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Daily Press Briefing

Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 27, 2007

INDEX:

12:35 p.m. EST

MR. MCCORMACK: I don't have anything yet. Please, proceed.

QUESTION: Judging by the -- I haven't been covering it, but judging by the limited -- the extremely short statement that was put out this morning at 8:30, and the briefing, I--

MR. MCCORMACK: The briefing you can't characterize as brief, short.

QUESTION: No, no, no, I'm not characterizing that as short. But where is this document?

MR. MCCORMACK: Where is the 123 Agreement?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. MCCORMACK: I think -- I don't know. Did Nick talk about this at all?

QUESTION: I don't know.

MR. MCCORMACK: We are going to -- we're not putting it out today, but we are going to be putting it out as soon as we possibly can. We're working with the Indian Government on that and we're also working to try to secure some other agreements: the IAEA with -- between India as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group Agreement.

QUESTION: Right.

MR. MCCORMACK: So at some point -- and I can't circle a date for you, Matt -- it will be transmitted up to the Congress. And the Indian Government will forward it to their parliament for approval.

QUESTION: But in answer to the questions that you were asked yesterday --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: Is there -- is there parts -- are there parts of it that are not going to be released, that are --

MR. MCCORMACK: No, to my knowledge, the whole thing will be released and public when it goes up -- when it's transmitted to the Hill. And that's the other part to it, as well, is, we want to -- we're going through and doing all the briefings with the Hill, and we want to make sure that everybody who wants a briefing on it -- including getting into some of the background in the negotiations, which could be classified -- has the opportunity to have those briefings. And then at some point in the future, we will release it in public. I can assure you I have been an advocate within the bureaucracy for releasing it sooner rather than later to the public.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you comment on this New York Times story today on the Saudis saying that the Saudis have been giving financial support to a lot of Sunni groups in Iraq, and also that about half of the estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters going into Iraq are coming in from Saudi Arabia, which is causing you to become increasingly frustrated with Saudi's role in Iraq?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in terms of aid to "Sunni groups", you can talk to the Saudis about that. I don't have any information that I could offer you. And there have -- we have talked about -- we, the U.S. Government, recently have talked about the fact that a failure -- a substantial number of the foreign fighters that are flowing into Iraq via Syria have come from Saudi Arabia. It's not exclusively from Saudi Arabia; others from Yemen, from the Gulf states, as well.

We're confident that the Saudi Government is actively engaged on the issue of trying to cut off the flows of illicit funds to illicit groups that are seeking to destabilize Iraq. They also -- they are also on the case of doing what they can to stop the flow of young men going from Saudi Arabia into Iraq via Syria, who are bent on blowing themselves up or blowing up others.

You're never going to completely be able to cut off that flow, despite the best efforts of the government. The fact of the matter is, we have engaged with the Saudi Government and other governments in the region -- the Egyptians, Gulf Arab states, as well -- to do what they can to support the Iraqi Government in all variety of means, whether that's financially or diplomatically or on the security front.

And this was the main topic of conversation at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference. And Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates, when they go out on their trip next week, are going to be talking to the Saudis as well as others about what they might do. And also, they are going to talk with them a bit about how to impart greater momentum to the work of the working groups, as well as the work of the neighbors' grouping as a whole, to see what we can do to support the Iraqis.

So the Saudis have been -- have provided some support to the Iraqis. We're looking for some more. They can follow through on their pledges of debt relief to the Iraqi Government and providing them some security assistance. So there are a few areas where they can follow through on pledges that they've already made. This is a case of, you ask more of your friends. And we're doing that with our friends in the region in order to help out the Iraqis. So there's some headroom, in terms of what more they can do.

But they have provided some support to the Iraqis on the Saudi account. We'd also like to see them reopen diplomatic representation in Baghdad, something that they haven't done.

