
Press Briefing, August 29, 2007
Multi-National Force-Iraq
BRIEFING BY LT. GEN. JAMES DUBIK, COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ AND BRIG. GEN. KEVIN BERGNER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ SPOKESMAN.
TOPIC: OPERATIONAL UPDATE.
LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
TIME: 2:00 P.M. EDT DATE: WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2007.
GEN. BERGNER: As-salaam aleikum. Good afternoon everybody. This afternoon I am pleased to be joined by a great soldier who has important responsibilities involved in Iraq's security.
If I could ask you guys just to turn this volume down a little bit in the back.
Lt. Gen. Jim Dubik came to Iraq following two-and-a-half years as the I-Corps Commander, First Corps Commander and before that he commanded the 25th Infantry Division. General Dubik was also one of the principal architects of our army's transformation. So he has played a critical role in helping our army adapt to new realities. In June, Gen. Dubik took command of the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq where he oversees the Coalition's assistance to the Iraqi government in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and substantiating Iraqi security forces. There is no one better prepared to assist the Iraqi security forces to transform, to grow in capacity, and to continuously adapt to the new realities here on the ground.
I have a few items I would like to brief you on and then I'll turn to Gen. Dubik for his comments and your questions for him.
Yesterday a group of individuals in vehicles attempted to pass through an entry control point near Abu Nuwas market in Baghdad. Several occupants were observed to have weapons in the vehicle though none had any documentation authorizing them to be armed. Later some of those individuals were identified to be Iranian citizens and all of them were detained until an investigation could be completed. Those individuals were released early this morning after the Coalition had an opportunity to determine the circumstances that were taking place.
Also yesterday, violence incited by militant forces in Karbala deprived some faithful Iraqis of the opportunity to fulfill an important religious observance. Despite the violence instigated by these armed groups, Iraqi security forces responded rapidly to reinforce and maintain control of the situation. I would also point out that Iraqi government leaders also responded effectively by increasing the security measures and providing on the ground leadership to help insure restraint and order.
This weekend government of Iraq agencies also responded to an outbreak of illness in As-Sulaymaniyah. Ministry of health officials dispatched medical supplies onboard two ministry of defense C-130 aircraft to assist medical authorities in the province. And they also coordinated assistance from the World Health Organization and the ICRC. The Coalition is continuing to work closely with the Iraqi authorities to insure they have the necessary support.
This week, Iraqi and Coalition forces also continued a tough fight but are making progress against al-Qaeda and maintaining tactical momentum. On August 20th, operations in Tarmiyah resulted in the death of Ali Latif Ibrahim Hamad al-Falahi(sp), also known as Abu Ibrahim, an al-Qaeda Iraq leader who oversaw terrorists operations in the northern belts of Baghdad. He was killed after he grabbed a Coalition soldier and was attempting to detonate a suicide vest. This is what we know about him and his activities. He was an al-Qaeda emir for Tarmiyah who coordinated VBIED attacks in BaghdadIraq operations in the Taji area. He kidnapped and murdered Iraqis including a nine-year-old girl to intimidate local citizens. And his group was also likely responsible for the April 12th bombing of the Sarafiya bridge here in Baghdad. and also led al-Qaeda in
This operation is just another example of the importance of operating simultaneously against the networks in Baghdad and the belts outside the city where terrorists like this are positioning themselves. As Lt. Gen. Odierno briefly discussed in a press conference a few days ago, we have made some progress on countering the threats in Baghdad as well as targeting the Karkh VBIED network. Abu Ali, Abu Sahib, Abu Safa, Abu Marium(sp) are all in Coalition custody now. They were obtaining, building, and placing VBIEDs as part of that Karkh VBIED network. Abdul Rahman(sp) was involved in these VBIED operations as well as well as the movement of foreign terrorists to Baghdad from the Syrian border. He was killed on August 15th. Shakur(sp) who also conducted VBIED operations in both north and sough Karkh was killed on August 24th. And already mentioned, Abu Ibrahim was the key supplier of the VBIED materials to this network. The south Karkh cell was one of the worst perpetrators of VBIED attacks that have murdered thousands of Iraqi citizens.
