Military

MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody. I don't have any opening statements, so we can get right into your questions, whoever wants to start out.

Mr. Lee.

QUESTION: How did the Kosovo meeting go?

MR. MCCORMACK: I assume it went very well. I was not in it. I was doing other things and I have not had a chance to talk to the Secretary about it. We'll try to get you some readout, whether that is on background or on the record, this afternoon

QUESTION: Okay. Then perhaps we can move to Iran --

MR. MCCORMACK: The floor is yours.

QUESTION: -- and tomorrow's meeting, what can you tell us about what you expect to happen?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we'll see. In terms of the outcomes of the meeting where the -- it'll be up to the Iranians. We have previously met with an Iranian delegation in Baghdad to focus specifically on issues related to Iraq and Iraq's stability. This is another of those meetings. Ambassador Crocker will represent our side and you can talk to the Iranians about who will be on their side. And it's designed to see if Iran will change its behavior and we can talk about issues related to Iraq. We think that this kind of engagement is important, that at the very least, we can have a direct message to the Iranians that if they truly do want a more stable, secure, prosperous Iraq, they're going to have to change their behavior.

Now, after the first meeting, we haven't seen really any appreciable change in their behavior, certainly not for the positive. We had gone into this with the thought in mind that perhaps more than one meeting would be required. So the Secretary in consultation with the White House, decided that there -- another -- one more meeting was merited, so that we could underscore for the Iranian Government directly the importance of their changing behavior, if they truly do want to match their actions with their words. So we'll see. As for what will come out of the meeting, I think that depends on the Iranian Government's reaction.

QUESTION: Okay. You say that since after the -- since the first meeting in late May, you haven't seen any appreciable change in --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: In fact, haven’t you? Hasn't their behavior actually gotten worse?

MR. MCCORMACK: I said any appreciable change for the positive.

QUESTION: Oh, okay. So -- but you have seen a change for the negative.

MR. MCCORMACK: Talk to MNFI. I can't tell you, you know, which way the graph trend line is pointing on this. But it hasn’t, at the very least, it hasn't gotten any better. And that continues to add to the instability in Iraq, because the Iranians we know are providing assistance, a variety of different kinds of assistance, to the EFP networks which pose a direct threat to our troops. We also know that they are providing assistance to some of these sectarian militias and death squads that again, stokes sectarian tensions in Iraq and lead to instability there. So just to repeat myself, that if they really do want to see a changed Iraq and they want to contribute to that, then they -- then they are going to have to match their actions with their words.

[Public announcement interruption]

So anything else? You can -- focus, focus.

QUESTION: I can't. I can't.

MR. MCCORMACK: Focus.

QUESTION: Bombs, explosions. (Laughter.) I can't. (Laughter.)

MR. MCCORMACK: That's fine. Just for anybody who may be listening to the briefing or watching the briefing or reading a transcript of the briefing, across the street there is some construction going on. And from time to time, they have some construction-related activities and that was just an announcement for those construction-related activities.

Matt, now.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. MCCORMACK: I'm giving you an opportunity to regroup and refocus.

QUESTION: Yes. My head has been cleared. But can't you say that in fact the evidence of Iran's misbehavior or negative behavior has increased substantially since the meeting in May from what you had before?

MR. MCCORMACK: I can't -- I can't say, Matt. I can't quantify it for you. The folks in Baghdad, maybe MNFI would be better qualified to give you which way the trend line is pointing. But I can say at the very least, it hasn't gotten any better.

QUESTION: Okay. Well -- but does -- if it hasn’t got any better, what does this say about the utility of these meetings?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, like I said, you know, sometimes going in and underscoring once again, a similar kind of message -- and again, at the end of this we'll try to get you some of the flavor of the meeting. Ryan or others may talk about some of the content of the meeting. But at the very least, it merits underscoring again for the Iranians that they should change their behavior. Sometimes that is what is required. Now, we don't want to get into a cycle where we're just scheduling meetings for meetings' sakes. We don't want to do that. But the decision was taken that it is worthwhile to underscore again in person directly with the Iranians on this narrow set of issues related to Iraq that they should change their behavior if they truly want to see a more positive outcome in Iraq.

