Weekly Press Briefing, June 15, 2006
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Air Strike Video [WMV 5.79MB]
IRAQ OPERATIONAL UPDATE BRIEFING
BRIEFERS:
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM CALDWELL, USA, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL
FORCE-IRAQ BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN HOOG, USAF, DIRECTOR, AIR
COMPONENT AND COORDINATION ELEMENT
LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
TIME: 8:00 A.M. EDT
DATE: THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2006
GEN. CALDWELL: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. Today we'll discuss the overall context of the strike that eliminated Zarqawi, an action that we believe has dealt a severe blow to the al Qaeda network here in Iraq. Not only was Zarqawi considered by many amongst the most dangerous operational terrorists across the region, but he was a foreign fighter, deadlier than most, who was able to garner funding, additional foreign fighters, and propagandized myth.
Today we have provided an overall operational overview with detailed questions and answers. We have, of course, looked at the definitive findings from the autopsy and from the recent DNA testing that established Zarqawi's death. Additionally, we'll provide a more comprehensive time line to you today: the intricacies of the airstrike and further detail regarding operations that led to Zarqawi's demise. However, more than just a litany of details to fill in the story is required. We will attempt to put this in some kind of context for you, especially the last few weeks.
Recently, we just heard Prime Minister Maliki unveil his vision for the safety and security of the people here. A plan including Baghdad is the linchpin in his strategy for a democratic Iraq. As the prime minister noted in his op-ed piece that was read around the world, Iraq's national unity government will build -- and I say, quote -- "on the additional momentum gained from the death of Zarqawi in order to defeat terrorism and sectarianism and to deliver on the Iraqi people's hope of a unified, stable and prosperous democracy."
Yesterday the ministers of Defense, Interior and National Security gathered to articulate a key element of the Iraqi government's three-pronged strategy of security, reconstruction and reconciliation. Introducing the initial measures of the new security plan, Amaliya Ma'an ila Al-Amam, or, as we call it, Operation Together Forward, the ministers underscored the intend to target terrorists in Baghdad. Coalition forces continue to support as Iraqi security forces take the lead during this operation.
Removing the personal threat of Zarqawi disrupted the al-Qaida network, forcing the terrorists to re-shuffle their leadership, dislodging them from their corridors leading into the capital. These factors in themselves have now helped set the conditions for the Iraqi security forces to establish the foundation for unity, security and prosperity for the people of Iraq.
Over the past week, since the strike on Zarqawi, we have conducted 452 coalition and Iraqi operations at the company level and above, which is about the norm that we normally cover in a one-week period. Of these, 255 were combined operations, utilizing both coalition forces and Iraqi security forces. One hundred and forty-three were Iraqi security forces only, operating independently. The result of these operations was 759 anti-Iraqi elements detained and over 104 anti-Iraqi elements killed.
We found 28 significant caches during those operations.
Now, to take you through brief timeline of the Zarqawi strike, what I'd like to do first is introduce you to Brigadier General Steve Hoog, who will give you a(n) air operations overview associated with that.
GEN. HOOG: Good afternoon. I'm Brigadier General Steve Hoog, and I represent the Air Component Coordination Element here in Multinational Forces Iraq. What I want to share with you today is an expanded look at the contribution air power made for the elimination or al-Zarqawi and what the coalition Air Forces do every day to help protect innocent Iraqis and support ground forces.
Next slide, please. Next slide. Next slide, please.
This is a photograph of an F-16, similar to the ones that flew the mission on 7 June. The F-16 is a compact, single-seat, multi-role fighter. It is highly maneuverable. In its surface -- air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles or over 860 kilometers, deliver its weapons with precise accuracy, and return to base without refueling. You can see that this F-16 is armed with the GBU-12, and it's located on the wing to your right, located right here.
Back one. Back one slide. In pilot terms, they call this a PIO. We're going back and forth. Now back one. The other back. Freeze. Good to go.
On this wing, you can see the GBU-38, which is a GPS-guided munition. This is just one of several aircraft configurations that the F-16s may fly in every day over Iraq.
Next slide, please.
On June 7th, in mid-afternoon, two F-16s prepared for the mission and took off to conduct a routine operation to detect improvised explosive devices or IEDs varied in or along the highways in Iraq. They were able to do this because of the targeting pod attached underneath the aircraft. This pod contains a high resolution, forward-looking sensor that displays infrared or TVA images in a wide-field-of-view surge capacity or a narrow-field-of-view acquisition targeting capability to designate the target for laser-guided weapons.
During this time, they actually supported two separate searches n a period of more than two and a half hours. You should also note that we routinely refuel these aircraft, and in fact, we normally refuel almost all airborne fighter aircraft over Iraq. And this case is what we would normally call a top-off in terms of getting gas. The aircraft is allowed to burn down about half of its fuel load and then assent to refuel to the tanker to full capacity. That way, if an aircraft is called upon for an immediate mission, we want the aircraft to have the ability to loiter and search overhead for an extended period of time before it must refuel again.
