Press Briefing, Oct. 9, 2006
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Sunday, 08 October 2006
Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV
Spokesman, MNF - I &
Rob Tillery
Chief of Staff, NCT, IRMO
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, SPOKESMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC EFFECTS, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ, AND ROBERT TILLERY, CHIEF OF STAFF, NATIONAL COORDINATION TEAM TOPIC: SECURITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2006
GEN. CALDWELL: Good afternoon. "As-salaam aleikum."
Before I begin today, I would like to first express deepest condolences on behalf of the Multinational Force and the U.S. mission to the people of Iraq and to the family of General Amir al-Hashimi, the brother of the vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, who was murdered this morning in Baghdad. Details around this incident are emerging, and the government will seek justice against the perpetrators of this deplorable crime. I intend to highlight today how the government of Iraq is proactively and independently, with the support of U.S. and coalition forces, attempting to find solutions to an array of challenges.
But first let me comment on the security situation in Baghdad. It is clearly tough at the moment. I told you last week that attacks and casualties had risen during the sacred month of Ramadan, and they're -- are mainly a result of increasing sectarian murders and high-profile, sensationalized type of attacks. The rise in violence has occurred every Ramadan period in the past three years. We anticipated it, and we expect this to continue over the next several weeks.
The sectarian tensions in the city are high. I have told you -- and you have heard it from -- other Iraqi, U.S. and military leaders reiterate it -- that the complex security issues here will take an Iraqi solution that primarily will depend not on a military strategy but on political and economic progress.
Iraq's young government, though still in its infancy, is facing extremely complex issues, issues that would cripple many mature nations. Today the elected government of Iraq is only 142 days young.
Yet Iraq's political, military and religious leaders are independently taking an initiative to reconcile the Iraqi people and bring economic opportunities to them.
There are recent indicators that show significant forward motion on these fronts. Please allow me a few moments to outline some of these.
On Saturday, Prime Minister Maliki, key ministerial leaders and sheikhs from the Al Anbar province met in Baghdad to dialogue and discuss recommendations aimed at tackling some of the tough security, culture and economic province -- problems facing the Al Anbar province. On October 1st, the prime minister, flanked by key political parties and religious sects, also signed a pledge aimed at ending internal battles and sectarian violence in Baghdad by setting up district committees representing community leaders from all sects.
Later this month, several hundred civil society representatives will meet for the third of four conferences as part of the prime minister's reconciliation and national dialogue plan. Already participants of that conference have agreed to work together to reduce the level of violence in this country.
There have been numerous other tribal and civil society conferences at the provincial and local levels to address the same security issues. Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a religious leaders are currently meeting in Saudi Arabia and discussing inter-Islamic fighting during a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The most telling sign of progress towards reconciliation is that the leaders from diverse factions, with different interests, are working together and are communicating with each other.
In terms of fostering economic prosperity, ministerial representatives from the around the world are in Baghdad today to continue discussions towards forming an International Compact for Iraq, which is an Iraqi government-led initiative to promote international investment that will help transform Iraqis' economy over the next several years.
So since the government formed a few short months ago, Iraqis have made strides towards unity, but it is not easy. Progress takes time, and it is hard to be patient, as the government of Iraq moves forward, when we see innocent people dying.
While the government must act with urgency that the security situation here requires, the Iraqi people must support the government and stand with it against extremist elements
Reconciliation between Iraqis is what will ultimately end this violence.
Let me also highlight a few operations that demonstrate Iraq's young security force taking the lead in planning and conducting operations nationwide.
Iraqi security forces conducted an operation this weekend in Kirkuk aimed at identifying and eliminating terrorist threats that existed in that city. What's impressive with this operation is that it was solely conceived, planned and coordinated by Iraqi security forces. Even more significant is that it was the 4th Iraqi Army Division. This is the first Iraqi army division that came under total Iraqi control, responding directly to and taking orders from the Iraqi Ground Forces Command.
This operation was executed because Kirkuk had seen a recent spike of vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks just prior to and during Ramadan. Due to these attacks, elements of the 4th Iraqi Army Division and Iraqi police forces working together are taking the fight to the insurgents to clear Kirkuk of insurgent safe houses, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and weapon caches. This was the first division-level plan to execute an operation by the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Headquarters.
In Diwaniyah yesterday, Iraqi security forces, with coalition forces in support, conducted an operation to capture a high-value individual who was involved in the execution of Iraqi soldiers on August 28th. During this operation, militia members attacked the patrol, and a gun battle ensued. The result was approximately 30 militia members killed. There were no Iraqi security forces or civilian casualties. During the firefight, a coalition tank was damaged. The target of the operation, the person in question, was captured.