Yeah.

QUESTION: So are you going to go into this meeting with some carrots and some sticks and say, "If you change your behavior, you'll get this, you'll" --

MR. MCCORMACK: It's not a negotiation. It's not a negotiation. Look, this is in Iran's interest. Iran and Iraq are neighbors. That isn't going to change. There's nothing anybody can do to change that. Iraq wants a positive, open, transparent relationship with Iran. We absolutely support that. The Iranians say they want the same. They say, in fact, that they would like to contribute to Iraq's stability. They would like to have a good, transparent relationship so that they can have exchanges diplomatic, political, economic, up -- open and above board and positive.

If Iran truly does want to play a positive role, they can. We've seen it in the past with their neighbors, even where we may have differences with Iran. The Iranians have proven that they can play a positive role in one of their neighbors' future. I give you Afghanistan as an example of that process. And we -- you know, we, in fact, through the Bonn process, had interaction with the Iranian Government.

Now as for Iraq, we haven't seen a similarly positive role from Iran and certainly not in the past years. So they are capable of it. We have seen it in the past. It's really up to them to see whether or not they do want to play a positive role. We are there at the invitation of the Iraqi Government under UN Security Council mandate. We are there at the cost of significant treasure, whether that's measured in lives or dollars, to help the Iraqi people build a different kind of Iraq that can be a force for stability and a positive force in the Middle East. That's what we're there for. That's what we're trying to do. And we'll see, in terms of the Iranians' actions, what their answer is to the question of what are they trying to do.

QUESTION: Just to take this one step further, I mean, if you're speaking to the boogeyman Iran on Iraq, why not then extend this policy to dealing with people like Hamas if that might change opinions?

MR. MCCORMACK: Totally different situations. Look, for all of Iran's behaviors that lie outside the norms of international behavior, they're a state. This is a government that represents the Iranian people. No matter our views of the elections, it brought about this government. It is the officially recognized government, seated in the UN, of the Iranian people. Hamas is a terrorist organization and we treat it as such. So I'm not trying -- this is really apples and oranges, although some of the behaviors in terms of support for violent extremism may be similar. It's really two different situations.

QUESTION: So it would be wrong to extend this as sort of a slight move in your policy and speaking to --

MR. MCCORMACK: No.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. MCCORMACK: I mean, we have as I pointed out had opportunities for exchanges with the Iranian Government from time to time over the past -- certainly the past couple decades. You know, you can look back at the news reporting on all that.

Yeah, Matt.

QUESTION: Sean, I just -- I mean, I only raise this because you just mentioned it. But you know, yeah, Hamas is an FTO. But, you know, Iran is the state --

MR. MCCORMACK: State sponsor of terror. I know.

QUESTION: The equivalent, if it was a group and not a country, it would be an FTO.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, they're completely different situations. I'm not going to get into the political science or legal arguments about why they're different. On one hand you have a government that is officially recognized as the representatives of the Iranian people, the nation; Hamas a completely different situation.

Yeah, James.

QUESTION: Sean, you've said repeated today that it was always contemplated when you embarked on this course with Iran that there would likely be more than one meeting.

MR. MCCORMACK: May require.

QUESTION: Or may require more than one meeting.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: And I gather from that statement that that calculation was made without regard to whether the meeting produced benefits or not, correct?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, not at all. It doesn't -- what I didn't say was that we would automatically agree to multiple meetings. It was contemplated that there might be the need for more than one meeting.

QUESTION: And what would -- what was it in our calculation that would provide the impetus for a second meeting?

MR. MCCORMACK: These are decisions --

QUESTION: Even before the first meeting you said it was always contemplated we might --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- may require a second.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: What was it that would trigger a second in that calculation?

