Press Briefing, Nov. 28, 2006
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Tuesday, 28 November 2006
Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV
Spokesman, Multi-National Force - Iraq
IRAQ OPERATIONAL UPDATE BRIEFING BRIEFER: MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, USA, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 7:00 A.M. EST DATE: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2006
GEN. CALDWELL: Good afternoon. "As-salaam aleikum." Today we will try to put last week's violence into perspective, emphasize the resolve of Iraqis to determine their country's future themselves, and highlight the coalition efforts to support this transition towards Iraqi responsibility. But first, I'd like to provide you an update on yesterday's F-16 crash and several of our ongoing operations.
Yesterday at 1:35 p.m. Baghdad time, an F-16 conducting air operations in support of coalition ground forces crashed approximately 20 miles northwest of Baghdad. The cause of the crash is unknown, but at this time there is no indication suggesting the plane was shot down. For now, the Air Force has officially classified the pilot as duty status and whereabouts unknown. A board of investigation has convened to determine why the plane went down. And information on the pilot's status will be made available as soon as we have further knowledge. We do have here today with us Brigadier General Steve Hoog, the air component adviser to General Casey, and he will be glad to answer any of your questions on this crash and the associated operation, during the question and answer period.
Coalition and Iraqi security forces also remain committed to finding Specialist Ahmed Qusai al-Taei, the American soldier of Iraqi descent who was kidnapped on October 23rd while visiting his family in Baghdad. To date, Iraqi citizens concerned about kidnappings have provided more than 387 tips which have led to 57 missions executed, and the detention of 49 persons of interest.
As I noted last week, the U.S. government is offering a $50,000 reward for information leading to the whereabouts of Specialist al- Taei. Iraqi citizens with any information on him should call us at our (Iraqna ?) number, and that's 7901655361, to speak to one of our translators. We have also provided an e-mail address, which we have posted on both this slide and on the chart here. And again, this is the (Iraqna ?) number that they can call to speak to one of our translators. And the e-mail address they can use, again that is hooked into our Personnel Recovery Person Office, and they will receive that e-mail. This will ensure the privacy and security of any Iraqi citizens that want to provide information to the coalition force to locate Specialist al-Taei.
As we conduct operations to recover Specialist al-Taei, we continue to execute focused intelligence-driven raids against death squads responsible for extrajudicial killings along sectarian lines.
Slide and chart, please.
In order to provide the security and stabilization necessary for this transition to Iraqis determining their own future, we have to continue to make progress against the forces who are trying to divide this nation through sectarian violence. The majority of this violence occurs in a tightly focused geographical area within 30 miles of Baghdad. The Iraqi security force and coalition forces continue to pursue illegal armed groups in this area. In the past week, our combined forces conducted 18 operations against sectarian death squads, resulting in the detainment of 78 suspected cell members.
If you look here on the map, again what we've tried to show you is that total number of missions was 18, of which 10 was in Baghdad specific, and each of these locations provides the respective area where the operation was conducted.
We can provide you any further information you want on any of those operations, too, in terms of when the operation was conducted and the exact number of cell members that were detained at that location.
Civilian casualties in Baghdad spiked dramatically this past week, and that was due to the vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices or car bombs and mortar attacks on innocent civilians in Sadr City last Thursday. From approximately 3:30 to 4:30 p.m. Baghdad time, a series of six car bombs were detonated in and around Sadr City. A seventh car bomb failed to detonate and was disarmed. Simultaneously, there was a series of mortar and rocket attacks that impacted on Sadr City between 4:00 and 4:10 p.m. The result of this was over 180 Iraqi citizens killed and more than 245 wounded.
The attack was indisputably a terrible crime against the Iraqi people. The retaliatory talks we have seen over the past few days are, also. We expect to see elevated levels of violence as a result of this over the next several weeks. But it's important that we keep this sectarian violence in perspective. Al Qaeda, foreign terrorists and extremists do not want to let the Iraqis decide their own future. Through two elections, a constitutional referendum, the Iraqi people have demonstrated that they want to be a part of this political process, and they want to have a representative government.
Under the best of circumstances, this transformation from dictatorship to democracy is an extremely difficult one. Given the depths of the previous regime's depravity and Saddam Hussein's effort to strengthen his grasp on power by setting Iraqi sects, ethnic groups and tribes against one another, this task is all that much harder.
By now it is not a revelation that the terrorists and criminals are willing to commit brutal acts in order to prevent Iraqis from determining their own future. Iraqis are creating a country that will replace the rule of the gun with the rule of the law, and they will put criminals and killers out of business.