Since the aircraft were engaged in surveillance operations, the pilots elected to use an option of refueling single ship.
When they do that, that allows one airplane to stay overhead and provide surveillance while the other airplane goes and get refueling.
Next slide, please.
Once refueled the second time, they were redirected and instructed to remain on call for possible surveillance operations northeast of Baghdad. Soon after 6 p.m., the flight was
past the location of a safe house where Zarqawi
was hiding. The pilot used a lightning pod to view the house and positively identify it was a
correct target.
At approximately 6:11 p.m. local time, the lead F-16 was directed by the ground commander to engage the house with a single GBU-12.
Next slide, please.
This is the view from the lead F-16 during the attack. There area few items to note before we play the release sequence. First, note that the target itself is not actually visible directly ahead of the aircraft. At this point, it has gone under the nose of the aircraft and is only visible to the pilot and the targeting pod system.
Second, the time is displayed in the lower right corner, right here. When it plays, it will become clearer.
All air operations are conducted in Zulu Time
for standardization across the entire Iraqi theater. Since we are four hours ahead of Zulu Time here in Iraq, the time is 14:11 Z, or 16:11 p.m. local, displayed, to make the conversion.
Finally, you can see the airplane's heading, airspeed, and this little triangle here represents the vector that the aircraft is on. When this cue comes down and meets that, that will flash, and that indicates to the pilot that we've had a successful weapons release.
Now let's begin the video.
You can see the time of 14:11. You can see the cue coming down. And momentarily it should begin to flash. At that point, the bomb isaway from the aircraft.
Next slide, please.
Here is a weapons system video of the GBU-12 as it actually hits the target. The Paveway II guidance system used on the GBU-12 is very reliable and has been in service and used by U.S. and coalition forces for years to meet our precision requirements.
Of note, let me point out several items on this video. First, in the lower right-hand corner, you'll see time till impact. That's the actual countdown before the bomb should impact the target, if all is going as planned.
Second, the cross-hairs represents the designation point for the laser beam on the ground. That is what the pilot physically uses to aim the weapons spot. He has a little button on left-hand throttle that he can use to steer that laser spot, using this picture to guide him.
Third, this L will start to flash. That means that the laser is actively working to make sure we are designating the correct target. And you'll see that because you'll get a digital readout here that tells you your exact range to the target as measured by the laser.
Let's begin the video, please.
Here you can see the time to impact. The laser is flashing, 3.3nautical miles from the target and the weapon impact point.
You'll notice that the picture changed at the very end from aclose-up to a faraway view, and I'll talk more about that in a moment.
Next slide, please.
Then, just a couple minutes later, the lead aircraft was again directed to follow up an additional bomb, this time a GBU-38. Since this munition requires coordinates for the satellite guidance, the pilot had to verify the exact coordinates before the weapon could be released. Both weapons successfully hit their target.
Next slide, please.
And here, again, is a weapons system video of the GBU-38. To note before we start this: Since the weapon is satellite-guided, the cross-hairs are no longer relative to the target itself. They can be anywhere, and the weapon is being guided in by the coordinates and the global position satellites to the target.
In addition, you'll notice that this is a large field of view, whereas the explosion you saw before in the GBU-12 -- the entire screen was this big. Now you can see you have a much greater field of regard. And that is one reason why the explosion looks so small in the second bomb as compared to the first. It's simply not its greatest magnification.
Please begin the video .
(Video is shown.)
Next slide, please.
The two aircraft remained overhead for another couple of hours, refueling one more time. The average fighter mission is scheduled from between five to six hours, and in this particular mission, it was within those parameters. To the pilots, this was a routine attack conducted to support Iraqi national security objectives. They were not aware of the exact high-value nature of this target until sometime the next day.
Next slide, please.
This slide depicts some of the assets used to support ongoing security operations over Iraq on a daily basis. On average, more than20 different types of aircraft fly in support of coalition and Iraqi objectives every day. And this is just an example of some of those. This air umbrella is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The key point to remember about this air umbrella is that although it cannot be everywhere all the time, it's up there all the time ready to be tasked as needed. Because of the flexible nature of air operations, it can be rapidly adjusted and refocused to support security operations on a moment's notice. This mission we just described is a classic case of prosecuting a time-sensitive target once the painstaking and detailed intelligence-gathering process has identified the location of the safe house.
On average, we fly enough strike assets every day to fly around the world four and a half times if they flew in a straight line. We pump over 250,000 gallons of fuel every day from our tankers. The airlift assets fly around 150 missions, moving some 3,000 passengers, and moving over 1.1 million pounds of cargo per day. These are just some of the examples of airpower that give the coalition the ability to rapidly reach any part of the battlespace.
The bottom line is we're here to support the Iraqis and our coalition allies to help bring security to this nation.
General Caldwell.
GEN. CALDWELL: What I'd like to do now is just take you through the timeline here. There's obviously a lot more operational aspects of this than we're going to put up on the screens today. It was far more comprehensive. But through the intelligence declassification process, this is what every concurred was acceptable to be released.
