Lt. Gen Chiarelli media roundtable, Dec. 12, 2006
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Tuesday, 12 December 2006
ROUNDTABLE INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER CHIARELLI, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL CORPS IRAQ TOPIC: UPDATE ON OPERATIONS IN IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2006
GEN. CHIARELLI: Okay. Go ahead. Who's first?
I don't have an opening statement, except to just remind everybody I'm the operational commander -- not the strategic commander, the operational commander. And I guess that's it.
Q How about your statement a couple of days that you've done -- sorry. Jane Arraf, NBC. Your statement a couple of days ago that you've done everything you can militarily -- that was sort of astonishing to a lot of us. Does that mean -- it seems to mean you've really downgraded your expectations for where you can go with this, militarily. No?
GEN. CHIARELLI: No. Not at all. I think y'all know how I feel about this particular conflict. I think it is singularly unique to our history. I think there are basically five lines of operations, and those five lines of operation have to be worked all the time.
There's definitely a military line of operation. There's what we call the transitional line of operations, working with the Iraqi military. When I came back at the beginning of my second year, I made the comment that the thing that surprised me the most after being gone for about eight months was the tremendous achievements made by the Iraqi army. And I still feel that way. The Iraqi army is continuing to improve and get better every day.
I also believe that there's a reconstruction line of operation, an economics line of operation and a governance line of operation. And I think that all five of those have to be worked simultaneous -- not sequentially, but simultaneously.
I believe we've been working the military line of operation very, very hard, less so with some of the others. And I think they're going to have in fact mature over time if we're going to see the kind of progress we want to see here in Iraq.
So that's basically what I'm saying.
I know, because I concentrate all the time on what I call the non-kinetic lines -- you know, the governance piece, the economics piece -- that that in fact is what people look at a lot. But I think those are just absolutely critical.
As I mentioned the other day, we've got some pretty good data that indicates that if we could improve job satisfaction here in Baghdad by a small amount, it would have really, really a major impact on the sectarian violence we're seeing. And I'm less sure what that military line can add to what it hasn't already done. Now, there's no doubt about it; there are some bad folks out there that we have to find and we either have to kill or capture. But at the same time, I think -- and it's not just that I think this; it's the people that I talk to tell me that putting young men and middle-aged men to work would have a tremendous impact on this level of violence that we're seeing in and around Baghdad and also in the other provinces.
You know, I don't think the Marines have gotten enough credit for what they've done out in Al Anbar. We concentrate on the fight that's going on in Al Anbar, but there are lots of fantastic things going on that Rick Zilmer and his guys have brought on board that have given people out in Al Anbar a feeling that their life is getting better and could get a lot better. And it is in those economic lines of operation and what they've done in putting people back to work, what they've done to start to provide basic services to people who haven't had them for so long that has had a tremendous impact out there. So those are the areas that I think need to in fact start to mature here in the next year, and I think it'll have a tremendous impact on the security situation not only here in Baghdad but throughout the country.
Sir?
Q Staff Sergeant Baez (sp), AFN. Sir, with everything that you just said, what can you say about the changes that you have effected since you've been in country, sir?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, we seated a government after an election. I got here just after the election. I was here for the elections last year. I got to watch the elections. I was absolutely surprised, having been here in January of 2005 for the first election that we held in the country, to see the difference in the level of violence, particularly out in Al Anbar, to tell you the truth. I think we had one attack as I viewed the elections that day.
We seated a government. It took a little bit longer than any of us wanted -- most importantly, the Iraqis wanted, and certain things happened during that time period. We have been in a reaction mode in many ways to the events that occurred because of the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, and that began a cycle of sectarian violence that we've been working very, very, very hard to keep under control. And as I mentioned the other day, it is always hard to prove a negative.
But what I have to do as I talk to my soldiers each and every day not only here in Baghdad but throughout this entire country -- soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines -- is to talk to them about how much worse it might be if they had not done what they have done, if the Marines had not stopped working some of the economic improvements out in Al Anbar, if Randy Mixon and before him Tom Turner up north had not worked as hard as they did in Tall Afar and Mosul in the whole northern area, giving us an opportunity, as you saw us do for the Baghdad Security Plan, to move forces out of the north and, quite frankly, out of the west in order to provide them where we needed them to our main effort here in Baghdad.
There are -- and I know it's very hard for you to get out and see them -- there are some areas that you've all reported on before that used to be real trouble spots that have improved over time. Now, I'm not in any way happy with what I see in Baghdad. The level of violence is way too high. But I think there are some other things that have got to occur here in Baghdad and in Diyala and some of the other areas where we're having particular problems before we're going to see that level of violence go down, and it's not just all in the military line of operation.
Sir?
Q Nick Rollison (sp) from CNN. In reference to the sectarian nature of the violence you were just talking about, and thinking about this weekend in Hurriyah, the neighborhood on the north side of Baghdad where a number of Sunni families were forced out, they claim they called what they call "the U.S. Army" to come and help them. What is the position and policy now when there is this sectarian violence where it's Shi'a on Sunni, Sunni on Shi'a? What is the policy of the U.S. military now? Is it to get in between these two groups?
GEN. CHIARELLI: It's to go and stop the violence, and that's exactly what we do.
Q To get between --
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, I don't think saying "in between" is necessarily. Many times the mere presence of U.S. I can't think of too many times that we've gone out on a call like that where the mere presence of U.S. forces and coalition forces arriving on the scene hasn't put a clamp to it almost immediately. The two sides don't necessarily want to fight when that occurs. forces and coalition forces in an area stops the violence.
I will tell you that I know of no call that was made to U.S. forces in the Hurriyah area. I know Hurriyah is one of the areas we've been watching. I know that we, like every single one of these events that occurs, immediately dispatch forces, combined joint forces, many times U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, to those areas to try to find out exactly what's going on. And many times the reports you receive are just not the case. For about 18 hours we did not really think that anything had happened in Hurriyah. But I'm convinced now that something did. I do not believe it was to the scope that may have been initially reported and carried. But there is no doubt that that has been an area that we have been watching very, very closely because of some of the events that we've seen go on out there. But we respond, and normally our response is a calming factor and causes that to stop, many times without firing a single round.
Let's see, I'm supposed to go one side of the room, the other side of the room, if that's okay. Supposedly it allows you to set up or something. Q Hi, David -- (last name inaudible) -- from AFP. Following on from Nick's question in a way, would your successor benefit from having 30,000 extra troops, U.S. troops in Baghdad from outside of theater?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I'm not going to get into operational planning. That's something that General Odierno, but more importantly, General Casey and folks far above my pay grade are going to have to make a decision about.
As I indicated to you, I think that there is a lot that can be done along the other lines of operation that may have as great an effect. This work that we had done, this modeling, we have -- one thing we have here is we have unbelievable statistics, and if you give it to the right group of individuals, they can put it into a model and they can at least model out. Now, I don't understand it, I got to tell you. They write one of those articles that maybe some of you can read and understand, but I can't. But they feel good about it, and they feel very good about the data. And the data shows, just like I indicated. It's kind of amazing what the data shows. Not only did it show that job satisfaction is really, really critical, but one that I just didn't think would be as high is very, very critical, and that's the picking up of trash.
And those of you around here know how many times we've gone around trying to pick up trash. The problem is trying to get it picked up and leave it picked up. But it has a real effect on people.
The other thing it showed is that fuel is a very, very important thing, to be able to provide fuel. And it even eclipsed electricity, which surprised me. But I think that there's a general feeling out there, quite frankly -- everybody says to me the power in Baghdad can't be that bad, and quite frankly, I've asked that question too as I fly in at night and I see most of the city lit up, at least the lights outside and in the homes. I've often asked myself, you know, how could we only be getting seven hours of power if in fact this place is lit up like this? It must be getting the seven hours all at one time.