We know this will continue to be a tough fight and that we must keep the pressure on these networks. But the courageous stand of the local citizens and their cooperation with the Iraqi security forces is making a difference. This week provided another example of that when Coalition forces targeted al-Qaeda elements who were disrupting the flow of water through the canal system that leads to the city of Khalis. Combined engagements resulted in a total of 33 terrorists killed and three detained. Three weapons caches were seized consisting of an anti-aircraft gun with 2,000 rounds of ammunition, 150 pounds of homemade explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms. And importantly upon completion of this operation, the task force reopened the canals gate and water is once again now flowing to the city of Khalis.
There is also continuing progress in helping local citizens find a common bases to unite against the violence. On Monday, the 27th of August, nearly 1,000 sheiks and leaders met to reinforce national attention on efforts of reconciliation in the Taji area and to denounce terrorism. Their public commitment to work together is another example of the grassroots courage being fostered by Iraqi and Coalition forces working closely with citizens and tribal leaders.
Finally, this Sunday, on the 26th of August, we saw another example of Iraqi army forces operating effectively as they repelled a series of attempted insurgent attacks in Mosul. In the first instance, Iraqi soldiers stopped two separate VBIED attacks and took both drivers into custody. At about the same time, an Iraqi army patrol intercepted a motorcycle suicide bomber killing the driver when the bomb prematurely detonated. Thirdly, an Iraqi army patrol disrupted an attempted ambush site forcing the insurgents to flea the area and then found and cleared two additional car bombs. And on the west side of Mosul, another Iraqi army patrol killed four gunmen in two vehicles who were carrying assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers and munitions.
So as we continue to press against al-Qaeda and other extremists groups, the Iraqi people and their security forces remain at the center of this fight as evidenced by the courageous and effective operations of the 2nd Iraqi Army Division in Mosul. Their courage and perseverance are hard to adequately describe as they fight everyday to restore security in their neighborhoods. And with that as a background, I'd no better transition to turn to Gen. Dubik to talk briefly about the Multi-National Security Transition Command and their work with the Iraqi security forces. Sir.
GEN. DUBIK: Thanks Kevin. My first couple of months here in country I traveled throughout Iraq and visited both army, other military forces and police forces. And the army and the police are fighting for their country and taking casualties, as all you know, sometimes three times the number of Coalition forces. That said, there is still very tough challenges and in many cases no quick solutions for the challenges that the security forces face.
In my position with the ministers of defense and interior, I can't focus just on the fighting forces. The ministers of defense and interior and I must also look at what we call ministerial capacity. That is the ability to raise, to equip, to train and sustain, to provide bases and to provide adequate funding for the security forces over the long term. Here too, from my perspective, there had been both progress and challenges. Both security ministries have increased their spending. Together from 2005 to 2006, they've spent more than 2.5 billion dollars more on defense of Iraq than the year before. From 2006 to 2007, another 2 billion dollar increase and they're dealing with continuing challenges with creating and then running a bureaucracy to conduct business. These are all very hard problems. No doubt about it. But as my boss had said sometime ago, "hard doesn't make it hopeless it just makes it hard". So I'll be happy to take your questions and get into some of the specifics.
Q Questions. General Dubik, you've talked about a progress in the performance of the Iraqi forces. General Dubik, you said there is a progress in the performance of the Iraqi forces so in Karbala now are you satisfied with what happened of the reaction of the Iraqi forces in Karbala? And there are some news that some of the soldiers didn't perform their duty in a good way so what would the reaction be against those soldiers?
GEN. DUBIK: Sure. The minister of defense is down there now making that assessment and when he comes back then we'll put our heads together, see what actually happened, and take whatever appropriate action he deems as necessary in the cases of the Iraqi security forces. But in our kind of business, better to let the facts speak for themselves first and then make a decision as to corrective action. So he's down there and he'll come back and we'll talk. Thanks.
