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Press Briefing, August 5, 2007

Multi-National Force-Iraq

BRIEFING BY REAR ADMIRAL MARK I. FOX, LT. GENERAL KAMAL, COMMANDER, IRAQI AIR FORCE AND BRIGADIER GENERAL BOB ALLARDICE, COMMANDER, COALITION AIR FORCE TRANSITION TEAM, TOPIC: A JOINT MEDIA ROUNDTABLE, LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 2:00 P.M. EDT DATE: SUNDAY, AUGUST 5, 2007

ADM FOX: Good afternoon and as-salaam aleikum. Multinational force Iraq's offensive surge of operations continues to maintain the initiative pressuring al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian sponsored secret cells. Yesterday, the government of Iraq announced that the coalition force killed a senior al-Qaeda terrorist, Haitham Sabah al-Badri. He was killed east of Samarra on August 2nd. Al-Badri, the al-Qaeda amir of greater Samarra, is believed to be the mastermind behind the February 2006 and June 2007 bombings of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. He is also believed to be involved in the bombings of the Kirkuk courthouse on June 23, 2006 that killed 20 Iraqis and the attack on a Samarra checkpoint that killed 29 soldiers on August 28, 2006.

Eliminating al-Badri is another step in breaking the cycle of violence instigated by the attack on the holy shrine in Samarra. As Prime Minister Maliki has pledged, the Iraqi security force and coalition are pursuing those responsible for the reprehensible attacks on the Samarra shrine and we will continue to hunt down the brutal terrorists who are intent on creating a Taliban-like state in Iraq.

In another noteworthy event this week, Wednesday in Mosul Iraqi army soldiers from the 2nd Iraqi Army Division shot and killed three members of al-Qaeda of Iraq including the al-Qaeda amir of Mosul known as Safi. Iraqi security forces are increasingly the first line of defense or perhaps better put in this case, the first line of offense. But even as we gain tactical momentum we are well aware that the enemies of a free Iraq remain capable of conducting spectacular attacks that indiscriminately kill and maim innocent Iraqi civilians.

In last week's press conference, Major General Dave Edgington discussed the key role air support plays in coalition operations and he received several questions about the Iraqi air force. And to that end today I'm joined by the head of the Iraqi air force, Lt. Gen. Kamal Arzanji and Brig. Gen. Bob Allardice, US Air Force, commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team to provide an update and additional information on the training, equipping and status of the Iraqi air force. General Kamal. Welcome.

GEN. KAMAL: Thank you. Welcome everyone and I'd like to give them a brief idea about the Iraqi air force that we've started establishing since 2004.

As everybody knows, the Iraqi air force is basically one of the oldest air force in the region and it was established since 1931. But now, we've started a new beginning since 2004 on a new basis with support and from the abilities and experience by the international air force, particularly by the western countries. We've also started to bring aircraft in different sizes and shapes like reconnisance flights and transportation and helicopters as well.

Currently we can say that the plans set by us for the air force and for supplying the air force with equipment and experience and we've made good use by the experience by former Iraqi air force who are actually now are the backbone for the new Iraqi air force. And we also have future plans to develop the Iraqi air force on stages and hopefully we will reach the stage that we always hoped to achieve to fulfill these plans. Thank you.

BRIG. GEN. ALLARDICE: As-salaam aleikum and good afternoon to you all. I'm General Bob Allardice, the commander of the Coalition Air Force Transition team also known as the CAFT. I'm honored to lead a team of about 300 airmen who assist and advise the Iraqi air force in the development of their military capability, the military air capability. A capability that's focused on building an air force to help fight the counterinsurgency in support of the government of Iraq.

Our efforts largely today focus in two main areas; training up the Iraqi air force and then becoming involved in counterinsurgency operations. It's a very complex process to both help train an air force while at the same time trying to fight a counterinsurgency.

The government of Iraq is making significant investment in their air force and I have two slides to talk very briefly about some of the airplanes that we are currently working with. The first slide demonstrates or shows three of our battlefield mobility assets and then fighting in counterinsurgency operation moving stuff and people, equipment and people around the battlefield throughout the country of Iraq is critical. And to do that we have C-130s. In addition, we're training and procuring Huey-II helicopters and MI-17 helicopters.

Next slide.