And in reality, when you get down to the neighborhoods, as many of you have, you see that entrepreneurship has taken over in many instances. You've got individuals who own generators. They've got them at the end of the street. They sell chits, and you can sign up for as many hours of power as you want based on how much you're willing to pay per day to have electricity to your home. So fuel has become important because I think people are turning to fuel and it equates to electricity because of the massive use of generators.
So it was really striking to us what we call these SWET things -- sewage, water, electricity, trash, employment -- the impact that it has on people's lives and, at least what these professionals tell us, the impact that it would have on the level of violence.
I've always believed that, not because I was born with that embedded in my brain, but it's when you go out and talk to Iraqis and ask them what they want fixed in their neighborhoods. And I will tell you, I've said it time and time again, you go talk to the governors, and every time they'll tell you, "Take the angry young men off the street."
Yes, sir?
Q Thank you. Larry Kaplow with Cox Newspapers. Related also to Nick's question. When you hear people in the states, like commentators talking and regular folks, the impression they seem to have is they say there is a sectarian conflict going on here and U.S. soldiers are getting shot from both sides in the middle. But I was, like, on an embed in Taji last month, they were dealing with the sectarian thing and the Sunni problem, and they said by far the much greater threat was on the same old Sunni insurgency. It seems like the casualty reports we see are overwhelmingly from that side of it.
I wonder if you could say -- somehow try to put a percentage on casualties that come from the Sunni insurgency and what kind of threat you actually do face trying to tamp down the sectarian conflict. I mean, do you get shot at from both sides or do you actually not get shot at very much at all in those situations?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I think your observation validates the point I made earlier. Normally in these sectarian type of events, where it's Sunni against Shi'a, one group against another group, the mere presence of American forces, the coalition forces, has an impact, and normally it stops immediately. So many of these killings are individuals or small groups of individuals who go out and terrorize people. And it's just absolutely horrible to see.
And I think it is really an unfair characterization of the issues over here to write home to Americans that it's the sectarian conflict that is seeing -- the violence that is occurring against our forces. Again I say that those things that are purely sectarian, normally our mere presence, the mere presence of coalition forces causes them to stop, at least as long as we're there.
I don't agree with this concept that it's only Sunni insurgents that are killing coalition forces. The militias have a hand in this, and there's no doubt in my mind. I can't get into the details on why I know that, but there's no doubt in my mind that if you say we're getting it from both sides -- some of the Shi'a militias and some of the Sunni insurgents, if that's how you characterize them, and al Qaeda are involved in the killing of coalition forces. And to, in any way, try to indicate that that is only happening by one of those groups, I just don't buy that, and I know that's not the case.
Okay, I'll come back to you, ma'am.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Sabrina Tavernise, New York Times. Taking the mere presence fact, what then is the best use of U.S. troops in Baghdad? Do the neighborhood patrols -- are the neighborhood -- do the neighborhood patrols then -- are they useful, do they make sense? Was that something that you found as a very good and valuable use of U.S. troops in the city of Baghdad? What's been your experience over the past, you know, year that you've been here? How should U.S. troops be used in this city?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Exactly. (Laughs.) You answered your own question. When we're out and about, we don't do presence patrols, we don't just go out there to be present, we go out there with a task purpose every single time that we go out to do anything.
But when we're out on the street, when we're out talking to people, taking a look at conditions on the street -- I was in Amiriyah not too long ago, had an opportunity to stop at a couple of locations and talk to some folks and get their feeling for what was going on. And I know that many of you who haven't been out there find this hard to believe -- in many of those cleared areas that we have out there, life is going on normally for this city. People are out about, walking around; markets are open, fruit stands are open, and commerce is bustling.
At the same time, it's not a life that any one of use would want to live, being in a -- what we call kind of almost a gated community where, you know, you don't have the ability to get out around the rest of your city and enjoy some of the things that are here in Baghdad. We would all like that to change because, you know, I can imagine this city is a very beautiful city with a lot to offer, as many of you, I know, also believe. But the presence of coalition forces, along with Iraqi security forces -- and we try to do everything we possibly can to ensure that those patrols that we're out on are combined joint patrols consisting of Iraqi army, Iraqi police, Iraqi national police along with us as we go about -- and it has a tremendous effect, a tremendous calming effect out there, as I mentioned before.
Yes, sir?
Q Thank you. Philip Siskind (sp) from the Wall Street Journal. Sir, I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the ability or the willingness of the Iraqi government to take on the militias, particularly the Shi'ite militias. Do you believe the government has tried in good faith to tame down those militias?
Thank you.
GEN. CHIARELLI: I have to believe that the government is moving toward doing exactly that. And I have trust in the prime minister and that he is moving in a direction that we are going to in fact begin to see some advances made on these militia groups. I think he's been clear in the statements that he does not believe any armed groups should be in a position to challenge Iraqi security forces, and I have all the trust and confidence in the world that this will move ahead.
It is a political issue now. They are a sovereign government. They need to put in place some of the things that will allow that to happen, and I honestly believe that the prime minister is moving in that direction.
Okay. We'll break the rules and we'll stay on this side for two questions. (Laughter.)
Q Thank you. Eva Durick (sp), Fox News. I'm just going to do a follow-up on the previous question. What would you say is the U.S. military's role in dismantling or dealing with militias? You are saying it's -- the prime minister stands firm. How you see it? How -- what is U.S. military doing on this front?
Thank you.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, I hope to see a reintegration plan before too long. I happen to believe there are many, many members of the militia -- I've had it happen before; I had it happen twice in 2004 -- who do not want to be members of the militia. And I just really think that anything you could do to explain to the American people and the people of the world how interconnected this conflict is, how absolutely critical it is that people get work, because if people get work, you know, honest work, they don't have to join militias in order to provide for their families. And I hope to see a reintegration plan of some kind kick off that's got some money behind it, that allows us, through vocational training and also to work much of the infrastructure work that needs to be done in this city and other cities throughout Iraq, begin to employ people. I see that reintegration program as something that could give people skills, lifetime skills.
And God knows there's plenty of work to be done rebuilding this country. I think the United Nations said it was a $60 billion bill. When you take the 18.4 (billion dollars) that we put against it, when you back off the money that was taken off for security and you back off some that went into oil infrastructure, we really only paid a down payment on that infrastructure bill, and some of it is, I think, worse than the original 60 billion (dollars) that the United Nations indicated needed to be spent to try to bring that up. So I think if we can create the conditions that allow over time that to occur, I think you'll start to see the militias get a lot smaller.
And then there will be probably -- at the end of this, there will probably be a group that in fact no amount of reintegration, no amount of reconstruction, no amount of anything, are kind of irreconcilables, and there will be probably be a role that we and the -- particularly backing up Iraqi security forces will have to take to once and for all hopefully get rid of this challenge to the democratic state of Iraq.
Yes, sir.
Q Corey Flintoff, NPR. You mentioned earlier that some of the areas cleared during Together Forward, that life is returning to normal, although we see -- it doesn't seem to be the case in neighborhoods like al-Dura, which was one of the first places that Together Forward went. Can you tell us where life really is returning to normal in Baghdad?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, you know, even if you go down into al- Dura, you'll find that a lot of the markets are opened up. Al-Dura is one of the areas -- we call it Masafi, that particular portion. I was just talking to the Brigade 3 who has responsibility for that area down there, and he indicates that there's a group of people that either have come into that neighborhood and getting into that neighborhood or trying to prove that Iraqi security forces can't give the people security. But we meet them. We do what we have to, as do the Iraqi security forces do what they have to, and I have to believe over time that will continue to get better and better, and we will see life return even more to normal in those areas.
There are -- Amiriyah is one that again, I was in the other day, that I could tell you it's about as normal as it's going to get. We have good days and bad days in Ghazalia and Shula. Adhamiya -- I'm very anxious for a big electrical project we got ready to get kicked off over there that's going to employ a lot of folks and also bring hopefully some amount of electricity to that area.
When I was in Adhamiya, that was the number-one complaint that they had. Every area you go into is a little bit different.