Next slide, please.
We have talked already a little about the time associated with the aircraft there. I won't go into that. I think the two things to point out to you on this one is we were obviously tracking al-Rahman for a considerable amount of time, but it specifically started narrowing in and all the checklists were being met sometime mid-afternoon. This is the first time that we saw Rahman move to a meeting location, moving from his vehicle to inside another place. And then at some point later, you can see him here, he departs again about 30 minutes later. He then moves from that location -- next slide please -- where we see him at 4:55 enter the safe house which would later be struck at about 6:15.
This thing here, where we say coalition ground forces asked to verify nothing in the vicinity, it's not because there were troops physically there involved in the operation, rather, this safe house is in the operational objective area where a unit does operate, and because this was unplanned and it was a time-sensitive target, there was no way of verifying ahead of time that there weren't by chance some kind of coalition patrol combing through the area. So in fact, when it was decided that they were going to be striking this target, they went ahead and cleared that there were no patrols or any other ancillary -- either Iraqi or coalition forces in that location that might be incidental to the strike.
And then as you heard, by 6:15, the safe house was destroyed.
Next chart, please.
Okay, and we talked the other night -- at about 6:40 is when coalition forces arrived at the location of the safe house. And then at 7:04 is when they established -- there was no pulse or respiration present in AMZ any further at that point.
The MIT here is our military teams, our military training teams that are embedded and operating with Iraqi forces. They live, eat and associate with them on a day-by-day basis. They maintain their presence there with them. They serve as mentors, similar just to what our president did the other day with the cabinet, where he brought his Cabinet together with the government of Iraq cabinet to spend two days sort of mentoring, talking and training together. These gentlemen and these ladies that are associated with MIT teams are spread throughout the country of Iraq, do that on a 24 by 7 basis for a one-year tour.
So what they did is they contacted -- because we knew there was a MIT team up at this Iraqi army compound -- and asked them to the safe house location, since they were the closest U.S. coalition forces that we had that routinely operated in that area.
Next slide, please.
And as you can see, the MIT team did in fact get down there at about 7:30 that night. And then around 9:06 p.m., coalition forces --a portion of them departed the safe house location, taking the remains of the three males with them when they departed. We had also brought in engineer assets at that point because we knew we would need to conduct sensitive site exploitation of that location. And to do that, because of the rubble that was there, it would require bulldozers to plow over different portions as we would continue to search through the wreckage.
Iraqi police were already onsite and did assist at this point in helping clear and attain evidence. And then around 9:45 p.m., the MIT team commander went ahead and took charge of the engineer assets and was prepared to establish a cordon throughout the night while other coalition forces continued to arrive at that location.
Next slide, please.
The next day at 11:00 the site exploitation was complete. So mission complete, site exploitation done.
The question was asked, what about the three females who had died in that? We have now verified, it was about at 12:45 -- right around noon the next day that the Iraqi army did in fact pick up the remains of those three personnel and transported them to Khalis GeneralHospital.
And then our MIT team departed about 1:00 p.m.
Next slide, please.
Two days later, Saturday, the 10th of June, June 10th is when we conducted the autopsies on both Rahman and Zarqawi, each one lasting approximately, as you heard the other day, about three hours.
And then the next day is when we brought the engineers back inagain. Went ahead and finished the final exploitation of that site and went ahead and leveled it back out.
(Break for direction.)
The many pieces of the Zarqawi puzzle were obviously put together as a result of the -- our neighbors in -- that were associated with us in this global war on terrorism, the neighbors that are part of the global war on terrorism with the government of Iraq, both coalition and Iraqi ground forces, air and ground forces, military and civilianefforts, pilots, police, engineers, doctors, a lot of folks associated with that operation to bring that to the conclusion.
But as we have now, we've shifted, and the focus now, as theprime minister has said the other day, has become the focus of Baghdadand the operation that's ongoing here in Baghdad itself. And Operation Together Forward is continuing and will be executed for the unforeseeable future, depending on what the government of Iraq says.They in fact have taken the lead. They are in charge. Coalition forces are operating in support of them as they impose and execute some curfews, some restrictions on driving, set up additional checkpoints. And they do focused operations throughout the city of about 7.2 million, when you consider the suburbs of Iraq.
What I'd like to do is talk to you briefly about this point, as we continue looking at the al Qaeda network -- no question that it'sin some kind of disarray and disorganization at this point as they start coming back together, having lost their leader.
At this point, with the information that we have available, we’ve gone ahead and done -- made an assessment that we think that Abu Ayyub al-Masri is in fact probably Hamza al-Muhajer. They're probably one inthe same.
If you would -- go ahead and show the picture and put the firstone up here, if you would.
You can show the one back up on the screen now.
