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Arabic Media Roundtable, Nov. 30, 2006

Multi-National Force-Iraq

Thursday, 30 November 2006
Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV
Spokesman, Multi-National Force - Iraq

IRAQ POLITICAL AND OPERATIONAL BRIEFING BRIEFERS: ALI AL-DABBAGH, IRAQI GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN; AND MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, USA, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 8:00 A.M. EST DATE: THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

(NOTE: Mr. al-Dabbagh's comments are through interpreter.)

MR. AL-DABBAGH: (Translation in progress) -- in the Political Council for National Security. In fact, these meetings gave the political aspect more clearing and in order to reduce the sectarian tension in Iraq.

Relations with Iraq's neighbors -- the visit of the President Talabani to Iran is very successful in order to boost the relation between the two countries. Iraq hopes that Iraq's neighbors will abide by the goodwill and not intervene in its internal affairs. And we will not allow anyone to take Iraq as haven for terrorists.

Also, the prime minister's visit to Jordan and his meeting with President Bush is very good, and it paints the horizons of relations between Iraq and the United States. We believe that there is a review for security situation in Iraq. We will make an all-out review for the security situation in Iraq and to take necessary steps in order to make Iraqi forces enabled to hold responsibilities. Of course the Iraqi forces need more support from the MNF-I in training, equipping and in order that the Iraqi government enables to ask the coalition forces and international forces to pull out of Iraq. Also, the extension of the mandate of the MNF-I by the Security Council, the Iraqi government has the right to decide that.

Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi also met Jordan's King Abdullah in order to paint the horizons on the limits of the Iraq's neighbors' intervention in internal affairs. We hope that their intervention will be positive by Iraq neighbors to an increased confidence of the political cause in Iraq.

These are the results on the summary of the political movement in a week. We now let the ground to General Caldwell to talk about security situation.

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, thank you, sir. It's a pleasure to be here today. As-salaam aleikum.

Today was a very historic day, with both your prime minister and our president meeting together in Jordan and having a very productive talk, as we heard them both say afterwards that we will transfer on an accelerated pace both security and responsibility for matters here in Iraq to the government of Iraq and its security forces.

I'm privileged to be able to join you here today with my good friend Dr. al-Dabbagh as we attempt to clarify and answer whatever questions you all may have. As you all know, ultimately any solution for problems here in Iraq are going to be Iraqi solutions, but our president stated again today, as he has stated on many occasions, he is committed to helping this government, this prime minister to see it through until which time the prime minister says our assistance is no longer required, and then American forces will go home.

So any questions I can help answer today, I'll be glad to. And with that, sir, I'll turn it back over to you.

Q (Through interpreter.) Mr. al-Dabbagh, we notice past two days the withdrawal of Sadr (trend ?) from the political process, protesting the meeting between the prime minister and the president. Will this affect the political process in Iraq?

The second question for General Caldwell. We notice these days the increase of violence in Iraq and the insecurity, continuous tumult. How do you explain that? And what is your (interfere ?) in this aspect? Thank you.

MR. AL-DABBAGH: It is the question of suspension, but not withdrawal, from political process by the Sadr (trend ?) from the Iraqi Parliament. And they have the right to describe that as a protest letter and they have the right to announce that.

I think the question of visit is -- this is not the first meeting between the prime minister and the U.S. president. There is a program for the Iraqi government, and all the political powers agreed on this program, including Sadr (trend ?). I think brothers in the Sadr (trend ?) in the parliament is part of the political process, and then they are responsible for the success of this government.

As you watched that prime minister met with President Bush -- and it was very successful meeting, and we expect that the Sadr (trend ?) to review their decision and in fact --

GEN. CALDWELL: Thank you, sir.

If I could add on, I think your prime minister said it very eloquently today when he said that participation in the Iraqi government is a responsibility and a commitment by all concerned. I thought that was a very eloquent thing Prime Minister Maliki said today in describing the situation.

As far as the levels of violence go, the current levels of violence are unacceptable. There is a very deliberate, ongoing process, but we're working very closely with your government to continue to assist them as they work towards solutions towards that.