We were very, very happy the other day that the minister of Finance opened up the bank in Amiriyah. You just wouldn't -- I know it's -- it sounds like such a small thing, with all the heavy issues that you see every day, but you wouldn't have believed the impact that the opening of that bank had on that community, that people had a place they could go. And quite frankly, it was kind of amazing to us. We expected the money to be leaving the bank as people went to pull money out, but the exact opposite was true. People were putting money into the bank, and it was a sign of normality. So life was kind of returning to -- so that they could leave their house and go to the bank, if they wanted to go to the bank.
I know that many Americans don't even believe that banks are used over here, but we've found that in many of the cleared areas, that's the number-one thing people have been asking, is they have an opportunity to have their bank opened back up.
Q General, Cesar Soriano, USA Today. Following up on this gentleman's question, it's been six months since Operation Together Forward was first launched, and since then we've only seen the attacks increase. And the Iraq Study Group called it, quote, "disheartening" -- the operations to secure Baghdad.
Why have military operations not been successful in reducing the violence? And what can be done militarily?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I just get this feeling that the whole world believes that somehow the military -- I think that the president has said it; I think the Iraq Study Group said it, if not on the first page, on the second page of their report -- they indicated that this problem will not be solved by the military alone.
And I know everybody wants us to charge on out there and make everything okay, but you cannot if you don't get these other things moving. And I don't know why it's so hard to get people to understand that.
You know, maybe this is a bad analogy, and I'll probably get in trouble for using it. But after Katrina, if all we had done is send in the National Guard, okay, to provide security, and done nothing else, what would New Orleans be like today? What would Mississippi be like today? I tell you, they wouldn't be the way they are right now. If all we'd done is send in the National Guard and security, and stopped whatever there, and not provided people something to show them that their life was going to get better, that they were going to rise up from this horrible calamity that happened, I don't think that you would see the kinds of good things you see going on in the New Orleans area, Louisiana area and the Mississippi Gulf Coast area. I think it's absolutely essential. And that's been a hard thing for us to get started.
I also get frustrated at times that everybody compares this to other conflicts that we have fought, like somehow there is a defined enemy out there, a group of individuals; that if you could just go out and either, you know, kill, capture, put in jail, do whatever, that everything would be all right. And I don't believe that. I don't believe that. I believe that you have got to go out and give people a reason, okay, not to how to either militias or AQI preying on them, offering them money and other things, in order to be part of it. And I think it's absolutely essential that we give them alternatives, and that's what I've been trying to stress. And I think what I've read the Iraq Study Group -- they tried to say some of the same things.
STAFF: Megan.
Q Megan McCloskey, Stars and Stripes. What's your perspective on both the incoming secretary of Defense and the Iraq Study Group saying that the war is not being won?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, I gave my answer the other day. You know, that I'm the operational commander, and from where I sit, in military operations, the kind that you report, we have not lost the battle nor will we lose the battle. We have certain strategic goals that General Casey has laid out, and I think he'd be the first to tell you that we are making progress on those strategic goals, but none of us would make the claim that it's going as fast as we want it to go. It just isn't. It's a very, very difficult problem set. It's so complicated.
I mean, my ability to move the Iraqi army along is dependent upon my -- General Casey's ability to -- and the government's ability to become a functioning government that can provide for its military. We are the best fighting force in the world. But there are a lot of folks who can fight. Besides being extremely lethal and extremely good fighting force, the best in the world, we are supported. We have logistics that are provided to us to ensure that we can do what we have to do.
We get an American -- we get a coalition soldier and an Iraqi soldier off the battlefield, the standard is, one hour from time of injury anywhere in Iraq till he's at a Level 3 medical facility where he can be cared for. That's not easy. But that's why coalition soldiers fight out here, because they know that they're going to be taken care of. And that's increasingly why Iraqi soldiers fight out here, because they know they're going to be taken care of if, in fact, they're injured. That is a capability that Iraq, maybe not to the standard that I've laid out that the coalition has, but that is a standard -- that is a requirement that the Iraqi government is going to have to put in place or they're going to have to rely on us until they can. And there's a lot of work to be done in that area.
We can go ahead and build the capability in a great national depot at Taji that can hold all the supplies to take care of this force. We can get trucks that can move it all over Iraq. But there's got to be supplies up there, there's got to be a way to order parts for the new humvees that are coming in, there's got to be food contracts and contracts to take care of things out in forward operating bases, life support issues. Those things all have to be built and the capability has to be built inside the Iraqi government to provide that for its soldiers. And that is, in fact, a difficult thing and one of the things that we're working very, very hard on. The ministerial capacity thing is huge.
Nancy? Not only to go to the same side, but somebody sitting next to somebody else. So, broke all the rules. Q Thank you. Nancy Youssef with McClatchy Newspapers. I had a training question for you to follow up on what you were just saying. How do you craft a training program that teaches Iraqi army and policemen to successfully take on insurgents and militias and the like, given the difficulties that U.S. officials have had in battling those elements?
GEN. CHIARELLI: How do you create a training program for the Iraqis?
Q Yes, that teaches them sort of how to battle insurgents and to battle militias, given our own difficulties in coming up with programs to suppress those elements?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, one of the things that Iraqis don't have to spend a lot of time studying that I wish we could spend even more time studying is culture and language. They come by it naturally, and that's one of the reasons why they're so effective when we can get them into the neighborhoods. They automatically speak the language and automatically understand the culture and understand the do's and don'ts of that culture. And I think that I've made it clear many times that I think that's something that we need to work as hard as we possibly can.
General Casey's done us all a tremendous -- given us tremendous benefit in the two schools that he's established up in Taji that all our leaders go through, either when they come over here for their reconnaissance or what we call the PDSS, reconnaissance prior to being deployed over here. And then also before they actually go in to a particular sector, we bring them up there for a period to go over many of those kinds of things, key and critical pieces for counterinsurgency.
We've got a -- Marty Dempsey and, before him, Dave Petraeus, have just done a marvelous job putting together a series of training schools to train Iraqi forces and bring them on board and ensure that they get some of the same kind of training we do when it comes to how to use their weapon systems and how to fight.
And I think it's proven to be very, very valuable. The Iraqi army acquits itself extremely well on the battlefield every single day. So I think most of that is in place.
For us, we have to continue to stress those two things, I think, that are really essential is whatever language training we can get our young soldiers that are out on the street. I will tell you that when I left with the 1st Calvary Division, I was a little closer to soldiers at that time, and I had AARs run, after action reviews run with all my senior sergeants and platoon leaders and company commanders. And they went and spent 72 hours and basically told us that -- what we were trying to do is to get ready for the next time when we had to come back, if we had to come back, and said, hey, how would have trained -- after doing this for 11 months, what are the things that you would have in fact done more of? And it was hands down the two things were language training, not from the standpoint of speaking fluent Arabic, but coming over here understanding basically some of the phrases, common phrases that they needed to have down on the street on a daily basis the first day they got here, rather than after three months, after they learn them through the school of hard knocks. And the next thing -- and this really surprised me, because I'd really pushed it before we came over because I'd been told how critical it was, was cultural awareness training, understanding that the culture over here is totally different and you'd better understand that. It makes all the difference in the world.
Sir?
Q General, thanks.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Oh, man. You're next, sir.
Q Aaron Katursky with ABC. Understanding your thoughts about the limits of the military here, do you foresee a day when U.S., coalition forces will just have to go into Sadr City and take out Muqtada Sadr? And can you give us your sense of the level and limits of his influence on affairs here?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I spent a lot of time in Sadr City. U.S. forces go into Sadr City now; coalition forces go into Sadr City now; Iraqi forces go into Sadr City now. Again, my hope is that the prime minister is successful in putting together a reintegration plan that hopefully will make it so that we don't have to do what we had to do in April of 2004 or, again, in August, September and October of 2004. I don't think any of us want that to happen. I know the residents of Sadr City don't want that to happen. And I think the prime minister is moving along a road that, hopefully, will make that something we don't have to do.