MR. MCCORMACK: It was the decision of Secretary Rice, working -- talking to President Bush and other members of the Administration that it was appropriate to take this opportunity to see if we could underscore with the Iranians that they need to change their behavior, despite at this point any lack of change in their behavior. I didn't say that it was envisioned that automatically this was going to be a series of meetings. That provision was allowed for in the thinking prior to the first meeting. And as for any subsequent meeting, we'll see. That's going to be -- that's certainly going to have to be a decision that Secretary Rice and President Bush take a look at down the road.

Like I said, we don't want to get into a situation where we're doing meetings only for meetings' sake. But if we can take the opportunity to have one more engagement between Ryan Crocker and his counterpart to underscore the importance of the Iranians trying to play a positive role in Iraq, we think that that is worth it. We think it's worth it if we can bring about a change in their behavior.

QUESTION: The messages that you convey in these meetings are not any different from those that we express from the various official podiums, correct?

MR. MCCORMACK: James, I can't rack up the public and private statements. I'm not sitting in these meetings. We'll -- after the first one, Ryan Crocker, our ambassador there, gave you a little flavor for the meeting there and we're going to try to do something similar for you, if not from him, from somebody else.

QUESTION: I just don't understand what the potential value of "underscoring" would be when, in fact, the position of the United States as to what Iran needs --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- to do has been very well-known for some time. So explain to me what the value of underscoring it personally would be unless there's a different message being conveyed.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, James, sometimes in diplomacy, it is worth taking the opportunity for one more meeting, for taking the opportunity to convey something in person and directly. Sometimes, especially in the case of Iran, no matter how clearly I may be speaking from the podium or others may be speaking from other podia, messages are subject to misinterpretation or they -- somebody may not get the information directly. And so it's an opportunity to speak directly to the Iranian Government and say, "Here is our message to you. Here's what we're saying. Play a positive role in Iraq."

QUESTION: One last question if I may. I know they're wholly separate tracks.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: But we have, at least through the intermediary of Javier Solana, a long experience now over several years time of -- or at least two years time of negotiating with the Iranians or trying to come to some terms with the Iranians -- if you don't -- if you're not comfortable with the word, negotiation --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- on the nuclear issue. And I wonder if you have been able to discern any similarities in the approach or the postures that the Iranians take as they have negotiated in that track and as they are behaving in this set of meetings with Crocker or the first one. Is it in -- for example, in the nuclear track, we've seen them say, "We'll promise this, this, and this."

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: Sometimes it materializes, sometimes it doesn't. Is there a similarity in the way they're handling the two tracks that --

MR. MCCORMACK: To my knowledge, James, I'm not aware of any similarities.

Yeah.

QUESTION: The Secretary met with the Syrian Foreign Minister when she was in --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- Sharm el-Skeikh. Have you noticed any change in behavior of the Syrians and does the Secretary plan to meet them again in terms of pushing the process forward, just as you are with the Iranians?

MR. MCCORMACK: No plans at this point, but I would -- and she did take the opportunity to meet with her Syrian counterpart, again, to talk specifically about Iraq. But again, that's a different situation. You have -- if you look back over the history with the Syrians specifically on Iraq, you have a whole series of meetings dating back to the first term of the Bush Administration urging the Syrians to change their behavior. You don't have a comparable situation with the Iranians, so again, different -- a different situation.

QUESTION: Yes, but has the personal appeal of the Secretary for the Syrians to do more had any impact at all? Have you noticed any change?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, whether or not the Syrians take a decision to change their behavior is going to be a decision taken by Bashar al-Asad. We would just point out to them that we would think Syria would not want to become a transit point for terrorists, for violent extremists. Because very often, what happens if you lend your country to those individuals as a transit point, some of those individuals decide that they don't want to continue transiting on to their final destination, whether that's Iraq or elsewhere and so that -- so that it could very well become a problem for the Syrian people that they allow their country to be used as a transit point.

Now that's putting aside the interests of Iraq and putting aside the interests of being a good neighbor and putting aside the interests of being a positive force throughout the region. That's just purely an argument based on self-interest of the Syrian people. We would think that they would want to take heed of that.