This is a Ayyub al-Masri. This is the individual at this point that we've established that is probably the person that is going to move to and take over and be responsible for the leadership role herein Iraq -- in al-Qaida in Iraq. If you have listened on the -- read on the website, they're calling the person that they're going to put in charge Hamza al-Muhajer. We think they are one and the same at this point. We'll continue to do further analysis.
What we do know about Ayyub al-Masri is that he is a senior al-Qaida in Iraq operative and direct associate of Zarqawi. We know he is responsible for facilitating the movement of foreign fighters from Syria through the southern Baghdad belt into Baghdad itself. We know al-Masri has been a terrorist since about 1982, beginning with his involvement in the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which was led by Zawahiri.In 1999 is when we think we have established that he probably first went into Afghanistan to receive training and provide Islamic lectures to other terrorists. Due to his training in Afghanistan, Masri became an explosives expert, specializing in the construction of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. We believe he maintained this skill throughout his time operating both in Fallujah and in Baghdad.
Following the fall of the Taliban, he left Afghanistan, eventually arriving in Iraq. Originally he began to work with Zarqawiin Fallujah, and then later became, we think, basically the emir of southern Iraq for al-Qaida in Iraq. He operates primarily in the past out of southern Baghdad. Raids in April and May of this year into areas of southern Baghdad recovered some materials confirming his high-level involvement in the facilitation of foreign fighters to conduct attacks in Baghdad itself. On 13 June, or June 13th, we did see posted by him a -- threatening retaliatory attacks against the multinational force for the death of Zarqawi, claiming that our only option was to leave this country. Al-Masri's intimate knowledge ofal-Qaida in Iraq and his close relationship with AMZ operations will undoubtedly help facilitate and enable them to regain some momentum if, in fact, he is the one that assumes the leadership role.
Al-Masri's ability to effectively exert leadership over the al-Qaida cells remains unclear, and how many al-Qaida senior leadership members and Sunni terrorists may attempt to exert their influence and take charge is unknown at this time. We do know that he espouses in open press statements the same tactics of attacking and killing innocent civilians. We do know other people that might, in fact, tyro ascend to the top of this leadership role. It would be people like Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi, or the other one might be, in fact, Abdullah bin Rashid, who is the self-proclaimed head of the Mujahideen Shura Council.
But we and the people of Iraq remain very vigilant. Two days ago the president traveled here. He met with the prime minister of this country. He established, between him and the president and the prime minister of Iraq, a relationship where they looked at each other in the eye and, as he says, assessed the commitment and dedication that each have as to where we're going to move forward from here. The president says he sees in them the desire to move forward. We’re encouraged, we're optimistic, and we're here to work in support of the government of Iraq as they move forward in combating terrorism and reestablishing unity, security and peace in their country.
With that, both Steve and I will be glad to take any questions you all may have.
Yes, sir?
Q Just a few really quick. Looking at the timeline, can we assume from the timeline that Zarqawi was already in the house waiting for Rahman to arrive? Or did he arrive at a different time and areyou just not telling us when he arrived?
And also referring to the timeline, is the first site that you’re talking about, that Rahman arrived at, is that different from the second site? Or did they go and come back?
GEN. CALDWELL: That's correct, different sites at those two locations. Those are very different locations. And that was a movement along a path that eventually took him to the safe house.
Q Movement along a path. And --
GEN. CALDWELL: And your assumption is correct that he was already in the house.
QHe was -- can you talk about -- can you talk at all how long he'd been there? You know ---
GEN. CALDWELL: For operational security reasons, they're not talking about the duration in time or the activities associated with him arriving at that safe house.
Q And I just had a couple for the general -- the Air Force general. Sorry.
Can you just tell us who put the laser on the house initially for the first strike that you did? And I think you said something like the coordinates -- they had to plug the coordinates into the house on the second strike. Where did those coordinates come from? All of which is a long way of asking, did you have people on the ground who were providing those coordinates, as a couple of very senior people in the Pentagon have indicated.
GEN. HOOG: Let me start with the last part first. I have no idea about the last part. I don't have any operational knowledge, and I don't believe if we did, we'd be releasing it at this point.
But back to your first two points. On who lazed the target, the target was lazed by the aircraft that you saw here. The flashing "L"I ndicates that that was a self-designation laser-guided bomb drop. So the pilot in the first F-16 did in fact laze his own bomb into the target.
The second piece is the coordinates. As you might expect, we have pretty good satellite coverage of all the entire country of Iraq, and we have been doing time-sensitive targeting for some time. So the ability to generate GPS-level accurate coordinates, although the exact number is classified, I will tell you it's measured in minutes. And we had that capability to generate those coordinates once we have a place to focus our efforts.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes, sir?
Q Borzou Daragahi, Los Angeles Times. Just a few quick questions with regard to the -- can you just say where you got the picture from, where this picture of al-Masri came from?
GEN. CALDWELL: It came from the Defense Intelligence Agency. I mean, well, I don't know -- I have no idea where they got it from. But they declassified it for us at our request so that we'd have that available today for the press conference.
