: Greg Bruno

Sixty-five years after World War II’s Battle of Midway, the United States remains the world’s only naval superpower. U.S. planners now face the challenge of preserving that dominance while adjusting to a new world of threats. A maritime strategy unveiled October 17—a partnership involving the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—advocates a shift from sea combat to fighting terrorism, protecting shipping routes, and providing humanitarian assistance. Naval experts say the move is intended to reposition the service from a Cold War fighting machine to a post-9/11 prevention force. Human and economic “soft power” have “been elevated to the same level as high-end naval warfare,” one Navy official told the Washington Post.

The strategic overhaul includes no details about funding or ship numbers. Some Navy officials have complained (DefenseNews.com) the document doesn’t go far enough. The makeover comes at a time of tough budgeting talk in Washington. The Pentagon counts fewer than 280 ships in its fleet, down from 350 in the 1990s. In February 2006 the Navy unveiled plans to increase its ship total to 313.

But the price is steep; the Navy estimated its plan would cost taxpayers $16.5 billion annually for the next thirty years; the Congressional Budget Office says it will cost more like $20.6 billion (PDF) a year. George Friedman, CEO of Strategic Forecasting Inc., a private intelligence firm, questions whether the payoff is worth it: “What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought?” For the Navy, the answer is obvious. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy’s former chief of naval operations, told lawmakers in March 2007 that maritime supremacy is the most powerful U.S. deterrent (PDF) abroad.


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Copyright 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.



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