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Press Briefing, Jan. 17, 2007

Multi-National Force-Iraq

Wednesday, 17 January 2007

Rear Adm. Mark Fox, Communicaitons Director, MNF-I

Brig. Gen. Terry Wolff, Commander, Coalition Military Assistance and Trainign Team

WEEKLY PRESS CONFERENCE WITH REAR ADMIRAL MARK FOX, COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ, AND BRIGADIER GENERAL TERRY WOLFF, COMMANDING GENERAL, COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING TEAM TOPIC: SECURITY OPERATIONS AND TRAINING IN IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 7:00 A.M. EST DATE: WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007

ADM. FOX: Good afternoon. "As-salaam aleikum."

I'm Rear Admiral Mark Fox, communications director for the Multinational Force Iraq. Major General Bill Caldwell is home in the States right now, and I have the honor of being here with you today.

Last week the president of the United States announced a new strategy for our support to Iraq. On Monday of this week, Ambassador Khalilzad, General Casey described the implementation of the president's strategy.

All agree that this plan takes a holistic approach that incorporates political, economic, basic services and public affairs, as well as an increased number of U.S. forces to enhance security in the near term.

As General Casey said on Monday, this plan is different in that there is a strong political commitment from the government of Iraq. There is more Iraqi buy-in. The plan is Iraqi-conceived and Iraqi- led.

Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey emphasized the importance of the commitment from the Iraqi government to allow the Iraqi security forces and coalition forces to target any group who threatens to undermine the government of Iraq or attack coalition forces. And as President Bush said, training of Iraqi security forces remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq.

So in support of that mission, coalition forces are providing basic and advanced training for the Iraqi soldiers and professional development for officers.

This institutional training mission is a critical component of our strategy to assist the Iraqis in creating and maintaining a viable and professional military capability. And so over the next several weeks we will be providing you opportunities to hear from the subject matter experts on our support to the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces during this transition period.

Today we have the opportunity to give you more information on the institutional training for the Iraqi army. With me is Brigadier General Terry Wolff, commanding general of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team. He'll give you additional details of their progress and the way ahead.

General Wolff, having served previously as commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operation Iraqi Freedom, is extremely well versed in the training of the Iraqi security force. Welcome.

GEN. WOLFF: Thanks a lot.

Again, I'm Terry Wolff, and good afternoon, everybody.

The responsibility for assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in generating capable Iraqi military and police forces falls to the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq, known MNSTC-I and led by Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey.

I work for General Dempsey and command CMATT, or Coalition Military Assistance Training Team. And as the name implies, I work the military side of MNSTC-I and am ably assisted by about 450 training team members from all branches of the United States military and a number of coalition nations.

We're responsible for helping the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters as they man, equip, train, base and sustain army and navy Iraqi units. My team, which is spread all over the country, helps the Iraqis with force generation and the building of institutional training and logistical capabilities.

In 2006, we made significant strides in force generation in all components of the Iraqi military. The Iraqi security force currently sits at 327,000 trained and equipped policemen and Iraqi military, and the total number of Iraqi military is approximately 135,000.

This fall, the Iraqis decided to begin replenishing their combat formations and decided to kick off what is referred to as the 30,000 Initiative, or 30K Initiative. The goal of this effort was to replenish the losses that have occurred within their formations, and then bring their 10 combat divisions, 36 brigades, and over 110 combat battalions up to 110 percent strength. The Iraqis are in the second cycle of this training effort, which is occurring at seven different training centers spread across the country.

Additionally, the prime minister asked the minister of Defense to increase the army's strength by about a division equivalent. So the Iraqi Joint Headquarters is in the midst of planning how to expand the army from about 135,000 to nearly 155,000. This expansion will add several division headquarters and at least five combat brigades to their formations by the end of 2007. The Iraqi training centers will begin training the leading edge of these forces soon.

And while this may seem challenging, the process of helping the Iraqi Joint Headquarters develop the institutional pillars that logistically support the force has been equally interesting. By this I mean we have been on the ground floor helping them with their strategic and operational, logistical infrastructure which is necessary to sustain those soldiers out in their tactical units. And this is about putting in place the infrastructure to sustain their feeding, fueling, arming, fixing and maintaining of that force. It's about helping them improve their military medical system. It's about improving upon their existing supply depot and getting their maintenance depot up and running. And finally, it's about getting their support command operational with the logistical linkages that enable them to help these tactical units that are in the fight.