Q Also, I just wanted to ask you real quick about this document that was released today by Mowaffak Rubaie, the national security adviser.
GEN. CALDWELL: Right.
Q Can you give an assessment about this document? Do you have any comment on it about its authenticity, veracity, provenance?
GEN. CALDWELL: Obviously, I just knew a couple of hours before the national security adviser was going to make the announcement myself. I did in fact go back in -- I know that we can verify that through operations that this information did come off some kind of computer asset that was on a safe location that had been struck at a much earlier date. It was an item that was used, amongst many other things that the Iraqi forces and coalition forces were involved in through exploitation that they continued to use that eventually led them to find al-Zarqawi.
Q So this isn't from the Zarqawi safe house?
GEN. CALDWELL: No, this was prior to the Zarqawi safe house. There were actually a -- as we stated before, there was a three-week intense operation that went on that led us, actually, to the safe house that night.
And during that time period, there was a series of targets that each in itself continued to help us move towards the eventual location. Again with information shared by partners in the global war on terrorism and Iraqi forces, that enabled us to find and fix that location.
So the authenticity of this is that it came off one of those targets. We know that for certain. But as far as analysis of it, we have not done any yet that -- I'm sure somebody has done some, but I have not been privy to any of that analysis that's been done.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Was that the Iraqi security forces or the coalition security forces that got that document?
And also, can you tell me -- the timeline talks about two people leaving the house just before it was struck. Were any of those people-- were either of them intelligence people related to the strike on Zarqawi's house? Do you know who those two people are?
GEN. CALDWELL: We've been asked not to talk about any of the individuals that either entered or left the place or where they may have ended up or where they are today.
As far as the strike on that one particular target, there was a series of quite a few targets that were hit. I'd have to go back and find out specifically what forces were involved in the strike that found this one particular document that evening.
Yes?
Q Sir, two questions. One for you and one for General Hoog, if I could. When they checked to see if there were coalition forces in the area, I would imagine the MiTT team would have blue force trackers, and that would be relatively easy, but then checking to see if the Iraqi army or Iraqi police have patrols in the area must have been a little bit harder.
GEN. CALDWELL: Really, the thing that they were primarily checking was on the Iraqi army. Our MiTT team there lives and is embedded with the Iraqi forces there at that compound, does have complete situation awareness of what operations are conducted and where they're supposed to be when they're out on patrol, and was utilizing that to help clear that we should have no coalition forces and Iraqi security forces in that location.
Q And for the General, just -- you gave us some great numbers about pounds of fuel and pounds of stuff (found ?), but how many sorties does that translate to on average per day over Iraq?
GEN. HOOG: We prefer not to go into the actual detail on number of sorties. It varies up and down. We try to major it in effects and capability provided. So I would not like to discuss individual sortie counts.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes, sir?
Q Brian Lenz (ph) with the Associated Press. I want to return for a second to Rubaie's comments this morning regarding troop withdrawal and troop draw downs. He said that the last troop – the last coalition soldier will leave by the middle of 2008. Was that news to you? Did you know that? And secondly, if you didn't, doest hat indicate that there is a clearly outlined plan for a drawdown?
GEN. CALDWELL: As my boss, General Casey, always says, it's all conditions-based. But clearly, we see the Iraqi security forces continually improving, becoming better, operating more independently. And as they do so, they assume the operational space out there, which will give the ability for the Multinational Force commander, General Casey, to make that assessment as to whether or not we need as many forces as we have today.
I have not been privy to the ongoing discussions about timelines that were referred to. As I read it, it said the last soldier will leave in 2008. General Casey has not briefed us and said there is some specific timeline. He has said, as late as this morning, that we still are conditions-based; we'll look at and assess how well the Iraqi security forces are doing, but always mindful of the fact that we are guests here of the government of Iraq, and at which time they tell us that they're ready to have us return home, we will, in fact, depart.
Q So if, in fact, Iraq wants the last soldier to leave in the middle of 2008, regardless of what those conditions are, you will leave?
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah -- this is a sovereign nation. We are here as guests of the government of Iraq.
The prime minister and his council of representations will make those kind of decisions. We will give our advice and recommendations, and they will make the decision.
Q General, two questions for you; one brief one for the Air Force commander. I know that we have taxed you on this time and time again, and you'll be aware of why we are pulled in two directions on this issue.
GEN. CALDWELL: Okay.
Q I'm sorry. For the recording, I should say, John Burns, The New York Times.
There were no United States forces, specifically no United States Special Forces, in the vicinity of this house on this mission at the time that the F-16s were called in. The most recent prompt for this question is that the president met with people who were involved in this mission in the Rotunda on Wednesday -- Tuesday afternoon. There were some Air Force personnel there. That suggested that their role was more than just coming in and putting Zarqawi on a stretcher and taking him away. That's the first question.