QUESTION: Yes, but have you noticed, though -- have you noticed a change? Are there fewer arms coming over? Do you have a more positive outlook on the Syrian response, for example, than the Iranian response, which has been --

MR. MCCORMACK: To my knowledge, no. You know, I can only measure that in terms of output, so -- if you see any change in terms of reduced flow of foreign fighters, violent extremists coming over the border from Syria into Iraq. To my knowledge, the answer to that is no, and I think if you look back last week, General Bergner, in his briefings in Baghdad -- I think it was last week, either that or the week before last, talked in some compelling detail about this pipeline that is flowing through Syria into Iraq, which foreign fighters are conveyed. And I didn't detect in his presentation any indication that the Syrian Government is acting to turn off that spigot.

QUESTION: So the Iraq Survey Group said you should talk to both Syria and Iran. Has it been worthwhile?

MR. MCCORMACK: We think -- yeah, we think the engagement has been certainly worth the effort and that given the importance of trying to bring about some greater stability in Iraq, that it has been worth the effort. Now as in many cases, it is not going to be a question just of the United States engagement with Iran or Syria or any other country. The regional component to this is going to be very important if you are going to bring about some greater level of support from within the region for Iraq, for this Iraqi Government, for the Iraqi people and also for highlighting either to the positive or to the negative the roles of various neighbors.

Now one of the interesting dynamics that you could sense at the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting was that there was pressure on states like Syria and Iran to play a positive role. And they, again, during these meetings made positive comments about their intentions to play a positive role. Now, that -- I know the next portion of that, your question --

For all of you that was the controlled detonation. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. MCCORMACK: The next answer -- the next question that you were going to ask is: Well, okay, well, so it hasn't yielded any results. Well, again, we hope to convene the working groups of the neighbors' meeting as well as the larger neighbors' meeting again at the same -- at some point in the future.

So sometimes this takes a gradual ramping up of pressure and keeping the spotlight on the need for these countries to play a positive role and it's in their interest. I can't imagine that the Syrians or the Iranians want to have an unstable violent Iraq on their borders.

QUESTION: Sean, is this something -- just one last thing -- is this something the Secretary and Gates are going to bring up this -- next week when they travel to the region? Is this a key part of their message that Syria and Iran -- that Arab countries must put more pressure on Syria and Iran?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think the message of the importance of Iraq's neighbors playing a positive role in Iraq's present and Iraq's future is going to be an important message of their trip. And we'll have more on their trip -- I hope to get you guys a trip announcement today or tomorrow morning and we can talk a little bit more about the trip.

Yeah, Charlie.

QUESTION: Sean, to go back to the U.S.-Iran meeting. You've answered the question a number of times about whether anything else would come up --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- you know, the four Americans who are being held there and perhaps a fifth, and so we know your answer on that.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: My question is given the line if I have you -- to quote correctly, that these talks with Ryan Crocker and the Iranian over Iraq are an opportunity to speak directly to the Iranian Government.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Why would you not avail yourself of that opportunity to speak directly to the Iranian Government about four missing -- four Americans who are being held there?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, the meetings in Baghdad are only about Iraq and we don't think it's to anybody's benefit to start using various issues as bargaining chips. And the fact remains that these people who are being prevented from leaving Iran are being held unjustly without any cause. There are accusations that somehow they pose a threat to the Iranian Government and the Iranian regime. That is just absolutely ridiculous. So we're not going to get in a situation where we're trading off the future of the Iraqi people for some other interest or being even perceived as trading off the interest of the Iraqi people against some other interest that we or others may have. So therefore we keep these issues in separate channels. We handle the issue of the American citizens through our protecting power in Iran, the Swiss. They have gone in -- in multiple times -- talked to the Iranian Government about this. We're going to keep talking to the Swiss Government so that they will keep going in and talking to the Iranian Government about it.

QUESTION: But that's a --

MR. MCCORMACK: But the fact of the matter --

What's that?