The next area in a counterinsurgency is for the key is your ability to collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnisance of the battlefield. And we have several airplanes that we use for this particular mission that are displayed in the slide here. The Iraqis are building up fairly rapidly what I would call a good capability to look around the country and support the nation in the counterinsurgency.

Currently the Iraqi air force has a fleet of over 45 aircraft. Iraqi pilots, a year ago they flew about 30 sorties a week. Today they fly over 150 sorties a week. A full one-third of these missions are dedicated to supporting the critical infrastructure in Iraq, components like the electrical lines and the oil pipelines. This is really an exciting time of growth in Iraq and Iraqi air force.

This fall, in October, we start pilot training in the Iraqi air force. We're taking new lieutenants that were recently commissioned and actually teaching them how to fly and building them into future Iraqi air force pilots. It's a complex process. It takes from two to three years to mature a pilot to the point where they are able to actually participate in the counterinsurgency.

That concludes my formal comments.

ADM. FOX: And with that, I'd like to open it up to any questions please. Yes mam.

Q Question to General Kamal. Ever since the Fardh al Qanoon, what has the Iraqi air force achieved ever since Fardh al Qanoon Operation started?

GEN. KAMAL: The Iraqi air force, as you know, is part of the other forces. And as you know, the grand forces have participated in a good way in Operation Fardh al Qanoon. So it's normal that the air force also contributes to these missions. The air force should back the ground forces in their missions in transportation and reconnisance and also providing any kind of support so that the ground forces could work in a better way.

We had so many activities like transportation and maneuvering through the airplanes like C-130 in addition to reconnisance flights like the Amandico (sp) that provide intelligence through pictures. In addition, we also have the helicopters that started to contribute during the missions. And these operations are developing everyday as the air force is developing.

Q My question, how do you view the capabilities of the Iraqi air force?

GEN. ALLARDICE: The Iraqi air force is growing I would say very quickly in their capabilities. It's very difficult to start with almost nothing, which is where they started in 2004 with about 35 people to build a capability where you can actually fly to engage safely the types of missions we're flying.

How quickly have they come onboard? I'll give you an example. In March, they received the first of now 16 Huey-II aircraft they have. And at that time they couldn't fly any missions outside the wire other than training when they first started. But since that time, they've trained up aircrews and have flown over 100 missions outside the wire. They've flown over 600 hours. So, last week General Kamal and I were taken to a place in a Huey aircraft and they dropped us off and then they flew a five hour mission to go look at the electrical infrastructure to see, you know, if there were breaks in the line or if there were any dangers that they needed to call into the power ministry, Ministry of Electricity. So those are good examples of they're doing very good work and they're becoming very capable.

Q Question to General Kamal. Concerning the orders and the missions are they being given from the Iraqi side of do you take it from the American side and particularly in case of approval and being in the air, do you have the utmost freedom in conducting air missions?

GEN. KAMAL: Certainly, the Iraqi pilots are doing the missions according, but of course there is coordination and there should be coordination between both sides so that both sides will know about the missions that are being conducted. Because it's impossible that - so these are normal things. We conduct our missions in an utmost freedom. We don't have any problem with that. So, there is no limiting or specification but I confirm that there is a coordination between both sides. Approvals and orders come from us, from the Iraqi air force with coordination of course, which is important. Coordination is important.

Q Question to Admiral Fox. Could you clarify how the terrorists have been killed who bombed the mosque in Samarra despite that, the Iraqi forces said that on TV that the Iraqi forces is the one who killed bad terrorists. Could you clarify how you killed that terrorist? Does he have any followers and the question for Admiral Fox concerning the American flights. This poses a disturbance to the civilians, the Iraqi civilians. Sometimes we see those flights on residential places. Is there an end to these flights that disturb the civilians?

And also a question for General Kamal. Could you tell us the number of the aircraft and helicopters that you received from the American forces and are there any new helicopters that you've received?

ADM. FOX: Okay. Let me start at the beginning. Like me make sure, the question that you asked, the first question in regards to the al-Qaeda amir can you clarify exactly which one you were asking about? The one in Mosul or the one in Samarra..

The one in Samarra.

ADM. FOX: Okay, that's all right. I just want to make sure I got it straight here.

