Press Briefing, Sept. 6, 2006
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Tuesday, 05 September 2006
Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, IV
Senior Spokesman, MNF-I
BRIEFING BY MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ TOPIC: SECURITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2006
GEN. CALDWELL: (In progress) -- under Iraqi leadership, Operation Together Forward is continuing its advances towards reducing sectarian violence and terrorist attacks in Baghdad that are designed to uproot the democracy and derail Iraq's steady progress. Since August 7th, Iraqi security force operations, with coalition forces in support, have been targeting key neighborhoods that had experienced the highest levels of violence, attacks and murders.
Slide 1Slide and chart, please.
What this slide shows is the density of murders and executions or -- other words, sectarian violence -- and the focus areas, primarily west of the Tigris River. If I could, I'll just talk you through this chart so you understand it. Specifically, what we're talking about here -- as you know, we're operating in the Dura beladiya, the Mansour beladiya, and the Kadhimiya beladiya up in here.
This is what it was in density, with red being the most dense, the highest number of those who have been murdered executed being found in this location here, and then somewhat more right in the center, right up here, and to where it's less dense, down. This is across the entire Baghdad city area. These are deaths that are reported, that are recorded, that we know about. And this is what it looked like in July. This is what it looked like in August, based on the casualty figures, as reported.
And then up in the Kadhimiya and the Mansour areas, you can see literally almost down to nothing here and then a little bit here.
Last week we began operations in the Adhamiya beladiya, over in this area right in here, and in the one week of operations that have been going on, you can see there has been a slight reduction already noted there, too.
We're encouraged that with more time, the density area that you see on the chart should continue to shrink further down in the Adhamiya area.
Slide 2Slide and chart, please.
What this slide shows is the density of all casualties in the same geographic area. This includes murders that you saw in the previous chart, murders and executions, but it also includes all civilian injuries, too.
And again, this is now spread across again the city,. And as you can see, down here in the al-Dura district, where we -- beladiya, we've been operating, again, you can see what it looks like in the August time frame. Again, all casualties that can be the result of vehicle IEDs -- it can be small-arms fire. It can be indirect fires from indirect systems, such as mortars or something like that, IEDs on the side of the roads, any kind of incident there that would produce casualties, other than a direct murder or execution.
And so this is the al-Dura area. And again, moving up to Mansour and Kadhimiya, again, the intent was -- as we stated very early, the prime minister said, we're going to take and focus Operation Together Forward, phase two, on the areas that have the highest number of casualties, where the greatest number of deaths and murders and executions have occurred. And so that correlates directly -- what you're seeing here. And then you can see in August the corresponding numbers about the reduction that's occurred in those three areas.
Up here, where we have just begun Operation Adhamiya, you can see a slight reduction already starting to occur up there. Slide and chart, please.
Slide 3One more indicator that operations are in fact reducing the amount of attacks on civilians is shown here on this graph. What I'd like to do is talk you through.
This is the baseline in March. Without getting into specific, exact casualty figures, this is the casualty figures as we reported them, as we tracked them during the month of March. We found in the month of April we had about a 3-percent increase over that baseline of March, and in the May time frame we had about a 39 percent increase from, again, the baseline in March. By the July time frame, we had experienced a 73 percent increase in the number of casualties -- these are murders, execution, indirect fire, IEDs, whatever it was -- attacks that were being levied on civilians within the Baghdad area. And then in August, August 7th is when you saw that the operations commenced, Operation Together Forward phase two. This month at the end of the month it's an 8 percent increase from the baseline back in March.
Again, what this shows is the cycle of retaliatory violence has been slowed in the target areas as we have specifically focused our efforts here within the Baghdad area. Again, we remain very cautiously optimistic about these figures, but we also recognize that the real measurement of this progress isn't just this month's but rather the sustainment of this over the long period of time. As we said many times before, this operation is going to be conducted over many months, not over several weeks.
Slide 4Slide and chart, please.
The ongoing focused operations in the four beladiyas -- again, we've talked about Dura, Mansour, Kadhimiya and Adhamiya right over here -- continue, if I could talk you through. We've used this chart the last two weeks. If you in fact see the green area like you see right here, that means that's complete, complete in the sense that we have finished the search of that area and in fact have now secured it. And these are the four primary areas, again, which we've been operating in.
