Inspector Generals and Public Integrity in Iraq, March 28
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Monday, 27 March 2006
Participants:
Thomas Delare, Chairman, Anticorruption Working Group, U.S. Embassy Iraq
Ellen Klein, Rule Of Law Coordinator for the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team
Muklas Abdul Arazak (Ph), Inspector General for the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights
COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER BRIEFING TOPIC: INSPECTOR GENERALS AND PUBLIC INTEGRITY IN IRAQ PARTICIPANTS: THOMAS DELARE, CHAIRMAN, ANTICORRUPTION WORKING GROUP, U.S. EMBASSY IRAQ; ELLEN KLEIN, RULE OF LAW COORDINATOR FOR THE BAGHDAD PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM; MUKLAS ABDUL ARAZAK (PH), INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF HUMAN RIGHTS MODERATOR: JOHN ROBERTS, U.S. EMBASSY IRAQ INFORMATION OFFICER LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2006
MR. ROBERTS: Let's go ahead and get started.
Thank you very much for joining me. My name is John Roberts, embassy information officer.
Welcome to this on-the-record press conference to discuss U.S. support for the Iraq anticorruption effort.
With us today we have the minister-counselor for economic affairs, Mr. Thomas Delare, chairman of the embassy Anticorruption Working Group; we have Dr. Ellen Klein, rule of law coordinator for the Baghdad provincial reconstruction team; and we have Mr. Muklas Abdul Arazak (ph), inspector general for the Ministry of Human Rights.
I would like to inform you that of course this will be taped. We are running a transcript of this, so please speak up. We have microphones. And I will also be calling on you during the question and answer period after the statements.
Thank you very much.
MR. DELARE: Thank you, John.
Welcome, all of you. I'm very pleased you've all come here today to one more time deal with the problem of corruption in Iraq and to talk about the various institutions that have been established in Iraq to deal with the problem that is of great concern to all the Iraqi people and the American people.
Corruption threatens Iraq's future as a democratic nation. Corruption betrays the people of Iraq, robs them of their right to good government. It takes vital resources and money away from vital things like hospitals, schools and security.
And corruption like the insurgency is a threat to the country's future, its stability and its future economic growth.
Defeating corruption requires a coordinated and comprehensive approach. It begins with the appointment of honest ministers and other high officials. Ministers with substantial resources at their disposal are ministers who are particularly at risk and of particular concern.
Just looking at the history of Iraq over the past few years, we can even identify which ministries are of particular concern: Defense, Interior, Finance, Oil, Electricity, places where the resources are there. And unfortunately, people are sometimes inclined to see how they can divert those resources.
One of your most distinguished judges recently told me how important it is that high-quality appointments be made at these ministries. I will quote him: "If the minister and his director generals are honest, then even an employee inclined to be corrupt will refrain from doing so." And that's absolutely true. It's true not only in Iraq; it's true everywhere else in the world. Good leadership will breed a good ministry and will breed good behavior and bring services to the Iraqi people.
Now the inspector generals are just one part of a quite comprehensive system that's been designed to fight corruption in Iraq. In addition to the main inspector generals, we have their partners, the Commission on Public Integrity; the Board of Supreme Audit; and of course, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Now the IGs are particularly important because they have a mandate or a task to root out corruption in the ministries and to help prevent corruption, which is just as important as after the fact discovering something and punishing someone. If you can stop it before it starts, that's an incredibly important thing. They do that through guidance and education of ministry employees, including the minister himself. Will it work? As in other countries like the United States, the inspector generals are often the first line of defense against corrupt practices.
Since the inspector generals work within the ministries, they are uniquely placed to track corruption at its source. They often have in-depth knowledge of their ministries and are able to take corrective action before something becomes larger and unmanageable.
However, this does not come without a price. As my colleagues will tell you, they are under pressure from within the government and without. There are constant threats and political pressures. Two IGs have been killed since the inspector generals were created. And within the past weeks alone, four inspector generals have survived assassination attempts.