QUESTION: The article also refers to some documents that were handed over to a U.S. envoy in January, and these documents, which apparently the U.S. later judged to be forged, indicated that the -- that Maliki was someone who could not be trusted and was possibly a, you know, an agent of the Iranians. Do you have any comment on those documents?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, I haven't seen them myself. I -- look, there are some historical tensions within the region. Everybody understands those, everybody knows that they have to be overcome. But the fact is that they need to be overcome if you're going to realize a different kind of Middle East, where each individual can realize his or her full potential, where you have Middle East with greater freedoms, greater prosperity and ultimately a real kind of stability as opposed to the false stability that we had.

So these historical differences and tensions are going to need to be overcome. It's not just between Saudis and Iraqis. There are rifts within the region that go back centuries. And part of what the people of the region need to deal with are some of those rifts because in some cases, those differences, or those perceived differences, lead to acts of violence, and that is something that is not good for anybody in the region. It's not good for us, not good for our friends and allies.

QUESTION: But can you confirm that some documents were handed over and that Zal then complained to the king about these?

MR. MCCORMACK: I -- yeah, Sue, I can't confirm that right now.

QUESTION: All right.

QUESTION: Can you confirm whether or not Saudi officials have expressed to the U.S. concerns about Maliki?

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, I think their concerns center on having an Iraq in which all Iraqi voices have a say and that it is -- you have an Iraq that is for all Iraqis, whether you're Sunni, Shia, Kurd or from some other ethnic or religious background. That's their primary concern. And they would -- they would like to see the selected Iraqi Government govern in that way. I'll leave it to them to express whatever positive things or negative things they might have to say about this current Iraqi Government.

But whatever differences may exist or whatever unhappiness may exist on the part of Iraq's neighbors with the actions of the government, the fact of the matter is, it is in their strategic interest to see strategic stability in Iraq, an improved security situation; a situation in which the central government in Baghdad has control over law and order within -- all over -- in all of Iraq and has its grid of governing extend throughout the entire country. So that's in everybody's interests.

So, you know, whatever shortcomings they may perceive in the current government or the current elected officials, our message is that it is in your interest -- both in the short, medium and long term -- to see a different kind of Iraq; see an Iraq different than the one we see currently today.

QUESTION: Sean, do you happen to know, since you're talking to the Saudis, or you want to see the Saudis reopen diplomatic relations with Iraq, when the last time they did have diplomatic relations with Iraq was?

MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check that. I don't know.

QUESTION: Or any of the GCC countries?

MR. MCCORMACK: With Iraq?

QUESTION: Like Kuwait. I can't imagine that they were, you know, really big on having --

MR. MCCORMACK: I think they've had -- they had -- I know that they had diplomatic relations throughout the whole Saddam era, and I know that at one point, they did have some diplomatic representation in Baghdad. I can't tell you when that ended. But I think they --

QUESTION: The Saudis --

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, the Saudis.

QUESTION: They became part of Iraq for a little bit there.

MR. MCCORMACK: But -- no, I'm talking about the Saudis.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. MCCORMACK: But they withdrew because of security concerns.

Yeah, Farah.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: I hate to ask you something I would have liked to ask earlier on the call, but I didn't get a chance to ask my question. I was going to ask about the State Department background official who was -- he seemed to be giving mixed messages on Iran. In one sense, he said, you know, we're going to go to the region and talk about Iran, Syria and the forces of international terrorism that are, you know, acting negatively in Iraq. And then maybe just two sentences later, he said -- he mentioned a working group on refugees in Damascus, and we all know about this working group that Crocker spoke about earlier this week.

So can you just clarify what, you know -- are Iran and Syria potential partners or are they beyond repair like the forces of international terrorism? I mean, in the one sense, he seemed to be putting them beyond the pale with Al Qaida and everybody else, and then in the next sentence, he seemed to acknowledge that there were efforts to work together. So I'm just --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, very basically -- and let's just focus on Iraq -- I'm not going to get into all the other various negative behaviors of Iran and Syria. We can, if you like, but let's just focus on Iraq for a moment.

These two countries are part of the problem right now. Can they be part of the solution? Can they add to strategic stability in Iraq? Can they add to greater security in Iraq? Can they lead -- help lend their efforts to greater stability in Iraq? Absolutely they can. Are they doing that now? No. Do we think it is worth the effort to see if there's a willingness on their part -- on Iran's part and on Syria's part -- to play a positive role in Iraq?

