Forty Years in Search of Arab-Israeli Peace
16 October 2007
Talks set to resume if common principles for peace can be found
Few international issues have commanded more attention from American presidents and secretaries of state during the past 40 years than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The crucial turning point for the region, and for the United States, came in June 1967 when war broke out between Israel and most of her Arab neighbors. Within a matter of days, Israel had won on the battlefield and was in occupation of Arab territories in Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. (See map.)
President Lyndon Johnson, at the time preoccupied with the war in Vietnam, made a crucial judgment that there should be no return to the status quo ante. Instead, the United States would support Israel in holding the newly occupied territories until the Arab states were prepared to recognize Israel and make peace. This stand was endorsed broadly by the international community with the acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967. (See text of resolution.)
The basic trade-off envisaged in this important document is between Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." While the resolution stopped short of calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and for full peace treaties, it was understood at the time, and subsequently, as calling for an exchange of "land for peace."
While Resolution 242 established the basic equation that has guided subsequent Arab-Israeli peacemaking, it left many questions unanswered. For example, it referred only obliquely to the Palestinians, calling for a "just settlement of the refugee problem." It said nothing about what might happen in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by a million or so Palestinians and now under Israeli military occupation. Nor did it address the sensitive issue of the status of Jerusalem, formerly divided between Israel and Jordan and now under full Israeli control and annexed to Israel proper.
THE PEACE PROCESS
If Resolution 242 became the centerpiece of Arab-Israeli peace efforts after 1967, it nonetheless is fair to say that little actual peacemaking occurred until after the next big conflict in the region, the October 1973 war. Frustrated by their inability to break the stalemate that had endured on both the diplomatic and military fronts since the 1967 war, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on October 6, 1973. Coming at a crucial moment in the Cold War and in the embattled presidency of Richard Nixon, the war provoked not only a regional crisis but also a global one. This persuaded Nixon and his energetic secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, to devote unprecedented diplomatic efforts to finding a solution to the conflict.
Kissinger introduced several techniques into what came to be known as the "peace process." First, he traveled frequently to the area to deal with presidents, prime ministers and kings on a face-to-face basis. This came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy," and ever since has been something of a standard by which many judge the seriousness of the American commitment to getting results from diplomacy. Second, Kissinger was skeptical of grand bargains, package deals and the ability of solving long-standing conflicts quickly. Thus, he urged the parties to focus on practical, small steps toward peace rather than insisting on solving all problems at once. This came to be known as "step-by-step" diplomacy, and three negotiated agreements resulted: Sinai I and Golan I in early 1974, and Sinai II in fall 1975.
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE
Kissinger not only helped break the diplomatic logjam between Israel and her Arab neighbors, but also asserted American supremacy over the negotiating process. In his view, only the United States, in part because of the unique relationship that it maintained with Israel, and because of its economic and military assets, was in a position to provide the carrots and sticks needed to move the local parties to make the concessions needed for peace. An early convert to this view was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was fond of declaring that the United States held "99 percent of the cards" in its hands. (He actually knew this was an exaggeration, but wanted Americans to take seriously the major responsibility that they had assumed as custodians of the peace process.)
By the time Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977, there had been no progress in Arab-Israeli diplomacy for more than a year and tensions were on the rise, especially as the situation in Lebanon deteriorated. Carter and his advisers concluded early on that step-by-step diplomacy had reached an end. It was time, they believed, to see if a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace could be achieved. This would mean, in Carter's view, getting the Arab parties to face up to the requirements for peace: recognition and security that Israel needed, and the territorial withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights that were central demands of the Arabs.
Carter was the first American president to talk of a "Palestinian homeland", a controversial term at the time, and one that made clear that the Palestinian issue had to be seen as a political, not simply a humanitarian, issue. Unfortunately for Carter, there was no consensus on who should speak for the Palestinians in future negotiations -- Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or even Egypt were all considered at various times.
Carter's ambitious vision of a comprehensive peace was dealt a harsh blow in mid-1977 with the election of Menachem Begin as prime minister of Israel. Begin headed the Likud Party, whose central tenet was that Israel had a right to keep all of what he called "Judea and Samaria," or the West Bank. This ran directly counter to the views of those who had crafted U.N. Resolution 242, as did Begin's insistence on Israel's right to build civilian settlements in these territories. Carter and his team were frustrated by Begin's intransigence, but they pushed forward, soon discovering an opening on the Egyptian-Israeli front.