Q Question from Hora TV. Gen. Dubik, there are military operations, large military operations by joint forces and during these operations you always detain hundreds of suspects that are uh - in return we have a national reconciliation program that the leaders agreed upon and this which demands that the detainees should be released, those who have not been convicted. So the detention operations is there a timetable that you've set to expedite the release of the detainees that haven't been convicted?
GEN. DUBIK: Well detainee operations do not fall under my responsibility. But I know that Maj. Gen. Doug Stone who on the Coalition side has this responsibility, has very strict and very precise coordination requirements with the government of Iraq with respect to holding detainees and releasing detainees. Those policies you can ask him when he comes here to talk to you because I've got enough issues myself with the ministers of defense and interior, the police forces and the army forces to deal with.
Q Brian from AFP. Two questions. One, do you have any idea who the groups are, the gunmen in Karbala? There are reports that they were Mahdi army people. Can you confirm that? Second question relates to the Iranians. We've seen television footage of people being led away in handcuffs and with blindfolds and apparently this is the way they were arrested. Can you confirm that?
GEN. DUBIK: Let me start with your second question. When Coalition forces detained these individuals from the hotel, they led them off and they did secure them in a similar fashion that they detain anyone. It was not for any specific reason associated with who they were or what they were doing. It was a standard operating procedure about how the Coalition forces operate. And once the facts on the ground were determined and once we understood the nature of their presence and what they were about, they were released as I said in my opening statement.
Your second point about the nature of the threat in Karbala is what the minister of defense and the national government leaders are working with the Iraqi army and Iraqi police forces to better understand exactly who was involved in instigating that violence. We have seen the same reports that Jaish al Mahdi elements were part of that and we will learn more about that as the Iraqi government completes its trip down there.
Q I have two questions. The first question that President Bush announced that he had given the military leaders had told him that in Iraq to standout against the harsh operations in Iraq so what kind of license President Bush given you license? The second question. What about the Iranian detainees that had been detained within these two days, have been detained for a certain reason or not?
GEN. DUBIK: Let me start with second question. The individuals who were detained in the vicinity of the Abu Nuwas market were only detained because of the presence of weapons which were not documented. There was no authorization for those weapons and so we could not explain and understand why illegal weapons were with this group of people. And so Coalition forces detained them until we could understand that. That was the only reason that the detention took place.
Q First question. There was a statement by President Bush concerning allowing the military leaders in Iraq to standup against the Iranian attacks in Iraq, so what kind of license or what kind of orders that President Bush gave to you?
GEN. DUBIK: Um, we have not received any change to our mandate as the Multi-National force or operating procedures that guide our efforts here. And as you know, in his forum, we have talked very candidly and very frankly about the funding, the provision of weapons, the training and the involvement of Iranian Quds force operatives and using Lebanese Hizballah proxies in conjunction with their efforts to equip and support extremists groups in Iraq. And we have within our mandate, as the Multi-National force, continued to conduct operations to limit the flow of those weapons, to operate against those special groups along with Iraqi security forces operate against these special groups as a way to help improve the security and stability for the people of Iraq. And so our focus remains on the mandate for the Multi-National force, which is to take all necessary measures to provide for the security and stability of the people of Iraq, to support and partner with the government of Iraq in doing so. And so that continues to be with the Multi-National force is doing relative to the threats that come from a number of different extremists groups.
Q Question from Samarra TV. Why the American forces did not present any support to the Iraqi forces in Karbala? Can we say that the American forces is the only one who has the benefit? You said that the Jaish al Mahdi and Iraqi forces are there so why there is no backup from the American forces in Karbala?
GEN. DUBIK: Well first let me say that the 8th Iraqi Army Division under the very capable leadership of Maj. Gen. Othman(sp), is responsible for security there And does a very good job. General Othman is a good military leader. He is an effective division commander. In Iraqi security forces, both army and police, are responsible for that area. They are the ones that are operating there and I think the response that the Iraqi army provided to the violence yesterday, the leadership shown by the government of Iraq, as well as the provincial leaders in working with them has proven to be pretty effective in maintaining control in a difficult situation. And so I think the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police, to the best of our knowledge, have done a good job dealing with the problem there. This is less about the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police and their capability than it is about militants who do not respect the Iraqi people and do not respect the right of those people to fulfill an important religious observation and important religious duty. Shukran.