Recently we've begun operating just in the eastern part of Mansour, right there. And again, if it's in yellow, that means the operations have been initiated, they've been started --as they have right here in the dead center -- but have not yet been complete. And if they're in red, obviously, focused operations have not begun yet in that area. As we said before too, the economic and civic portions of this operation are key to a success. We've been working very diligently -- I say "we" -- primarily the Iraqi security forces down there with coalition support, with the neighborhood and district advisory councils -- to ensure that the community is engaged in this whole process of cleanup and restoration of their mahalas. To date, more than 11,000 man days of employment have been executed by Iraqis for projects directly related to cleaning up and developing their neighborhoods where focused operations are occurring.
In addition, the Baghdad Provincial Council's Reconstruction and Development Committee recently unanimously approved 15 reconstruction projects worth $9.2 million. Fourteen of these projects -- that's 14 of the 15 projects of $9.2 million -- are focused down here and in Dura beladiya.
Iraqi contractors will perform the work, and all projects together will provide employment for an estimated 1,900 Iraqi workers over the next five years. They will also create an estimated 541 permanent positions in the management and maintenance area associate with those projects.
These projects rage from things like construction of a sewage network, the final mile of a sewage network that will connect approximately 2 million residents of the southwestern portion of Baghdad to the water treatment plant, an asphalt overlay of the residential city roads, and construction of one primary, one secondary and one high school down in that location.
Security improvements in Dura have also allowed the Baghdad Provincial Council to fund $2 million towards the renovation of the Kerkh wastewater treatment plant, which serves approximately 3 million down in the southern part -- southwestern part of Baghdad.
This plant closed last winter after falling into despair (sic). Iraqi security forces will provide security during the renovation and the recommissioning, which they hope to complete towards the end of this year. Once operational, the plant will provide permanent employ for 400 Iraqis from that area.
These are just a few of the examples of what is happening in the community as they work -- the leadership does, along with the neighborhood and the district advisory councils, to take back their neighborhoods, clean them up, reopen stores, jump-start further economic development, and work hand in hand with the Iraqi security forces to maintain security. The government of Iraq ultimately holds the key to success, to maintain this progress and to assure the further development of their country.
Slide 5Slide, please.
Prosperity will flourish with greater unity and security. Throughout Iraq, coalition forces are transferring operational control to Iraqis as the security environment and their capabilities improve. On August 31st in Habbaniya, the 1st Iraq Army Division Headquarters assumed operational control of one of its brigades. The event marks the start of a three-phase transition aimed at shifting operational control of four brigades from Multinational Forces West to the 1st Iraqi Army Division. In this photo here you see Iraqi soldiers from the 1st Iraqi Army Division, specifically their 3rd Brigade, participation in a ceremony on the 31st of August in Habbaniya when that event occurred.
Slide 6Slide and chart, please.
This map shows the areas where the Iraqi army is in the lead right now. You can see the division headquarter symbols on these maps. Currently, there are six of 10 divisions with Iraqi army in the lead. So these four here, and then the two within the Baghdad area itself. So that's six Iraqi army division headquarters in the lead at this point. Underneath them are 26 brigades and 88 battalions in the lead. With the recent 1st Iraqi Army Division Headquarters assumption, that means now 60 percent, six of the 10 Iraqi army divisions have taken that lead. They're maintaining the lead in coordinating, planning and conducting security operations in the area in which they're operating. It is also the first time since the new Iraqi government was elected that an Iraqi division in the Al Anbar province will independently control Iraqi forces operating out there. With more and more Iraqi security forces in the lead, the number of counterinsurgency operations being conducted by Iraqi security forces, with coalition forces in support, continues to increase steadily.
Tomorrow, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, through the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, will assume operational control of the Iraqi ground forces command structure, the Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Navy. This event, again, continues to show the progress as we move forward with the Iraqi army's capabilities. It will mark the first time in the history of this nation, since 2003, that Iraqi security forces will be commanded and controlled directly from the prime minister down through the minister of Defense, to the Joint Headquarters to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command structure, down to the individual Iraqi soldier on the ground.