Yeah, let me give you a little bit of detail about that. Haitham Sabah al-Badri, again he was assessed to be the amir of greater Samarra for al-Qaeda, an operational planner of the attack on the Samarra mosque bombings both February of 2006 and June of 2007. He was also assessed to have been involved in the Kirkuk courthouse bombing on June 23, 2006, in which there were 20 Iraqis killed and over 100 wounded and involved also in an attack on a Samarra-Iraqi army checkpoint on August 28, 2006, in which 29 Iraqi security force members were killed and 66 were injured and 51 civilians were injured as well. He was assessed to operate a terrorist network in Samarra, responsible for numerous improvised explosive device and car bomb or VBIED attacks, sometimes acting as a trigger man targeting Iraqi civilians and coalition forces.

The details of what I have right now in terms of the actual events on the second of August- they were operations east of Samarra and apparently there were movement of some of those people the coalition forces were targeting the movement of the people that they were after into fighting tactical fighting positions and so it was assessed that - it looked like it was from the surveillance that was going on, it looked like they were setting up an ambush and so they brought in rotary wing close-air support and there was some strafing that occurred from helicopters and that was assessed to be the close-air support was conducted by rotary wing aircraft. He was positively, al-Badri was positively identified- his body was BY close associates and family members.

Okay your second question. I need to go back and refresh my memory again.

Q Concerning the flights that the American forces do with their helicopters, some of these flights are in a very low altitude on residential places. This goes to disturbance for the people. Sometimes you say that there are terrorists who are hiding in those places but we've noticed that in everywhere we get to see there are flights in a very low altitude, so would you comment?

ADM. FOX: Um, the altitude of the helicopters that operate and in fact I might defer to some of my air force colleagues here to talk about the specifics of it but the altitude at which those helicopters operate are the appropriate altitude for the tactical environment in which they're operating. And I know that we've had discussions before about the noise or the concerns of some of the people on the ground. I think the way that I would characterize the operations though is as you've seen from previous examples, we have some very careful procedures for or some very deliberate procedures for how we operate those aircraft and also how we employ weapons from them very precisely. And so, I think the bottom line is if you're not in or around bad guys then you're probably in pretty good shape on the ground. And if you're close by people that are conducting terrorist operations, you should probably move away from them.

And then there was a third question, I think back to General Kamal.

Q General Kamal could you give us the number of the aircraft that you received from the American side?

GEN. KAMAL: When we talk about this case, we should thank the American side for their support for rehabilitating the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi airplanes and helicopters. So, since the beginning of the establishing of the Iraqi air force, the American side supplied us with helicopters as gifts without taking any price. One of them is the C-130 and the reconnisance and we have also helicopters. We have received helicopters that General Allardice has mentioned, the Huey-II and those are 16 helicopters. And at the same time, we've also received three additional Cessna Caravans and these are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. And we have also future plans so that they could provide us with other helicopters that could be used for training or training the pilots so that we can equip our air force with new pilots who will conduct missions within the air force.

At the same time, the question leads us to something else and that is that we wish that these supplies and aids increase so that we can move faster and reach the goal that we wish at the Iraqi air force so that the Iraqi air force can cope with the regional...

Q Question for Admiral Fox regarding the ongoing reconciliation efforts. Talking to one of the Prime Ministers cabinet and also some of the internally displaced people around Baghdad, uh some of the tribes and some of the former insurgent groups that the military appears to be working with now are also the same people who have apparently been engaged in sectarian cleansing. What's the military's policy in working with people who are essentially war criminals?

ADM. FOX: Well I think that the way that we're handling this right now is we're looking at anyone who is willing to align themselves with the government of Iraq and to subjugate or to be part of a future political process. I wouldn't necessarily jump or characterize, you know, that we're embracing any particular segment or sect or group of people but what we are doing is number one, focusing on the way ahead in terms of an Iraqi political process that is going to include as many people who are willing to be part of that political process in the future.

That said, also there is a vetting process that goes on in which in particular as we're dealing with in the security force, you know, the relationship in terms of security forces that there is a very strong vetting process before anyone gets to that point. So it's a work in progress quite frankly and it's something that I think we're gonna just have to see how it plays itself out.

I wouldn't necessarily characterize it as anything other than, you know, we all agree that reconciliation is going to have to happen in this country. There's gonna have to be movement foreword and uh and so I think it's a carefully managed process here between the government of Iraq and the different factions we're talking about.