QUESTION: That's a brick wall.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that's the nature of dealing with the Iranian Government in some cases. But the fact of the matter is -- and I will repeat it again -- that we're not going to get in a position where we're trading off the interest of one country or one issue at the expense of somebody else, or being perceived as doing that.

Yeah.

QUESTION: A change of subject.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: Do you have any precisions on the talks of the Secretary with Kosovo?

MR. MCCORMACK: No. Matt just -- Matt asked about that. I wasn't in the meeting and I didn't have a chance to ask the Secretary about it, so we'll try to --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) a minute, though.

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: What was the Secretary's message to them? And I understand it was to be patient for these negotiations, but why does the U.S. think that anything better can come out if the Russians are so stern as the Kosovars say?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, what we were counseling is allowing the diplomatic process to play out. Now, that's going to play out in a number of different venues. It's going to play out up in New York. It's going to play out in capitals around the world, including in Russia and Europe and here in the United States. The end point here isn't in doubt as far as we are concerned. President Bush laid that out when he was at the G-8 meeting in Germany in June. And that is that the end point of this process should be independence for Kosovo on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan. Now, that's the end point. The question then becomes how do you get there? And that is an issue that we're talking about with our European allies. We're also talking to the Russian Government about that and we've engaged the Serbian Government on that as well.

Everybody wants the optimal solution here, where you have as much buy-in to that endpoint that we're all talking about, as possible. Will we and others be able to realize that? I can't tell you. We'll see over the coming weeks and months how it plays out. But the endpoint is not in doubt, from our perspective. And one of the things that we have counseled for all parties is that it is in nobody's interest to try to short circuit the diplomatic process. Because the last thing anybody wants to see is a renewed outbreak of some of the deep violence that we've seen in that part of the world before.

QUESTION: Wasn’t the (inaudible) to the veto which forces the withdrawal of the resolution in the UN? Doesn't that kind of signal the end of the diplomatic process or is that just the beginning?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, like I said, this is going to be play out in a number of different venues, not only up in New York, but in capitals, in Europe, Russia and around the globe. So I would expect that you are going to see this -- see the diplomacy played out at a lot of different levels.

QUESTION: The Serbian Foreign Minister is going to be here later in the week. What's the U.S. message to Serbia?

MR. MCCORMACK: Very similar -- that there can be a situation here in which most people's ends are realized, although not all of them. We understand that this is a difficult issue for Serbia, but we believe that there are also important things at stake here for Serbia and I think the Europe -- Serbia's European friends have talked about that. We want to have a Serbia that has a horizon in Europe that's ultimately going to be up to the EU and the Europeans, but we want that to happen. They need to do certain things in order to realize that. So they have interests here as well on both sides of the issue. So we ask them to take a look at those interests, take a look at where their future lie and to take a look at what is best not only for their people, but the people of the region.

QUESTION: Kosovo's Prime Minister on Friday suggested that the parliament should declare -- unilaterally declare independence at the end of November. In your opinion, would this lead to an increase in violence and is this something that you're steering the Kosovars against?

MR. MCCORMACK: What we said is we don't think that short circuiting the diplomatic process that is still ongoing is in anybody's interest, including the -- (laughter)

QUESTION: (Inaudible) speak for saying you don't agree with --

MR. MCCORMACK: (Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible) there 120 days on the diplomacy? I mean, isn't there a deadline?

MR. MCCORMACK: We expect that it will play out over the coming weeks and months.

QUESTION: So it's not something that you would agree with, calling for unilateral independence?

MR. MCCORMACK: What's that?

QUESTION: So if Kosovo's parliament were to call for, you know, unilateral independence for Kosovo, this is not something --

MR. MCCORMACK: I'll refer you to my previous answer.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Before leaving, the Kosovo leader said that he wanted to get from you some guarantees about the independence. Are there some guarantees you are -- you could give them or --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, the President of the United States talked about where he thinks this process should end up. I think that's a pretty good statement.

QUESTION: Apparently, it's not enough for them, because they came --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I don't know what more we can say.

Lambros.