What is probably news to most people is how strongly the Iraqis remain resolved to enact this vision of a unified, secure and prosperous Iraq, despite the continuing violence. In polling conducted last month, 89 percent of Iraqis nationwide agreed with this statement: "My first loyalty is to my country rather than my sect, ethnic group or tribe." Seventy percent of Iraqis said they support the government of Iraq, and only 25 percent agreed the Iraqi people would be better off if the country were partitioned along ethnosectarian lines. It is important not to rely too heavily on poll results, either positive or negative, and these numbers by themselves do little to counter the violence currently raging on Baghdad streets. However, they do indicate that the violence is not representative of the desires of the Iraqi people.
We continue to support Iraqis stepping up to determine Iraq's future. To do this, we are helping the Iraqis build their institutional capabilities, including professionalizing and training a security force that is both capable and enjoys the confidence of all Iraqis' ethnic and sectarian groups.
Our mission in Iraq is to help stabilize the country while the Iraqis develop their capacity for self-governance. Recently I had to see -- chance to see some of this support for institution-building firsthand on my trip to Kirkuk and the surrounding forward operating bases just last week. I saw several military transition teams in action, just a few of the 4,000 U.S. service members organized into more than 430 teams to advise the Iraqi army, police forces and border guards. These military training teams, or transition teams, are necessary to sustain and develop these forces, so that they can evolve into a professional security institution, and will remain in place well after we have met our goal of training and equipping 325,000 Iraqi security forces.
I also witnessed cooperation at the company level between U.S. and Iraqi forces in a battle position near Hawija. Although extremists are attempting to plant more IEDs in that areas, the partnership of coalition and Iraqi security forces have enabled them over the last month to discover and disable more than 80 percent before being detonated.
I also visited an Iraqi strategic infrastructure brigade, compromised mostly of Kurdish soldiers, living in a former residence of Chemical Ali. This strategic infrastructure brigade is partnered with coalition forces to protect the vital resources that will fund Iraqis' reconstruction.
Coalition support and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces has produced some noteworthy successes to date. Although the terrorists were able to execute latest week's brutal attack, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made significant progress in dismantling the terrorists' network. In the last two weeks alone, security forces captured 11 senior-level terrorists of Ansar al-Sunna during a series of raids in north central Iraq.
Slide and chart, please.
During the raids, Iraqi security forces captured the terrorist emirs of Iraq, Ramadi, Baqubah, Tikrit, Al Qaim, Baiji and Baghdad. They also captured two terrorist facilitators, a courier, an explosive expert and a financier. The detention of these terrorists delivers a serious blow to the Ansar al-Sunna network that is responsible for violent acts against Iraqi civilians and their security forces.
And if I can turn your attention to the chart here, again, during the period of 14 to 19 November, on a series of very selected, focused raids, based on intel, those personnel were captured at these seven different locations, two in the vicinity of Baghdad, one up near Baqubah, three near Tikrit and one up in Baiji.
On al Qaeda, since October of 2004, we have now killed or captured over 7,000 al Qaeda in Iraq terrorists. More than 30 senior- level al Qaeda in Iraq terrorists have been captured or killed since July alone. Among these terrorists are many who are closely connected to the senior leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq.
In their debriefings, these terrorists have provided us some unique insights into al Qaeda's agenda of death and division. Their strategy for dealing with progress in Iraq appears to be aimed towards three goals.
Slide, please.
This first goal, as they have stated to us in the debriefings, is controlling the Sunni population. Al Qaeda in Iraq is looking to dominate Baghdad. They hope to convince the Sunni people that resistance to unity is a realistic goal and that al Qaeda in Iraq is the best avenue for sectarian-based resistance. Part of this strategy, they told us, is that murder and intimidation of Sunnis who are brave and foresighted enough to work towards reconciliation takes place.
As they stated, again, their second goal is to weaken the Iraqi government.
A strong and unified and representative Iraqi government that is the only legitimate authority to terrorism, they want to weaken. So al Qaeda in Iraq consistently looks to destroy faith in the democratically elected representatives of the Iraqi people. It seeks to achieve this through constant attacks against public servants and those who may serve with them. Al Qaeda in Iraq aims to make Sunnis fear cooperating with their own government. They want to convince people that hope is misplaced, that the government cannot offer security of stability.