As Iraqi security forces assume the lead, they're also setting the conditions to allow for the provincial Iraqi control, which, as we know, is the counterpart somewhat to the Iraqi security forces in the lead. PIC, as it is called, is when civil authorities in the province assume independent governance civil security duties. On August 31st, Prime Minister Maliki said that Iraq will assume provincial Iraqi control over the Dhi Qar province during this month of September.
As you remember, in July, Muthanna was the first province to be turned over. And as the prime minister stated, there will be several other provinces that will occur during this year.
Again, these are decisions that are made by the prime minister, with the board that he has that makes recommendations to him. And he has made the decision that Dhi Qar will in fact go to provincial Iraqi control during this month of September, at some point, date to be determined by the Iraqi government.
Whether it's Iraqi security forces taking the lead or hand-over of governance and security responsibilities to Iraqi civil leadership in the province, we continue to see Iraqi forces, Iraqi security forces and Iraqi governance moving forward here.
Iraqi security forces are also continuing to display their growing capabilities, as evidenced by last week, when the Iraqi national security adviser, Dr. Rubaie, made the announcement that Iraqi security forces had scored a big success in the capture of Abu Humam, otherwise Hamed Jumaa Farid Jeru (sp) al-Saeedi. He was the most significant al Qaeda leader captured since the death of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi. Abu Humam admitted to being a senior leader within the terrorist organization, particularly in the Salahuddin region, where he had several terrorist cells reporting directly to him.
We also know that the mastermind behind the golden mosque bombing, al-Badri, reported directly to Abu Humam.
As Dr. Rubaie said, Abu Humam has provided extensive information on the al Qaeda in Iraq network that has led to the capture or killing of multiple other al Qaeda in Iraq leaders.
Over the past two weeks, we have seen many other successful operations that continue to dismantle and disorganize the al Qaeda in Iraq network. Iraqi army security forces, with coalition in support, conducted over 80 missions targeting al Qaeda in Iraq across this country, resulting in the killing of 49 terrorists and the detention of 225 other suspected terrorists. Those captured were connected to terrorist activity that included everything from emplacing improvised explosive devices, inciting sectarian violence and government instability through kidnapping, murders and armed attacks, as well as facilitating the movement of foreign fighters, weapons, explosives materials and funding for terrorist operations. Slide and chart, please.
Slide 7We continue to see success in the killing and capture of those terrorists who carry out these attacks against Iraqi people and Iraqi security forces. One recent operation resulted in the killing of six terrorists who were observed firing mortars at innocent civilians near Ramadi just this past weekend, on Saturday.
Specifically, the town of Ramadi here -- the noted area that was over here was where the firing position of the mortars was, and then over here the airstrike that occurred, where the terrorist mortar team was destroyed.
What I'll do -- I'll run a short clip here, about two minutes, and sort of talk you through the events that unfolded last Saturday in the vicinity of Ramadi.
If you would, would you run my video clip, please?
Watch Air Strike Video
What you're observing here is the terrorist vehicle that's being used to transport the six terrorists, the mortar rounds and the terrorists with the mortar system itself. It's in fact -- over in this area right here is where they're firing the mortar rounds from.
We have been observing a safe house over in that location used by terrorists for a period of time. On that morning, we observed this vehicle, with those people in it, that parked in that location and moved to there. As we continued observing -- you can see them right over here, moving around, where they've been firing their mortar -- they're now picking it up, dismantling it, and they're going to move it back to the car. But we observed them that morning. We followed them to that location under aerial observation. We were able to watch in fact and see them conduct mortar firing at that location into civilian locations. They're all moving into the vehicle now to prepare to leave. These are shots coming out further from it.
This is the vehicle right there. If you note, the time's about 12:08 here. The vehicle now is moving, and it'll travel for about 20 minutes until it gets to another location. This is the vehicle continuing to move along the road. We're about 12:19 now. And it will move to a location where it's going to becomes stationary momentarily.
This is the vehicle moving again right here.
It's going to move to a location right over here in the woodline. You'll see the vehicle as it moves up into here, into a hide position here in the woodline.
As it gets settled into there, the decision was made to go ahead and engage it with an airstrike. You'll see a weapon system coming in from this direction over to here where it's going to hit the vehicle momentarily. The vehicle's right here. That's a hit, and you're going to see a large secondary explosion momentarily. There's the secondary explosion right there occurring, which means there in fact were still many mortar rounds or other. And you'll see some more third, tertiary, explosion occur at that same location.