The second question, this picture looks like it might be 20 years old. Are we safe to assume that Masri is probably in his 40s? And do you draw any conclusion from the fact that Zawahiri in his letter to Zarqawi, I think about nine months ago, said it's time to cut out of this business of striking mass civilian targets and the Shi'ites, etcetera? If he comes from Islamic jihad, it might suggest that there might be a change in policy on that.
And the question for the general, and then, I'll -- I'm sorry --give the microphone up. I wasn't able to tell from here what the time to target is in the case of each bomb. I think the first one was 3.5nautical miles. The other one was, I think, three nautical miles. How long does it take for those bombs to, after they have left the aircraft, to hit the target?
GEN. HOOG: A notional time of flight would be anywhere from about 16 to 24 seconds. It's traveling about 900 feet per second, so depending on the exact release range, that's the distance in the time you’re looking at.
GEN. CALDWELL: I think your real question, John, you're asking me, if I'm correct, on the first one was, were there coalition ground force -- were there coalition forces on the ground in the vicinity of that safe house when the target was struck? And the answer to that is no.
Q(Anywhere ?).
GEN. CALDWELL: There were no coalition ground forces in the vicinity, right on the ground there, when that target was struck. I’m not exactly sure how far away, but they were not right near by when the target was hit.
QBut that doesn't preclude the possibility that they might have been the ones who -- (off mike)?
GEN. CALDWELL: Well, in all -- I mean, John, all seriousness, the target was lazed by the pilot himself. I mean, it -- and that was the intent, to try to show the intricacies so you could see that onthe heads-up display, because I know people keep thinking that perhaps there was a JTAC on the ground who was doing the lazing itself, but there wasn't. It was done by the pilot.
Q Can we -- can I just turn to a phrase I used the other day? When you say "in the vicinity," does that mean over the horizon? We can assume there were no U.S. forces within the horizon of that house.
GEN. CALDWELL: That's a technical question, you know, you’re asking me. (Laughs.) I would have to find out approximately how faraway they were, but they were not close enough that they could move there rapidly by ground, and they were not close enough they could move there rapidly by a vehicle. I mean, if you saw, we struck the house -- the final bombs went off at 6:15, and we were not able to get coalition forces on that site until 6:40. I mean, that literally was the first time that a coalition force other than the Iraqi police stepped foot on that objective was at 6:40 p.m.
Q And then, the question about Zawahiri and this guy's age.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, obviously, when we asked for photos, we were given more than just this photo.
This is the one that we were able to get releasable. I will go back and ask the question on age. I had not, because I had not seen a tremendous difference in --
Q The ages.
GEN. CALDWELL: -- in the ages of all the different photos. It wasn’t like one was of a very, very young man and then there was others where he was much older, of middle -- I mean, senior age or something. So I'll go back and ask the age.
That actually was somewhat representative of the other photos, too, that we had -- perhaps slightly older, but not much. But we'llgo back and ask if we could not get some kind of approximate age. I think they'll be glad to provide that.
Q And another question: Zawahiri was saying kind of to Zarqawi: Cut out this mass killing of people; it's not good for business. Any reason to believe that as an Islamic jihadi from an Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement, this guy might be more amenable to that advice than Zarqawi was?
GEN. CALDWELL: Our initial assessment is we think he will probably continue with the same tactics and techniques that Zarqawi did. But again, we're not certain at this point. But that's our initial assessment. There is nothing to indicate to us that he would do differently, because he has already been here in this country for over -- oh, gosh, almost three, four years now, and has been a part off and associated with the innocent (sic) killing of Iraqi civilians. So for him to make a change, there's nothing that shows or reflects that he would do that. What we have seen posted on websites allegedly associated with him have not condemned that type of activity. So we’re just going with the assumption that they will continue as they had previously, at this point.
Yes, sir?
QI will speak in Arabic, okay?
(In Arabic.)
GEN. CALDWELL: The question that was asked is, when he saw the photo of Zarqawi, it did not look like somebody who might have been ina home that had been hit by two 500-pound bombs, by looking at the cuts, the bruises and the incidentals on his face, and wanted to know if we were going to show photos similar as we did to Saddam Hussein’s sons after they were killed.
The answer to the question is we were not going to show any other photos. We obviously have more photos that will be maintained with the autopsy results that were conducted on Zarqawi's and Rahman's body.
But what we did last week, we brought in a medical examiner or a doctor who was associated with the medical examiners, and had him explain why when you look at the shock waves that occur with the blast, the location where the person was, any walls that may have been there, the degree and angle with which the bomb may have hit the building, and he sort of walked us through. Zarqawi had massive internal injuries to his chest from the pressure that may initially immediately explode sort of inside your body and then starts to contract afterwards from an explosion of those type of bombs going off. In fact, if you look down, he did have some scarring here on the side of his face here, some lacerations and cuts up in here.
But his body in itself externally was not hit by shrapnel; it wasn’t picked up and didn't hit any sharp objects. But he had massive internal injuries inside. When the medic arrived on scene, the coalition force medic, and immediately fixed his airway, he had a lot of blood that came out. And the report talks about the volume --about a pint and a half worth is -- the medic reports it in his report afterwards writing about it. So quite a bit of blood, which would be consistent with extremely massive internal injuries.