Secretary Rice had a meeting with her counterpart at Sharm el-Sheikh. That was the thinking that went into having that meeting. She put it out to the Syrian Foreign Minister that Syria could play a positive role in Iraq's future, and that it is in Syria's interest to do that. Ambassador Crocker did the same thing with the Iranians.

So the answer is, they're part of the problem now. Do they want to become part of the solution? We'll see. They say that they want to be part of the solution. But thus far, their actions have not matched their words.

QUESTION: I just want to follow up, I mean --

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: Three years ago, we were excluding Iran and Syria from border security meetings on Iraq. They were absolutely shunned and they were not a part of any of -- you know, they were being actively pushed out of conversations on Iraq. Now, I mean, this is an obvious shift, and I guess I'm just trying to understand the extent to which U.S. policy is moving in that -- in a direction of a shift. And I'm wondering -- I mean, do you describe -- do you describe what's happening now as "engagement", as Gates, before he became Secretary of Defense, argued in a long paper about U.S. policy towards Iran? I mean, do you describe -- do you use the word "engagement" to describe it?

MR. MCCORMACK: Look, I'll leave it to all of you scribes out there to write stories about shifts and the very dramatic shifts in American policy.

QUESTION: But do you use the word "engagement"?

MR. MCCORMACK: In what sense? Are we having meetings with the Iranians? Yes. We are -- yes, we are trying to engage them through the channel of Ambassador Crocker on the issue of security in Iraq, yes. We're trying -- we -- through that channel, we are seeking to understand whether or not Iran is going to play a positive role in Iraq's future.

They have in other cases; they have in the case of Afghanistan. So we know they're capable of it. And this channel with Ambassador Crocker is intended to determine what are the Iranian's intentions. And how do you measure that? You measure that by changes on the ground. You measure that by whether or not you see a decrease in the level of Iranian support for these EFP networks. You measure it by seeing whether there's a decrease in the level of support for these Shia militia death squads. So -- thus far, we haven't see any of that. Ambassador Crocker talked about the fact -- in fact, you have seen a rise in those kinds of activities. So that's the metric.

Our diplomatic engagement is only one aspect of trying to address these issues in Iraq. There's also a military aspect to it, which our military has made it very clear they are going to try to break up these networks. They're going to do what they can to prevent people who may be engaged in these activities from not engaging in them. And we've detained people, we have -- had some success in breaking up these networks, but there's still a lot more to do.

So we're going to engage on a variety of different fronts here. This is the State Department's part of that effort: to see if there are any possibilities and determine whether Iran sees it in their interest to promote greater strategic stability in Iraq. We'll see.

QUESTION: Sean, you said that --

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, Matt.

QUESTION: -- you've seen Iran play a helpful role in Afghanistan. I thought that -- it was my understanding that you were seeing a trend the other way; that they were becoming unhelpful.

MR. MCCORMACK: They have, but previously. In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban, they did play a more positive role. And, in fact, we had a similar channel open between Ambassador Khalilzad, our then-ambassador in Kabul, and his Iranian counterpart. And, of course, there was the whole Bonn process where we had direct interaction with the -- with Iranian representatives about the formation of the Afghan Government. The result of that was President Karzai and the jirga and the election of this government. So that's what I was referring to.

They have, in the past, played that role. We know they're capable of it. You rightly point out that we have current concerns about what the IRGC and the Quds Force are doing, in terms of allowing -- at the very least, allowing arms to be shipped into the Taliban in Afghanistan.

QUESTION: But doesn't your past experience with -- on that issue color what's going on now in Iraq? Doesn't the experience now -- I mean --

MR. MCCORMACK: In what sense?

QUESTION: Is it really worth it? I mean, the Iranians have shown that they're not willing to play, even after maybe being helpfully -- helpful in the initial stages, but they're going to end up, you know, working against you.