I think it's fair to say -- I won't single out any single militia, I'll say that militias have made inroads in this country and have posed, in some instances, a threat to Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi populace as a whole. And I think the prime minister has been steadfast in saying that that's something that the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government is just not, over the long run, going to be able to allow to occur. There can only be one group of individuals responsible for the security of Iraq, and that has to be the duly constituted Iraqi security forces.
Sir?
Q Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post. You just talked about how hard the enemy is to define. And I was just wondering -- and, you know, we've also been hearing quite a bit about how much of a cat and mouse game it is around Baghdad when you're dealing with insurgents, militias, and so on. And increasingly it's become an outright guerrilla war where snipers are being used and all sorts of really, you know, urban warfare tactics.
My question is, do you feel that U.S. troops, as well as Iraqi troops, are prepared to fight such a war that's literally becoming, you know, a battle block by block, neighborhood by neighborhood? I mean, are they adequately trained? And I guess the second part of that question is, will more troops make a difference in such an environment like this?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I really believe we're well-trained for the task at hand. There are certain areas that we could always be better trained at. I thought that Greg Jaffe's article was excellent yesterday. You -- it was in the Wall Street Journal. He talked about some of this. You know, he indicated that -- my primary responsibility as a leader is to ensure that I deploy forces that can fight, that is what you pay me for, and that's what I've spent 34 years of my life doing.
This conflict is so complicated that now we have to start talking about things like cultural awareness and language training. Now, do we say that because we just want to be -- come over and kind of cast away the stereotype of an American that doesn't care about somebody else's culture? Not at all. We do that because it means force protection. It means force protection. These things mean force protection. It means that coalition soldiers are not fired at, shot at, or have IEDs go off on them when they can go into an area -- or they have less -- when they can go into an area and are viewed by the people as being somebody that people want to see in their neighborhood because they acquit themselves the way they're supposed to in this culture. And I always wish -- I don't think you can get too much of that. And it's hard to take a young American or coalition member from any other culture and bring him in here and teach him some of the things that are absolutely essential in order to act in the way that I laid out to you, so that he doesn't create more problems for himself, or herself, than he solves with their presence in an area.
So those things are essential. But there's no doubt in my mind that the soldiers that -- sailors, airmen, Marines that we're sending over here are trained for the fight that they're in. Is it tough? Yeah, it's really tough. It's very tough. I mean, I grew up in an Army where we fought battles at NTC, and many of you have been there where we were training, you know. And you had a line that was drawn somewhere in the desert, and the good guys were on one side and the bad guys were on the other side, and the good guys attacked into the bad guys, and once you got the bad guys down to a certain percentage, they left; or if they got you down, you left. And everything was wonderful.
And I still believe that that's the way many Americans think this fight is. And I find it just absolutely frustrating. I don't even necessarily believe the Vietnam comparisons are right. I mean, some of you -- well, maybe not in here, but maybe some of you covered Vietnam and know that in Vietnam -- I've read of battles where you had companies, battalions, brigades, divisions' worth of North Vietnamese Army soldiers who attacked U.S. soldiers in that fight. We don't see that out here. We see Baghdad, a city of anywhere from 5.5 to 7.5 million people crammed into an area that -- you know, I mean, you have 2.5 million people alone is the number that we think you have in Sadr City, where no one's wearing a uniform, at least we haven't seen any lately. Very, very difficult to pick out who's for you and who's against you. And it's an extremely difficult fight. And I don't believe there's a defined group of individuals out there that all of a sudden that there's a military solution that if you get to it you can -- the fight's over with. I just don't believe that.
And I believe these other things, like I've mentioned before -- I know I sound like a broken record -- are just absolutely critical to, first, defining the problem, finding out who those folks are that, no matter what, they're going to continue this conflict, okay? And second of all, making people feel that, hey, my life's going to get better.
And one thing that I've learned about the Iraqi people is they are so optimistic. They really, really believe that things are going to get better. And if we can show them -- we don't have to drive unemployment down to 4 percent, like it is in the United States. That's not what I'm talking about. We don't have to get 24 hours of power in Baghdad. If we can increase the power in Baghdad back to 12 hours a day, it would be huge -- in fact, I've heard comments from Iraqis when we've had good days and power's been up to nine, 10 hours -- and then continue to build on those successes, I think you would see things here change in ways that are hard to believe right now when you see the level of violence out there, when you see people have something else to look forward to and can take care of their families and neighbors and everyone else.
Q So in this environment, do you think more troops, if we increase troops here, would that make a difference?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I'm not going to go there. I'm going to let General Casey and everyone who's looking at plans and looking at different options make a determination on that. I go back to the piece that I told you a little bit earlier. I will tell you, every time that I've asked for additional forces, I have received the forces I've asked for. I've said that before and I'll say it again. But, you know, I think it should be clear by my comments that I don't necessarily believe that additional forces is the answer to every problem you have over here.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Hello. I'm Liz Sly with the Chicago Tribune. You said that the Sunni insurgency is not solely responsible for all the coalition deaths that are occurring, that the militias also have a hand in this. Can you give us some sense of, like, what proportions you see being Sunni insurgency versus militia? Is this something that's been constant over time? Are you seeing militias playing a greater role? Is the fact that coalition casualties have been -- seem to have been ticking up in recent months, does that reflect that sort of maybe a new group's got involved or a new side has got involved? I wondered if there are some dynamics on that, some sense of what's going on.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Yeah, it would be unfair for me and I think it would be unfair for anybody to be able to go out and be able to indicate that they can know with any kind of certainty or I could put a percentage on it, on, you know, what percentage of our casualties occur because of the actions of any particular group or group of individuals. It's just impossible to do that. We do not have that kind of fidelity.
But I can say with certainty that there are coalition deaths that occur that are conducted by just about every one of the groups that you see out there and that you report on. And it is not solely Sunni insurgent terrorist groups or al Qaeda that is causing coalition casualties and fatalities. But I will not put a percentage on it. I think that's --
Q Is this something that's changed or just evolved over time? I mean, would you have said that with the same certainty a year or two years ago? And have different groups piled in?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Nothing stays the same over here. Nothing stays the same over here. What I try to tell every single new soldier who comes -- the very first thing I do when I go up to the Phoenix academy to talk to leaders that are coming in here is I ask -- when I see soldiers, I ask them to raise their hand, new soldiers and new units coming in, "How many people have been here before?" And the ones who raise their hand, I look them straight in the eye and I say, "You're the ones I've got -- you've got to listen to me. Don't come over here thinking that things are exactly the way they were when you left here, because they are not. They change, and they will change in the period that you are here." I will be absolutely out of touch with what's going on here a week after leaving here. I know that. Because things change that rapidly here. This is an enemy who thinks, learns and acts, and you've got to ensure that you are on top of your game all the time out there. It changes.
Yes, sir?
Q (Name inaudible), ABC. The Iraqi officials as well as some Iraqi military commanders have constantly said on Iraqi media that the reason that we're unable to tackle the issue with militias and to have control over the security situation is simply because we are not allowed to do so; second of all, because we are not properly equipped.
First of all, do you think this is a true statement, that they are not properly equipped? And second of all, is the coalition willing to equip the military, the Iraqi military and security forces, before the actual Iraqi government tackles the issue of insurgency and cleaning both ministries of infiltration by the Iraqi insurgency?
GEN. CHIARELLI: First of all, we continue to equip the Iraqi army and the Iraqi army continues to equip itself. I mean, that is something that is ongoing, a monumental task in building an army this size over this short period of time, in bringing it up both to a level of training and equipped to the level that it needs to fight this kind of fight. But I think you're seeing on a daily basis there are, as there is with the distribution of any new set of equipment, you never can issue it all to everybody -- when you're talking about the numbers we're talking -- to everybody at the same time. So you're going to run into folks who are still waiting for some of that. We prioritize that equipment, as does the Iraqi government prioritize that equipment. But they are being equipped and they will continue to be equipped, and they will be better and better equipped every single day, every single month and as time goes on.