In 2007, we placed a lot of emphasis on the building of the needed support forces and those logistical systems I just mentioned, that will overall aid the Iraqi military in becoming self-sustaining in the future. So MNSTC-I and CMATT remains focused on leaders and logistics as we continue the work of transitioning responsibility for Iraqi security to the Iraqis.

So thank you very much. ADM. FOX: And with that, we'll take any questions you may have.

Yes, sir?

Q Mike Aldridge from BBC. You'll be only too well aware that there's a major problem with infiltration of the Iraqi security forces, leading elements of them to operate in a sectarian nature. How do you deal with that in the process of training? And in particular, are there any new ways in which you're going to tackle it with the critical nature now of this new security drive for Baghdad and Anbar province?

GEN. WOLFF: I would first answer that, you know, dealing with the militias and infiltration, particularly infiltration, is really a function of leadership. And so, you know, a lot of the training effort that is ongoing now is focused on ensuring that you have the right leaders in the right positions that are capable of leading from the front and appropriately. And so that's, obviously, the first step.

There has been a lot that has been done with the national police, that has been reported previously, where the national police brigades have been pulled out of line and sent down for additional training. And those leaders have embedded beforehand so that the leadership changes have been made prior to the organization beginning the training.

So when the organization finished its training, it then returns and is committed back into the fight with new leadership that has been vetted and retrained just like the organization. So it really, in our mind, is a lot about getting the right leaders in position. And, you know, good leaders then tend to have good units.

Q (Off mike) -- just because it's related to that. What, then, would you say is the scale of this problem at the moment of the Iraqi security forces, of all kinds, whether police or army operating in a sectarian way? And how do you think that that is likely to affect the commitment now, that there is no part of the city, no group in the city that's going to be off-limits, that they are all to be dealt with in a more evenhanded way than has been the case in the past? Because obviously, that will be the test, won't it, of whether this new operation in Baghdad is different from previous ones?

GEN. WOLFF: I mean, absolutely. The effectiveness is whether they'll do what the prime minister and the leadership expects them to accomplish. And so I still go back to leadership, that that is absolutely the key. So I can't really give you a percentage.

What I do know from watching the Iraqi senior leadership deal with this problem is when there are indicators of problems, they have moved ruthlessly to try to investigate those problems of this nature, and they will do their best -- they tend to do their best to try to remove difficult leaders that can't perform to standard.

Q Bill Licus (sp) from AFP. Is it simply a question of leadership or is there something more fundamental that's, for example, a commander might not necessarily see? And if so, are there ways of dealing with that?

GEN. WOLFF: Well, I suspect it is also -- it's a combination of leadership and training as well. I mean, good leadership, good training tends to be the glue that holds units together. And so where units perform poorly, invariably, you can go back to one of those two problems. And it's a very general answer to what you're asking, but, you know, we determine that and get good insight into that not only by the Iraqis identifying and solving their own problems but also by the MiTT teams that are out there with the force. And the MiTT teams are setting the example on a daily basis. I mean, that's what you're seeking here, is that all these different eyes are helping the Iraqis as they help themselves to become and continue to improve on a daily basis. ADM. FOX: The other part that I would add to that is the fact that because it has been identified as a problem, we've taken -- we the coalition have taken steps to enhance the training teams and to ensure that there's a greater level of -- I would call it deckplate participation of role models and mentors. So we've increased the number of people that are role models, examples and also the ability to provide leadership and example.

I don't think you can overstate the importance of the institution of the army as a unifying institution in Iraq, when you have people who come from all over the nation and now put on a common uniform and serve together.

So we understand it's a very important part of this process, and we also understand that there are a lot of issues in terms of loyalty and previous alliances, so it's not something that we can snap our fingers and turn on a dime. But I think it's recognized at all levels that this is something that we've got to work very hard and we're committed to it.

Q Do you find that that glue is strong enough to overcome the really deep sectarian differences?

ADM. FOX: I think that the months to come will tell, quite frankly. And we've certainly seen good examples of inadequate units that had problems, and after either putting good leadership and additional training, that have come back and have served well. But it's not something that -- it takes a certain amount of time, and it'll take, I think, a certain amount of time to tell.

Q Lauren Frayer from AP. About the Baghdad security plan, one possibility that I've heard talked about is that perhaps insurgents in Baghdad might lay low or even leave the city in the short term during this operation. How can the U.S. guard against perhaps deceptive levels of resistance by insurgents in the short term? And when will the Baghdad security operation begin, and when will we know it's begun?