And the third goal they stated in these debriefings is to attack Shi'a civilians. Al Qaeda seeks to divide. They do this by targeting Shi'a, by seeking to create distrust and fear in order to incite retribution. We know that al Qaeda in Iraq has issued orders to attack the Shi'a population. The attacks in Sadr City last week were a vivid reminder of al Qaeda in Iraq's strategy of executing high- visibility, high-casualty-producing attacks against civilian targets in order to sow division among Iraqis along sectarian lines.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has attempted to establish their extremist rule in Egypt, the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. In each of these cases, they brought suffering, bloodshed, and death to the people of these countries. But in each case, they failed and were driven out by the people of those countries. This is why they do not want the Iraqis to determine Iraq's future.
Iraqis are gradually assuming an increasing role in these operations against al Qaeda in Iraq, and the foreign fighters who seek to destroy the unity of the Iraqi people. Acting independently of coalition forces, Iraqi security forces recently broke up a major smuggling operation on the Iraqi-Syrian border. At the direction of the minister of Interior, on November 20th, a platoon from the 2nd Directorate of the Border Enforcement conducted a raid on the Iraqi side of the border near port of entry Walid. Operating with no coalition support, the platoon detained 67 suspected anti-Iraqi forces. These suspects were in possession of 20 cell phones, two suitcases full of various blank documents prepared for forgery, and hundreds of vehicle license plates -- all materials that are useful in the construction of IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs.
We continue to support the Iraqis stepping up to determine Iraq's future. And despite the difficulties and increased in violence of the past week, we remain committed to helping Iraqis achieve their goal of a prosperous, multi-ethnic Iraq, with a united government that represents all of the people of Iraq. And with that, I'll take whatever questions you may have.
Michael?
Q Sir, it might seem a bit trite to those of us here on the ground, but back home in the States it's quite a hubbub, as you know. Can you tell me, what's the MNF-I definition of civil war?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, what I'll tell you is that -- what we see on the ground right now. And what we see on the ground right now is unacceptable levels of violence here in Baghdad. There's no question about that. That's not something that we're willing to live with, and we have factored, again, working very diligently with the government of Iraq to deal with that very issue. But what we do see is the fact that the government of Iraq is functioning, albeit they have plenty of challenges; there's plenty of difficulties ahead.
We also see a council of representatives that's working and functioning. They've got plenty of challenges too ahead, but they in fact are continuing to vote on laws. They had readings again yesterday. They voted through some passages to some pieces of legislation, and they're meeting again today. They continue to work through the political process.
We also see an Iraqi security force that is responsive to the government, and there are challenges there too there's no question -- when we see things like the 8th Brigade of the 2nd National Police Division, and it has finally identified that its loyalty and members are not in fact doing what the government said; it's pulled off-line, it's disbanded, they reorganize it, they put it through a month of specialized training, a third of the force disappears out of that organization, and then, it goes back through and is in now the second week of retraining -- second month of retraining.
So in fact what we see is a government that is functioning. We see a security force that is responsive to the government, and we see people that are still looking to the government for their future. So we in fact see the institutions still functioning in this country. What we also see is the people themselves having the faith and belief.
I mean, I went out to Fallujah, and I see a police chief out there -- this is two weeks ago I was out there with the police chief in Fallujah -- I mean, he's coming to work every day, he's determined to make a difference, he's working very closely. He's a Sunni and he's working very closely with his Iraqi army Shi'a counterpart. They're dialoguing with each other. They want to see change. They want to see it at work. They want to have peace and stability and security out in that town, which, you know, two years ago was ravaged in the major battle that occurred there.
So what we see is this government still moving forward and the institutions still in place. We don't see an organization out there that's looking to assume the control of this country, but rather just to create anarchy, to create death, to create destruction, and that's in fact what we're combatting right now.
Q If you remember, we discussed that Fallujah trip last week, CNN was with you --
GEN. CALDWELL: That's correct. Q -- and NATO's provincial council actually asked for your help to intercede between Ramadi and the central government. All of those things that you've just outlined as measures of success, functioning institutions, all of those things still fit within every academic and every strategic think tanks' definition of civil war anyway. That does not preclude civil war.
So General, again, what's the MNF-I definition of civil war? When -- what are the elements that make up a civil war before we can declare this civil war? How do you define it, sir?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, what I would tell you, Michael -- again, I can only back to -- if in fact all the governmental functions are still functioning, and we don't see an organization out there that's trying to overthrow and assume control of the government, we don't see two viable entities out there like that, what we see is a(n) entity out there that's been duly elected, representative of the people, that's got plenty of challenges in trying to work through all their difficulties but moving forward nonetheless, and we see another entity that wants to do nothing but create division amongst the people, to create anarchy, to create casualties, to separate them.
So we don't see somebody competing for control of the country here at all. What we see is a country that's still functioning and still has duly-elected representatives in charge who are able to give instructions and orders to their security forces, who are responsive to them with, again, challenges we still find in the police forces and we deal with them as we find them and keep moving forward.