Q Can you describe that vetting process because commanders I've spoken with on the ground and then in other reports that I've seen from other journalist they say it's next to impossible to really truly vet these guys.

ADM. FOX: I'll talk, in security terms, I'll talk about the way that we're going through all of the essentially the biometric data, the scans and so forth. The people that are potentially going to be included in security forces all of their data and all of their background information is vetted before they actually become part of that. And there's a growing database of people who have been involved before. So that's, as I understand it, that's a process that before anybody ever gets on the payroll for an Iraqi security force they have gone through a vetting process.

Q Question to Admiral Fox. You've started saying at the beginning of the process that there are joint military operations that target the secret cells, the Iranian secret cells, so what do you mean exactly by that?

ADM. FOX: Well we've talked before in the past about how the members of organizations that are not really accountable to any - these Iranian backed secret cells have had no accountability and they are doing things that are not under any leadership of anybody in the Jaish al Mahdi whatsoever and apparently are rogue or splinter or these secret cells. So we're going after those kinds of rogue elements just like we're going after al-Qaeda. You know, we've talked about the spectrum of people who are in this society. On one end of the spectrum, you have al-Qaeda and those people who are determined to create instability and terror and then you have on the other end of the spectrum people who are part of these Iranian backed cells who are also creating instability and indiscriminately targeting innocent people. So on either end of the political spectrum, there are people who are interested in seeing these efforts or these efforts towards a political process, they want it to fail. So as you watch this play out you're seeing as many people as we can include as we go forward in a future political process that's what we will attempt to do. But there are some people who are not going to be reconciled and they'll have to be dealt with in a kinetic or in a security related way. Yes mam.

Q Um on the topic of al-Badri and AQI, um I'm curious as to whether there has been, you've been able to establish any link between al-Badri and al-Qaeda um the larger group because there are still these critics even within the intelligence community saying there is no evidence that there is this link between AQI and al-Qaeda. And so I'm interested if there's any further explanation of that link.

ADM. FOX: We've not made any specific linkages here between al-Badri and anything specifically to al-Qaeda outside. But that said, we've had a number of previous press conferences and information rolled out in which we've described a lot of the activities in which a lot of these foreign terrorist, the three al-Turkey brothers and you know [inaudible], but those previous examples here where we have had what we consider to be pretty clear evidence and some people, you know, will or will not believe and that's okay. In this particular case, we have not necessarily made that kind of linkage but we by their own words here this is, you know, they use- al-Qaeda of Iraq uses this word "amir". That's their term. And that's why we refer to them as the amir's here in al-Qaeda.

Q Steven Farrell New York Times: On the same subject, can I just ask this gentleman Badri, were the fighters with him were they Iraqis, outside fighters, Arabs whatever or both? How many of them were there? And how senior was he in the planning and/or execution of both the attacks especially the February one? And do we believe that he was in recent times actually fully fledged within the al-Qaeda Islamic state whatever you want to call it or had he splinted off and was leading a bit of another group?

ADM. FOX: I don't have that level of detail right now to be able to give you a specific assessment. I've given you kind of the summary of what we had but I don't have a whole lot more information to share with you on that right now. Sir.

Q Question to General Kamal. From your speech, you said that the Iraqi forces did not contribute in the Iraqi missions so what's the reason?

GEN. KAMAL: Actually the joint operations are actually - I mean one part finishes the other. So, when the helicopters move or transport the soldiers from one place to another so they are taking part in an operation. Of course, we have also the reconnisance flights that provide exact information about the targets that should be eliminated. This is also taking part in an operation. We have maneuvering also like the helicopters do. This is also taking part in operations. So, what exactly do you mean that the Iraqi forces are not taking part of any operations?

Q The engagement, concerning the Iraqi force did not make any engagements with insurgents.

GEN. KAMAL: Well basically the air force fights other air force so when they take part in operations they play different roles. As I mentioned and if you'd like to know - I guess you're pointing out that the Iraqi pilots are not doing any bombings or targeting. This could be done when necessary. But currently now we're developing the capabilities of the air force, the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi pilots so they can do these jobs. And they are doing these things. And as you know, the equipment of the air force is following a good plan and the same follows the operations. So the stages and the developments of the Iraqi air force follows a good process and this is according to a good setup plan of course.

Q Question to General Kamal. The Iraqi aircrafts now are they enough for military operations that you're conducting in Iraq and what about the pilots who left the country and went to other countries? Will they be sued?