I highlight these operations to make the point that across the country, Iraqi security forces are beginning to act independently and are making a difference. Today we have with us Rob Tillery, the chief of staff from the National Coordination Team, to discuss the provincial reconstruction teams which are operating throughout Iraq. While U.S. and coalition efforts to help Iraqis achieve self-reliance are more visible at the national level, the U.S. mission in Iraq has specialized civil military teams operating throughout the regions to develop capacity of provincial governments and help those governments prioritize the needs for security and basic services for their citizens.
And with that, I'll ask Rob, if you wouldn't mind coming up and give us an overview of what they presently have ongoing.
MR. TILLERY: Thank you, General Caldwell. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, and thanks for taking the time to come and listen about provincial reconstruction programs.
The provincial reconstruction team concept began in Afghanistan as an effort to help stabilize remote areas of the country beyond the reach of the government in Kabul. When determining an effective approach for our provincial engagement in Iraq, we looked at this model. However, we knew that in Iraq the model had to be different. In Iraq, we did not need to change or to extend the reach of the central government, but rather we needed to enforce and bolster the ability of the provincial governments to lead and to respond to the needs of their people.
Our previous efforts at working with provincial governments included the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees. With this program, we sought to use reconstruction projects to bolster transparency and responsiveness of provincial governments. Ad hoc teams of military and civilian experts work with the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees in 15 provinces throughout Iraq. The PRDC helped prioritize and identify those electrical, water and roads and bridges projects that required repair, redevelopment and reconstruction. Once prioritized and identified and submitted for funding, the U.S. government, through its IRF program, funded these projects. So what we did is we shifted from U.S. and international experts deciding what needed to be built in Iraq to Iraq's people, through their elected officials, determining what needed to be built in their cities, towns and villages.
In this PRDC program, Iraqi officials identified 135 projects in 15 provinces, valued at over $100 million.
I think just last week, General Caldwell took a group of media to Hillah. And there, in company with local elected officials, they went and visited a road project. This was a number one project identified by the province of Babil to be reconstructed using the PRDC program. These programs are being implemented today to make the lives of local Iraqi citizens better.
The PRDC program was good, but it was only a start. And an opinion shared by the government of Iraq, back in 2005, we recognized that capable local governments were critical to the successful decentralization of Iraq. Governments with strong skills in public administration, public finance and budgeting were going to be critical as we transferred authority and power from the central government, who had been doing many of these functions in the past, to local governments now charged, under a new constitution, with these roles and responsibilities.
During the late summer of 2005, we conceived of the PRT program, appropriately modified to fit the circumstances here in Iraq. Using the PRT program, we envisioned being able to engage in every province throughout Iraq. While resource limitations have caused us to relook at our location of PRTs throughout the provinces -- and I'll get into that in a minute.
But if I could have the next slide, please.
The PRT is a civilian-military team that brings together technical expertise in a variety of areas to assist Iraq's provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability of the government, promoting increased security and the rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration to meet the basic needs of the people. Through the PRT, we hope to build the capacity of provincial councils and governors to foster stability through the promotion of good governance and democratic processes, build strong provincial institutions, and promote economic development so critical to providing hope for a brighter future. By helping local governments more effectively address the needs of their citizens, they will gain the support of their people. Citizen support and confidence in government institutions is critical to a successful democracy. As Iraq emerges from a generation of centralized control from Baghdad, it is essential that constructive relations are developed between the center and the provinces. There are a few mechanisms in place to support this, but the PRTs are helping to stimulate constructive dialogue that will build these relationships.
Next slide, please.
We established the first three PRTs in November 2005, using the facilities of existing regional embassy office compounds in Nineveh province, in Kirkuk, and in Babil province. To test the concept and ensure that what we were doing would work, we assessed these three for a couple of months. Iraq is a challenging environment. An Iraq PRT model, while based loosely on those in Afghanistan, was a bit like venturing into uncharted waters. Where we saw the need for change, we made adjustments. As we continued with the rollout schedule in March, 2005, with the establishment of Baghdad PRT, and then followed closely with the establishment of the remainder of the U.S.-led PRTs, just finishing up in September with Diyala and Salahuddin provinces. In fact, we have the inauguration of Salahuddin PRT scheduled for Thursday. In addition, we have two coalition-led PRTs established in Dhi Qar province with the Italians, and with the U.K. in Basra.
Right now, we're in the middle of establishing a final PRT to be led by the Koreans in the Kurdish region. This is will be known as a Regional Reconstruction Team, specifically because we'll be dealing with the regional government of Kurdistan.
You may notice that there are not PRTs in every province. As I mentioned, we had originally envisioned having a PRT in every province, but as we looked at our resources, as we looked at the location of various forward operating basis in regional embassy offices that were available to house the PRT facility, we decided that we had to take a different approach. We couldn't put a PRT in every province, and in some provinces, we would need to have a PRT located in an adjoining province remotely reach out to that province. It's a bit of a challenge at times, but we're making it work. And I think that the governments in those provinces are glad to have the ability to talk to, work with international experts to determine and to discuss issues that are of concern to them. You know, how to do budget, how do you work strategic plans.