It's progressively gotten better down there not worse in the security forces, but we do have plenty of ways to still go. I mean, it's like we said last week: This isn't a sprint. We're in a marathon here, and it's going to take time.
Q But most definitions of civil war do include opposition to an existing government, so the mere fact that there's a government bears no relation to the nature of civil war or not. So what is the MNF-I definition of civil war? Most definitions (put it as ?) a broader conflict between competing groups within the same country, often for the political center, with various elements of militia-style combat, neighborhood on neighborhood -- a whole host of elements.
I mean, how do you define civil war?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, Michael, I'll go back to the same thing I told you a second ago, that as long as we see the government of Iraq still functioning, the institutions still in place, the people still being responsive to them, the security forces still responding to them, and we don't see another viable entity out there that's vying to take control of the government and take them in open and armed conflict, then we -- in fact, we have sectarian violence. There's no question it's at unacceptable levels, as of last week, when we saw that in Baghdad. And we're having to deal with that -- the government of Iraq is -- and we're supporting them. But that's what we're challenged with right now, sectarian violence out there.
Yes, sir?
Q I was just wondering -- Ned Parker from The London Times. Last week, I know people in Ghazalia who were displaced by al Qaeda putting out, you know, papers telling all the Shi'a to leave. Al Qaeda, in August and September was part -- I mean Ghazalia was part of this Operation Together Forward, and it was a neighborhood that was supposed to be held and reconstruction services were supposed to go back there. Instead, al Qaeda is able to work through the blocks in Ghazalia and distribute pamphlets telling people to leave or they'll be killed. And I'm just wondering why the coalition forces and the Iraqi forces have essentially ceded Ghazalia to extremists. And also, you have people fleeing en masse.
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, what I'd tell you, it has not been ceded. But just like we have seen down in the Dura area, we have -- even though forces are still present there, security forces, we have had to go back in and conduct two additional sweeps through that area, and in fact, in both cases, you know, did detain people and find caches of weapons. And, obviously, that continues. These areas are constantly reassessed and looked at on almost a daily basis. And if, in fact, they have found that what you're saying is true, then actions will be taken to go back in there. I mean, there are security forces present there now today.
You know, I don't -- I should have brought -- I don't have with me the particular data. We just looked at it again yesterday. But I'll go back and look at it specifically on the focus area of Dura -- I mean of Ghazalia, and we'll get back to you on what exactly we're seeing ourselves. But there's no question that each of these focus areas, once we have gone in and cleared them, established -- and we've got the reconstruction projects ongoing like we do, that the al Qaeda elements or other extremist elements are really punching back and trying to get back into those areas. They know that that is the area where we've identified, the government of Iraq and us, that they're going to make a difference, and there is nothing they would want to do more than to discredit this government and show them that they're unable to provide the security for their people. So they tend to put a heavy -- very focused trying to get back into these areas. But overall, the seven focus areas, as compared to the rest of Baghdad, the levels of violence are much lower in the focus areas than they are in the area of Baghdad itself.
Yes, sir?
Q Paul Schemm, AFP. You mentioned that you've detained, I guess, 7,000 al Qaeda fighters and a number of leaders, especially since July. That seems to clash a bit with the report that The Washington Post just issued, that according to a Marine analysis, essentially Al Anbar has been ceded to al Qaeda, which is now in more or less control of that province. I was wondering if you had read the article or were familiar with the report, and how do you comment on its findings, which seems to suggest they rather lost there?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, what I'd just tell you, I was just out in Fallujah last week, and that's not what we saw at all just out in the Fallujah area. It's been a few months since I've been back in the Ramadi area. Now, Qaim area, we're not hearing that at all. So I've not seen this report, I'd have to go look at it, but I think if you go talk to the Multinational Force-West commander, he would not agree with that assessment. But I have not seen this actual report, so it's difficult for me to comment on it specifically.
Q But it does not seem correct -- (off mike)?
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, it does, it does not sound correct to me at all. There's no question that Ramadi is still a day-to-day challenge and the Marines are still in daily conflict there out there, but they are making steady progress.
Yes, sir?
Q Just following up on that, The New York Times also had an article that showed that the insurgency/al Qaeda had funding in excess. I mean, how does the U.S. military expect to deal with them when this report in The Washington Post says that we don't have enough forces here and that they have excess funding. What's the goal of the U.S. military in an-Anbar if that's the case?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, the goal of the U.S. -- the government of Iraq in Al Anbar is in fact to bring it back to stabilized and return it back to the duly representative officials. I mean, if you go out to al Qaim, you go out to Fallujah, in fact you're going to find the provincial council, you're going to find a mayor, you're going to find a police chief, you're going to find the people operating and in charge of their own cities again. And, you know, the report is incorrect if it's making a statement that those, in fact, are the case, because they in fact are under the control of the government of Iraq in those locations.