GEN. BERGNER: I could say about six weeks ago the direction of the prime minister, the minister of defense had transferred about 3,000 rifles from the minister of defenses stocks to the provincial director of police in Karbala as an example of the government thinking ahead of time what the police may need and using the resources of all the ministries in support of the police. So, I would start with a different premise. I think there was quite a bit of support in anticipation and when it's all said and done, you may find that there was more support even than that. Yes mam?
Q I have two questions. The first question is the Iranian deligation that you've captured, wasn't he a diplomatic? So isn't the diplomatic people allowed to have weapons? So where exactly did you capture them in the hotel or the street? The Hyrriya TV were confiscated their cameras. Their cameras were confiscated and destroyed while they were on the way because the dog have sniffed some strange smell in the camera and this all this because the Hurriya TV went to - they went to an American base. So is there, will you compensate for cameras because you've destroyed our cameras just because a dog sniffed our cameras and you destroyed them. So will there be a compensation?
GEN. DUBIK: Well I don't know the facts or the details about the camera issue but I will find out and we will get you an answer here shortly about why that might have been identified and what its status is.
To go back to the first part of your question. When Coalition forces identified the undocumented weapons, that led to their follow on to go question the individuals further and detain them until we could reconcile the nature of the undocumented weapons and the people that were associated with them. And as I mentioned earlier, once we figured that out, the individuals were released early this morning. Shukran.
Q Steven Farrell of the New York Times. Two questions. One, related to Karbala and Najef. Is there any sort of agreement, formal or informal or understanding, that US forces tend to say out of holy cities such as Karbala and Najef unless the invitation of the Iraqi authorities or under any other circumstances that may have been agreed in advance? And secondly you previously in Baghdad, General Bergner, characterized different varying levels of security progress in different areas with a patchwork, if you like, across Baghdad. Could you maybe give us some sort of update or assessment on which areas you feel are doing well and which maybe less well?
GEN. BERGNER: I would just start with your first question by saying that the Multi-National force has always exercised great respect for the important shrines and the cities that they're associated with. And so we understand the significance that has to Iraqi citizens and we're very mindful and respectful of that. Iraqi security forces in the two places you described are capable of dealing with the security challenges there and they have demonstrated that over time. And as Gen. Dubik pointed out, we have been supportive of them in providing the necessary resources and other kinds of support that they require. Anything else you want to add to that Sir?
GEN. DUBIK: No. I'll add to your Baghdad answer if you're gonna do that one.
GEN. BERGNER: Sure.
GEN. DUBIK: It's not Baghdad, from my standpoint, one of the most exciting things from my standpoint in the last couple of months, in my first couple of months here has been the number of police that the government has hired as a result of opportunities created in the offensive operations following the surge. For example, in al-Anbar, over 8,000 policemen hired, Diyala 5,000 policemen hired, Abu Ghraib 2,000 policemen hired. We expect in the next six months about 12,000 new policemen hired in Baghdad. And the reason I find this exciting is the police should provide security and these are areas that are being in transition from security provided by military forces to security provided by police. Now these police are local citizens, vetted first by the local provincial directors of police and local governmental officials, then names taken to the government's reconciliation committee, vetted a second time and then once hired on official minister of interior hiring orders become policemen, provided training, their fingerprints entered into a database with the serial number of their weapon, and then providing security in local areas. Besides the numbers that listed, there have been another 30,000 policemen from other places around the country whose authorizations have gone up and whose hiring the minister of interior has authorized and supported. This is a huge security development that was untrue just four months, five months ago. So, you asked a little different question in terms of Baghdad but I think that's a related question to Baghdad.
GEN. BERGNER: Yes Sir?