Let me have the next slide, please.
As I mentioned, the PRT is a civil military team composed of experts in a variety of areas supporting the development of good governance. There are five key functional areas that the PRT focuses on.
Local governance, which is a cornerstone of the PRT's mission. This role is supported principally through the USAID local governance program, which is a program of civilian experts in public administration, good governance that conduct formalized training instruction in various areas: in public finance, in budgeting, in infrastructure planning, in public administration.
Roles and responsibilities of various government officials. With this program, we are working with provincial officials to provide formalized training, as I said, in public administration, finance, budgeting, strategic planning and economic development. Our experts work closely with government officials coaching and mentoring them in areas in which they feel they need assistance.
Also we have the rule of law. Our team from the Department of Justice and United States Department of State's International Law, Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau work with the Iraqi police and Iraqi courts to build their skills in modern investigative procedures and improve the efficiency of the system. Rule of law also addresses enhancement of measures to ensure protection of human rights.
As the name implies -- provincial reconstruction team -- reconstruction is going to be in there some place. We do focus on reconstruction and development. Following on, the processes start -- started through the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee, PRDC program. We continue to work with local governments to systematically plan for and implement projects to meet the basic essential service needs of their citizens. I mentioned earlier that about $100 million has been spent through the PRDC process last year. This year we will continue to support projects in provinces through this process, but we will also shift to working with Iraqi governments to use the funds that the central government has provided for infrastructure development. In 2006, this was about $2 billion nationwide, and we expect at least the same or more in 2007. So we're transitioning from international funds, U.S. government funds specifically here, to Iraqi government funds with provincial officials taking the lead in identifying, prioritizing and executing these projects.
Economic development is another area that we try to work in. People need the confidence that they will need to be able to find employment to earn a decent living, to support their families. The PRT will work with local business leaders and the provincial council to implement programs that promote the creation of jobs. Right now, the PRTs are helping the local government define a three-to-five year provincial development strategy that will help guide the development of the provincial economy in the future.
In the center there you see public diplomacy. Our efforts here seek to strengthen lines of communication between the local government and their citizens. We want to help local officials let people know what's going on with their governments, with their economy and with their future. As you can see, the PRT has much to offer, but all of this depends on bringing together great people focused on making a difference.
If I could have the next slide, please.
What you'll see here is a chart showing the typical staffing of our PRTs. Please note that they are led by senior diplomats with military officers as their deputies. We believe that this is the right way to go. We want the PRT to be the bridge that transitions from the coalition military forces being the dominant presence in the provinces to civilian development specialists assuming this role. Our Iraqi partners support this approach. However, our military colleagues are a key part of the PRT and bring a wealth of expertise and experience.
Also integral to the PRT are the Iraqi staff.
They bring a local perspective and understanding so that we are not simply trying to impose a Western model of democracy in the province.
Nominally we have about 134 civilians throughout the PRTs and about 175 military personnel, all grades and specialists from all services, as well.
Next slide, please.
The PRTs are making a difference. Let me share with you just a few examples. In Baghdad, the provincial council chairman, Mu'een, has established a Strategic Vision Committee to work with leaders across the community to form a vision for Baghdad's future. The PRT in Baghdad was instrumental in supporting the initiation of this effort and provides continuing support to Chairman Mu'een as he moves forward with this tremendous effort.
The reconstruction project process in Kirkuk has evolved, with the support of the PRT, from a predominantly coalition-led effort to one that today is fully an Iraqi process. In fact, the provincial government in Kirkuk was recently awarded an honor by the central government for their effectiveness in project implementation and execution. We believe that this is the mark of success that we will see other provinces fulfilling soon.
In Ninevah Province, the PRT's rule of law adviser assisted local judges in initiating a model program that brings local judges and police together to train police in effective investigative procedures and rules of evidence, thereby strengthening the judicial process. The U.K.-led PRT in Basra worked with the Basra council to develop a comprehensive provincial development strategy that will set the course of Basra's development for the next three to five years. this has become a model upon which other provinces are basing their development strategy as well.
Recently in Najaf, with the assistance of the local governance program out of PRT Babil, the governor hosted an agri-business conference that drew over 350 business leaders and government officials throughout southern Iraq to come and to talk about how to enhance agricultural business throughout southern Iraq. These types of events are excellent means of fostering a sense of national unity.
Finally, I'd like to leave you with a couple of points that I borrowed from Ambassador Khalilzad's comments recently at the inauguration of our PRT in Diyala. Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people, and success here depends on decisions of the people and their government. The PRTs are in the provinces to support this effort.
Iraq's success depends on four things:
National reconciliation. And the PRTs are working with government officials to help develop effective conflict resolution techniques.
Effective and trusted security forces. The PRTs are not specifically involved in security; however, they do support the military commanders in the field, they do support rule of law improvement, and they do support ensuring that government officials understand their role vis-a-vis security.