Slide 8Slide and chart, please.
At the same time we're targeting al Qaeda in Iraq, this past week Iraqi security forces, again with coalition forces in support, continue to target illegal armed groups and death squads. As we discussed before, these death squads have emerged as a real threat to Iraqi security.
There were 16 specific operations conducted, 15 of them in the Baghdad area. Number 13 and 16, shown here, were just north up here right off the map. The other 13 operations are specifically within the city itself. And you can see the area which they encompass where the operations were conducted.
As we've discussed before when we've used a slide similar to this, if you in fact see something marked in red, that means when they went in and hit the target and executed it, they did in fact either find the person in question that they were after -- the cell leaders, in this case -- or they detained somebody of questionable nature that they wanted to take back for further interrogation. If in fact nothing was found, then NSTR, nothing significant to report, was found there and it's what we call a dry hole. There was a piece of intelligence that said something was there, and when the target was prosecuted, nothing was found.
The end of this was in fact the capture of five more cell leaders and 11 more cell members from the town proper of Baghdad itself. And each time we're able to execute these and remove more of the death squad members from the Baghdad area, that's going to contribute greatly to reducing the sectarian violence that occurs within the city. And that we would hope over time we continue to see -- the same chart we showed earlier -- a reduction in the overall numbers of innocent civilians who are indiscriminately attacked by these extremist elements on both sides.
Okay. With that, ladies and gentlemen, I'll take any questions that anybody has. Yes, ma'am?
Q Rebecca Santana from the Associated Press. Rebecca from the Associated press. Can you give us an exact timeline on when exactly Abu Humam was detained and exactly by who?
GEN. CALDWELL: What I can tell you is that there has been some question about when he had actually been detained. When Dr. Rubaie said we had just captured him this week, we've gone back and what he really meant was they had just been cleared to announce that he was in fact in captivity. Abu Humam had been picked up at an earlier point in time. As with most terrorists that are picked up, they are not initially announced as being captured because of the intelligence value that is normally gained from somebody not knowing that they are in fact in Iraqi government control.
So that's not announced. And then, as the interrogation process goes on, as long as they are providing actionable intelligence, something that we can utilize, we, the government of Iraq with coalition forces in support, then the announcement is not made that this person is in captivity. When they no longer become of tremendous intelligence value, then, like the decision was made last week, it is publicly announced that that person is in fact in captivity. His actual capture date was the 19th of June.
Q The 19th of June?
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes. But he provided a tremendous amount of intelligence. In fact, if you can give me Humam -- slide two, back up, please, I'd appreciate it.
I don't know if you picked up from the -- next slide, please. These are, in fact, the key 11 mid-level Iraqi leaders that we either killed or captured directly as a result of what Humam provided in the interrogation debriefings that were conducted over about a two-month period while he was being detained. These are the additional nine lower-level members. But you can see the variance, I mean, when somebody says how significant was he, when you start taking that number of mid-level leaders of that varying degree of the type of jobs that they had -- and again, we have all the names, but have not made those releasable at this point -- then that becomes a very significant person that was detained.
STAFF: We have this as a handout, also.
Q I have a follow-up to that. We'd also had a number of people who told us that it was basically the coalition forces that found this guy, captured him, and the Iraqis, their role at all was just a supporting role. Could you comment on that?
GEN. CALDWELL: The actual operation itself and where it went down, as you know, is near Baqubah, where, in fact, Humam was in fact born. But all these type of operations today are conducted with Iraqi security forces in the lead, coalition forces in support. The specifics of this particular operation, you'd have to go back to the Iraqi government to get from them as to exactly, you know, all the details of it.
Yes, ma'am? Q Liz Sly with the Chicago Tribune. A few other follow-ups on that. June 19 is about a week after the capture of Zarqawi. Was it related to that, the capture of Abu Humam on June 19th? And also, there have been some reports that he was in fact a former Ba'athist intelligence officer, as well as a leading member of al Qaeda. Have you been able to confirm that? And finally, was there any reason why it was announced now, if it happened all the way back in June 19th? Why now?