Q [inaudible]
GEN. BERGNER: We have described, and I think accurately so, the security situation in Baghdad to be much like a mosaic where there are elements where it's improved more significantly and there are places where there is still a tough fight. East and west Rashid in the southern part of Baghdad continue to be a place that sits astride sectarian fault lines and where sectarian violence continues to be a challenge. There has been progress there but still a significant challenge remains. In Adhamiyah, we have seen a similar fault line and the challenge that's there. We've also seen a number of concerned citizens who are now coming forward to work more closely with their security forces and their government which is an encouraging sign. And in Dora where I was just a few days ago with the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division, soldiers that I remember from my time at Mosul they are making progress there as evidenced by the growth and expansion in the Dora market. But that's also a place where al-Qaeda continues to try to assert itself. And so, there isn't a one size fits all answer to Baghdad. It's a place where we are working against a variety of security threats and making progress though in a number of those places and still have a tough fight in a number of districts as well. Yes sir?
Q There are some citizens who work as watch guards in their neighborhoods with coordination with the American forces and they get paid from the American forces as happened in southwest of Baghdad in Yusufiyah and also in Kadavul(sp) village and there are some other places. So, have you told the ministry of interior so that they will be joined to the ministry?
GEN. BERGNER: Well you raise a good question.
GEN. DUBIK: I'll start. The categories of policemen that I referred to are just that. They are new police. They're hired from local areas, vetted first locally then nationally. In addition to those, there are a good number of citizens that you referred to some of whom want to be police and are waiting. Others don't really want to be police but want to provide security for fixed locations. And the Coalition forces, the commanders on site have authorization to pay those people some amount of money for a specified period to provide local security. Again, some will ultimately become policemen once the vetting process is complete. Others may not have that chance. And that's happening around the country not just in Baghdad.
GEN. BERGNER: Yes Sir?
Q Gen. Dubik you've mentioned that there are great challenges in front of the Iraqis in transition so is this an indication that there is a long time so that the Iraqi forces could take over the security issue? The second question, what happened in Karbala despite the tight security operations that we've seen that there are armed men, so would you consider this as a failure for the Iraqis security forces in controlling that place?
GEN. DUBIK: No I don' think presence of armed men is a failure of security forces. You can find armed people, men and women, anywhere in the world. When you have criminals who are willing to take the law into their own hands, they're gonna be found anywhere. So no I don't take that as a failure. Your first question though in terms of the challenges. I think the Iraqi security forces, because they have grown, especially the army because they have grown so quickly just in 18 months, two divisions, seven brigades,16 battalions. When you grow a force that quickly, you're gonna have generally four kinds of problems. Number one, you're gonna be able to get soldiers before you get leaders and so you have groups of soldiers without leaders. Second, you're not gonna be able to create mid-grade leaders as quickly as you can create lieutenants. A lieutenant and a captain you can create in a year or two. A major or lieutenant colonel or colonel takes a lot longer to create. And even though the Iraqi army has reached out to former military members very aggressively you just can't create and find the number of leaders as quickly as you can create units. The third problem that you have is getting the sufficient equipment on time, delivered to the unit as you create it. And the fourth is to build the bases necessary to house the unit that you create and create the training space. I created three brigades at Fort Lewis in my last job. As a matter of fact, two of the brigades are here. Two of the three Stryker Brigades that are in the country I created at FortLewis. And I had four problems at Fort Lewis. Number one, soldiers came before leaders. Number two, leaders didn't come on time in sufficient numbers. Number three, equipment trickled in over time. And number four, I had to build buildings. So many of the problems that you see here in the country are associated with normal growth of units this quickly.
Add to that, the problem that you have to replenish these units as you're building them because of casualties and fighting a war while you're building a military, the problems that the military commanders and the minister of defense have here in generating the Iraqi army are very significant. And they shouldn't be taken lightly. That's not to say about the fighting side, their skills are growing a lot faster than on their bureaucracy side. You can create a combat unit in a matter of a few years but to create the bureaucracy that knows how to sustain that army, to acquire the things necessary, to spend the army, to construct all the facilities, to manage all the facilities, to develop the school system necessary for leader development those take longer time. So there's two different categories of military time here. The first category is how much time is necessary to build a combat unit. That's a few years. How much time does it take to build the military bureaucracy?. That takes a lot longer. So I hope that answers your question.