So I think that that's something that I've seen improve tremendously in the time that I've been here.
I think some of the things that I'm concerned about is making sure we have the logistics base, which is -- I know it's not something that many of you write about a lot, but which is absolutely essential to any army; that once you get that new equipment, you've got to have the systems in place to provide the parts -- spare parts and the trained technicians to take care of that equipment.
And that's a daunting task that takes time.
(Pause.) Well, I guess we've -- oh.
STAFF: I don't think -- (laughter). We have more.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Yes, sir?
Q Ned Parker with The London Times. I'm wondering, on the whole issue of the army, it seems to me, just from speaking with different army officers, that there is, beyond the question of infiltration or not enough troops, it's from both sides, Shi'a and Sunni, within the government or political parties or members of political parties that are associated with the government -- wherever an operation is done, someone will call up, even field commanders, and say, "Why did you do this operation?" And even there will be movements within the ministry to remove officers on the ground. And that's coming from both sides. And I was just curious about your thoughts on this problem and what should be done and how that affects the ability to raise a strong and effective army.
GEN. CHIARELLI: I think when you have some of the sectarian divisions that we have right now, that some of the kinds of things that you're talking about are definitely things that you have to watch out for. And I know it's something that we're looking out for and I know that the minister of Defense is looking out for, who I happen to believe is a wonderful man, a good friend, a former army officer, who did a wonderful job as the commander of the Iraqi Ground Force Command.
And -- but some of the kinds of pressures that you've outlined are no doubt out there. And it's something that has to be watched all the time. And I know he is, and trying to ensure that they do not negatively react on his force as he continues to build it.
Yes, sir?
Q Hi. Dave Buck (sp) again. You've spoken a lot about your successes with the Iraqi army, but we've heard less today so far about the Iraqi police, facilities protection services, border guards, peshmerga. There are a lot of forces in between the army and the militias of varying degrees of quality. They're often implicated in -- with the Health Ministry, force protection services, various Oil Ministry guards have been accused of corruption, and you hear about violence in many other units. You could you speak a bit about what happened in the Year of the Police?
GEN. CHIARELLI: The Year of the Police is going to take us longer than we thought it was going to take us.
Q Longer than a year?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Yeah, it's going to -- and one of the things that the Year of the Police allowed us to do is it allowed us to get the police training teams down into the individual police stations and realize that it was something that -- we were not aware that the state of training and in some instances militia influence in the police was as high as it was.
Now, again, hats off to the minister of Interior. This minister of Interior is definitely focused on working some of the issues that you're talking about. We have his full support. In fact, he's been very much a part of helping us put together the training program for the national police that we're running down in Numaniyah. We have the first brigade that has gone through that training program and been equipped with the new uniform and is currently on the street in Baghdad, doing to date a very, very good job.
But that is an area that we had to -- in fact to work, and I think it's been reported that we had some issues early on in the Baghdad security plan, this particular phase of the -- for one of the national police units. The minister reacted exactly like we would hope that he would react, took them off the street immediately. That unit right now in fact is currently down in training down in Numaniyah.
And there will be a certain amount of vetting that will be done by the Iraqis, a validation of leaders. And some national police individuals will be vetted, and some probably won't have a job, depending on them taking a look at them to make sure that they're quality of individual that they want in their formations.
And that unit will come out, it will receive a training team. We've beefed up those training teams and made them larger so that when they go back into the Baghdad area -- most of the national police, I think you all know, now are in the Baghdad area -- so that when they go in, we continue that training process with them as they assume their duties on the street.
As you get down into the individual police stations, one of the great things that happened with the Baghdad security plan was being able to basically have a police training team for every single one. We are about one to one. We are one-to-one in all the stations that we have concerns about, where we've got a training team of anywhere from 12 to 14 to 16 individuals that are out with those police all day long, and they're helping to train them, make them better, and start to fix some of the issues that we first saw when we got into the police, in a very focused manner that the police training teams allowed us to do.
Again, this is a huge city. Consider doing this in Chicago. I mean, this is Chicago, when you're talking about population. I don't think it's quite the land mass. I think we've got a lot more people in a smaller area than Chicago -- I haven't checked that out. But that's the size we're talking about here. And any endeavor like that, where you've got some of the problems that we've got, are going to take a little bit longer than we thought to get to the point we want them to be at. But I think police are absolutely critical to this. We want to, as quickly as we can, like has happened in some places in Baghdad today, to turn over responsibility for security to the police, because that's the way the Iraqis want it, and that's the way it should be.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Jane Arraf, NBC. You know, a lot of the things you're talking about make perfect sense. And I remember you talking about them when you were here the first time around, and doing them: picking up the trash, creating jobs, all of that. Given that things are moving so quickly, as you know better than anyone, is there time for the things that you think need to be done that are military, given the situation here and the time that's running out?
GEN. CHIARELLI: I guess in a lot of ways that's up to you. I mean, you've got to help us in explaining that the size of the issues that we have here and the fact that they take time. This is what it is. Okay? And it's going to take however long it's going to take. And I can't tell you whether there's time. But I don't like any of the alternatives that I've seen. I just don't like them.
I happen to believe that we have tremendous strategic interests in what we're doing over here. I happen to believe this is the most important conflict that we've been involved in in the last 50 years. And I think it's absolutely essential that we give the Iraqis an opportunity to do exactly what they want to do, and that's to form their kind of democratic government here in Iraq. And no matter what we say back home, it's going to take time.
I hope we can start to focus with the new government, as it continues to get its legs underneath it, I hope it will start to focus on some of the things that I'm talking about that I think will have as great an impact as, say, increasing the number of soldiers we have over here. I think that if you start to work some of those things and start to spend the same amounts of money into doing some of those other non-kinetic things I was talking about, you might be surprised that it has a greater effect on the security situation than, say, spending that same amount of money on security forces at some particular point, wherever that point might be. Not to say that the current initiatives that are going on aren't well-founded, they are well-founded. But there will come a time when you're going to have to look at how can we take that money that we've got -- and we know that there is money -- and use it for capital spending.
There hasn't been a lot of capital spending done by the Iraqis in the last year. There's -- budget execution isn't exactly I know where they want it to be -- much less than perfect, and so much of that budget execution has gone to the paying of salaries and not necessarily in the areas of capital investment. And we all know that in any society, capital investment is absolutely critical for doing some of the things that I'm talking about doing and that they are talking about doing. Those things are absolutely essential.
So however long it takes, that's how long it's going to take. And I think there are ways we could speed it up, but I think it's first an understanding by everyone that these things are critical to the level of security and lowering the levels of violence you have in the country. I just don't understand how anybody can argue with the fact that a man or a woman is much less likely to want to join a militia if they have a job to go to every day and can provide for their family in a manner that doesn't put their life at risk every single day.
Q Is anyone arguing?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Huh?
Q Who's arguing?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, I find that many times that we seem to be totally focused on the military solution to this, like somehow it will be the thing that will win this. It is a contributor, a huge contributor -- and please don't get me wrong -- but there are other things that are important.