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, the reason we just announced now, there are other people in captivity right now that have not been announced, the government of Iraq has not made an announcement about that they in fact have detained and are currently exploiting them for intelligence value. When somebody is captured, if they in fact are able to provide intelligence, actionable intelligence, of intelligence value, then normally you do not immediately release their name because then the terrorist organization knows that you have them in captivity, that you may be getting information from them, and then they'll take the appropriate measures to mitigate that by moving people, changing their methods, moving to other locations. I mean, there's a lot of things they can do. Whereas if they don't know if we in fact have that person currently in government of Iraq control, then they'll continue, perhaps, with their normal operations, which is what we would hope they would do. And so that's why it's not normally announced.
And the degree of time to which a name is announced varies with how much information that person is providing and whether it's actionable as intelligence information. As you saw in that chart, when you start getting that many actionable pieces of intelligence from one person, at the point where they're no longer able to carry out any more direct action missions, then normally the process is the government of Iraq makes the announcement that they have this person and he's captured, which they did in this case.
Q The other parts of the question.
GEN. CALDWELL: And the other part of your question was?
Q If he was also a former Ba'athist officer, as well as an al Qaeda official. And whether there was any link between the June 19th capture of him and the killing of Zarqawi the week before.
GEN. CALDWELL: Okay. I'll have to get back to you about the other information on him with respect to that. There is some direct linkage, I know, from the information that came out of the series of targets that were executed associated with the killing of Zarqawi that did in fact lead to, I believe, this operation occurring. But as far as what his specific background is, I don't -- I'd have to go back and see what we can provide you on that.
Q Can you say what the linkage was?
GEN. CALDWELL: I can't provide that information to you.
Yes, sir?
Q General, Rich Oppel with The New York Times. Just two questions, the first one on Abu Humam. Dr. Rubaie described him as the direct supervisor of al-Badri. Does that mean that Abu Humam actually came up with the idea to bomb the al-Askariya shrine? Did he order the shrine bombing? I mean, was he the one who really set that in motion?
And secondly, on a different issue, I just wanted to see if you could talk a little bit about what the major issues had been between the U.S. and the Iraqis on the hand-over of the control of the ground forces.
GEN. CALDWELL: On that first question, Rich, I guess what I can tell you exactly is we do know that al-Badri worked directly for Humam. I mean, there's no question there was direct linkage there and that that was who he reported to, and that there was exchange of information, which right now has not been made releasable, that there is some clear evidence to show that there was a direct connection associated with the bombing of the mosque. But that's all I have that I can provide on that right now.
And as far as the second question goes, I guess you're asking about the ceremony for the transfer of control?
Q Yes, sir, just what the issues have been that have --
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. I guess what I'd say here, you know, a lot of people, I think, perhaps made a lot bigger deal out of that. The intent was originally to go with the ceremony on Saturday. The government of Iraq had a couple of questions on some technical aspects that they wanted to make sure that were completely ironed out, and those have been worked over the last couple days, and the ceremony's going to take place tomorrow. I mean, it's really just a matter of working out some technical aspects. I mean, there was nothing else other than that.
This is such a huge, significant event that's about to occur tomorrow. I mean, if you go back and you map out significant events that have occurred in this government's formation in taking control of the country, tomorrow is gigantic. I mean, it's the one event that puts the prime minister directly in the operational control of his military forces as his role as the commander in chief. That takes place tomorrow.
So that's not something you want to rush into. If there's even a question, if there's even the slightest misunderstanding, you would absolutely want to get that thoroughly resolved and have complete understanding before you proceeded forward. So we were glad to see that the government of Iraq said, "Hey, we have a few more questions, we want to work them out, we want to make sure we understand exactly the technical aspects." Everybody's done that, and tomorrow afternoon -- they'll make an announcement here shortly that tomorrow afternoon they anticipate the ceremony occurring.
Yes, sir?
Q Solomon Moore, Los Angeles Times. First of all, could you tell us just how many troops will be handed over to the prime minister for him to control? You know, how many battalions, whatsoever? Because one of the arguments, I thought, one of the points of conflict was just how much control the prime minister would actually have.
The other question is, following the killing of Zarqawi, the military said that you had actually been tracking him for some time, and I wonder if you could shed a little light on how you actually found this latest al Qaeda operative.