Good governance and the rule of law. We're out there every day working with Iraqi leaders to help them develop the skills to become more effective leaders for their people.
Economic development. Helping to identify areas of economic advantage and developing incentives to encourage job creation; working with business leaders to create business plans that will employ people; implementing vocational technical training programs.
The PRTs contribute to all of these goals and are the embodiment of the U.S. and coalition commitment to the provinces.
Thank you. I'll be happy to take any questions if you have any. Yes, ma'am?
Q (Name off mike) -- NBC. I just wonder if you could help us better understand how is this different from the other initiatives we've seen like this over the past three years. I mean, surely the idea that you have to have Iraqis involved is not a new idea.
MR. TILLERY: I'd tell you that as a new idea -- all the ideas we had before were sort of disparate ideas.
Everybody was out in the province doing what they thought was best. Oftentimes they were not very well coordinated. So USAID was out doing a project, civil affairs forces are out doing a project; NGOs in many cases, the U.N. was doing projects -- all with the goal of developing the province.
What we try to do through the PRT is bring together all those ideas, efforts, and synchronize them and ensure that those ideas are coordinated with what the Iraqi government wants to do. Oftentimes we found that we were doing things that a village leader may appreciate, but the provincial governor didn't know anything about that. So we're trying to make sure that when the group that was doing a project at the village leaves, the provincial government is there to carry that on.
Sir?
Q Doug Smith from the Los Angeles Times. Last week I was in Hillah with the PRT, and we talked to an employee of RTI who was doing local governance training. And he made -- he gave us a lot of information about the things they were trying to do, and he did acknowledge the need to have some way of measuring what they were actually doing, but he really didn't have -- he wasn't able to articulate the way that the success or an achievement is going to be measured. Could you give it a try?
MR. TILLERY: Absolutely. And it's a great question. And one of the areas where I think the PRTs are a little different than the previous efforts that we've had, what we do is every month we conduct a functional assessment, and in this functional assessment, we use effects-based metrics to determine how well we're doing at achieving our end state. Our end state is transparent governments that are capable of providing for the needs of their citizens. This functional assessment measures our progress in areas such as infrastructure development, economic development, rule of law, and in governance measurement -- how well they were able to carry out the tasks of government. We trend this over time, and we can make adjustments on a quarterly basis is where we've drawn the line, to see if in fact are we being successful, and if not, what do we need to do to get back on track? If we are successful, then we can continue along. But I think that's the key, is being able to measure this on a monthly basis and trend it over time.
Q I'm the test score expert for the LA Times. I'd sure like to get into this in more detail with you. MR. TILLERY: Please. Anytime.
Yes, sir?
Q (Through interpreter.) (Name inaudible) -- from Al- Sumariyah TV channel. You talk about reconstruction and you said that you assess the reconstruction in Iraq. I know the Iraq -- (inaudible) -- very well, and I know the Iraq people. The Iraqi people don't see any development and reconstruction in Iraq. The Iraqi people think that the situation is deteriorating from bad to worse. How do you assess this? The electricity come only for a few hours, and so is it for water.
MR. TILLERY: That's a very good point, and I share with you your concerns. And I've heard this often when I go to visit provincial governments. They are concerned about this as well. However, I am convinced that the only way we're going to achieve success here is not to try to do this centrally, but to have each of the provinces start to take a leadership role in returning essential services to their people. Who knows best than the leaders in the villages and the towns and the cities and in the provinces what is necessary? The PRT is helping them develop the infrastructure development plans to address those needs.
I think in the past we have been misguided when we tried to do large electrical projects.
In fact, they were probably needed, but unfortunately, it doesn't show down on the streets, as you say. I think now we are going to be able to start moving forward listening to people that live in the villages, in the towns, in the cities and what they need and implement those types of projects.
Q Looking at the list -- I'm John -- (last name off-mike) -- New York Times. Looking at the list of PRTs, it seems that it cannot mean nothing that you have rather more representation in mixed Shi'ite-Sunni provinces and predominately Sunni provinces than you have in the Shi'ite provinces in the south, Basra and Dhi Qar aside. For example, you have one in Babel, but you don't have Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah, Kut, Diwaniyah.
Is this because you have run into resistance from the SCIRI- and Mahdi-controlled provincial governors in those areas?
MR. TILLERY: Not at all. In fact, we had intended to have a PRT in Najaf. Based on the length of time it took to rollout the PRTs, the U.S. forward operating base in Najaf closed, and we were no longer able to find a facility to house the PRT. I think what you're seeing here is this is where the U.S. forces were. We had reached out to coalition, and the coalition partners that you see have responded. We wish we could be there, and I think that we have constructive dialogue with the governments in Wasat, in Diwaniyah, in Karbala, and in Najaf. It's certainly a little bit more challenging to get routinely to visit them, but they're coming to visit us in Hillah. And I think you're going to see over a period of time that our relationship will strengthen.