I am really pleased with Paul Brinkley and the group that he's brought over here. He's found a way to harness American brainpower, human capital in appealing to many of the large companies in the United States for assistance in sending folks over here that can help Iraqi factories that have been neglected for 30, 40 years improve and become more -- not only productive but to hire more individuals. He's shown us ways that, for a very small amount of investment, we can put a very large number of jobs in place, long-lasting jobs that will produce goods and services that are wanted by people in Iraq and outside of Iraq. It's been one of the most exciting things that I've seen happen over here, and it's only been going on for about three months. I had dinner with a few of the folks that he brought over the other day that have spent their life in manufacturing, and they were able to walk into a linen factory here in Baghdad and basically within about a four-hour period lay out a work plan for them and an investment plan for them that would see their productivity go up exponentially and add -- in 10 industries, he showed me how they could quickly add 13,000 jobs in and around Baghdad. Well, you get that kind of thing going through a community, you get that kind of an individual here, someone who's proven himself -- I think the real power of our country isn't -- I mean, our military is a wonderful thing and it is definitely something that we all should be proud of and it is an element of American power -- but, you know, besides wanting to have a military like ours, I think that one of the things that intrigues people about the coalition nations and the United States is our economic power. And why not bring some of those real experts in here to take a look at those kinds of things and maybe make up for some of the shortages we've got in the interagency to assist us in trying to find a jump-start and do exactly what you talk about, Jane, and move this thing faster along.
I would like to see similar things in other areas. I mean, those of you who traveled around the country know that agriculture is just huge here. And Iraq's not even growing enough food to feed itself. The Public Distribution System is something that we have to watch every single month to make sure that the stocks are in there, that people who are relying on the PDS system have the ability to get at those stocks of wheat and rice and sugar and tea and those other kinds of staples. There is no reason for that. There is absolutely no reason for that in this country. And how much good could some individuals who came over from some of the land grant colleges in the United States, who came over here and took a look at a country that has wonderful land and most important has the water and the irrigation system that will allow you to get an agricultural system, something that's the easiest thing to turn around, okay, get it up and operational.
You know, one of the frustrating things for me when I was here before, of that $18.4 billion that was part of that first, what we call the IRFF money, that Congress gave us for the reconstruction of Iraq, there wasn't one cent of that that could be spent on agriculture. Again, I'm not a budget guy and can't tell you exactly how that goes, but it was put into different buckets, and there wasn't money that could be used in agriculture. And there was good reason for it. No one was doing horrible things, it was just a belief that that was an area that many nations would come and contribute to and would get that going. And it's an area that just hasn't gotten -- it's gotten a little bit better, but it could be so much better. Not only could Iraq feed itself, but it could feed large portions of the region and have goods and services to export.
We're very, very proud of something that we helped the Iraqis get kicked off this last year, the corps did -- particularly a Colonel Brad Ward who just refused to say no, he'd been over here so many times -- and that was the date palm and the wheat palm spraying program that we got in place. And I invite you, ask Iraqis how the date crop was this year.
Now, is that decisive? Is that going to, you know, is that going to lower the violence? Probably not, but it is one victory, one small victory, that if you add it up to a whole bunch of others, like I wrote about one time, can have a tremendous effect on lowering the level of violence, because it makes people more prosperous. And I think you'll find that the date crop this year was the best because of that spray program. And also, there's wheat that's coming into the PDS system from up north that was also part of that whole program in order to get it down here that there's extra wheat that can be sold and bought and moved internally in Iraq to fill up some of those stores down here.
I'd like to see that across the board in the area of agriculture. I'd like to see it in health. I'd like to see some folks come in here -- not and set up a system necessarily like ours, but just work their way through helping the Iraqis get a system up that takes care of all the Iraqi people. I'd like to see it in transportation, I'd like to see it in IT. I'd like to see American human capital come over here, okay? And Brinkley's been able to do it in a security situation. He's been out and about and in over 60 factories with his professionals, out looking and seeing and working through some of these issues. And those are the kinds of things that are small victories, probably kind of float in under the radar, but I think over time can have a cumulative effect that can really start to see the level of the violence go down, and get people thinking about something else than whether their neighbor is Sunni or Shi'a.
Q Have you and the military been let down by the -- Nic Robertson, again, from CNN. Have you and the military been let down by the people who should have been responsible for the economic part of the puzzle here?
GEN. CHIARELLI: You know, a lot of people, when I talked about this, I heard -- you know, you guys have spies on you, too, who tell stories about you -- that when I talked about this the other day, people were going, well, why is he concerned about that? He's a military guy, why should he be concerned about economics and those kinds of things? I'm concerned about it because that lowers the level of violence. Where I've been able to go into neighborhoods like that and do those kinds of things, the level of violence has gone down. Now, what I have to do is have it be self-sustaining.
Have we been let down? I will just tell you, I think we need to really look, because I happen to think that this is not an (NO1 ?), that this is going to redefine conflict for your lifetime, my lifetime, our kids' lifetime, and probably on into the future. And we'd better take a look at how we organize ourself before we get involved in anything like this, in order that we've got those kinds of things and understand how they're going to play in the environment that you move into. And I wish we had had more assistance in those areas.
Q The economic areas?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Yeah, in the economic areas. But, you know, maybe that's one of the things we learn here that in the government we don't. Maybe we should have, earlier on, gone out and looked for how we could get help from outside the government and call upon American human capital.
The folks that are over here -- okay? -- that I had dinner with the other night, I got to tell you, their families aren't probably happy that they're over here, and they had to kind of pinch themselves and question why they were coming over here to do this. But every one of them says that this has been a life experience for them. It has been a life experience. And they understand how they can make a contribution and how it will have a tremendous impact on what we're trying to do over here. It will have a tremendous impact on what we're trying to do over here.
There's a particular factory that a battalion commander brought to my attention when I was out on one of my visits, and he told me about this factory. And we went down there and we found that this was a factory that was amazing. It had plant leadership, a manager who was just -- you know, it was like he came out of the Harvard Business School And all he wanted to do was get his factory going. And we helped him out with some contracts that we were able to get him. And we found that we were able to increase his employment -- it used to be at about 10,000 and it was down to about 300. To show you what a professional this guy was -- since we've got some time, I'll tell you a story. He, after the war, had kept a man -- he kept a couple of his folks -- he made a particular kind of vehicle. He kept a couple of his folks there in the factory, that used to produce 10 to 12 a day, he made one a month. And he did that because he wanted to ensure than when thing turned around, that he had the kind of help there who could train folks that he brought on. talking to him.
We were able to send a few contracts his way, and we got his employment from about 300 to 400 up to 1,000. He was bidding on some other contracts that was going to get him up to 2,000. At one time he'd employed 10,000. And he lamented, when I went down and talked to him, about the fact that he was making on the contracts we gave him about 20 percent profit, and he wanted to reinvest it into his company so that he could get better at what he was doing, but because this is a command economy and many of the laws haven't changed, that the money that he made that was profit for him went back to the ministry in the way that it always had before, and wasn't necessarily earmarked to, in fact, improve his factory.
That upset me a little bit, and I was kind of in a downer as I left, and trying to figure out how I was going to change that. And as I left, I stopped to give some COINs to some soldiers that had, in fact, rolled up an IED factory. And when I got done giving those COINs and they talked about that, I was walking to the helicopter to fly out, and my intelligence officer turned to me and he said, "Well, I'm going to put you on a downer again, because you know the main ring leader of that factory, do you know where he used to work? He had worked at the same factory that we had tried get back up and operational." Because yes, he was getting a stipend, but it wasn't enough money to keep his family in food and to care for his family, so he had to find a way to supplement his income, and that's what he was doing, he was out planting IEDs.
Now, that's one instance, okay? But I happen to believe that there are plenty of those out there; that if you can put those folks to work -- and what Paul Brinkley has done with his group of folks in bringing these guys over here who are professionals, and what they're doing is just absolutely amazing. And I'd love to see a program like that expand so that we can call on the human capital -- one of the real, you know, portions of -- our power as a nation is our economy -- to pull them over here to help us solve this problem set. And there's plenty of them who want to do it because they want to see this succeed also.
Gee, that was a long answer. (Laughter.)
But I'm passionate about it because I think it's so important. And I'm trying to get this story told back home.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Thank you, General. Eva Durick (sp), Fox News, again. Two very brief questions. The first question is, on his recent visit to Amman, President Bush has called Prime Minister Maliki the right man for the job.