But we'll be glad to get you that transcript, too, of the doctor’s recounting of everything.
(To staff) Could you take care of that, Christina (sp)?
We'll get that for you because it's very detailed. We had a medical person do it which -- far better than I can even talk about that.
Yes, Dex?
Q Dexter Filkins again with The New York Times. Do you have any evidence to indicate that Masri was with Zarqawi in the mountains in Kurdistan before the war, as you believe Zarqawi to be, the camp that was hit by the Special Forces up there? Do you have any indications or any evidence that he trained in Zarqawi's camp in Western Afghanistan?
And can you -- just on that same subject -- do you have any idea when those two guys came into contact? And then when you just said, "I think that he trained -- he trained in Afghanistan in 1999 or 2000" --
GEN. CALDWELL: Could you guys -- could you guys put up the other chart, please?
Q-- Was that the Farouk camp? Was that the bin Laden camp in Afghanistan, and -- which obviously suggests -- you know, has he met the grand sheik?
GEN. CALDWELL: Some of the data I talked about is listed on that
chart there.
At this point -- releasable is the fact that we do know that two of them did train together at the al-Farouk training camp in Afghanistan. We do know the -- it is about 1999 was the first time that they linked up -- al-Masri did with Zarqawi probably -- well, we know 1999 was when al-Masri went to Afghanistan. We don't know when the actual linkup occurred. They may know that. It was not releasable at this point. But I do know that it's releasable that the two of them did train together at the al-Farouk training camp while he was there, and then eventually made his way back to Iraq after the fall of the Taliban.
Q Does that -- I mean, the Farouk camp, as you know, is in Southeastern Afghanistan -- or was in Southeastern Afghanistan. Is there anything to indicate that he trained in Zarqawi's camp in Western Afghanistan, had any contact with bin Laden at all? And was he in Kurdistan, the camp that you guys hit before the war -- before the war here in March of 2003?
GEN. CALDWELL: I'll have to go back and ask those questions.
Q Okay.
GEN. CALDWELL: All right?
Q Thanks.
GEN. CALDWELL: There's obviously more information, but what I was -- what I'm able to share to you is what I was able to get declassified before we came today.
Q Thank you.
GEN. CALDWELL: Yes, ma'am?
Q The Iraqi government says it's considering the possibility of amnesty as part of a reconciliation plan, and one of the proposals that’s being considered is a possibility of amnesty for insurgents involved in strikes on U.S. troops only. And there were suggestions that there had been some preliminary contacts with the U.S. military about this, and there had been some kind of accord on that or some kind of preliminary acceptance. Could you comment on that?
GEN. CALDWELL: Those type of discussions have taken place between the government of Iraq -- of that type of nature would be between the government of Iraq and the Department of State, the U.S. embassy, and I should let an embassy spokesman really address those versus myself.
Q If I can ask another question. Are you satisfied with the amount of cooperation so far from the Iraqi government in terms of operations against renegade elements of militias, of the Shi'ite religious militias? Are you getting the cooperation you need to --for operations against them when you felt there was reason to have operations?
GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, absolutely. Nobody ever, in any reports that I've read, ever said anything but very complimentary -- ongoing action between our forces and their forces. In fact, if anything, it-- you know, when I was out in Eastern Baghdad about two weeks ago and was able to talk to the 4th Brigade of the 101st operating over there as part of the 4th Infantry Division, I was absolutely amazed at the relationship they have established. And I think -- it's either 12 or15 Iraqi battalions associating and working with that 101st Brigade. And they had nothing but laudatory comments about the interactions, the relationships, the cooperation, the exchange of information between them.
It's -- gosh, everywhere I've been, even out in the Ramadi area, when I visited out there -- I mean, again, everybody has just had nothing but great things to say about the ongoing dialogue and relationship we have with the government, Iraqi army forces that we're working with.
Yes, sir?
Q Slightly off track, but there was an operation this morning in Karbala which apparently arrested the chair of the Provincial Council and, I believe, another member of the council.
The governor sort of condemned the action. This was a U.S. and Iraqi joint operation. The governor's condemned it. There have been some demonstrations about it. I was wondering if you had any information about the operation and why this man was arrested.
GEN. CALDWELL: I don't at this time, but I can get that for you. I mean, I did hear of the operation taking place. I'm aware of the activity that went on. I don't know the lead-up to it myself at this point, but I -- we should go back and ask those questions.
Q (Off mike) -- U.S. forces, and they seemed -- I mean, it's a fairly friendly city at one point that's now starting -- the governor now refers -- who used to meet a lot with J.D. Thurman, now refers to U.S. forces as the occupation forces, and everything like that. It seemed like it was a fairly high-profile operation that no one seems to be able to comment on, so I'm curious about it.