GEN. KAMAL: Concerning the aircrafts we said that we hope that they will increase and their efficiency will grow. We're working on developing these aircrafts but as everybody knows, the Iraqi air force generally speaking or the air force costs a lot that is from buying the equipment or the airplane so to rebuild an air force this whole process of rebuilding the air force takes a long time. Much longer than it takes building any ground force. We aspire that we'll reach the goal that we hope that our aircraft could be comparable with all other aircrafts in other neighboring countries.

Concerning the Iraqi pilots, as you know, they have a good experience and helicopters or any kind of aircrafts. Of course those who are serving now in the air force are all of them from the former Iraqi air force. And what you've mentioned about those who fled the country, now some of them are actually coming back to the country and they're going back to serve in the new Iraqi air force. As for those who have left the country and started working in other air forces in other countries, it's up to them. I mean they chose this. But we hope that all Iraqi pilots who love their home and love their country we hope that they come back and rebuild their country again.

Q Question to General Kamal. Are the American forces the only side responsible for training the Iraqi air force or do we have other parts who are contributing to the training?

GEN. KAMAL: The training is being conducted by the multinational forces and also by the American side and also by other countries. Without the multinational forces but the majority of the training goes back to the American side and this is simply because the American abilities are a lot better and they have a much better experience especially at the American air force. And we're making a good use of their experience. And this is a good opportunity for us that they are here with us today so that we can make use of their experience and the good technology that they reached and the air force particularly that belongs to the American forces.

Q Hi, um two questions if I may. One for you Admiral Fox was having identified the mastermind of the two Samarra attacks, can you tell you anything further about how they were conducted in the first place? And in particular how they were able to get such large quantities of explosives in a second time? And for Brigadier General Kamal as well, could you tell us how the current capabilities compare to the point that the Iraqi air force was at before the war started?

ADM. FOX: In answer to your first question, we don't really have any additional specific information that we have to share right now about the details of either of those attacks. As the investigation continues and as we have more information, we will certainly bring that forward.

GEN. KAMAL: Concerning the abilities of the Iraqi, you mean before and after the war? Before 2003 and after that? Is that what you mean?

Yes.

GEN. KAMAL: Prior to 2003 the Iraqi air force of course had diverse aircraft like helicopters and jets. But actually they were exhausted. The Iraqi air force was exhausted despite the existence of those different types of aircraft and this is due to the Iraqi-Iranian force that went on for eight years. And in addition to that, we had the war in '90-'91 and after that we had sanctions, military sanctions so that the spare parts couldn't be found. And these aircraft set there and expired. So, we needed to supply us with new kinds of helicopters. The number also was a few. Those were before the war.

But currently when we compare the current situation with that in the past, we can say that the beginning now is good and correct so that we can put and establish a good foundation and a good scientific foundation for the use of these aircraft in a good way through applying good efficiency in conducting different missions. And I've said as I've mentioned, that we're working on developing these aircraft within a short time we will be able to reach the goal that we're seeking. But we keep hoping that our friends could help us of course and we hope that they still continue their support for us.

Q Question to General Kamal. There are Iraqi aircraft in Iran. Have you made a decision to bring them back?

GEN. KAMAL: Concerning the aircrafts in Iran, those actually they went to Iran in 1991 and until now, we've never brought back any aircraft. And the issue is the whole case belongs to the political side. But I'd like to mention that these aircrafts are actually not useful in terms of their efficiency. So, we can't make use of them, except for a few aircraft. But we hope that some of these aircrafts could get back to Iraq or we could bring back some of these aircrafts to Iraq.

Q Steven Farrell for General Kamal. General Kamal does the Iraqi air force have any offensive capability? Can it shoot or bomb anything? And if not, when are you expecting that capability to be developed?

GEN. KAMAL: Of course any kind of air force should have an offensive job. But as I've mentioned much earlier a few minutes ago, that capabilities that we're working on now the Iraqi air force are doing now is being planned according to some certain stages. We started with reconnisance, then transportation, then we've moved to the use of helicopters to support the ground forces. And the stage that you've mentioned concerning the bombings is actually close.

Q Admiral Fox you mentioned the special groups earlier and that coalition forces will be going after them just like al-Qaeda and I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about how they're different from al-Qaeda and how you go after them is different from going after al-Qaeda.