Q Hi. Laura Lobin (sp), CBS. You talk about a period of time and moving forward from now and having been misguided in the past and challenges before. Are these all euphemisms for saying, "We really messed things up originally, and that's why three years on things look as bad as they do now?" And how much time do you think that you have, when the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want the U.S. out of Iraq very quickly, the overwhelming majority of Americans want the troops home? So when you say about, you know, moving forward, how we're going to do it now and the vision for the future and all that, what exactly are you talking about?
MR. TILLERY: Well, I certainly didn't want to imply that we messed up, as you say, in the past. I think that what we're doing is we're learning that perhaps we need to listen more closely to the Iraqi people, and I think that -- I'm not hearing that Iraqi people want us to leave. I'm hearing that the governors appreciate us being in their provinces. They appreciate having the civilian and the military teams there to assist them with development of their governments.
And I think when I say we're moving forward from here is that we're -- we recognize that Iraq now is a sovereign government. Iraq has challenges ahead of it as it transitions from centralized control, implements its constitution, and passes provincial government laws to transfer the power down to the provinces. This is what I'm talking about into the future, and the future is in the governments of the provinces, not necessarily in the strong central ministries.
Q Nancy Youssef with McClatchy. I recently visited the PR Team in Nineveh, and both the coalition experts and the local government leaders complained that they couldn't develop their government because the Iraqi constitution is so vague about what the relationship is between the central government and the provincial governments.
And so my question to you is, how do you advise local governments, when the people are supposed to be leading them are unclear about what a local government is supposed to do?
MR. TILLERY: That's a great point, and as you know, there is the local governments law that's in -- I believe it may have even been in the Council of Representatives at this point -- and certainly once that's enacted, we'll be able to better advise them. The provinces had a large role in helping to shape that. You may have known that they had provincial conferences where they discussed this law -- input to this law. So we understand the tenets of that law, and we can help shape how the governments form themselves to respond to that law.
But a lot of what we're doing now, pending the enactment of that law, is to try to talk about generalized rules of procedure, traditional roles and responsibility -- things such as strategic planning, strategic vision.
As I mentioned, in Baghdad, you know, the idea that a group of leaders and a group of citizens, that are engaged in a very violent period of time, can look to the future and plan for the day when the violence is over and everybody is working to attain the success that's possible here, I think that's critical. And the PRT, through its various training programs, is helping them understand some of the technical aspects of doing infrastructure master plans, strategic planning, and those things.
Sir?
Q That was another point that came up in Hillah. In my experience, the juice of local government is the power to control the local tax base. And you're talking about changing the balance of power to the local level and away from the central government. But the people we spoke to in Hillah just said they don't have any power to tax, it's not in the constitution.
MR. TILLERY: That's true at this point. And all of this is pending the enactment of the law. Let's face it, you know, the constitution was only recently passed. It takes time to transition a government from centralized control to decentralized control, and all the areas of fiscal authority that go with that. So I know they're working on this, and it's an area that we hear every time we go to the provinces, that in fact governments in the provinces want the authority to raise revenue. And you can't blame them for this. They want the ability to control their own budgets. But these efforts are under way, and in time, that will happen.
Sir?
Q You gave us a figure of $100 million for projects currently in hand. Are you very much constrained by the tank being empty? I mean -- (inaudible) -- the United States has spent over $20 billion in the last three years on an attempt to reconstruct here. That money is committed or spent. How much money do you have to offer to support this program?
MR. TILLERY: In the 2006 supplemental, which Congress passed, there was $315 million for infrastructure projects through the PRTs. Q I'm sorry, the supplementary. Is there not a level of frustration for you, having finally fixed on a -- as you see it -- a means of making the program coherent, to find that the vast majority of the money that the United States taxpayers have been willing to provide has already been spent?
MR. TILLERY: I wish we would have had this great idea in 2003.
Any other questions?
Q As you might have noticed, my experience is in local government. I've been walking around some neighbors in Baghdad --
MR. TILLERY: Want a job? (Laughter.)
Q I've been walking around neighborhoods in Baghdad looking at infrastructure, or the lack of it. And I've seen some areas of the size of a small community in Los Angeles, and just my rough estimation is that for maybe a one-square mile area, there's several billion dollars' worth of needed infrastructure. Do you have any kind of estimate of how much money needs to be spent to make this country even minimally function?
MR. TILLERY: I have no estimate. I'll have to leave that to other experts. I've heard figures that go all the way across the map. But it's certainly a challenging problem. And I think that it's certainly not going to be U.S. dollars or international dollars alone that solve all the problems of Iraq. It's going to be a united effort between the government of Iraq raising revenues by restoring its oil infrastructure; the international community, from things such as the International Compact -- those are the areas that we're going to return Iraq to a vibrant economy.
Other questions?
(No response.)
Well, thanks very much. Ramadan Karim.
Q Thank you.
GEN. CALDWELL: (Off mike) -- want to ask before we close out today? Yes, Jane?