Ramadi is still a challenge. They deal with it. We've got a mayor out there -- I mean a governor out there in the province who's determined. He's working real hard. They've formed the council out there of the tribes. They're going through many different ways to bring back the people to take control of their province out there. And I think you can find the tribal council out there right now is working very closely amongst themselves to rid al Qaeda from that area. So if anything, I'd tell you there's been a turn of events over the last few months in the very positive sense.
Q But we're seeing more and more Marines dying, and both of these reports were military reports. So how does that square?
GEN. CALDWELL: I have not actually read that military report. I'd have to look at it. I mean, I'd be commenting on something I have not read.
Q Can you look at that and get back to us?
GEN. CALDWELL: I'll be glad to look at the report.
Yes, sir?
Q (Through interpreter.) Mufit Hanit (ph) from -- (inaudible). You say that we are going to support al-Maliki government. Why do you strike strongly cities like Sadr City, killing women, children, and these people are -- (inaudible). This produced many confusion in the Iraqi Parliament, and some political parties have withdrawn from the Parliament. How do you justify these military strikes against some gunmen or some positions where fire comes from?
GEN. CALDWELL: The question was asking, if we're supporting the Maliki government, why are operations being conducted in Sadr City? What I would tell you is that any time that there is people who are operating outside of the law, who are conducting illegal activities, wherever it is in the city of Baghdad, we're going to conduct military operations to detain them, just like you saw on the slide.
(To staff) If you could throw back up the extrajudicial killing slide, the death squad slide for a second. You'll see that those operations are conduced throughout -- there are two that were conducted right here -- (indicating on the slide) -- within Sadr City, but additionally you'll see they're conducted throughout the city. It's wherever we in fact -- we don't conduct operations based on a particular sect or a particular -- area dominated by a particular party or anything else.
It's -- if there's somebody conducting illegal activities, then in fact we will go ahead and conduct operations to apprehend them.
Now, if you're talking about last Thursday's attack, I can walk you through that in detail and tell you what happened there. That was --
Q (Through interpreter.) I mean, the level of the military operations -- you used excessive fire to kill gunmen along with the civilians.
GEN. CALDWELL: If you want to give me a specific example you want me to address, I can. But what I can tell you as a general rule that we follow all the time is that we use escalation of force -- I mean, proportional force. If in fact we're being engaged by small- arms fire, normally we use small-arms fire, too. But if in fact there is a large volume of small-arms fire and the Iraqi security forces and coalition forces are in danger of -- you know, then they'll escalate the level of force that's used to bring the situation under control. But nobody goes in using excessive force up front. It's always done in a proportional manner to what they're faced with.
Now, if you look at the attack last Thursday in Sadr City, that was not done by Iraqi security forces or coalition forces. There was, though, the one incident at the very end where in fact there was mortars firing out of Sadr City in that one field, and they were engaged.
Yes, sir, in the back.
Q Hi, General. Ed Wong from The New York Times. It seems like in your answer to Mick's question and then in your briefing, you seem to deny that there is any sort of struggle for power or political dominance in Iraq. But General Maples, in his testimony to Congress, said that -- characterized this as "a violent struggle for power." Those were his exact words. And then Prime Minister Maliki, in his press conference on Sunday, said that the violence over the last week was because of political differences between parties. So I don't understand why you keep saying that there's no struggle for political dominance here.
GEN. CALDWELL: Ed, in fact you are going to see struggle. There's two kinds of struggles that do occur out there, and it's both for political power and economic power. And if you go down to the south, you'll see there's a political and economic struggle between Shi'a elements between themselves down there between, you know, different elements down there. You can go out to the west, and you're going to see a struggle amongst Sunni elements out there.
So to characterize -- I didn't say there isn't any kind of political struggles that occur. There are political struggles that occur. I don't mean to say there's not. But what I think the prime minister was referring to in his remarks is the fact you've got political parties representing all the different groups of this nation that are there together, that are supposed to be working together as one entity, and they need to set aside their differences and work for the good of all Iraqis and not for a particular party or a particular sect. I think that's what the prime minister was referring to, whereas in fact he feels -- and again, I'm sort of interpreting what he said from what I've read on his remarks -- is that there's different political parties that perhaps are only looking after a particular group that they represent and forget that they also have a responsibility to the nation at large when he was talking.