GEN. CALDWELL: We can go back and look at that. Clearly, anything we do now here in this country, since they're a sovereign nation, we're going to have to get their support and their cooperation to execute. We're not operating unilaterally without ensuring that the government of Iraq is informed of ongoing activities. So -- but we’ll go back and ask those questions. I mean, General Casey's been very clear on this point, to tell us and remind us that we're here in support of the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces.
Yes, sir?
Q General, just two quick questions. One kind of easy one, sort of philosophical. You mentioned forcing al Qaeda to reshuffle its leadership and change its safe houses as one way that this attack on Zarqawi, this killing of Zarqawi will help defeat the al Qaeda network in Iraq. Are there any other examples, specific examples of ways in which you guys believe this has disrupted al Qaeda’s activities?
And the other question. I mean, I got to ask this, but I mean coming here -- you know, I mean, al-Masri means "the Egyptian"; al-Muhajer means "the immigrant." You know, I mean, these are -- I mean, aren't you worried about kind of making a super-hero out of this guy? I mean, this is what they want, is media attention, as, you know, you guys have pointed out a lot. Isn't there a worry that, you know, by coming here and sort of making this big presentation and putting his picture up, that -- you know, like, the new face of terror in the headlines tomorrow, you're giving them exactly what they want?
Thank you.
GEN. CALDWELL: If I hadn't put the picture up, then you would have been asking for a picture. I mean, it was like catch-22. And we had a tremendous amount of discussion about that. I mean, that was a very good question to ask, because that was not something that we just said, "Hey, let's throw a picture up." That was a lot of requests coming in, a lot of people asking if there was a picture. Everything we had was classified was just 24 hours ago associated with this gentleman, this terrorist. And so the question was, do we in fact make something available or don't we?
And a lot of discussion went on at a lot of senior levels and we decided, hey this is a terrorist. If he follows what he's been doing for two and a half, three years in this country, he's going to continue killing innocent civilians. He is not the kind of person that the Iraqis want in their country and he's not the kind of person that we want to have around here either. And so we decided we'll show his picture.
You know, if somebody turns him in, you know, there is already an ongoing standard reward of about $200,000 that existed on his head before even Zarqawi was killed, because of his level of leadership within that organization that still exists right now. But our feeling was we'll share it with you-all.
So no, our intent is not to glorify him, make him more important or anything else. As we said, we're not fully sure who will actually eventually rise and assume the leadership role. I mean, that's still to actually be seen. Our assumption is it will be him. And we think, in fact, he is one and the same as they have talked about on their website. But it's still going to take a little more analysis as we continue looking at this. But all indications we have at this point in time, this is who it is.
Q (Off mike.)
GEN. CALDWELL: But as far as the reshuffling goes, there is no question that we beheaded the organization, but it's been proven in the past to be very resilient. And they are going to eventually get themselves reset. Our focus is to continue going after, just like we said we have been for many months, and especially intensely here just before we got Zarqawi, some of the mid-level leadership down there and keep taking them out, because eventually those kind of activities, we find information, are able to exploit, that leads us to more of them.
They have nothing they want to do more than just incite sectarian violence. They want to kill innocent civilians.
I mean, I truly believe as you look at this situation, the Iraqi people are going to grow very weary and tired of these type of people, especially when you have someone like him, who's Egyptian-born, has absolutely no ties to this country, who's coming in here and killing the people of this country. They're not going to want him around here very long.
Yes, John.
Q General, John Burns, New York Times. You anticipated my question, which had to do with -- you talk of sovereignty, and yet we have here yet another al-Qaida leader, apparently, who is a foreigner. I think you've -- you've answered that. But perhaps I could re-tool my question simply to say is that an encouragement to you, that they have made what, from your point of view, might be a tactical mistake -- if they have chosen him -- in choosing a foreigner and not an Iraqi?
And the second question for General Hoog. Was the pilot of the F-16 -- and we understand you will not identify him. Was he amongst those who met the president on Tuesday?
Thank you.
GEN. HOOG: I don't know the answer to that question or not. As far as I know -- I just don't know.
GEN. CALDWELL: As far as who takes over the leadership role, I mean, I'm sure our government has a position on that. But it -- probably inappropriate for me to discuss my personal position on that now. The bottom line is, though, regardless of who it is, if it's -- if -- you know, this is a terrorist organization. This is a terrorist person who has done nothing but espouse, you know, killing as a way of life in order to change the governments and change people's beliefs and uses intimidation and kidnapping, everything else. I think it's important for the people of Iraq to know who this is. And hopefully they will stand up against him just like we believe they really will ow that they see the opportunity and the hope for the, really, first time in the last three years. They have their own government now. They have that possibility. And they can really grab hold of it.
You know, the president of the United States came all the way over here just to talk to the prime minister, his cabinet, and to tell them how committed the United States is and how much we're going to support them, and to say to them, too, that we expect the same out of you. And if, in fact, they follow through, the conditions are being set that will allow them to succeed.
(Pause.) Okay. We want to thank you very much. Appreciate it, all.
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