Q You mentioned that you had expected attacks to continue to increase. Can you tell us any more about that, what your major source of worry is, either geographically or types of attacks?
GEN. CALDWELL: Obviously, the areas -- it's the same volatile areas we've been operating in that we're concerned about. That's those four provinces we've talked before -- Al Anbar, Baghdad, Salahuddin and Diyala. We have seen, obviously, recently up in the Kirkuk area where the Iraqi government all on their own planned and coordinated that operation there to eliminate what was an initial spike that they saw that recently occurred in VBIEDs up there.
We're still very much concerned and focused on the high- sensationalized types of attacks that would occur here in the Baghdad area, VBIEDs specifically. That's one of our predominantly major concerns.
And then just attacking and still reducing the level of sectarian violence that occurs here, trying to get a handle on that. Obviously, you know, the military solution alone won't do it. We see the political leaders taking some great strides, making some real efforts in that endeavor, and we're hoping to see some results from those. We're hoping to see some actions that come out of those different efforts that they're making here by the government themselves.
Yes, sir?
Q (Through interpreter.) (Name and affiliation inaudible.) You talked about operations in Kirkuk. What did you target with these operations? Was it against al Qaeda organization? And the person you captured, did (they release ?) anything about Ayyub al-Masri? Can you talk about that?
GEN. CALDWELL: Right. I think you're talking about perhaps two different operations. There's the one up in the north at the 4th Iraqi Army Division with the local police up there conducted, and that was one they planned and coordinated all on their own, specifically targeting terrorist cells up there that were starting to bring in more vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices into the city. And really I'd have to turn you back over to the 4th Infantry Division or the government of Iraq to talk to those specifics. The coalition forces had absolutely nothing to do with that operation other than provide external support to them. It was planned, coordinated and executed completely by the 4th Iraqi Army Division.
It's a huge step, and I just -- I mean, I mentioned it at the beginning, but this is so significant what just occurred, in that this is the first Iraqi army division to go back under Iraqi army control, under the Iraqi ground forces command, working for the prime minister. They saw a problem developing, they took the steps necessary to plan to address it, and they went out and executed it. I mean, that is a major step forward in the development of the whole command structure for this country's armed forces that they did that.
And then they've been talking themselves about the resultant actions that have occurred since they've started that operation up there. They found some caches, detained about 30 or so people, they've reported. Again what I'm reading is their press releases and their press reports they're putting out, since we're not directly involved in that operation up there.
As far as the person that was detained, that was down in Diwaniyah. And that person was a person of interest that's suspected of being the one responsible for the actual murder of the 13 Iraqi army soldiers that occurred down there on August 28th when they had been in a firefight, had run out of ammunition, had been captured, were under the control of whatever element that was down there, and then were summarily executed. And that's why we went after that person. When I say "we," the Iraqi army did with us, coalition forces, clearly in support shoring them up as they went in there with -- providing armored support for their operation.
Yes, sir?
Q Thank you. Larry Kaplow with Cox Newspapers. Sort of a two-part question here. I wonder -- you know, in your remarks, in the remarks of others, you've been pretty upfront about the fact that the Baghdad operation has gone through a lot of twists and turns and hasn't gone the way it was necessarily envisioned at the beginning. You started in June. You overhauled the whole thing in the middle of July, saw a little bit of a decrease in violence through the first part of August, and then it picked up again. There was all this talk about 60 miles of berm work around Baghdad that was supposed to reduce the violence in Ramadan and didn't seem to do that.
We hear about 3(,000) or 4,000 Iraqi troops that were either late showing up or still haven't shown up, and we also see the apparent -- anecdotally, the violence going on.
I wonder if you could just take a minute or two and lay out why this has been so tough. We've also heard people say that the insurgents are just going to areas where you're not. And more than just beyond what you've said before about how we know Baghdad is the focus for the terrorists, why has this been so tough to do, to explain to Americans looking on to this?
And also, I wonder if you'd commit to providing another statistical summary, as you did in the middle of July, about attacks in Baghdad.
GEN. CALDWELL: Larry, like any military operation, when you begin to conduct it, one thing you don't want to do is stick with a plan if you see reasons to adjust it. A typical military expression is, a plan's only as good as until the first shot is fired, and then you start modifying it. And that's exactly what we've done in the Baghdad area. As we have seen the different elements that we've had to deal with in there, we've continued to modify the plan.
And again, this is a government of Iraq-led plan. It's not a U.S. plan. This is the government of Iraq making the decisions, giving the direction, deciding how much force will be applied, where it will be applied, when it will be applied.
And so really to get into the intricacies of why each of those decisions were made, that's a government of Iraq decision. We're here to provide advice. We're obviously intimately involved with their command structure and giving our recommendations and ideas to them. But in the very end, normally on a Sunday evening at the Ministerial Council for National Security, these things are briefed, discussed. The prime minister makes the decisions, and then all the military folks move out and execute according to the elected leadership. So that's exactly how that thing continues to evolve and will evolve.