Q (Off mike) -- translated, there's a direct link between the violence. I mean, his statement was that there was a direct link between the violence that took place yesterday and the political differences. He's not just talking about political squabbling within the government of Iraq. I mean, he's implying that political -- there is a political agenda behind all this violence that's taking place. It's not just (to settle ?) chaos. There's some -- there is a struggle for power and control over the center of Iraq or over large portions of it.
GEN. CALDWELL: Right. And I think that we see that. There are different political parties that represent different sects.
Clearly, what we saw in Sadr City was the Shi'a group there being attacked with car bombs and mortar attacks by a Sunni element of some type -- extremist elements nonetheless, but a Sunni element. And so that I think his point he was trying to make is that, hey, there are political parties out there that need to start reining in their extremist elements and their people they represent, and work towards reconciliation and solve their differences not by force, but by dialogue.
Yes, sir?
Q (Through interpreter.) Ali-Awan (ph) from Al Furat. According to the challenges facing the Iraqi people, like displacement and sectarian violence, and areas dominated by al Qaeda, as you said in your greeting, do you think that it's now time to reconstruct the Iraqi security forces regarding the equipment of these forces, like airplanes and tanks, I mean equipping the Iraqi army to help it assume security after the multinational forces leave Iraq?
GEN. CALDWELL: The question was whether or not based on the levels of violence we're seeing that the Iraqi security forces should be better equipped with tanks and airplanes and other larger pieces of weaponry in order to assume control of the situation, especially once the multinational force starts withdrawing its presence from Iraq.
And I think some of that's already starting to occur as we talk right now. I mean, General Hoag can talk a little, if you want, about what's going on with the air forces. I know already there's -- you know, they've in fact being equipped and manned with more assets all the time. Right now we've got the 9th Division, the Mechanized 9th Iraqi Army Division mechanized, and they do have some armored personnel carriers, and tanks, and other assets like that.
And then we also know that the prime minister has recently announced that he's going to form additional force structure of about 18,700 soldiers that will provide him with greater mobility within the country, that we're going to have more mobile assets so that he can move them around rapidly to deal with the situations that he sees are challenging in this country. And, you know, it's the three division headquarters, the five brigades, and the 20 battalions that are going to be built up over the next five months here.
Q (Through interpreter.) For the time being, we see a spike of violence, and terrorists have more weapons than the Iraqi army now. How do you see this difference? Don't you think that it's time to reconstruct the Iraqi security forces now and not after the departure of the foreign troops? And do you intend to (reduce ?) the number of the Iraqi troops now in Iraq, especially that your partner, the British forces, said that it is going to reduce the number of troops next year; next year there will be a big reduction of the British forces. Do you have a plan to reduce the troops, and where are you going to reduce these troops first?
GEN. CALDWELL: The first question that you were asking was about the armament for the force. Ultimately, the government of Iraq, the prime minister, has the final decision on how the forces are equipped. Up till now, it's been fairly much an agreement on how they're equipped, but that's a decision of the prime minister's; he has the complete authority.
The Iraqi Ground Forces Command already has two of its divisions back under its complete command and control. So the prime minister has the ability now, if he so chooses, to make modifications or adjustments. I mean, that's not being dictated by the Multinational Force. Those are his security forces. And those two divisions have been passed completely back under his command and control, as another division will here in another week, and then more in the next coming few months, till really by the springtime almost all the Iraqi security force divisions will be back completely under the command and control of the prime minister.
So -- and now on the second question, about forces withdrawing, as we in fact go through provincial Iraqi control and the provinces are turned back over to the governors; and, you know, as the prime minister dictates, after discussions that occur with the council that he has that's established to make those recommendations to him; and in fact all coalition forces do go into what we call an overwatch position, where they are no longer actively involved, participating or conducting operations in those provinces; they're available there to provide support if in fact the governor makes the request back through the prime minister for coalition force support. But otherwise, the forces will not conduct day-to-day patrolling operations or anything else within that province. The only other time you'd see them conducting operations -- it was deliberate raid against an al Qaeda element of some kind. And again, these things are all discussed.
So you're going to see a withdrawal of coalition force presence as these provinces get turned over. The prime minister has already announced he's going to do one more next month for sure and that he's looking at several more in the next few months. So each time those occur, the coalition forces will assume a(n) overwatch position. They won't be actively involved anymore.
The MiTT teams will be out there. Military training teams -- transition teams will be out there, working with the Iraqi security forces, but not combat forces that will conduct combat operations.
All right. Yes, ma'am?