MR. MCCORMACK: We'll see, Matt. I think we go in this -- go into these meetings that we have had with a very clear sense that Iran needs to prove through its action that it is going to play a positive role. But anyhow, words are great, we have plenty of words, we have lots of words from the Iranians about the fact that they want to see a more stable, secure Iraq. Well, let's see them do something about it.

QUESTION: Sean, but also on this call, there was a big focus on countering their hegemonic threat and -- I mean, so there are two messages going on: that you're seeking greater Arab support to counter the hegemonic threat of Iran --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I --

QUESTION: -- but also you're engaging them. I mean --

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah -- yes, the answer is: Iran is a primary sponsor of terror and a great source of instability in the Middle East. That's a problem for us. That's most immediately a problem for the states in the region, and they have an interest in seeing that Iran is not able to expand its activities that destabilize the region. So yes, we are going to talk about this wider context. I invited the -- I -- this is my invitation to talk about the wider context. I'd be happy to --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) setting up this, sort of, fight between the Arab states and Iran?

MR. MCCORMACK: I will let the -- Iranian's neighbors talk about their own views of Iran. But I can tell you, just in a general way, that there is a healthy appreciation for the threat posed by Iran to the stability of the region, and also a healthy appreciation for the threat posed by Iran to those states who want to see a different kind of Middle East, who are engaged albeit at various stages in political and economic reforms that will result in a better future for their people.

Iran -- as we know it now, the regime -- is 180 degrees opposite; has a view 180 degrees opposite from where the rest of the world is going, in terms of the Middle East. None of that means that you cannot explore, as we're doing through the channel with Ambassador Crocker, whether or not there's some small area in which there is perhaps a mutual interest in a -- in preventing greater security instability in Iraq. That is what we are exploring through the channel that Ambassador Crocker has to his Iranian counterparts. And we'll see. We'll see in terms of Iran what sort of actions it takes. That also doesn't mean, just because you explore whether or not there is some small ground of overlap of mutual interests concerning security in Iraq, that you don't continue vigorous diplomacy to ensure that Iran isn't able to further destabilize other states throughout the Middle East.

QUESTION: It just seems like there's a lot of mixed messages going on. It doesn't leave a whole lot of -- a lot of -- it doesn't make it so attractive to our -- for our -- I mean, on the one hand, you're trying to argue that Iranian officials should sit down and work with U.S. officials on the U.S.'s biggest problem, which is Iraq; but on the other hand, the whole Gulf security dialogue has been talked about in terms of counter Iran, arms sales to -- you know, to counter Iran's influence. So how -- how would Iran agree then that we're going to be an honest partner --

MR. MCCORMACK: I think we as well as others believe that the leaders in Tehran are fully capable of cold-eyed calculation of what is in their interest and what is not in their interest. They'll make their own decisions in that regard, as will we.

The only -- the only thing about the Ryan Crocker channel is we're saying -- and they'll understand this -- is that perhaps there is some mutual interest in having a stable Iraq. the calculation is that the Iranians don't want an unstable, unsecure Iraq any more -- any more than any of other -- any of Iraq's other neighbors.

QUESTION: So ideally -- and I just want to summarize real quickly -- we want to move forward on both tracks: one, the track of getting Iran to sit down and work with us as partners in Iraq on security; and two, to get the rest of the Gulf states to sit down and work as partners in countering Iran. Both tracks will move forward. That's what our goal -- the U.S. goal is?

MR. MCCORMACK: We are going to -- there is -- we have -- we have an interest in allying ourselves and associating ourselves with those in the Middle East who want to see a different kind of Middle East, a better, more prosperous, secure, stable Middle East. That includes our friends, and I can go down the list.

Part of that -- part of that effort is ensuring that states like Iran and Syria, and their terror proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, aren't able to further expand their activities and further destabilize the region and take it in an entirely different direction. Believe me, the Iranian regime is fully capable of holding these two thoughts --

QUESTION: And so are you?

MR. MCCORMACK: And as are we -- as are our friends and neighbors.

QUESTION: Did you say the calculation is they do want a stable Iraq or that they do want an unstable Iraq?