We all support the government of Iraq in its efforts to insulate the inspector generals, to keep the inspector generals away from security threats and political pressures. We also support uniform, common and adequate employment procedures and benefits, including security protection for inspector generals and other senior Iraqi anticorruption officials.
We support the creation of an inclusive centralized training institution for anticorruption and ethics training so that inspector generals and employees of the Commission on Public Integrity and auditors from the Board of Supreme Audit can under one roof come together and share their experiences and learn to know each other and work with each other well.
We are ready to continue supporting the government of Iraq to ensure that all of its anticorruption institutions work well together and are given the necessary resources and assistance to do their jobs.
Of course, there is always room for improvement, both in our support efforts and in the efforts we see here. For their part all of the anticorruption institutions working in Iraq must coordinate their activities even better than they do now. They must also be absolutely above suspicion, that none of their activities are motivated by political vendetta, personal vendetta or political interests.
I note that a set of charges against a minister were recently dismissed, for example, because the charges that were brought by an IG were subsequently found by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to be unsound. Again, that's the process as it should work. The inspector generals should do their jobs, but also, they need to be looked at as well to make sure that they are doing them properly. So there's room for work on all sides of it. There's also room for the press. The press is often in fact the very first line of defense for the people to understand what is happening in their country. I encourage the press to look at scandal, to try to uncover scandal, to try to understand scandal. And when it appears in the press, then government officials have a responsibility to look into it as well.
Of course, the press also has a responsibility to report it accurately so that we don't end up pursuing vendettas created, for example, by politicians who then indeed simply wish to use the existing institutions of state for political purposes.
So that's enough for me. I know you'd like to hear some of our experts who are actually involved with the inspector generals. I'm going to turn the microphone over to my colleague, Dr. Klein, and then we will go to the inspector general for human rights after that.
Thank you.
MS. KLEIN: Iraq is at a crossroads. As the new national government is formed, Iraq will have to commit more resources to fight corruption. Corruption is just as much of a threat to this country and its stability and economic growth as the insurgency.
The Iraqi inspector general, or IG, system is crucial to the war on corruption and has proven to be of great value to government ministries as they seek to improve their effectiveness and efficiency.
In February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 57 established the IG system. There are 31 offices which are associated with all government ministries. Each IG is appointed to a five-year term by the prime minister, and they have formed an active cross- ministerial association that is developing the oversight and educational capacities of all IGs.
These IGs stand ready to assist Iraqis in developing standards and policies that would further any kind of transparent and accountable government.
In 2005 the 31 offices of the IGs produced over 3,700 audits, over 1,000 inspections, and initiated or completed some 2,900 investigations.
One ministry enabled thousands of people who had been fired under Saddam's regime to be compensated for wrongful dismissal and later reinstated to their previous position.
Many of the Iraqi IG offices have developed a directorate of human rights to address allegations of abuse. Some IGs have networked with the Ministry of Human Rights to inspect detainee facilities and develop a uniform detainee facility checklist that meets international standards. Work in this area has been an integral part of their anticorruption portfolio, since it is often corruption that encourages abuse.
The Iraqi IG offices are staffed with nearly 2,300 professionals, and these IGs hope that a national anticorruption training institute will be established in the near future to help them accomplish their goals.
And now we're going to have Mr. Muklas (ph) come up. I was going to speak from back there. Okay, very good, thank you.
MR. ARAZAK (ph): (Through interpreter.) (Inaudible.) In addition to that, the general inspectors are still considered as officials in the ministries. And general inspectors are suffering from financial problems, despite the fact that these inspectors are dealing with criminals and people who have experience in corruption. The security problem - we as Iraqis we live in Baghdad, and that caused big problems for us and we lost many general inspectors. In addition to that we lost other workers, we lost many security guards. These were the victims to fight corruption.