ADM. FOX: The answer to your first question is the thing that's different this time is the fact of the sustainability, the emphasis that we've placed on additional Iraqi forces that have actually come under Iraqi control. There are a number of things that are different that we feel are relevant to the Baghdad security plan. Part of it there's a much greater, as I mentioned before, a much greater level of political will and political commitment to this. There are also what we would also refer to as lines of operations or other areas of changed emphasis in terms of basic services, economics. And also, with the additional Iraqi troops, that will give the ability to sustain as opposed to sweeping through a neighborhood and then allowing, you know, people to come back.

This is going to -- this will have an Iraqi face on it, and it'll be an Iraqi solution.

Q But so the security plan was announced last week. And how can you guard against insurgents having left the city in this past week? And how might it affect surrounding areas of Baghdad? ADM. FOX: I think you need to understand that the overall plan is not just Baghdad. I mean, there's a Baghdad security plan, but there's a holistic approach to the plan here in terms of the entire country. And so in the same lines of emphasis that I just described in terms of additional political will, lines of economic activity, basic services -- those sorts of things are the things that are now wickered in, if you will, into the larger plan.

And so just because there's a portion of it that's the Baghdad plan, it doesn't necessarily mean that the insurgents will be able to just go outside and wait it out.

Q Will there be some sort of lockdown or long curfew put in place during the plan?

ADM. FOX: It would be inappropriate for me to talk about specific tactics or techniques that they might use.

Q The additional troops that are going to be surged into Iraq, into the Baghdad area, I presume some of those are going to be put at your disposal for police training. Can you give us some idea of sort of how many troops? You know, is there going to be a big increase within the police units of U.S. forces?

ADM. FOX: You know, quite frankly, I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give you the specific levels of that kind of detail at this point.

Q Any kind of a ballpark or general description that you can give?

ADM. FOX: No, I really don't have that for you right now.

Q You talked of increased mentoring and so on. Is there actually going to be -- I'm trying to get a picture of how this is going to work. Is there going to be actually an increased embedding of American personnel in Iraqi units, perhaps even something on the lines that the Iraq Study Group was recommending?

GEN. WOLFF: I wouldn't compare it to the exact number. I think suffice to say that the answer would be yes, there is an intention -- I think General Casey talked about this the other day, the growth of MiTT teams by about two to three times. And that's what is being considered, and the plans are being put together for that, as we understand them.

And so that should give greater coverage. And when you see how that translates out on the ground, it gives the MiTT teams better capability to assist the Iraqi forces on a more 24/7 coverage. It gives the MiTT teams the ability to help the Iraqis as they continue to grow some of those logistical appendages that we want to see them grow over time. And so, you know, more folks, additional coverage, really allows you to expand some of the skill sets you want to work with them to continue to develop. And so -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

Q Can I just ask one more while I've got the microphone? And it's about the whole -- and I think training relates to this -- the whole command process that there's going to be now in the coming weeks and months? I must admit myself to still a little confusion over this. We've been told by Mowaffak al-Rubaie, for example, the national security adviser, that it's going to be not just Iraqi-led but Iraqi-commanded, and we hear from General Casey and others that American forces will remain under American command. How those two are going to be squared, I think, is an interesting issue.

Now, I know there's been quite long experience at this, but now with these much more intense operations, again, going into much more politically sensitive areas and the forces operating in more politically sensitive ways, how do you -- what sort of preparations are being made at the moment to deal with that; and how do you actually see it working out in practice, and your honest opinion, your experience of training the forces, whether there is a potential for difficulties here.

GEN. WOLFF: I mean, any time you put coalitions together, it is challenging. You have to sit down with all the players and the participants and try to iron through procedures, and you have to kind of rehearse the command and control activities. And some of that work is ongoing and those sorts of discussions are occurring to try to cement the linkages and the reporting networks and how decision-making is being made. And General Casey also talked about that on Monday as well. And suffice to say there are a lot of discussions and work that is ongoing right now in that area. But coalition warfare, where you build coalitions, it takes some time to iron out those sorts of procedures. And suffice to say that's what they're working on, you know, kind of as we speak now. There are seminars and meetings ongoing.

Q A couple of questions, actually. How much of a problem is attrition at the moment among the Iraqi police? And second question: You talked about advance training in the introduction. Could you give some idea of what that entails?