There was never an attempt to build an entire trench system around the city. There may be about 1.8 kilometers or -- 3 kilometers, 1.8 miles or so of actual trenching. It's a system of barriers and obstacles that are all integrated with natural pieces of terrain, establishing additional checkpoints around the city, around 28 of them, to help impede the flow of traffic in and out of the city, so that it's more checked. I mean, already -- you can go through and look at some of these -- they've picked up people already that came in, that were clearly foreign nationals that were coming into the city, that -- the paperwork didn't look right. Some Iraqi security personnel there, for whatever reason, detained the person and then further interrogation -- it was discovered that in fact this person was not an Iraqi citizen at all but somebody from outside the city. A couple of those have already been captured coming in. So they've had some success. They've already picked up one or two caches and vehicles trying to get into the city. So they've had some success already out on those checkpoints, and that's the intent, is to impede the flow more getting in and out of the city.
It's a comprehensive effort. It's an ongoing thing. And again, the military itself is not going to bring the ultimate solution to the Baghdad security plan. It's a -- we've talked about it before, and it's so critical that the entire economic piece continue, the development there inside the city, the projects that are being executed. The PRT that Rob talked about in Baghdad is a key, integral centerpiece of that. And in fact it's at the PRT in Baghdad that you find the JROC, the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center that has been established to handle the volume of projects that are ongoing, being planned and being conceived for the city of Baghdad. It's specifically in -- right now in the focus areas where the operations have been conducted.
So it'll continue to evolve, but you've got to have that piece going, and then you've got to have the governance piece going. And the more the national -- I mean, the neighborhood and the district advisory councils are involved in this, the more probable that the operation will be successful.
There has got to be neighborhood buy-in. There has got to be local citizens involved. The Iraqis are the key to this entire solution in the city. It is not the armed forces. They can only set the conditions. And they'll continue to work very diligently in doing that, but ultimately, it's going to be the Iraqi people that are going to make the difference here.
Q The second part, about whether you'd provide another statistical update like you did in the middle of July.
GEN. CALDWELL: I was trying to remember what exactly stats it was in July, Larry.
Q You said for two or three weeks how many attacks around Baghdad and the rolling average for those weeks -- like, it was 23 attacks, and then it went up to 34 attacks or something.
GEN. CALDWELL: We can go back and look at that. I don't want to make any promises right up front, but, Larry, we'll sure go back and at that. We'll pull back out what we did in July and provide it and take a look at that for you then.
I mean, clearly, we want be just transparent and open about this entire process, what's going on in the Baghdad Plan as we can.
Yes, ma'am.
Q Thank you. Sabrina Tavernise, New York Times. General Caldwell, can I ask the following thing: you guys have had -- I mean, as a counterpoint to Larry here, there was some success in August -- the death count, the body toll count was actually down, which was, I think, pretty significant. It was modest, but it was a significant achievement. Will you please release the numbers to us for September? I mean, they're known. The channels of information for us are shutting down. We can no longer ask the morgue, and they're -- people, I know, are very sensitive about the numbers, but there's no way for us to judge your success. And if September was actually a drop again once more in the body count in Baghdad, I think that's very significant, but unfortunately, there's no way for us to know.
GEN. CALDWELL: Sabrina, we'll go back and look at that.
You know, obviously, any time we put out statistics, just like has happened over the last month or two, everybody gets in the big debate -- "Well, you're hiding this, you're not showing that." Of course, everybody does statistics very differently. I mean, we even see with our own headquarters -- if you go to different portions of our own headquarters, how do you define this or how do you define that, and exactly where do you extract the data from, and how many multiple sources do you use, and what is the determinant, and when you need to move something out or bring something in -- so there's not an aversion per se to providing information as we know it, but that's about what it is, is we know it as we best can collect it and make an assessment of it.
But we'll sure go back and the September numbers for you. I mean, I'm not going to make any promises in these statistics that are going to be provided here at -- standing up here, but we'll go back and look at the -- at what we can reasonably provide out there that, one, doesn't put any operational risk to the Iraqi security forces or our forces that are operating in the city; two, that the government of Iraq is comfortable with us releasing, too; and then, three, if it's reasonably available and we can provide that, then we'll do that.
Q Can I just add to that? You mentioned that there are different ways of putting statistics together, and that there are different measurements. I mean, presumably, you guys use the same standards month to month, and if we had those numbers --
GEN. CALDWELL: We do.
Q -- we could at least use some sort of a trend at whether things are getting better or worse
GEN. CALDWELL: Right. The trending data we don't mind providing. We've stated that before.
Q But I mean, even the statistics you must gather the same way every month.
GEN. CALDWELL: We do. And --
Q And that would offer some trend for us --
GEN. CALDWELL: That is correct.