My question to you is, how do you evaluate Mr. Maliki's performance? And would you agree with the president's statement? And the second brief question is, what do you see as the main stumbling block to U.S. -- the main obstacle to U.S. military performance here in Iraq? Thank you.
GEN. CHIARELLI: U.S. military performance? Getting all the lines of operation moving at the same direction.
Q I'm sure you could list a lot of reasons and a lot of obstacles that the U.S. military is facing on a daily basis, but what would you say is the one main obstacle to U.S. military performance here in Iraq?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, first of all -- boy, that's a tough one. I think that we need progression along all the lines of operation that I outlined. That our military performance and our ability to provide security would be greatly impacted and made better -- okay? -- if in fact we saw those other lines of operation maturing at the same level and to the same extent that our ability to provide kinetic effects in this fight is. I mean, we are able to do that. We can go anywhere at any time and do whatever we have to do -- okay? -- kinetically. What I mean is fight. Okay? That is not an issue. That has never been the issue.
What I need to do is to define and get clearly defined who it is out there that are the irreconcilables, those individuals who, no matter what we do and no matter what the Iraqi government does, are still going to challenge it and the Iraqi people's right to have a democratic country here.
And I think that if we can get those other things moving, we will see a lowering of the level of violence and it will reach a point where the duly constituted Iraqi security forces can provide for their own country and do exactly what we wanted to have happen when we came over here.
I think the prime minister's doing an excellent job. Remember, I'm the operational commander.
Yes, sir?
Q Mark Danner, the New York Review. I wanted to follow up Jane Arraf's question about time. You answered her by saying however long it's going to take is however long it's going to take. Yet there's an awful lot of evidence staring us in the face, from the elections, to the polls, to the Baker report, and you could go on, that there isn't unlimited time.
I just arrived here yesterday after an absence of 11 months, and I think the impression on the part of the American people, which seems to be that things are deteriorating here, the security situation is deteriorating -- the number of attacks are up, 3(,000) to 4,000 Iraqis are dying every month, Operation Together Forward, in which so much stock was put, was adjudged at least a disappointment if not a failure -- that that impression, at least in 24 hours, is somewhat confirmed by my impression of things on the ground -- the increased no-go areas, the lack of traffic in the city, the general feeling of a state of siege.
You're about to leave at the end of your tour. Are you telling the American people that the security situation has improved here while you've been here? And if you're not, when you're asking them for more time, are you not simply asking them for open-ended trust that things will eventually get better, if there are no signs of improvement?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Well, first of all, I never have claimed that it has gotten any better. And that's probably one of the hardest parts for me to understand right now. I left on a high last time, I mentioned in my Pentagon press conference the other day. I left on a high last year. The elections in January of 2005. We thought that we and the 1st Cavalry Division, the unit that I commanded and was here in Baghdad -- and I know other commanders felt the same way -- had participated in a tremendous strategic victory and the Iraqi people had had an election where over 50 percent of them went to the polls.
Now, we know that there were some issues with those elections. We know that in certain areas the Sunnis didn't vote. And that's one of the problems I came back to face right now, is some of the results of those elections. If you go up into Diyala Province, you go up into an area that is, by everything that I hear, is a majority of Sunnis, but you're going to find the Provincial Council is in fact almost all Shi'a, and that's because of the elections of January 2005. That's when they were voted in. And not a lot of Sunnis in Diyala, or at least not enough Sunnis in Diyala, got out, so they got the representation that they deserved based on their numbers, if that's how they decided to vote, as part of the Provincial Council. And that is a thorn in the side of many Sunnis up there today.
I am not in any way saying the security situation is any better. But what I have to understand, I guess -- and again I go back to what I said before. I'm trying to prove a negative. I'm just saying, how much worse could it be, given that for whatever reason, it seems like that the bombing of the Golden Mosque began a sectarian fight here that was underneath the surface, that many people saw before that time and were concerned about, but it seemed to be kind of the galvanizing moment that caused this to occur. And I happen to believe that the coalition forces that fought under my command in the year that I have been here have done a lot to keep that level of violence down below what it could have been. It is not better. Please understand that.
But I happen to believe that we have tremendous strategic interests here. I happen to believe that a large majority of the Iraqi people want this democracy to work.
And I happen to believe that we can't give in to terrorists who conduct the kind of attacks that they attack throughout this city and in other parts of Iraq on a day-to-day basis. I just don't understand how you give in to those kind of people. How can we allow that to occur? I find that something that I don't want.
Now, are the Iraqis the ones who are going to have to take the lead and win this fight? Absolutely. But I hope that we can be here long enough to ensure that they are able to do that. We will -- I'm sure, when our time comes to leave here, there will probably still be violence in this country. But I hope that we leave in a period that the Iraqis can be the ones who decide what form their government's going to take; that it can be the Iraqis who have a security force that is the primary armed force in this country and can handle those threats to their government.
And I hope, after the large investment that we, the coalition, have made in Iraq, that that is in fact the time that we leave, and not beforehand, when they don't have the ability to be able to do that. And that's what I'm saying.
You know, you all could help us. And you'll probably not want to run this part. I mean, I happen to consider you all friends and absolutely critical to telling the story of what's going on here. And I wish that we could leave here right now, and you could go check out those 60 factories, okay -- get in your cars, go outside, and go check out those 60 factories the Paul Brinkley guys have gone into here in the last two or three weeks. And you can see for yourself and you didn't have to listen to me being the one to tell you that there's some real hope out there. Okay? But you know you can't.
Q Well, we could have, actually. (Chuckles.) (Off mike) -- we would have loved to have -- and this is not the subject of the press conference, but we would have loved to have gone to those factories.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Okay. Well, we'll get you out with some.
Q Great.
Q Thank you.
Q Thank you. GEN. CHIARELLI: We'll get you out to some. (Soft laughter.)
We're more than happy to. I will ask General Odierno, folks, to get you hooked up with Mr. Brinkley and go out and see some of the things that he's doing. Okay?
Q Thank you.
GEN. CHIARELLI: But again, it's not as easy for you to get out there, and I think -- let's go back to your point again. If you had a choice, you'd rather go out there without us, because that's how you can report the best, okay, and see if what I'm -- I've got to quit doing that, don't I? -- to see if what I'm telling you is in fact what's happening out there. But in many instances, you're -- in almost all instances, you're unable to do that.
Now, we have -- my responsibility and the responsibility of our corps has been -- throughout this entire year is to always ensure that through public affairs, that we tell you the truth as we know it, okay, as soon as we possibly know it.
We had an instance here just the other day where we had those horrible bombs go off in Sadr City, okay, and killed a lot of folks. And those reports were absolutely correct. But there were reports that took place the next day about six mosques that were burned down and six individuals were dosed -- doused with fuel and set on fire that, by any account that I have, did not take place. They were called in by -- to somebody by a source that, for whatever reason, told that story. But neither this corps, with all the folks we've got in Baghdad, okay, could confirm any of that. And I think there's a leading newspaper here that also went out to check that out and also could not confirm that that happened at all.
And when that story got reported, on top of what had occurred the day before in Sadr City, it had an effect on many of your channels and many of the people who were commentating on the war that was huge. And it kind of created a(n) attitude or almost like a hysteria about what was going on over here.
I know that Ray will -- and, for the next couple of days that I'm here, I will -- always try to confirm those things for you and get you the story. But I have a responsibility to tell you the truth, and just like what happened in Hurriyah the other day, it took me 18 hours to get down and to get to the bottom of what I think really happened in Hurriyah the other day. I don't believe that it's as bad as originally reported, but I'm not going to argue over that. Something happened there, and I was able -- but it took me 18 hours to confirm it.
Q Could you tell was happened in Hurriyah, as far as you understand? GEN. CHIARELLI: There -- it seemed like there was a group of individuals that came in and tried to move another group of individuals out of their homes.
Q Did they kill anybody?
GEN. CHIARELLI: Not that I know of. There were threats made. But then again, I -- you know, again, this happened. My ability to put that together was after the fact.