GEN. WOLFF: I'd rather talk about the Army first. I know a lot more about that so let me start with that. The reason this 30,000 initiative was put together was because as we were building the 10 Iraqi divisions, with the Iraqis, obviously, there was recognition that there was some attrition out of those formations. Now, what sort of attrition are we talking about? Soldiers that are wounded, soldiers that are killed, and then you have some soldiers that go AWOL. I mean, it's a volunteer army, and they just don't come back. So there was a recognition that we needed to go back in and add about 18,000 soldiers back into those formations.

And then, we also got the requirement to go -- from General Casey, to go back in and add about 12,000 more soldiers. So that gives you 30,000 total. The 12,000 represented the number required to bring their formations up to 110 percent strength. So, to go back and do that, then, we had to, with the Iraqis, look at the size of their training organizations, and we had to expand those a bit. So we went from the capability to train about 3,000 a quarter now to over -- about 12,000 a quarter. And so that extra capacity of about 8,500 has given the Iraqis the ability to start to address those shortages over a number of additional training cycles. And it will give them a little bit of breathing space, as well, to deal with any losses that they might incur associated with current combat operations. So, it was recognized that you needed to be able to do that.

I can't exactly address the number on police losses. But what I can tell you is there's an aggressive recruiting campaign that continues in most locations to continue to recruit policemen, and that's as simple as what has happened out at al Anbar, where they're working to recruit, you know, several thousand out there.

Q Have you identified the major cause of attrition?

GEN. WOLFF: Part of it has to do with the fact that it's a volunteer army, and so, you know, you get soldiers to come in, in many instances they were from a particular region and they would be sent to another region to operate in with a unit. And, you know, when you consider what an Iraqi soldier has to do as every month he gets paid once a month, he has to take that money home because there is no electronic banking system in the country, it makes it particularly difficult when a soldier is spending a fair bit of his money just trying to get back and forth to deliver the money to the family, if he's the principal breadwinner. So we knew that contributed a bit to it. Many of the Iraqi units work leave convoys now to get their soldiers back and forth safely. And so we think that distances contributed to some extent.

The other piece is, again, the Iraqi combat formations have gotten better, they're getting a lot more capable of caring for their soldiers, and we're seeing these AWOL numbers seem to be dropping.

Q About the economic side of President Bush's new plan, I know there's been some additional money that the Iraqi government has allocated toward reconstruction and revitalizing some industry in Iraq. How is -- what's the process through which local Iraqi leaders might apply for that money? I know it's primarily an Iraqi question, but I've posed it to some Iraqi politicians on the middle to lower local level, and it hasn't seemed to be conveyed to them yet how they can apply for that money and apply for some of their industrial projects that have fallen on disrepair to be eligible for some investment.

ADM. FOX: You know, I don't have the details of exactly how the Iraqi businessmen would be able to get that kind of money. I know that we can get those answers to you in terms of some of the experts that work these economic programs, but I don't have that information right here at my fingertips.

You guys have got to ask a question back there.

GEN. WOLFF: (Laughs.)

Q If I may just ask one more. You spoke a moment ago that one of the problems in connection with attrition was troops operating away from their home areas, as it happens when that's the case. In the light, then, of the use of troops from the Kurdish region for this new security operation in Baghdad -- and quite significantly so -- I think it's going to be quite dependent on I guess these ex-peshmerga followers taking part in this -- do you see that as a problem? Do you think that -- do you expect them all to arrive? Do you think that some may leave? How do you think they will perform, from what you know of them, particularly the extent to which you've been involved with them in training and so on?

GEN. WOLFF: I mean, I would -- I think they'll do very well. And I suspect that there will be a few that are -- you know, that don't make it down here as part of the deployment.

When we took a real hard look at this last fall after some of the challenges the Iraqi army had previously, both MNCI the corps took a good, hard look at why some of the units were challenged, and we did the same thing with the Iraqi senior leadership, and we convened a couple of study groups that took a look at this. And kind of what we found was that we had applied kind of an American deployability standard to the Iraqi army; in other words, we said, "Well, they're just like us." And so if we ask a battalion of the Iraqi forces under Iraqi control to deploy, there won't be any difficulties, will there? Well, what we found out is there will be some difficulties unless you have trained them to deploy.