Q General, I wonder if you might tell us how the ethnic makeup of Baghdad has shifted around over the last few months. To what extent have Shi'ites moved to Shi'ite neighborhoods and Sunnis moved to Sunnis? How that -- has that then affected the patterns of violence and also the security challenge to you? GEN. CALDWELL: There is no question we have seen some shifting that has occurred over the last few months, where we have seen Shi'a moving out of some predominantly Sunni areas, and vice versa. And that has occurred where we've seen a Shi'a family moving into what would be a predominantly Shi'a area. And that -- those kind of movements we have seen occur within the city over the last several months.
Q (Off mike) -- scale.
GEN. CALDWELL: You know, at that -- we keep asking ourselves -- we try to measure it as best as we can, too, to get an understanding whether or not it's going up, steady; how much is occurring. And it's -- it -- you know, it's an extremely difficult thing to read.
We have not seen mass movements, but we are seeing some movements, not enough to the point of where we feel like there's -- it's a mass kind of migration across the city. But what it has produced in fact is, in some areas, a more predominantly ethnic group in that area than was presently (sic) before. And that obviously is disconcerning (sic), because you would like all Iraqis to be able to continue living together like they always have before. But some of them do it, and if for no other reason, just out of fear. They may not have experienced any violence themselves, but they see it on the TV, they read about it in the papers, they hear about it from other people, and for the fear of their families, they'll make a movement like that. Although nobody has come over and threatened them or intimidated them, they will do that as a precautionary measure for their own families.
Q So how has it affected the patterns of violence? Because -- oh, sorry. How has it affected the patterns of violence?
Because on the one hand, if you have homogeneous populations, it makes it easier for the other side to attack, if you like; and then I know from just where we are, that a lot of fighting is going on in some of the mixed neighborhoods. What do you observe about that?
GEN. CALDWELL: We, in fact, see that we -- we in fact have established what we call ethno-sectarian fault lines throughout the city, where we monitor very closely with the government of Iraq security forces because those in fact are very mixed neighborhoods.
What we have also seen is that the predominant amount of murders, executions and assassinations tend to occur on the west side of the river, and the high-visibility, high-producing casualty events tend to occur on the east side of the river, meaning it's some kind of al Qaeda in Iraq element or something probably producing the vehicle car bombs and putting them into the predominantly Sadr City area, just like we saw here last Thursday, and then we see the retaliatory action that occurs back over on the west side with them going over and conducting some murders and executions in response to that.
Q So would you say there's a sort of an east-west or a one side or the other side (and the river divides ?).
GEN. CALDWELL: It's not as perfect as that, but those are where we see the predominant kind of actions like that, occurred on the west and west side. But in fact we still have mixed -- a lot of mixed neighborhoods out there. I mean, people have not totally left their neighborhoods. We, in fact, have more mixed neighborhoods than we have singular-sect neighborhoods. So it's along those fault lines is where we see the greatest concerns that occur out there.
Q Can I have one more crack at this? You keep saying al Qaeda in Iraq. What proportion of the Sunni resistance do you think al Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for? It's a handy tag, but in reality is it 10 percent, 50 percent of what we would loosely call Sunni resistance or insurgency?
GEN. CALDWELL: We also, you know, look at that also very closely, try to identify exactly what percentage it is. What we do is the al Qaeda in Iraq are the most well-funded, produce the most sensational attacks than any element out there. So that's where we put our predominant effort against. We came here looking to take on the terrorist element. We've continued a deliberate focus against al Qaeda in Iraq. Although it's been severely disarmed -- or I should say disorganized over the last several months, there are still viable elements out there of that organization. Although a lot of the mid- level and some of the senior levels leadership has been taken out, it has not been totally negated at this point.
Yes, ma'am?
STAFF: Time for the last question, sir.
Q (Off mike.)
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. In fact, if you all don't mind, do you mind if I let --
Q I have one more question that I'd like you to answer first, if that's okay.
GEN. CALDWELL: Okay.
Q Thank you. I've been waiting.
I just wanted to ask about the scale of the mortar attacks that we've been seeing between neighborhoods in Baghdad; for example, between -- you've got, you know, Kagmiyak Rahat (ph), and on the other side you've got Agmiaslaf (ph). There's been this kind of tennis game between the two and it's been going on for a few weeks. And there have been suggestions that the Ministry of Health attack, the attack on the building in Bab al-Muadham (sp) was part of a plan to kind of create a bit of a Sunni corridor to lead to Adhamiya and -- (inaudible) -- those areas there.