We are still linked with the minister, and the minister has a certain special political status. And Iraq needs objectivity. And we should be objective before we tackle any issue or carry out an investigation on any issue.
We cooperate with public integration officers, (relative ?) public integration committee of Board of Supreme Audit. We carry out joint investigations of corruption issues. There might be some mistakes committed in the investigations. But we confirm that the general inspectors are working in unstable conditions. And it's very difficult to carry out the regulations and the laws in these circumstances.
And we still say that the inspector generals are very vital for any ministry. We don't want the help from the Americans. We want the help to come from our government. Part of the work of our government is to fight and combat corruption. The government should back the general inspectors to fight corruption so that Iraq will take another step toward economic growth.
Iraq is still suffering from this. And the budget of Iraq is causing a lot of financial problems to the people of Iraq. And we cannot achieve all of the goals for the Iraqis if we don't fight corruption. The many -- (inaudible) -- for the -- (inaudible) -- of those who didn't carry out the projects in the proper way. So we need cooperation from all parties, even from the press.
We should lay down the foundations to develop a new Iraq. Thank you.
MR. : (Through interpreter.) By the name of God, the merciful, the most compassionate, peace be upon you.
In addition to what Mr. Muklas (ph) said, I would like to add some balance, because I have experience in the two past years, the office of general inspector is very important in these circumstances. These offices didn't exist in the Iraqi government in the past. (Inaudible) -- these offices have been established in two years. They accomplished much for Iraq.
We started from scratch -- (inaudible). Now the efforts of the public inspectors or general inspectors was established by the inspectors themselves. The general inspectors did all the work without any help from any party. I say this frankly. Except for the -- some who -- except for those who cooperated with us.
Some may ask me for more details. And I would like to add that now the emphasis of the general inspector in any ministry depends on the personality of the general inspector himself. If the general inspector wants to fulfill his duties in these crucial circumstances, if the general inspectors are willing to serve their country in a proper way, they are playing a major role in this. The presence of the general inspectors in these circumstances is very important.
Can they continue in this direction? Although we don't have the capabilities to continue this process, I talked to the Iraqi officials about this issue and I told them that our work could collapse. The support given to the general inspectors should be -- and we are ready for this.
(The answer for any question about Iraq, about what Iraq is doing in ?) the past two years, but we won't ask the officials what did they do for the people of Iraq.
I give you an example. Some officials know that employment is very (large ?) in Iraq. I announced that I need some officials. When I make an interview with these officials they apologized and told me that they cannot work in their office because -- I think that these people are not -- (are ?) honest, because money is not everything. If we are really patriotic people, we should serve our country in these crucial circumstances and not in easy circumstances.
These are -- (inaudible) -- issues. The general inspectors can fight corruption in an effective way, but why do the government support our offices and don't support us. If they don't -- (inaudible) -- let them say this frankly. Many people do not want to help us because they don't agree with our work.
There is much difference between the ministries about this, who take over the ministries. We in our ministry, we have reached a joint cooperation between the minister and other officials, because in our ministry the office of general inspector is the main instrument used by the minister.
I told you that this depends on the personality of the minister. If a minister is helping the general inspector, they will be able to actually achieve big achievements. We have contacted the public integrity commission about these issues. We are happy to (obtain this conference ?), and through this conference we intend to contribute to the development of Iraq, not for anything else. Because we think that -- I think that God has laid this mission on our shoulders. We should serve the people of Iraq in these hard circumstances. We should make justice to people and we should be able to see the confidence of the people, and we're working on that. There are different points of view. Some people who worked on this efforts have points of view. But I certainly think that the issue between the general inspector and the minister -- (inaudible). This means that the general inspector is doing his duties well.
As a regular auditor, I think this is a wrong idea. I think that this person cannot educate the minister, so that he can get that permission and approval of that minister.
So these are related issues, as I told you. So if the nation with minister is good, this means that the results will be very good and effective.