And so, you know, the United States Army, the British army, other coalition armies are capable of deploying because they've built up that skill set over time, and, you know, the Iraqi army really hadn't. Half of the divisions were recruited, trained and are operating in the area in which they were recruited for. So if you draw one of those units or one of those brigades or battalions out of that area, you have to prepare that unit to deploy. And when we went back and took a look at it, we recognized we just hadn't done much to prepare them. So how has the leadership been trained to deploy? Has the senior leadership from the Iraqi military gone up there and talked to them and explained the nature of what they were going to be doing and how long they were going to be deployed for? As I've described to you, the Iraqi force -- you know, these soldiers know they have to get paid and then take the money home to their families. Are they going to be able to do that? So there were lots of questions in their minds that weren't being well-answered and taken care of. So we went back and investigated that and recognized there had to be a couple of aspects to deployment training that were pulled together. And so we've kind of applied some of those lessons learned to this, and the Iraqis have fully embraced this, because this was an Iraqi solution. And they sat down with us and said here's what we think we ought to do about it, and those have begun to be applied to these units that will be deploying down here.

Q And how they perform --

GEN. WOLFF: Sure. Exactly. And then the other piece that goes along with that is part of this four-phased effort was also to give them some training.

And we had to expand one of the training facilities, a place called Besmaya Range, to give it the capability to handle Iraqis that would rotate through there and do some additional training. It will -- many of these units deploying down in this first phase will probably not go to Besmaya, but -- because they don't have time right now. But they've done home station training in lieu of that, and some of the subsequent units we anticipate to go out to Besmaya and be able to go through a whole series of live-fire training exercises that the Iraqis would run with their MiTTs, who would be helping them do this.

So it's more than just telling someone you're going to deploy. How are you making them successful, to kind of summarize.

Q How much training do you think the peshmerga will need? And how long do you think it will take? And when do you think they'll get here?

GEN. WOLFF: My first comment is they're Iraqi army units. That's probably most important. These are Iraqi army units, and this is a national institution. So we kind of think of it that way.

They're training up in their organic unit area. I mean, they've known in advance that they were coming down here, which was another one of our lessons learned -- how much lead time do you give these units before they're told and, you know, given a directive from the Joint Headquarters or the ground forces that they're coming. So we tried to increase that, so they could do some -- you know, some home station training. So these units have done it. They've been doing a bit of home station training, preparing to come down here, before they actually get the order that says: Now deploy to Baghdad as part of this effort.

Q When will they arrive?

GEN. WOLFF: Well, some of them are arriving. Some of the units have arrived. I mean, there are several units over time that were -- I'll give you an example of one particular battalion that was used as a failure last time. Well, in effect, this unit -- and I won't give you the designation; it was a battalion -- it got down here with a little less than 50 percent of its strength. And everyone described it as a failure. Well, the chain of command was intact. It had all its company commanders and its principal organization. And so then the Iraqi Joint Headquarters said: Well, we'll just add some more people to it coming out of the training base. And so as they had some graduates come out of the training base, then they sent them to this unit. They were incorporated into the battalion. The training continued, and at the time it was effectively employed up north of Baghdad. And you never hear about it. It was labeled as a failure, but it's doing exceptionally well. I mean, it has come back around, and it has been in its battlespace for about three months now -- a success story.

Another example about these sorts of units and challenges:

There was a tank company in the 9th Division that fought out in Ramadi all summer, went out there in early June. And that unit was made successful because the division commander basically went up and talked to the soldiers, as did the remainder of the leaders. And they had a rotation plan to make sure that they rotated a company -- a tank company out there every month, so that they could bring the soldiers back, give them some rest and some recovery, get them paid, and allow them to take their salary home to their families. And that was a good example of another commander -- again, we talked about leadership when we started here -- orchestrating all of this for success.

So they're getting several weeks of training up at home station, and then as they get down here, they can do some additional training based on the battlespace that they'll be occupying, as it's worked with the units that will be responsible for them.

ADM. FOX: What we're seeing here right now is, we're in the midst of a transition from the initial training and equipping phase into a partnering phase, and ultimately with the goal of the Iraqi army's capability to deploy and to conduct autonomous operations and control their own battlespace.

And you see that throughout. We're at the 50 percent point right now in terms of the number of Iraqi divisions that are actually under Iraqi command and control.

So this year is a transition year, and to go from, you know, essentially ground zero, and now work our way to the point where by the end of this year they'll be in full independent and autonomous operations in support of the government, that's what our focus is right now, is to accelerate that transition and put the Iraqi face on this in support of the national unity government.

GEN. WOLFF: I would add one other piece. I mean, I do a lot of work with their training institutions, and they have a number of training centers and schools all over the country. Virtually all of them are under Iraqi control. They are training their own soldiers, they are training their leaders. They just graduated over 600 cadets from the three military academies, one at Rustamiyah down in south Baghdad; one up at Zakho, which is up in the north; and one at Qualachulon, which is also in the northeast. Those young officers, those 600 officers, are now all scheduled for basic courses that the Iraqis asked to be put together, and they're part of all that. So they'll go off to their officer basic courses, and then that's the next step in their leader development.