MR. MCCORMACK: We assume that they would want a stable Iraq, that it's in their --

QUESTION: Why do you assume that? Everything that they've done has shown you that they want an unstable Iraq, they want a -- no?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I'm not going to get into their motivations, Matt. But long term, the fact of the matter is that Iran and Iraq are going to live next to one another. That isn't going to change.

QUESTION: So are Afghanistan and Iran.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right, exactly. So like I said, they have -- they are capable of this calculation. We've seen it previously in Afghanistan. So we know they can do it and we would assume that that same calculation would apply equally to Iraq.

QUESTION: But one could argue that they do want an unstable Iraq because that would allow them to go in and take control of parts of the south, as many have warned.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm. And one can assume as well that our forces as well as other forces are going to do everything they can to see that the Iranians and others aren't able to undermine the progress -- progress on political as well as other fronts that's being made in Iraq.

QUESTION: Or you might also entertain the argument that they might stop this once there aren't several hundred thousand U.S. troops on countries on each side of their borders, right?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, Matt, again, I will let you talk to them about what their possible motivations might be.

QUESTION: And -- I wasn't on the -- I missed the conference call, but --

MR. MCCORMACK: Missed the conference call, missed the gaggle --

QUESTION: There was no gaggle.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yesterday.

QUESTION: But it's been a long time since I've heard the word "hegemony" or variations of it used in the State Department briefing room. Is there real U.S. concern that Iran is, you know --

MR. MCCORMACK: I didn't use the word "hegemony."

QUESTION: No, I know. But it obviously came from someone who was speaking for the Department. Is there a hegemonic --

MR. MCCORMACK: We -- well, Matt, you know, I think you know by now in terms of folks that work at the State Department, these are people with high SAT scores, so they are fully capable of using properly words like "hegemony" and "hegemonic."

QUESTION: And Manichean. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Now that we've solved all this, if there are no other questions --

QUESTION: No, no, I have an unrelated question.

QUESTION: Something about the Cambodian legislature?

QUESTION: No, it's about San Marino, actually. The -- remember back in June or late May there was a group that came out complaining about the State Department's response, inadequate response, to offers of aid for Katrina?

MR. MCCORMACK: Uh-huh.

QUESTION: They've put out an even fuller accounting of this and it accuses the Department of surprising ineptitude and all this kind of stuff.

MR. MCCORMACK: Which group is this?

QUESTION: It's called CREW. I can't remember what it stands for: Citizens for Responsible something or another. I -- but they have compiled all of these documents, including cable traffic and stuff like that. Do you have anything to add to what you originally said when these first reports came out about --

MR. MCCORMACK: I haven't seen this report, Matt. All I can tell you is this was -- this was a crisis response situation and we were dealing with a situation unique in American history in terms of the scope of the disaster and in terms of the foreign positive response to this disaster.

It was a matter of matching up on the run, as officials were dealing with this disaster, aid offers coming in and needs. And very often, when you talk about -- talk about needs, you're getting into various -- very technical issues. I remember one case in which there was a very -- there was a really generous offer of some pumps from a European country that could help aid with the pumping out of New Orleans. Really very capable pumps, highly capable. But they didn't fit with our electrical grid, and so you were going to have to do a lot of modifications to the infrastructure in order to use those pumps. And people have to make a cost-benefit analysis. You know, is it better to work with what we've got or maybe some other -- and take some other offers rather than engage in substantial changes to infrastructure in order to use that particular -- those particular pumps? That's just one small example.

There are -- there were examples of folks who were offering food aid and other kinds of aid. It is a fact of life that just because you do have a natural disaster does not mean you throw out -- throw out the entire rulebook in terms of food safety and those sorts of things, and so in some cases, we had to say thank you very much to generous aid offers because they didn't comport with U.S. laws and regulations. That's just a hard fact.

But at the end of the day, we did receive substantial donations from overseas, and in those cases where we didn't accept offers there were -- there were other materials, there were other offers that filled the need. So it's not as if, from that perspective, the needs went unfilled. They were filled in a different way.

QUESTION: Okay. Thank you.

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