What's key is there is a political solution to this and a military solution. A military solution alone will not solve the problem of the violence. And so we're very encouraged as we listen to your prime minister and the political parties discuss and continue with their efforts at reconciliation, because that's a key component to solving this violence.

What also will be important is making the Iraqi security forces even more capable than they are today. And when -- I think we heard the president of the United States discuss that and the commitment he made to your prime minister to accelerate the transfer of both authority and responsibility for security to the Iraqi security forces and to the government of Iraq, and we're going to live up to that commitment and we are going to do that at a more accelerated pace.

Additionally, the Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces working very closely together have continued to go after al Qaeda in Iraq. Our president said today and we all know it, that al Qaeda in Iraq has been trying to cause sectarian divide and division amongst the Iraqi people. They do this by sensational attacks causing large civilian casualties. They also do it through intimidation, murders and executions.

Recently, we -- the Iraqi security forces and us working very closely together have continued to target specifically the al Qaeda network. Provided today are some pictures of some recent members of the al Qaeda network that have been captured by security forces with us all working very closely together to target and take them on, and I think everybody should have a packet with some pictures of those who -- pictures we can release right now.

You know, it starts off with Omar Faruq, who everybody knows, we've discussed before. But I think inside, which is important to see, is there's people like Taha (ph), who, when you take a look at what he was responsible for, he was in Amiriyah controlling and organizing and equipping military groups operating, you know, south of the Euphrates, responsible for vehicle IEDs that are one of the largest civilian casualty-producing mechanisms that occur in this country. And we were able to through deliberate security operations working very closely together to kill him in a military operation.

And there's Fatima, and we don't have a picture yet, but I know that we're working very diligently to make that available and would hope to have that soon. But we know he was a very closely connected to the inner circle of Ayubal Mousari (ph), and so taking him down was very, very important. And you'll see other pictures of people like Ahmed (ph), who was the financier for Saladin (ph) for al Qaeda.

So there's some very key individuals, and we've gone ahead -- and I'll let you flip those at your own leisure -- but we tried to provide you some pictures and short explanation of why each one of these al Qaeda members were very important to have been targeted by the Iraqi security forces and us working in close cooperation with each other. And those operations are still continuing today, and we are working very diligent at bringing down those organizations.

The more we can bring down those organizations, the greater the probability of helping to reduce the levels of violence, and so it's very important that we keep that focus. I say "we" being all of our security forces working as a combined effort, and we will continue doing that.

Q (Through interpreter.) (First name inaudible) -- Zubaydi (ph) from Iraq's Voices News Agency. Ali al-Dabbagh, how do you comment on the report by the U.S. national security adviser who doubted the ability of Maliki to counter terrorism in Iraq?

MR. AL-DABBAGH: I think Mr. Hadley expressed his viewpoint on Iraq, and expressed more positive questions and remarks on the ability of the Iraqi prime minister. In fact there are challenges and difficulties. Situation here passes through political crisis and the prime minister needs tools to rise up and to put solution for the crisis. Now I read more positive questions in the report by Hadley, and I think it is his viewpoint in the report and he reflected these points.

Q (Through interpreter.) Mohammed -- (last name inaudible) -- from Kuwaiti News Agency. Doctor, did the six ministers within the Sadr trend boycott the political process and they didn't attend the sessions of the Council of Representatives today?

The second question: How do you explain the previous visits, which exceed the prime minister visit to Jordan? Did these visits were conducted in coordination with the prime minister? I mean by that, the visit by the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi's visit to Jordan and the security leader, Abdul al-Hakim to Jordan? Is there any coordination with the prime minister for this visit, and how do you link between these visits?

MR. AL-DABBAGH: The suspension of the Sadr trend membership was declared yesterday. Today there is no meeting for the council of ministers. It is only suspension of membership. The government will review this decision, and all should be responsible for taking decisions.

As for the visit to Jordan, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi visited Jordan. It is an unofficial visit to Jordan, where he met Jordan's king, and the Jordan king's made discussions and deliberations with Iraqi politicians.