Sadat was worried about the loss of momentum in the peace process and decided to try to break what he saw as a "psychological barrier" to peace by traveling to Israel in November 1977 and calling for "no more war." The effect in Israel was electrifying, and it soon became clear that the best chance for peace now lay between Egypt and Israel. Sadat and Carter still hoped that something could be included for the Palestinians, but Begin was very reluctant to accept such "linkage."
In mid-1978, Carter began to despair of ever seeing Begin and Sadat make peace. Therefore, he resorted to high-stakes diplomacy and invited them to a summit meeting at Camp David in September 1978. The setting was secluded, the pressures were intense, and the atmosphere was far from friendly and accommodating. But over a period of 13 days, with very direct involvement of the president, two documents -- The Camp David Accords -- were drafted and agreed upon -- one a general framework for peace, and the other an outline of a specific treaty between Egypt and Israel (See full text of accords).
The reaction to the Camp David Accords in much of the Arab world was surprise and opposition. Many saw a detailed plan for Egyptian-Israeli peace based on the "land for peace" formula of U.N. Resolution 242, but nothing comparable addressing the Palestinian question or the Syrian front. In the view of many Arabs, Sadat had agreed to a "separate peace," a cardinal sin in terms of Arab nationalist norms. As it soon became clear that Begin had not agreed to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza, whatever benefit of the doubt might have been given to the aspects of Camp David that were designed to appeal to Palestinians began to fade away.
Sadat, however, had gone too far to turn back, and in March 1979, after another presidential initiative -- Carter had flown to the Middle East to clinch the treaty negotiations -- the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty was signed on the north lawn of the White House. (See text of treaty.)
BRINGING IN THE PALESTINIANS
Carter was aware that peace between Egypt and Israel did not mean the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But he and most Americans nonetheless saw it as a major step in the right direction, one that established a model of sorts for future peace efforts, and one which would make possible a dramatically new relationship between Cairo and Washington.
If he had been re-elected, Carter almost certainly would have wanted to resume the peace process, probably focusing on the Palestinian issue. He had come to the conclusion that this was important on its own, and that it also had broad strategic implications in a region that was being convulsed by competing nationalist and religious visions. (The revolution in Iran had raised concern about a wave of radical Islamist movements challenging the prevailing order and trying to use the Palestine issue to win legitimacy in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims.) But it was left to Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and now George W. Bush to find a way to resolve this most difficult part of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
During much of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the central question for diplomats trying to move forward on Arab-Israeli peace was "who can speak for the Palestinian people?" For most Arabs, the answer was simple -- the PLO. But the PLO did not accept U.N. Resolution 242 and had not agreed to give up what it called "armed struggle" and the Israelis and Americans called "terrorism."
The Palestinian question involved much more, however, than finding an acceptable representative for the Palestinian people. The substantive issues that would have to be resolved eventually included territory (would the West Bank and Gaza be the core of a future Palestinian home, or perhaps even a state?); Jerusalem (would some or all of east Jerusalem come under Palestinian control?); refugee claims (could Palestinians expect to "return" to their original homes in Israel proper, or at least receive compensation for those lost properties?). Israelis and Palestinians were sharply divided -- amongst themselves and between the two sides -- and it was a rare American politician who dared to express an opinion on these sensitive issues.
One way out of the impasse seemed to be to bring King Hussein of Jordan in as spokesman for the Palestinians, either on his own or as head of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This might help get around the PLO's refusal to accept 242 and Israel's unwillingness to deal with the PLO. President Reagan spelled out the logic of this approach in September 1982. The Reagan Plan urged Israel to stop its settlements and to return most of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordanian control, while stating explicitly that the United States did not favor an independent Palestinian state, preferring some form of association between the Palestinian Territories and Jordan. (See Reagan Plan.)
Prime Minister Begin did not like the plan, and it never progressed, but "the Jordan option" remained a point of reference for U.S. diplomacy until almost the end of the Reagan presidency.
In late December 1987, a surprising change took place in the Palestinian Territories that had been under Israeli control since 1967. A whole generation had now come of age in the West Bank and Gaza, and it was tired of living under occupation. In contrast to the older generation of Palestinians living there, they were willing to demand an end to the occupation and to do so forcefully. This was the beginning of what came to be known as the first Intifada, from the Arabic word "shaking off."
Seven months after the Intifada began; King Hussein of Jordan made a historic speech in which he declared that Jordan no longer had any claim to the West Bank. Henceforth, anyone wanting to deal with the Palestine issue should talk to the PLO. After a few rounds of back-channel diplomacy, that is exactly what the Reagan administration agreed to do in its waning days. But first, it insisted that the PLO accept Resolution 242, recognize Israel's right to exist, and renounce terrorism.