But I can also tell you that if calls were made to U.S. forces, U.S. forces would react, coalition forces would react to those kinds of attacks. We -- and like I told you before, normally when we go out and we get into something like that -- and we've had it happen quite a few times -- then it stops.
Sir? Yes?
Q Yeah. Ivan Bilariti (sp) from Reuters. Two questions. Earlier, you didn't want to be drawn into additional troops, so I'll try to put you on the spot with less troops. One of the things the Iraqi Study Group recommends is withdrawal of combat troops, I believe, by 2008. Is that feasible?
And then second, I think, just going through my notes earlier, you said the battle will not be lost. So my question is, when the U.S. forces do extricate themselves from Iraq, how can -- can you define what is the goal of that battle? You said also we're trying to prove a negative. I mean, how can -- how much really better can it feasibly be as a commander -- operating commander -- what kind of Iraq is it possible to leave behind? An Iraq that does not disintegrate, period? An Iraq that can defend itself? Are we still looking into an Iraq of a Jeffersonian democracy that will propagate its, you know, new word to the rest of the Middle East?
GEN. CHIARELLI: It'll be an Iraq that the Iraqis decide. I mean, the Jeffersonian democracy piece here is -- I mean, their constitution is something different than probably Jefferson envisioned, okay, so I wouldn't argue that that's anything that anybody's necessarily looking for. I think it'll be a democracy that is defined as the Iraqis want to define it.
You're right, I can't prove a negative. But I do know that the levels of violence here are sometimes hard for -- that are accepted by Iraqis may be at a higher threshold than what would accepted by us. And we are seeing a level of violence out here that I don't believe any Iraqi accepts and we surely don't accept. But I happen to believe that from the operations that we run that there are many times that there are people that are alive today that would not be alive had we not been out there on the streets doing what we're doing every single day.
Just today -- or yesterday, we released 23 people who were in a -- the Iraqi army did; we were supporting them -- we released 23 people who were kidnapped and being held for ransom in a neighborhood in Baghdad. That's 23 people who are not going to be held who are back home with their families I hope tonight and will remain with their families because of the actions taken by Iraqi security forces.
And I see incidents like this -- maybe not 23 in one shot like we saw yesterday, but I see incidents like this every single day. And I happen to believe that that does make a difference, that was it not for the Iraqi security forces backed up by the coalition here in Baghdad, that which you are reporting would be much, much worse. And I believe that.
I hope that we have the time necessary, okay, to do what we need to to ensure the Iraqi security forces are able to handle the security threat here without the support of coalition forces. But for all the reasons I've outlined today, that's going to take time. And I wish I could tell you exactly how long it's going to take and exactly when U.S. forces and coalition forces could go home, but I am just not able to do that. I am not able to do that because there are so many factors that come into play in this particular conflict.
And I guess what I take exception of is that I get the feeling time and time again that somehow the military is going to solve this all on its own, that if only we were doing our job, that it would be in fact solved, and I do not believe that. I believe we're doing our job. We will continue to do our job, okay, but there are many other factors that are absolutely critical in getting to a point we all want to get to, including the Iraqis.
Q And the withdrawal of combat troops by 2008 -- (off mike).
GEN. CHIARELLI: Is that something that I think is possible? Yeah, I think it's possible. I think that anything's possible here. I think that if certain things were to fall in place here, that you could see the level of violence go down very, very rapidly.
I think that if we move toward reconciliation -- whatever that is -- as General Casey has talked about and the ambassador has talked about and I believe the Iraq Study Group talked about, that if we were to get a breakthrough in reconciliation, you would see the level of violence go down here a tremendous amount and set the conditions that would allow some of the kinds of things that we all want to have happen happen.
If Paul Brinkley can have the success, and other groups like him can come over here and put some of these folks to work; if some of these factories I'm talking about, who are currently employing a thousand people that could employ 10,000, could all of the sudden put people to work -- you know, state-owned enterprises in this country used to employ 12.3 percent of the people. Now, you know, I'm not an economist -- I like to think of myself as a words person, but I'm always intimidated when I'm around you all. But you understand what 12.3 percent of the population would be, if we could just get those factories up and working again, and the effect that would have, given the size of families here, if you can put that many people back to work, or a portion of that many people back to work. And those state- owned enterprises aren't up and operational now, so those people are out of work.
I mean -- and I'm not saying any one of these lines is decisive, I'm saying they all have to be worked at the same time, they all have to be worked simultaneously. And as you work them all simultaneously, you begin to have victories -- okay? -- that cause the level of violence to go down, because people no longer want to join the insurgency or the militia, they realize that their government is doing what government is supposed to do, and that gives them hope for the future, and hope for their families, and hope for their kids, and good things start to happen.
STAFF: Sir, we've got time for one more question.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Good. (Laughter.)
John?
Q It's really an autobiographical question. Do you sometimes feel, in making these arguments in an institution that has, as you said yourself, been trained and developed over the last 200 years to fight wars, to shoot, kill, capture -- do you sometimes feel as if you're plowing a lonely furrow here? It cannot be the easiest thing in an institution like the one to which you belong, to be the arch proponent of these ideas.
GEN. CHIARELLI: I don't think I'm the arch proponent, I think there's other proponents of what I'm talking about. But I think this is a form of fighting. It is the new way you have to fight, you know. And that's all I'm saying. And I'm sure there's other conflicts where these things would be used in different proportions than I'm saying that they need to be used in now. And please don't say that I don't believe that we have to know how to fight. We have to know how to fight because that part of this fight is absolutely critical. But we also have to understand these other dynamics that are at work here. And the American people, and the publics of the coalition have to understand that all those things are at work here in this particular fight.
And, quite frankly, it's a changing of a culture, okay? You know, we're changing a culture, and it's not the Iraqi culture, it's the culture of my particular service, the United States Army, in some instances. These things are different than many of us ever thought we'd be doing. I mean, 10 years ago -- well, not 10 years ago. I wish it was only 10 years ago. In my younger days, I mean it was a pretty high intensity conflict against an enemy that was well-defined, and again, across that line. At that time it was Fulda. You know, and I spent half of my career planning for that kind of a fight. This is a totally different kind of fight. It's not World War II, it's not Vietnam, it's not any of those. It's a totally different kind of fight, and I think it's the way that we are in fact moving. And it is very, very difficult at times. Change is hard in any organization, okay?
But I'm not the arch proponent, there's plenty of people who make the same argument I do. But then there's plenty of people who don't agree that that's how their military should be used, I guess, that are out there. But I would be derelict in my duty if I didn't make these arguments, because these arguments are what, in fact, save soldiers' lives. And I honestly believe that. And I challenge anybody to tell me I'm wrong there. If I could drive down unemployment in this country just to something that was reasonable, or if other people could help me drive unemployment down here, I promise you, our casualty figures would not be as high, nor would Iraqi casualties be as high as they are today, nor would the level of violence be as high as it is today.
If we could provide potable water, if we could provide a modicum of health care to people, what impact would that have on the level of violence? Many of you reported the problems in hospitals here in Baghdad, you know. I think some of you reported that there are Sunnis in this city who won't go to the hospital because they're fearful. What if we could increase the amount of electricity? I think all these things would, in fact, lower the level of violence. Would it make it disappear? No. But it would greatly improve it.
Okay, that was the last question, right?
Okay, thank you very much. I really appreciate it. And thanks for all the great work you all do, and I really mean that. I really, really mean that. I know it's hard. I know how hard it is. And one of the things that I'm going to try to do when I get back is try to figure out a way to make it easier, because this is a relationship that we've got to continue. And you've got to tell the story, and I want you to be able to tell the story exactly how it is out there. But I got to help figure out a way to make it easier for you to do that. And I'm sorry if you've had a bad experience. But I will do my best to get you out with some of those teams that are going out to look at those factories.
Q Thank you.
GEN. CHIARELLI: Okay, thank you.
Q Thank you.
END.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