Also, the leader of Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abdul Aziz Hakim, visited Jordan. And it was -- this visit was declared before. There is no timing between the visit of Abdul Aziz Hakim and the meeting between President Bush and the Iraqi prime minister. The visit of al-Hakim was pre-declared within a tour which includes -- which will include also the United States. This means that each party trying to draft a relation with the Iraq neighbors -- in order to draft an Arab viewpoint on the situation in Iraq, the other countries need to listen to the viewpoints from all Iraqi powers.

Q Muvrah Zihiri (sp) from I. Agency. Sir, I have questions for General Caldwell. Do you think that America today pulling as -- away from Iraq?

GEN. CALDWELL: I'm sorry. Do I think that the Americans --

Q Yeah. A question for the -- I mean, America is today pulling from Iraq?

GEN. CALDWELL: No, not at all. In fact, what I heard our president say today and General Casey continues to say is that we are committed to stay here as long as the government of Iraq requests our presence and assistance, so that they can set the conditions where the Iraqi security forces are able to handle the security situation without us.

Q (Through interpreter.) Dr. Ali, there are many political powers in the parliament demand not extending the MNF-I mandate in Iraq. But what we hear right in the some newspapers that there is extension for one year for the mandate of the MNF-I in Iraq. Does -- did this extension approved by the Iraqi parliament or individually?

MR. AL-DABBAGH: The extension was agreed upon by all -- by the Political Council for Security -- for National Security, which represents all the political powers in Iraq. Explicitly, that -- this means that the parliament agrees on the extension.

Q (Through interpreter.) Dr. Ali, senior U.S. media describe the situation in Iraq as "civil war." How do you comment on that? MR. AL-DABBAGH: We are not about to describe -- we -- the situation. We are reading the situation on the ground. There is political tension in Iraq, which takes sectarian fights and also the national tensions. There is political tension in Iraq, and when they describe the situation in Iraq as "civil war," this is very exaggerated. Yes, there are many problems -- expulsions, killings.

The problem in Iraq is there are terrorist groups which kill all Iraqi military, Sunnis, Shi'as, and all Iraqis are facing this flagrant aggression by terrorists. As you know, al Qaeda network consider Shi'as takfiris and consider Sunnis who take part in the political process as khawarjj, anti-Islam, and the Kurds are as traitors. So all Iraqis are facing a terrorist group which wants to kill as much Iraqis as they can, to plant the sectarian sedition. But in fact, the Iraqis greatly resist these attempts to -- which aim to break the relation between Iraqis.

My question to General Caldwell: do you share with Mr. al- Dabbagh that the situation is not a civil war?

The second question: is there any report which can be released by -- which includes the senior al Qaeda members and the sources of the funding of this group? How does the U.S. Army describe that?

GEN. CALDWELL: First of all, I would say I do agree with Dr. al- Dabbagh's assessment of this definition, which we hear the situation in Iraq being called a civil war, when in fact I hear your prime minister and President Talabani both saying there is not a civil war here. And I have great faith and confidence in what they describe the situation.

I think what's important is there's lots of categories out there from insurgency, counterinsurgency, civil war, a lot of broad terms, but they tend to conceal the complexity of what's happening here in Iraq. There's really no one single category that can adequately describe the complex environment that we're confronted with here.

In many respects, these terms are very academic. There are simplistic means by which somebody tries to label something when in fact our problem here is not simple at all. It's very challenging and it's very complex and requires us to deal with it very deliberately. So I think what we probably need to ask ourselves is what we are doing here, is it worth it? And if the answer is yes, then we need to keep doing it.

And then, is what we're doing reconcilable? Is there the ability to bring the differing views together? And the answer, I think, is yes.

So academics may debate all day long about what the term is, but the complexity here on the ground is very difficult, and it's something we need to focus on and not try to provide some broad, general term to what's happening here.