Q -- whether -- (off mike) -- better or worse.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. And the trending data -- we are very comfortable with releasing the trending data as we do it. And it is -- it's very consistent how we (pool ?) our data together every single month. Whether it be exactly right or exactly wrong, it's exactly the same, at least, and it's -- we do it the same, consistent manner each and every month. So we can provide the trending data.
Q So can you also then provide the number as you have it in terms of number of those killed in the month of September? GEN. CALDWELL: I won't sit up here and tell you I'll provide the exact numbers. I'll be glad to provide the trending data, though, all right? I understand that. I understand what you're asking for, all right? I do acknowledge that. I understand.
Q Thank you.
STAFF: We got time for one more question, sir.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes. Okay.
Q Sorry, General. Two very quick questions.
GEN. CALDWELL: Two? All right.
Q We were told by some of your commanders on the ground in Baghdad that the majority of attacks on American forces today come from Shi'ite groups and militias and not from Sunni insurgents. So can you give us an estimate of those figures, please? How much -- is it 50/50? Is it 80/20? What do your trendlines indicate, based on how you map those attacks and the nature of those attacks? That's one question.
And the other one is, the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces is now in excess of 300,000, and it's around 95 percent of the target number set. But how many of those trained and equipped forces are estimated by your military measures to be operational? Because we hear from your ground commanders that it's only about 50 percent of the number that's been trained and equipped, and that there are no adequate measures to map exactly how many Iraqi forces show up for work, quit; get wounded, don't come back -- that no one really has any idea, it's just the soldiers on the ground that are left with about 50 percent of the goal to actually work with.
GEN. CALDWELL: Let me start by saying, first of all, there's been, like you said, 307,000 Iraqi security forces that have been generated. That's the number that have gone through the training process, have been trained and equipped. There are obviously a lesser number than that that are currently out there operating in the field today. If you just listen to what General Peterson said last Friday, when he said that there was over 4,000 Iraqi police forces alone that have been killed in the line of duty, that's already 4,000 less just to start with there. There's been Iraqi army forces that have been killed in the line of duty, so you've got another decrement there. Like in our own army, after somebody has served for two or three years, they elect not to serve any longer, and you have some that have elected to leave military service.
So, we have generated 307,000, that's exactly correct, that have gone through the training process. We do not have that many, obviously, because of numbers -- and there's also those who have been wounded. I mean, he talked about a figure of about 8,000 that had been wounded in the Iraqi police forces. And if you take some number of that that were probably unable to return to duty or elected not to return to duty, then you can see right away you're talking at a lesser amount that are out there.
I would --
Q Would you agree with 50 percent?
GEN. CALDWELL: No, I mean, obviously, what we're trying to continually do is as the force levels go down in units, is to regenerate that force level back inside that unit to bring it back up. There is going to be the normal attrition that occurs from just, like we said, casualties that are incurred, decisions are made no longer that they want to serve in the military forces or in the police forces, so that then have to just be gone out and recruited and brought back into service.
I mean, if we look like out in Al Anbar province, we have another right at 900 that are just now being -- going off to start their police training. And we'll continue to regenerate the force numbers to maintain those levels. I know the government of Iraq is looking at this very closely. They've got some plans that they've been developing that will give some sort of additional percentage of forces to each of their 112 combat battalions that are out there that would allow them to have a higher percentage at each level so that they -- right away, when casualties are incurred are people are on leave or pass, or whatever else, that they can still maintain a higher level of daily operating strength. And I know the government of Iraq has some plan that they're working and will probably implement sometime here in the next couple of months.
Q So does that mean you agree with your commanders' assessment of about 50 percent, about half of --
GEN. CALDWELL: No, I would not agree that it's that low, no, not at all. But I'd have to go back and we'd have to ask -- you know, every unit is going to be so different every day, when you say what's the overall number. On any given day of the week, there's some that are taking leave, there are some that are -- you know, because of their banking system are back home taking the money to their families and all that; that can take a week or so, or longer sometimes. So you're going to have varying numbers.
On any given day, if you're trying to establish what the numbers are that are present for duty across the country, it would be very, very difficult. You can get an approximate number out there, but I'd have to get back and ask generally what we think is probably the approximate number that are out there each and every day operating in the field. I mean, in each area -- I look at it on a daily basis, just like everybody else does, but I've never seen it in some kind of aggregate number across the board for that day.
And your second question was on types of attacks and who they're coming from.
Yeah, I'm not aware of us -- at least we don't at my level brief on any kind of regular basis any types of attacks occurring from any specific type of Shi'a or Sunni extremist elements attacking U.S. forces. I mean, you can make that analogy, perhaps, in an area where you're operating, or something like that. About the best we do, normally, is making a determination perhaps if it's al Qaeda-related. For a variety of reasons, we can only do that. But as far as extremist elements that are attacking us, I don't know of any tracking mechanism per se that we're using on an any regular basis to make that type of assessment.
Okay, thank you very much. END.
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