QUESTION: On Turkey.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.

QUESTION: Anything to say about the big victory by the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan in yesterday's elections in Turkey?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, first of all, I guess the official election results aren't in, so we're going to wait until those are officially in. But it appears that there's a -- has been a free and fair election and that we would congratulate the Turkish people on holding a free and fair election. And we'll see what the results of that election yield. I would point out that we have had a very good working relationship with Prime Minister Erdogan and his government and that we have faith in Turkey's secular democracy. And the fact that Turkey will move forward on the basis of their own constitution and their laws.

QUESTION: One more question. What --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) turn of phrase, you have faith in Turkey's secular democracy. That's well done. (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: So far, you did congratulate Mr. Erdogan?

MR. MCCORMACK: Premature because official election results are not yet in.

QUESTION: One more question.

MR. MCCORMACK: I would expect, however, once the official results are in, that whomever is the winner will receive congratulations from the United States Government.

QUESTION: As you said a few moments ago, and DOS spokesman said -- stated yesterday that the U.S. Government is congratulating the secular democracy in Turkey. I'm wondering why, Mr. McCormack, secular -- and not simply democracies, the founder of Turkey Mr. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk October 29th, 1922 was established only "The Republic of Turkey" without using any kind of epithets.

MR. MCCORMACK: I'm not sure where you're going with that, Lambros.

QUESTION: Why you said secular? What is secular?

MR. MCCORMACK: It's the basis of -- one of the bases of Turkish democracy.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Can I go back to Iraq for a second and get your thoughts on these reports of the Ryan Crocker cable regarding Iraqi visas?

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm. What do you want to know about it?

QUESTION: Well, I would like to know if this is something that had been seconded by the Secretary, whether there was support for his ideas in the Department or not.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, a couple of things. I noticed a newspaper report about this that came out over the weekend. I would note that the actual cable is several weeks old and I would note further that back in February, Secretary Rice appointed a task force to deal with this very issue.

And what we did is we settled on three basic tracks for those individuals who have worked for the U.S. Embassy, the State Department under the Chief of Mission authority in Baghdad. If they feel that they are under threat just because they have -- are working or have worked for the U.S. Government, for interpreters and translators, we worked with the Congress to increase the number of visas -- special visas that can be given to these individuals so that they can get into the United States, so that they can immigrate into the United States.

We're currently working with the Congress on modifying the rules for what we refer to as special immigrant visas. And basically, these are visas that are available to foreign nationals who work for any embassy around the globe with the recommendation of the Ambassador and various other recommendations who have fulfilled 20 years or more of service to the embassy. So for example, if

you are a foreign service national who has worked in our embassy in Tokyo for 20 years and you receive all the right recommendations, you can receive one of these special immigrant visas and immigrate with your family to the United States.

What we're working to do with the Congress is to lower that time requirement from 20 years down to three years so that you -- so that we can take into account the consideration for those who have worked for us in Iraq with the thought in mind that you're not going to find very many people that have worked for the United States Government for 20 years during that period of time.

The third way is these -- any individual who feels threat of persecution can try to apply for refugee status. Now that requires to go to a refugee processing facility outside of Iraq. And one thing that we have done is that if there are those individuals who want to try to take that route, who have worked for the United States Government, we make sure that there is as smooth as possible a flow of information about their service for the U.S. Government to the refugee processing center. Now, once they get to a refugee processing center they have to go through the UN High Commissioner for Refugee screening process and then if they meet the requirements for refugees then they get a recommendation for resettlement to the United States.

I have some statistics as well here that can help you understand where we are in the process. Thus far, we have received about 8,000 referrals from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for Iraqi citizens. As of the --

QUESTION: Thus far?

MR. MCCORMACK: Thus far.

QUESTION: Since when?

MR. MCCORMACK: I can't tell you when.

QUESTION: Since 2003 or --

MR. MCCORMACK: No. Yeah, this is recently. I can't tell you -- it's very recently. It doesn't go back years. And as of July 23rd, 2,368 Iraqis had been interviewed by the Department of Homeland Security. They have a role to play in this process as well.