Is that a pattern that you're seeing more of? Are you seeing more of these mortar attacks and the use of them? Because it seems to us that it has been building up in the last few weeks.
We just want to know what your observations were.
GEN. CALDWELL: Your observation is entirely correct. There has been an increased use of indirect fires, mortar attacks, rocket attacks by groups on both sides of the river out there that have been firing back and forth in the predominate neighborhoods that were predominantly Shi'a and predominantly Sunni neighborhoods. And there's been a really deliberate ongoing effort to try to identify nicely where those are coming from and then put forces -- position so essentially we stop that before it occurs.
I mean, we saw it the other day. I mean -- (to staff) -- I'll tell you what, throw up the Sadr City bombing for me, would you? You know, it was interesting. When we had the Sadr City bombing the other day, everybody talks about the six vehicle car bombs that went off, but what you don't see is what started off first was a at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon we saw the indirect fire -- if you would throw that up for me -- that started over here, and these were -- you know, again, it was the use of mortars in the city along with some direct fires that occurred down there. And then, the next thing, you know, we exhibited was we saw the six car bombs -- the ones in red and then the green being the one that was disarmed -- and that all took place in about a one hour time period.
But during that exact same time period, between 3:30 and 4:30, at 4:00 we saw this indirect fire come in to Sadr City hitting in these various locations closely aligned to where the car bombs went off. So clearly somebody was trying to produce a casualty device that would bring first responders in, medical care, and then, they then put mortar rounds on top of that to produce even greater casualties.
As a result of that, what we saw -- if you could, next one, please -- was additional more indirect fires that came in on Sadr City later in the day and, again, somewhat close proximity and perhaps where that car bomb was supposed to have occurred. And then, what we saw next, if you could, is retaliatory indirect fires that then were started to be fired back, and what you're seeing is exactly right. That went on for a while. I don't -- I didn't capture all the rest, but that did in fact occur. And then at that point is when we started looking for where the indirect fires were coming from and operations were started over here and looking in Sadr City trying to identify those.
If I could, Steve, let me let them ask you a couple questions. STEPHEN HOOG (Brigadier general, Air Component Coordination Element, MNF-I): Yes.
Q Yeah, I just wanted to get a sense of exactly what was discovered at the crash site. I take it there was not a pilot's body there, but DNA samples were taken. Were there blood stains, and was there any indication the pilot might of ejected? I just want to get a better sense of what occurred with the crash.
GEN. HOOG: That's exactly what the board that's out there today, has been out there late last night, and all throughout the day is trying to ascertain. What they've done is they have had very limited DNA samples, and as you know, it takes anywhere from two days to about four or five days to fully analyze those. At the same time, they're picking up things like the ejection seat and all the other instrumentation in the aircraft that would answer those questions so we can give you a definitive answer as soon as we can.
Q So the ejection seat was not with the airplane?
GEN. HOOG: What'll happen, when an airplane crashes a lot of times, as the fuselage starts to break apart, you know, little -- the engine will go one place, the tail will go one place, and the ejection seat was found, but it wasn't found in a position that indicated one way or the other. And that's what they're going out there to determine today.
Next question.
Q Where exactly was it found? (Off mike) --
GEN. HOOG: The aircraft crash or the ejection seat?
Q The aircraft.
GEN. HOOG: It was about 20 miles northwest of Baghdad.
Q (Off mike) -- either Anbar province or Salahuddin, which --
GEN. HOOG: I don't believe we have a map here.
Q (Off mike) --
GEN. HOOG: I think it was in Al Anbar, but we'll get back to you.
Yes.
Q There were insurgents around the crash site when you arrived or when the ground forces arrived?
GEN. HOOG: As a matter of fact, the airplane was conducting what we would call troops in contact operations, and it was under the control of the ground commander in the area.
Immediately after the crash, we had both additional fighters overhead as well as intelligence and surveillance assets. Those assets did observe insurgents in the vicinity of the crash site, and that's one of the reasons that they conducted ongoing operations to make the crash site safe for ongoing investigations. So --
Q How long before the ground troops were able to secure the site between the crash and when the ground troops showed up?
GEN. HOOG: I don't have the exact timeline here. But what they did is they were factoring in the ongoing operations, the safety of the coalition folks involved and the ability to use the overhead ISR assets to monitor as they brought all those things together to determine the best time to bring in the quick reaction force to secure the crash site.
Q Was it a long time? I mean, I'm just trying to get a sense of how long the insurgents were at the site before it was secured.
GEN. HOOG: I don't know exactly how long the insurgents were at the site at this time.
I think that's it. Thank you.
GEN. CALDWELL: Thank you, sir.
END.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