GEN. CALDWELL: As far as the control goes, again, Solomon, that's the prime minister's decision how rapidly he wants to move along with assuming control of his -- he's going to assume complete control of the naval forces, the air forces, and the decision is made that tomorrow be the 8th Army Iraqi Army Division. They can move as rapidly thereafter as they want. I know conceptually they've talked about perhaps two divisions a month as they work through all the systems, the reporting procedures, the command and control.
So it's going to be up to the prime minister how rapidly they move after that. Our anticipation is, from what we understand from his staff, is that it may be about two divisions a month thereafter. But again, I'd really defer to the government of Iraq on how rapidly they want to move. It's not our decision. And we're prepared to support whatever they want to do.
And as far as the second question goes, I really don't have those other details I can give you. I'll see what else we can get from the government of Iraq and work with them to make releasable.
Yes, sir?
Q Paul Schemm, AFP. Just to reemphasize that point, so tomorrow the prime minister will assume control of a single Iraqi army division? GEN. CALDWELL: That is correct, Paul.
Q That is correct.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah.
Q And eventually the rest.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. And again, not just the division, but the navy, too, the air force. And then, of course the chain of command will run directly through his joint force headquarters to his Iraqi ground forces command headquarters, down to the division and down to the individual soldier.
Q Okay. And my other question was, I noticed there were four operations in Azamiyah over -- like last week, and all four turned up dry holes in the chart you gave us. Can you shed some light on that, sort of what happened there? And is there a problem with intelligence in the Azamiyah area or --
GEN. CALDWELL: I'm not sure I'd read that much into it, Paul. What I would tell you is -- I would hate to put a percentage on it, but obviously each time we go out and conduct an operation, we do not have the anticipation that it'll be a hundred percent factually accurate and there will be exactly there what we're looking for. And if you've noticed just the trending, it's known about 30 percent of the time that when we prosecute a target -- and in fact what we had hoped to find there is not there and -- but there -- there's nothing I've heard of or -- anybody talk about that would imply anything in terms of something different occurring at those particular targets.
I'll go back and ask the question. I've not heard anything, though.
Q Because they're all concentrated in one neighborhood and they're all --
GEN. CALDWELL: Right. No, it's an interesting question. We'll go back and look at that.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Laura Levin (sp), CBS. Just on that point, Sunnis that we've spoken to in that area said that that was partly because U.S. forces searching there were allowing Sunnis to keep their weapons, and that's also where a new Sunni militia/army has been, has located its command and control center, and that they're getting weapons from the Ministry of Defense. And according to them, they said the U.S. knows about it and is turning a blind eye as part of the strategy to help the Sunnis against the death squads and the militias. What would you say about that?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, Laura, what I'd say about that is that there is a policy that the prime minister has put out that each household is allowed to have a weapon in it and that there -- each mosque can have up to five weapons. This is from the prime minister, is the guidance he's given to the security forces, both Iraqi and U.S. security force, coalition forces operating in the city. So there may be in fact a case where they've gone into a home, they've found a weapon, they gave it back because it was authorized to be in the city.
As you know, as we're going through this operation, we're registering weapons, too. I mean, that's another big piece. The Iraqi security forces and us, as we find weapons in homes, we're doing the official registration, getting those identified and properly logged and recorded and put into a database.
As far as complicity in terms of helping any particular group, the coalition forces are not going to get involved in that. General Casey has been very clear. We're going to target those who operated outside the law. We're going to uphold the rules and regulations as laid down by the prime minister of this nation. We're here as their guest. And we're not going to take sides. We're going to just stick by the law and operate within the law.
Yes, sir?
Q Scott Johnson from Newsweek. You said repeatedly that the Iraqi forces are in the lead in this security operation in Baghdad, but the reports we've heard are that it's the Americans who are in the lead. So could you sort of describe or define what you mean by Iraqis in the lead?
GEN. CALDWELL: What I'd tell you -- any time we get ready to conduct -- if it's the coalition force getting ready to do something, it's done jointly with the Iraqi security forces. We do them as combined operations. We have a continual dialogue.