Yes Sir?
Q A couple of months ago there were news reports about 20,000 up to 20,000 missing weapons. Are those figures correct? Or if so, has there been any investigation into where those weapons went?
GEN. DUBIK: I'll answer that. I've heard various numbers, 20,000 being one, larger numbers, smaller numbers. Most of the reports that I've read associated with weapons accountability procedures in 2004 and 2005. If you remember that period of time was a pretty chaotic period much more so than now. The Iraqi security forces were literally just standing up and some crumbling. Others wanting to form and during that period the command that I had was issuing weapons very quickly in a very haphazard way because of necessity. Around January 2006, when things settled down, a much more complete operating procedure for handing over weapons was put into place, updated again later 2006. I signed it again when I assumed command. And the responsibilities now are very complete. We hand over weapons on the military side from Taji national depot by serial number to the responsible officer by Iraqi division. And then that person hands them off by serial number within the division. On the police side, they go to the Baghdad police college and again by serial number handed off to each of the directors of police, the provincial directors of the police who assign them to stations and policemen by serial number. You walk into any police station now you find a ledger of people signing weapons in and out by name, by serial number, by date.
Now all that said criminals go where there's possibilities. So the fact that we have really good procedures doesn't mean that there might be criminals out there who take advantage of this. And when we find those, which we have not yet, when we find criminal activity, we investigate it. And once the investigation is complete, then we'll take action against criminal behavior. That's kind of the long story to the weapons accountability issue.
Q A followup question. You cannot exactly say how many weapons?
GEN. DUBIK: No.
Q It could be more than 20,000?
GEN. DUBIK: Could be. Yeah, could be. Could be less too. If you have serial numbers again, then we can track the serial number to see when and if and how it was issued.
Q But that means you don't know how many weapons you handed out in that period?
GEN. DUBIK: In the period of 2004-2005, we can give you a rough number of what we handed out. But to track any individual weapon that's a different case. I mean in some cases for example commanders landed in helicopters during a fire fight and handed out weapons to Iraqi citizens who were willing to fight on behalf of the government. Those conditions luckily don't exist anymore.
GEN. BERGNER: Yes Sir?
GEN. DUBIK: I shouldn't say Iraqi citizens, Iraqi security forces cause there's a difference there.
Q There are Multi-National forces who behave in a good way with Iraqis and they help them and there are some soldiers who misbehave particularly in [inaudible] those who drive in Humvees. They bump some cars. And while on my way here, I spoke with one of the soldiers and I told him that I was a reporter so he threatened to kill me and so how could you reprimand those soldiers who misbehave with the Iraqi citizens?
GEN. DUBIK: Well there are two procedures. One is internal to the US military and that's called the Uniform Code of Military Justice. And this is the law that we enforce on ourselves. You can report, even as an Iraqi citizen you can report to a local commander something that happened with the name and rank of the soldier and that officer will investigate and take corrective action. Sometimes administrative, sometimes punitive. Punitive meaning go to jail or be detained. The other side is we have a system for paying damages to vehicles or property that was destroyed or damaged by US forces. So, again, find a US officer, go through the system and put that in. We hand out as a result of investigations appropriate payments in remuneration for our damages. I don't know the specifics of your case but I think in general the procedure you would follow.
GEN. BERGNER: And I would just add one thing to Gen. Dubik's comments and that is the circumstances that our soldiers operate here in Iraq are very, very complex. And even amongst innocent, law-abiding, good and faithful people like yourself, the enemy will locate himself and use his presence next to you to launch an attack. And so, there is no excuse for disrespect and we hold ourselves to a high standard. We understand, but it's important to understand the complexity that our soldiers face in dealing with those threats and they have to sort them out in a situation where they coexist with good and faithful and law-abiding citizens like you. So, we're sorry for the inconvenience you had today and for the encounter you had. None of us as American soldiers would like you to have to have that experience and we regret when it does happen. But it's also important to understand the environment. So thank you for your understanding. Shukran jazilan.