But this training is all being run by Iraqis. And so the basic training they're putting their soldiers through at the seven different training locations, run by Iraqis, resourced by Iraqis, and it's Iraqis training Iraqis; it's Iraqi cadre. So we do have some training advisers there that have helped over time and, you know, they'll work with them as appropriate. But coalition soldiers are not training Iraqis in any of their training institutions; they are training themselves. So that transition is well down the path. Logistically a lot of that is happening.

There are several regional support units that have regional logistical responsibility for these tactical units. Those are all commanded by Iraqi colonels or Iraqi brigadiers, and they have logistical responsibility for providing that sort of support for the Iraqi fighting units. So a lot of that is kind of behind the scenes and doesn't get the attention of Baghdad security or the frontline fighting forces, and appropriately so. But it's the backbone in which this army and this military will be able to sustain itself over time. Q I don't know if you're able to speak much about the police training, but I'm curious -- getting back to earlier -- advanced training for police, what sort of things are we talking about?

GEN. WOLFF: Yeah, I can just topically talk about the national police retraining which has been going on. We're up to the third national police brigade which is in training now, and that's happening down at one of the training centers. And it's about a month-long training period. The unit is pulled out of the line, it is sent down there, it's put through a month-long program of instruction. As I said before, the leaders are revetted, and they run through the whole series of normal police skills, everything from leader training to searches and seizures to, you know combat operations -- the sort of thing they would see up here when committed.

Then the unit is brought back up, and they are reinserted back in the line.

Q Is there sort of a training -- I don't know, forensic or more scientific sort of things, or something of that nature?

GEN. WOLFF: That's done by -- as I understand, done by others in the MOI. So it's not exactly what they're required to do. So there's some other folks who do some of the forensic work for them.

Q Thank you.

There are some Iranian citizens -- this is kind of changing gears, forgive me -- some Iranian citizens who were detained in Northern Iraq by U.S. forces, allegedly for interfering with the situation in Iraq. And some Iraqi officials have called for their release. Does the U.S. have any plans to abide by the wishes of the Iraqi government and release those Iranian citizens?

ADM. FOX: The situation in Northern Iraq with the Iranian detainees is still under investigation, and we are still assessing and getting the feedback from the information that we've gotten, both in terms of material evidence and also detentions. Our view has been -- and the reason that they were rolled up, or because they were detained, was because they were connected with -- or the assessment was that there was -- they were connected with networks that were smuggling weapons into Iraq, attempting to undermine the stability of the government of Iraq, and ultimately targeting coalition forces. And so the decision was made to detain them, and they remain in detention, and their status will be clarified upon later judgments.

Q Just as a follow-up to that, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, in an interview with the BBC today, has said, and I quote, "These raids" -- the two raids, the one in the North, and also the two Iranians who were picked up here earlier -- he said these actions were incorrect, regardless of Iran's position, and he called them "an attack on Iraq's sovereignty." What would you say in response to that?

ADM. FOX: I think that I would let the government of Iraq itself speak to that. But the sovereignty issue for the government of Iraq is one that means that neighbors don't interfere or meddle inside their neighbors' borders. And we have always felt that it has not been a useful thing for Iranian influence to be active inside the government -- inside the borders of Iraq. And in particular, if there are attempts to undermine or overthrow the legitimately elected government of Iraq, or target or attack the coalition, then the appropriate measures will be taken against that.

Q This is a purely practical question, if you will.

You spoke several times about the problems of Iraqi soldiers getting their pay back home to their families. Has it not been possible for, for example, the Finance Ministry to come up with a system by which that takes place in a credible way?

GEN. WOLFF: There's been discussion in military channels in the Ministry of Defense about an electronic pay system. So they're starting to explore that now. I mean, there's a recognition that you would rather not lose your folks who have to take their pay and travel home and lose them for that whole time. So there is recognition of a need to do something. So they're exploring it and trying to work their way through that.

ADM. FOX: I appreciate all of you being here today. It's good to have the opportunity to spend some time with you. As I said before, we will be coming out with a series of different subject matter experts in General Caldwell's absence, and we'll be making other opportunities available for you to talk about some of the other aspects of our plans and ensure that you're informed in those areas.

Thank you very much for your time here today.

END.