QUESTION: Wait, 2,300 and --

MR. MCCORMACK: -- 68. And we also have a role to play in this process and we are going to -- of those 8,000, so this is all against the 8,000 figure -- that we plan to complete our portion of the process about -- of 6,000 interviews of Iraqis by the end of September and then to continue interviews on an accelerated basis. Now this also assumes cooperation of the host governments in which these Iraqi refugee candidates are currently.

Thus far, as of June 30th, we have 133 Iraqi refugees that have arrived in the United States during fiscal year 2007. And what our goal is to get 2,000 Iraqis to complete -- successfully complete the process, all the processing steps, to allow their arrival in the U.S. and do that by September 30th, 2007. Then of course the process is going to continue on.

QUESTION: But by assuming they're actually here that's just completed the process 2,000 by the end of September?

MR. MCCORMACK: I can't tell you that they will actually be on U.S. shores, but they will have completed all the steps, all the required steps. Some may have arrived in the U.S. by that time, some may not have, but they've done everything -- everything has been done in order to allow them to get here, although they may not be here physically.

QUESTION: Some of them could have been rejected, too, of the 2,000, right?

MR. MCCORMACK: No. These are -- this is -- we believe, again, by September 30th, 2007 that we will have completed the process to the point of either those 2,000 people having arrived -- some portion of 2,000 people having arrived in the United States. The remainder of that 2,000 would have completed all the steps necessary in order to get here.

So why do I give you all these figures. I give you all these figures to show that the United States Government has mobilized on behalf of those individuals who have served well and faithfully the United States Government in Iraq. This kind of effort in which you're working across multiple time zones, involving several different foreign countries; one of which we don't have -- although we have diplomatic relations with Syria as we -- our earlier discussion pointed out, is not necessarily always the smoothest relationship. So working with several countries across multiple time zones, involving a number of different groups, not only within the U.S. Government but outside the U.S. Government, that we have mobilized to take this task on and that started in February. This sort of effort doesn't happen over night. It doesn't start on July 9th when the cable arrived, so all of this effort well predated the arrival of this cable.

Now, I've taken a look at it and as far as my reading of it is there's nothing in there that would substantially change the ability of this Department to increase the numbers or the rapidity -- or the speed with which this process moves forward. One of the -- probably one of the single most significant recommendation is something that we are already working on with the Hill and that is lowering the time requirement for service to the United States Government for somebody who wants to get a special immigrant visa.

So I know this is a long answer, but I think it's -- you love the long answers, Matt, but it's important because sometimes, when you get reporting like this, people think, "Oh, well, they haven't been doing everything," and memories get kind of short. Remember back to February and we talked to folks quite a bit about what we were going to put in place.

Now does this process -- has the process moved as many people through it as we would have hoped? No. Of course we want it to move faster and more efficiently, but it is getting more efficient and within a relatively short period of time, keeping in mind that -- you know, a week can be a lifetime for somebody who is waiting for news and they feel as though their lives or the lives of their family is in danger. We're fully aware of that.

QUESTION: But given that -- like you said, some of these have already been in place since February; Crocker wrote the memo just a few weeks ago. It seems to imply that the Ambassador is somewhat out of the loop when it comes to this.

MR. MCCORMACK: No, I wouldn't say that. I mean, look, every -- you can talk to Ryan. I don't know if he personally wrote the cable. I highly doubt it. Every cable from embassy -- every embassy around the world goes out under the name of the ambassador. You can talk to Ryan or the embassy there, whether or not he wrote it himself. I doubt it.

But look; everybody has the same concern here. They want to try to take care of the people that -- with whom they work on a daily basis, those people who -- those of whom might feel under threat. We want the same thing. But we all have to operate within the confines of the law and we're working closely with the Hill. Congress has a role to play in this. We have a role here at the State Department. Department of Homeland Security has a role to play. International organizations have a role to play. States in the region have a role to play. So we're bringing all these parts together. It's a complicated process, but we're fully aware of what's at stake.