Yes mam?
Q Let us suppose that the British forces will withdraw from Basra and this actually happened and the British forces are leaving their bases and this created a kind of struggle between the political forces of who will control these places. And recently we had the commanding operations in the chief police ambassador so after the British forces withdraw will the American forces take control instead of the British forces there? And second, what about the presidential palaces that concerning presidential palaces what will happen to them? And second is that there is a deterioration in security deterioration in Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah in Kud(sp), Karbala. Don't you think that giving the security transition to these provinces real fast?
GEN. BERGNER: I just want you to know that's counting as three questions. Let me start with the first one then I'd like to ask GEN. Dubik if he has anything to say about the security forces there.
To your first point. The British government just very recently their prime minister has come out and said very clearly that they are committed to the mission, that they are engaged here in Iraq, that they are not on a timeline, that they are going to make sure that they achieve the necessary conditions for the Iraqi people and the Iraqi security forces to be successful. And so, I think first of all we have to start with their commitment and their government's position which has been stated very clearly in the last couple of days.
I think it's also important to make sure we use some right terminology. What the Coalition forces in Basra are in the process of doing is consolidating some of their forces and handing over facilities to Iraqi security forces to operate from. And so they are consolidating and they are transitioning. They're not leaving. So there's a difference there in terminology. And with that I'll let Gen. Dubik talk just a little bit about the forces there and the Basra operational command and so forth.
GEN. DUBIK: The prime minister had put Gen. Mohan(sp) in change of the Basra Operation Center. He's gone down there several weeks and made a very good assessment of the situation. Since he's been down there, the minister of defense has deployed a special operations, special forces battalion. The minister of interior has formed a palace guard trained by the British and equipped by the government of Iraq. The division is gonna be replaced by the 14th Division being formed now so that Basra area has two divisions instead of just one. That training is ongoing right now. And there are at least two brigades more that will be formed over the next month and moved into Basra. The minister of defense is also considering some shifting of some other forces from other parts of the country but those are his decisions to make and I shouldn't comment on until he makes them. But this is, the situation in Basra has been under close study from the minister of interior, minister of defense, and prime minister for the last few weeks.
GEN. BERGNER: Yes sir?
Q Yesterday the Iranian president presented a speech that the region will witness, particularly Iraq will witness a security gap and he said that Iran and Saudi can fill this gap and he described the withdrawal of the American forces and actually they are actually in a swamp in Iraq. So how would you comment about this that the American forces are in a swamp? The Iranian president said that the last meeting between the two both the American and the Iranian one, Iran told America that it could help or to go off into the swamp in Iraq but the talk is taking the form of force now and who has the greater force in the country. So how would you comment?
GEN. BERGNER: well I think I would just start by saying that anyone whose watching events here in Iraq closely, the first thing that they would notice is that there is no vacuum here. The Coalition forces have undertaken a surge of forces, a surge of operations and are committed to helping the government of Iraq and their security forces make progress against the security threats that they face. And over the last eight weeks now, Coalition forces with their Iraqi partners have made some significant strides in liberating places like Baqoubah. Operating in places that were once al-Qaeda safe havens in the Karma area, operating in places where Coalition and Iraqi forces had not been operating south of Baghdad like Yusufiyah, Latifiyah, Iskandariah. And so I think that if you look at the facts on the ground, you'll see that the Coalition, the Multi-National force in Iraq is absolutely committed to working with the government of Iraq and their security forces to insure that there are no vacuums and that the places that were once safe haves or operating bases for the terrorists can no longer be used for that purpose. And that's the path that we're on. And we're gonna continue that level of effort and partnership with the Iraqi security forces and the government of Iraq to help the Iraqi people. Shukran jazilan.
Last question? Okay we thank you all very much. Shukran jazilan and masalama.
END.
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