The prime minister is in fact the one that sets the areas. Recommendations are made to him. He makes the decision which area to go to next and when they're going to do it. He's the one who's come up with whatever checkpoint system has been approved within the city. I mean, everything that's occurring ultimately is approved by the senior levels of the Iraqi government. It's not a coalition force decision. A lot plans are driven, worked up, briefings are made, but the Iraqis are ultimately making that decision.
Within the city itself, as the troops are operating within the city, clearly there's some places where you may have more coalition forces at a particular location than Iraqi security forces.
But ultimately, everything is going to be turned back over to the Iraqis. As we operate down in the Dura area, the intent is to set the conditions to allow the Iraqi security forces, the local police, to move back in and be the ones who can partner with that neighborhood and establish themselves as the long-term security solution for that neighborhood.
Q But, I mean, isn't it true that from a tactical perspective, right now in Baghdad the Americans are still in full lead in all of the operations on a day-to-day basis when it comes to tactical decisions and, you know, strategic decisions about where to go, you know, on an hour-by-hour, day-by-day basis?
GEN. CALDWELL: If you're a young company commander, whether you're in the Iraqi army or the coalition forces, you're making those kind of decisions. We allow junior commanders at the lowest level to make the tactical decisions they need to execute their mission. So, down at the lowest level, if you're with an American unit or whether you're with an Iraqi unit, you're going to see those young company commanders, those captains,making those kind of decisions.
In terms of what's happening in the city, there's nothing that happens in the city that is not done without the Iraqi structure, the Iraqi command and control structure blessing it and saying that that's the next thing that's going to happen. It is not a coalition force- led operation in that respect. Recommendations are made, briefings are conducted, discussions occur, and Iraqis make the decision. The Iraqi number of security forces, as compared to coalition forces in the city, is about 4 to 1. So to sit there and say that it's a coalition force-led operation when the Iraqi security forces outnumber coalition forces by at least 4 to 1, if not 5 to 1, in the city, would be a little inappropriate statement to make when they clearly are carrying the preponderance of the weight with the amount of security forces they have operating there.
STAFF: We have time for one more question.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes, ma'am?
Q Just on that point, General, I mean, it's a fact that --
STAFF: Use the microphone.
Q Sorry. As the security situation in Baghdad was getting worse, more and more Iraqi forces were brought into the capital and it didn't make any difference whatsoever until U.S. boots were on the ground. So how -- I mean, the long-term strategy is clear, yes; handing over, and it's ultimately the Iraqis are going to be responsible. I mean, we get all of that.
But how do you deal with the reality that we have right now, which is that until the American boots were on the ground, security wasn't improving in Baghdad? Those civilian attacks have dropped because American soldiers are in greater numbers out on the streets of Baghdad now. That's the situation we're in now. So just help -- I mean, we know what the long-term goal is, but even if they're 4 to 1, I mean even if the Iraqis outnumber the Americans, that's not having an impact.
GEN. CALDWELL: What I'll tell you, there's a -- it's a multi- pronged approach that's occurring now. If you go down into the Dura district and look around, I mean, you're going to see the Iraqi national police down there operating in that area, you're going to see Iraqi army forces operating in that area, you are going to see coalition forces. But it's not just coalition forces. There is no way we could execute this operation, Operation Together Forward, without the Iraqi security forces there in the numbers that they are. I mean they are essential to the success of this operation.
When you take an American -- coalition force unit, they're well- trained, they're well-organized and they've been together for a long time. They've got very professional officer corps and non- commissioned officer corps that's been in existence 15, 20 years. When you take the Iraqi army unit, they're about three years into their developmental phase and they have a lot to learn, like any organization would that's just being formed and organized and put out there. So they continue to grow and they continue to get better each day.
I don't think anybody expects an Iraq unit to operate at the same level of efficiency and effectiveness as an American unit of the same size today, but they will over time. They will. They're improving each and every day. They've got the willingness, they've got the desire. They're out there getting at it each and every day. When you just -- I mean, nobody likes to talk casualties, but when you look at the amount of casualties that the Iraqi security forces have sustained, you can see that there's no question about they're deeply committed, they're deeply involved, and they're in the tough situations out there. So we, the coalition forces, could never accomplish what we're doing in that city without the Iraqi security forces.
Okay, thank you very much.
END.
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