On the second one, dealing with senior leaders of al Qaeda, and I believe there -- we have ongoing operations, I know we're working very closely with the Iraqi security forces in this, and I would hope that very soon some additional announcements can be made about some further dismantling of that organization.

And as far as the funding goes, I really don't have any particulars to provide you. I did see that report in The New York Times, but I really can't either verify it. We just don't have that kind of detailed information on their funding. What we see is exact opposite than what the New York Times article. The New York Times article alluded to the fact that perhaps there was excess of monies available so they could even send them outside of Iraq, when in fact what we see is an organization that's been severely disorganized, severely attrited, is having a difficult time attracting, trying to bring in more assets to support it. They've been very weakened. They're not eliminated, but they've been very weakened. And I think if the pressure continues on them like it has, then we'll see some very positive -- continuing positive results.

Obviously, we would like to see Syria take some more deliberate steps to stop some of the foreign fighters that are coming into your country right now. Anywhere between 40 to 60 foreign fighters, we estimate, come across the Syrian border every month, and that is very unhelpful in trying to allow Iraqis to find solutions to Iraqi problems. The Iraqis want to determine their own future. They don't want a bunch of foreign fighters coming into their country to determine their future.

And we would also hope that Syria would take some deliberate steps to stop the flow of munitions that are coming across their border into Iraq, because extremist elements, the very, very small minority that wants to derail this political process that's taking place in Iraq gets ahold of these munitions coming across from Iran and then uses them against -- truly against, really, mostly innocent Iraqi civilians When you look at the amount of attacks that occur and who normally suffers the most, it's still mainly innocent Iraqi civilians that do. It's not the Iraqi security forces or the coalition forces, but it's the innocent civilians who really suffer the most. So it's going to be a combination of many things, but if we can get Syria to help us shut down the border and stop that flow foreign fighters, if we can get Iran to help us to stop the flow of munitions coming in from over there, and then, reconciliation continues to take place in this country with differing political parties continuing to dialogue and work solutions, which they are doing, and we see more of it all the time, then the combination of all those things will help reduce the levels of violence here. And in fact, al Qaeda will find they're not welcomed here, that there is not a place here for them.

Yes.

Q (Through interpreter.) My question, you classify the militias -- most of militias as Shi'ites, and the elements who -- assigned to Qaeda are Sunnis. Do you have a classification by the U.S. Army in which we can know who are the militias? Do you have any classification of the militias when you -- for example, you said that Badr Brigades or Jaish al-Mahdi -- we have many groups. All the people -- all the Iraqi people know, for example, Jaish (al-Marsch ?) in the western parts of Baghdad conducted many attacks that the U.S. Army also consider as militias.

GEN. CALDWELL: What I would tell you -- al Qaeda is somewhat of a stand-alone organization that we focus very heavily on. As far as militias go, the different militias that exist -- and you will hear our commanders working with yours inside of Baghdad say there could be as many as 23 different kinds of militias with -- inside of Baghdad. Our prime minister has said that his first and foremost desire is to deal with those through dialogue, through the political process, and we very much want to support him in that effort. The coalition forces' position is that if somebody is acting outside of the law, if they're conducting an illegal activity, if they're involved in a murder, an execution, a kidnapping or anything of that nature, then we in fact are going to go after them -- particular individuals. And they may belong to an organization, but we're focused on the particular individuals and what they are doing that's illegal while the prime minister continues the political track of dealing with organizations.

So I mean, if that helps clarify it some. Q (Through interpreter.) What I meant 23 militias you mentioned that focus in the southern part of Baghdad or southern Iraq. This is the question: How many militias? Are these all Shi'ites or Sunnis or mixed between Shi'ites and Sunnis, which don't have -- (word inaudible)?

GEN. CALDWELL: When you talk to the security forces that work around the Baghdad province, they will tell you there's as many as possibly 23 different kinds of militias around the Baghdad province of differing sizes.

And again, the approach we take when dealing with militias is that we really want to first find a political solution to those and let the prime minister through his political process find a political solution to dealing with militias, versus using a military solution.