ADM. FOX: The differences are certainly I think, their ultimate objectives are different in the way they're tackling their offensive operations here against the coalition. I think though that they fall into broadly the same category of somebody who wants to prevent a free Iraq from going forward. The difference is also in the way that they are supplied and the way that they're supported. These secret cell and secret groups are sponsored by the Iranians. We've seen many, many examples here of resources, funding, weapons, training, that sort of thing. And so the nature of the way that they're supported and trained is certainly different in that regard from al-Qaeda. Those are a couple of examples I think I would point to. Yes mam.

Q Talking about, you know we've talked a lot in the last several weeks about successes against groups like AQI and um, but in July we saw the number of people killed by these large scaled bombings that are most often linked to AQI just dramatically increase over June and those months prior. I'm wondering how that can be when we're always talking about the successes and what's happening from here to bring that number down in August and forward?

ADM. FOX: I think it's a good example of the nature of the enemy that we're fighting. What we've seen is a reduction in the number of successful spectacular attacks in the areas where the Iraqi security forces and coalition forces have operated. So, but then what we have seen are in small villages that are not hardened or don't have the kind of security arrangements or in other areas that are more protected is where some of these spectacular attacks have gone. And so, in the areas where we've seen the discipline of checkpoints and of the operations of the Iraqi security force and so forth we see a lot of good examples of the case of where we are able to stop or inhibit or hinder those kind of spectacular attacks.

But we've always also admitted that we know that one successful spectacular market bombing is something that kills dozens if not scores of innocent people is that spectacular kind of event that is intended by our enemies to take away the momentum or to try to overshadow any of the tactical momentum that we've achieved.

So, we've always felt that even in a weakened state, al-Qaeda is very dangerous and we know that anybody whose willing to kill innocent people in markets or in large gatherings of civilians will continue to find or attempt to find those kinds of soft targets.

And so our approach to how we handle that is to take down the car bomb networks is to go after these different nodes and cells here and it's what I would refer to as detective work almost in terms of you take down one portion and then you get more information that leads to you to others and it's kind of a careful kind of detective kind of work to take down these number, you know the number of cells. It still doesn't- it takes time for that kind of operation to take effect. And uh so what we're doing also though is we have more troops operating in more places pressuring and keeping off- if you look at the number of al-Qaeda both rank-and-file and midlevel and as well as senior leadership, we are very aggressively pursuing and capturing or killing a wide variety of people that are both in extremist groups but in particular as we're talking in this subject of al-Qaeda.

And so the idea of pressuring and keeping them off balance so that they don't have a chance to reconstitute or to reset and to avoid the safe have and safe sanctuaries that they've enjoyed before. So, this is one of those things that will take a certain amount of time. And there is a certain amount of what I would refer to as strategic patience that has to be applied to this.

We have time for one final question.

Q To Admiral Fox. When you show on the slides that you target the terrorists but we journalists go to those places we're seeing that the civilians are being targeted. How would you comment about this?

ADM. FOX: I would respond to that with we are very disciplined and very careful about how we target and go after the extremists and the terrorists that we are after. I would also emphasize the nature of the enemy. The nature of the enemy being someone who hides amongst innocent people and will conduct attacks against the coalition or against the Iraqi security forces when they're in the midst of an innocent neighborhood or close to people who are not part of that and so in a response against those kinds of attacks, we will sometimes escalate force against these terrorists who are in the midst of an innocent neighborhood.

And so that is the very nature of the enemy that we're fighting is that they will, you know, they don't come out in formations or in uniforms or anything. It's what we would refer to as an asymmetric kind of threat where they will attack against the coalition or Iraqi security force in the midst of an innocent neighborhood and then any kind of - even a disciplined attack every now and then will create a response that you know has collateral damage or other types of things that you'd want to avoid. But we take extreme, as we've take about, we take extreme measures to avoid that.

And also in contrast to the nature of the enemy, we also are very careful about righting wrongs or compensating victims or treating people who have been injured. So a war, a conflict is a horrible tragedy for innocent people in the midst of the battlefield. And the nature of the enemy that we're fighting though is someone who hides and operates amongst innocent people.

Okay I think that's probably good enough for today. Thank you very much. Thank you General Kamal for joining us today and General Allardice. I appreciate it.

END.