In December 1988 in Geneva, Arafat met all of those conditions and the United States agreed to start talking to the PLO. Another barrier to peacemaking had fallen, although it took time before the Israelis would follow suit.
GOING FOR BROKE, COMING UP SHORT
Early in the presidency of Bill Clinton, a breakthrough in the peace process occurred that had little to do with American diplomacy. On the margins of a negotiation process that had been launched by George H. W. Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, at Madrid, Spain, in October 1991, Israel had been meeting with non-PLO Palestinians in Washington, as well as with Jordanians, Lebanese and Syrians. The framework for a comprehensive peace was being discussed. But the Israelis found that little headway could be made in the official channels, so they opened a second track with the help of the Norwegian government. There Israelis met with PLO negotiators and reached agreement on what came to be known as the Oslo Accord, signed at the White House on September 13, 1993. Letters of mutual recognition also were exchanged. (See text of Oslo Accord.)
During the whole of the Clinton presidency, two parallel tracks of peacemaking were pursued, sometimes in parallel and sometimes in competition. One was an effort to push forward the Oslo process, as it came to be called, through incremental steps that would lead eventually to Israeli-Palestinian peace. Needless to say, this was a difficult, frustrating process, marked by fits and starts as one side or the other pulled back from making the hard decisions needed for compromise.
The other track was between Syria and Israel. In many ways it was more straightforward. The Israelis wanted security and recognition; the Syrians wanted their territory back. An eventual agreement almost certainly would have to resemble the Egyptian-Israeli peace and be based on the "land for peace" formula of Resolution 242. At various moments during the 1990s, Israel and Syria came very close to reaching agreement on these terms, but by the end of the Clinton presidency there was still enough of a gap to keep the two sides from reaching agreement.
The Palestinian-Israeli issues came to a head in mid-2000. Clinton decided to go for broke in the waning days of his presidency. He summoned Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO leader Yasser Arafat to a summit meeting at Camp David. But unlike the first Camp David summit in 1978, this one ended in failure, and the American side placed most of the blame on Arafat. Nonetheless, negotiations continued, and Clinton made one last effort on December 23, 2000, for the first time putting forward specific proposals to bridge the gap between the two sides. (See the Clinton Parameters.)
Both sides expressed reservations, but once again the American side concluded that it was Arafat who stood in the way of an agreement.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION
President George W. Bush came to office just as the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process was collapsing. A new and tough Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, made it known that he would not deal with Arafat, and before long that became the stance of the United States as well. In the West Bank and Gaza, the situation deteriorated rapidly as the so-called second Intifada gained momentum. Violence escalated. Israel took back control of parts of the West Bank, and Arafat soon was isolated in Ramallah. Peace seemed a distant dream.
President Bush, meanwhile, had to deal with the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq became major preoccupations at the expense of Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy. Still, as early as mid-2002, Bush placed new cards on the table. First, he called for new Palestinian leadership, making it clear that he had no intention of dealing with Arafat. At the same time, he spoke openly of a new Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with Israel. The details remained to be worked out, but the goal now was explicit.
Arafat died in November 2004, and by January 2005 a new Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected. By this time, Sharon had decided that negotiations could take a back seat to unilateral Israeli moves and he had committed to withdrawing his troops and settlers from Gaza by fall 2005, while speeding the construction of a barrier between the West Bank and Israel. Many thought the barrier eventually would mark the line that Israel might be prepared to accept as a future border.
January 2006 saw two dramatic developments. Sharon suffered a massive stroke from which he did not recover. He was succeeded by Ehud Olmert, a less experienced politician who took time to find his footing. On the Palestinian side, elections were held for the Legislative Council in January 2006 and the Hamas Islamist movement won a surprising victory. This meant that the new democratically elected prime minister would be from a party that still contested Israel's right to exist, while the president was from the Fatah Party mainstream and was committed to negotiations.
This awkward situation prevailed well into 2007, when the two major factions within Palestinian society engaged in a sharp conflict that left Hamas in control of Gaza and the PLO dominant in the West Bank. The unity government experiment was ended, and a new Fatah/Independent government was established by Abbas with somewhat doubtful legitimacy.
It is in these politically fraught circumstances that Israel and the Palestinians have resumed talks to see if common principles for peace can be found. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hopes to be hosting a meeting of Israelis, Palestinians and some other Arab countries in late November in Annapolis, Maryland, to restore momentum to the peace process.
Not for the first time, there is a real sense on the American side that much is at stake, that time is short, and that moderate and constructive leadership is needed. And, as important, Americans now seem to recognize that Israeli-Palestinian peace would help advance American interests in a broader Middle East where the United States is more deeply involved than ever.
The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.
(USINFO is produced by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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