But again, if somebody who belongs to one of those groups -- and they are a combination of Shi'a militia, and there are some Sunni militia. Most people tend to think of the JAM as "the militia," but there are other break-off elements, and I mean it's -- again, it's a very complicated -- it's not real clean inside of Baghdad. There's many different groups doing many different things. And so the approach that we take, the security forces take, is again, if somebody's operating outside of the law, then in fact we target them, go after them, and arrest them -- or, you know, if they resist arrest, then they're killed in the action.

MR. AL-DABBAGH: Let me add something. Any weapon out of the government's hand will be illegal. There is no ability in Iraq to establish a state of law and rule of law if these militias operate. There are efforts exerted by the government to reach a political accordance to disarm this militias so that the state will be responsible for protection of people. Whenever the Iraqi secretive forces have increased ability to counter these militias, this means that the Iraqi government will be strong.

There are many militias which conduct terrorist attacks against people. We cannot deal with these militias under the law. This elected government is responsible for the protection of its people.

Q (In Arabic.)

INTERPRETER: Sorry, there is problem in the sound.

GEN. CALDWELL: Can you hear it now?

INTERPRETER: There is a problem in the audio, sorry.

Q (Through interpreter.) How do you explain the using by -- the term of militias by some Iraqi political (force/foes ?) who describe the militias as the militias is a pick-up vehicle plus AK-47; that all these militias are working with the United Iraqi Alliance on each VBIED and IED, and elements are working with the al Qaeda?

MR. AL-DABBAGH: Each one understands this political fight in his way. The Iraqi government deals with all equally. There is no militia which conduct and build weapons; the Iraqi government deals with all equally. There are strict orders within the authorities given to the minister of Defense and minister of Interior to attack anyone; no one above the law if he breaks the law. If there are known militias, these militias have no right to carry a weapon in the streets.

For example, Badr Brigade -- there are orders by the commander of Badr organization, if you see anyone carry weapon and he alleges that he is a member in Badr Brigade, he breaks the law and he is above the law and he should be questioned.

The government deals with all equally.

STAFF: We have time for one more question.

Q (Through interpreter.) My question to General -- what is the new strategy the U.S. Army will take after the extension of the mandate of MNF-I for one year? And will you forecast this strategy focus on Baghdad or other Iraq provinces?

GEN. CALDWELL: If I could, just to clarify, you mean now that the UNSCR has been extended for one year, what's our strategy for 2007? Or --

INTERPRETER: Yes. Yes.

GEN. CALDWELL: Okay.

Q (Through interpreter.) And to increase the level of troops in Iraq after this, new strategy you will adopt.

GEN. CALDWELL: Obviously, whatever strategy we have has to first be approved by the prime minister, and there is an ongoing dialogue still now. But generally it will consist of a couple of things.

There will be a much greater number of coalition forces that will be embedded working inside of both the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police forces, where perhaps before we had an 18-person team, you may now have a 54-person team.

We're going to either double or triple the size of these teams across the army and the police forces, and their purpose is to focus on the professionalism and continuing training of the leaders and the soldiers and the policemen.

Additionally, we're going to focus a lot more on logistics this next year. The Iraqi army needs a much greater logistical capability to support itself, and we're also going to work on that this year.

2007 will be a year of transition. If you tried to put a name to it, I would call it "the year of transition." You will see far less coalition forces doing direct military operations, and much more Iraqi security forces as we go more into a support role than we ever have before. But to do that, the government of Iraq, the prime minister has to have command and control of all of his military forces first. And we also have to make sure that they're properly equipped with good weapon systems and enough hardware that he wants in those forces. And then he also announced he wants to increase his army by 30,000, and we're going to help -- assist do that too.

All of that should have pretty much taken place by next June. So the year of 2007 is a major transition year, transitioning from where coalition forces may have been predominate to where Iraqi security forces will clearly be in the lead, and coalition forces will be working in support of them, with the prime minister, through his chain of command to his soldiers and police will have complete control, both the authority and the responsibility for the security forces and the security in the country.

Okay.

MR. AL-DABBAGH: "Shukran."

END.