Yeah.

QUESTION: The figures that you gave on the refugees are exactly the same as they were two weeks ago, whereas -- except for -- I think that you may have made a slight mistake when you were talking about them the first time around. You said that there were 160 or something like that who had come in, but they don't appear -- they don't -- I remember, because I wrote a story about this, that they haven't changed. These numbers, the 133 that --

MR. MCCORMACK: Which means they haven't -- that's because July hasn't closed out yet.

QUESTION: Right, exactly.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: They're the same as they were two weeks ago, but I'm wondering if you -- may be something different in there and that would be if you could tell us how many of the -- of any of the group, the ones that have been interviewed by DHS or the ones that you plan to interview, the State plan -- that State plans to interview by the end of September were the 133 who have arrived who fit this category of having worked for the U.S. in Iraq.

MR. MCCORMACK: Oh, sure, I --

QUESTION: I asked back then and that they didn't have an answer on that, but --

MR. MCCORMACK: Okay. Well, let's see if they have an answer. I don't know, no.

QUESTION: Is it in -- it's not in the --

MR. MCCORMACK: It is not in this little list of… sheaves of paper that I have here.

QUESTION: I guess if you could check on that, that would be helpful.

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: And the other thing is that -- when you announced -- when it was announced, which I don't know if it was in February, but it was certainly in the spring, about the reduction of (inaudible) from 20 to three years, where does that stand right now?

MR. MCCORMACK: Still -- still on the Hill.

QUESTION: Is there any chance that it's going to get done before the -- you know, before the end of the fiscal year?

MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check -- I'll check with our ledge folks. I'll -- it's still up on the Hill. Once I -- once I --

QUESTION: But do you know where it is? What bill it's in? Is it in its bill is it being --

MR. MCCORMACK: I will ask that question.

Yeah.

QUESTION: What is the total number of Iraqis working for the U.S. Government in Iraq?

MR. MCCORMACK: I'll check for you. I don't know.

QUESTION: What is 8,000? Are there, you know --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that's -- I'll check for you, Sue. But that's not actually -- not the most important number, I would argue. The important number is how many people feel as though they are under threat to the extent that they want to leave Iraq permanently. That's an individual judgment. I'm happy to see if we can find this other number for you, get you an estimate. I don't know it off the top of my head.

QUESTION: Don't you think it's fair to say that most Iraqis working for the U.S. Government in Iraq would feel under threat?

MR. MCCORMACK: Sue, I don't know. I don't know. Certainly, based on the news reporting, that for many of them there probably is a substantial threat. We've lost foreign nationals working for -- who have worked at the embassy. I can't judge for you people's individual circumstances. But it wouldn't surprise me if they feel some degree of threat.

QUESTION: I mean, are you looking at a policy where all Iraqis working for the U.S. Government would be offered some sort of --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that gets -- then that gets into a question of contract employees versus direct-hire employees and I can't tell you standing right here whether or not -- how we differentiate between the two. I'll check to see if there's -- if people who are direct-hire employees of the United States Government are treated differently in some respect than contract employees of the U.S. Government.

QUESTION: Yeah, that would be useful. You could probably find that out through insurance statistics.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: Just one last little follow-up on that. The answer in your attempted changes on the legislative end of things towards --

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: -- the end of three years raises the question of what happened to those who've worked for less than three years. Is there an avenue you're pursing to help those people if they fall into the category feeling under threat?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I suppose. I'm not offering advice to anybody, but I suppose that if you felt that threat then you can apply for refugee status.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: One more question. On Kosovo, may we know the participants from both sides in today's meeting with the Secretary? And also any special briefing since the 10:30 a.m. one postponed?

MR. MCCORMACK: The which? What was postponed?

QUESTION: I'm asking may we know the participants from both sides.

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: And the second, any special briefing since the 10:30 one was postponed?

MR. MCCORMACK: We'll try to -- that's what I referred to with Matt. We're going to try to get you some form of briefing.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:32 p.m.)

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