And sorry for talking too much. Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: (Off mike) -- taking some of your questions now. Please let me recognize you first. You will be handed a microphone. And state your name and your organization before you ask your question, please.
Thank you.
Yes, sir.
Q John Finer from The Washington Post.
I was wondering, first of all, can we just get the name of this second Iraqi gentleman who spoke? I don't think it's on our list.
And second of all, if any of the people who spoke talk about any specific instances of corruption that have been discovered recently and describe those instances.
MR. DELARE: John, let me begin by saying that one thing we've been trying to impress on our Iraqi colleagues is the need for discretion in the judicial process at all steps.
Now if our IG colleagues here are in possession of information that they feel has proceeded along its course, you know, to conclusion, it's my understanding they can talk about that. But anything that is in process is not to be talked about. And frankly, we would encourage that, because we've already seen occasionally reputations taking a hit because things were prematurely released to the press from various levels of government.
So I would pass it over to our friend and ask if there is something he would like to talk about, but I would ask you not to push him too hard, because basically we want to create that other ethic here.
MR. ARAZAK (ph): (Through interpreter) In fact, there is a big difference between professional people and those who are not very experienced to carry out their job. When professional people want to talk about something, they should depend on documents and evidence. Otherwise they should remain silent. We cannot accuse anybody or any organization of corruption unless we have the evidence and documents which prove this.
Thus we have some corruption. And the public integration (sic) committee tackles these issues, but we cannot talk in details about these cases because the judicial system wouldn't take a decision about that.
Any new experiment at the beginning of this experiment should face some problems because of -- (inaudible) -- to apply this. We as general inspectors have noticed that, and so it has been released by the press -- some people accused without evidence, without any documents. This is very -- something very dangerous, because it ends the process. We should (both ?) as a nation -- (inaudible) -- with the people. The general inspector shouldn't have any doubt about corruption; otherwise he should stay silent. We have a number of cases, but when we take a decision about that, you can ask the public integration (sic) committee about any issue that has been -- that a decision has been taken about.
Q (Inaudible). I would like the general inspectors -- I want them -- the general inspectors -- (inaudible) -- tackle a very important issue -- that is, the Iraqi judicial system and the Iraqi courts. I refer to statements made by the chairman of the integrity commission about corruption. In the Iraqi ministries, the chairman of the commission should depend on evidence and documentation. The general inspectors didn't talk about this.
The general inspectors play an important role on this issue, when the general inspector speaks frankly about this issue and the way to tackle this problem.
MR. : (Through interpreter.) I think what my colleague said is enough about this issue. Our role is to carry out the investigations. And the courts should make a decision about this. So you can ask the Iraqi courts about this. How many cases have been referred to the Iraqi courts? And how many verdicts did these courts take in these issues?
The general inspector will refer these cases to the courts and the judges make decisions about this. So you can ask the Iraqi judicial system about how many cases have been referred to the courts.
Thank you.
MR. DELARE: There are numerous institutions that work on the corruption problem in Iraq. You know that. I mentioned some of them, as did everybody else.
Now none of these institutions really are empowered to pursue these cases to the end. They must be referred, either by the IGs or by, for example, the Supreme Board of Audit, to the Commission for Public Integrity. This is Judge Radhi's organization -- and at that point that they then go to the court system, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.
Now at each one of those levels, experts look at the evidence; they look at the seriousness of the case. In some cases, they pass the case up; in some cases they don't. Sometimes they ask for more data, more information.
But at the end of the day, it's useful to think of it as a pyramid, with the court system at the very top. And each one of these other organizations is playing their necessary role in the area where they have the most expertise to uncover instances of corruption, and to -- and to correct behavior where necessary.
I think that is a fair description, is it not? Okay. Q Bill Putnam, Zuma Press. This is for the Iraqi gentleman behind me.
What's being done about corruption at the Ministry of Oil, specifically at the Baiji oil refinery -- as you know is the country's largest refinery.
MR. ARAZAK (ph): (Through interpreter.) As I told you before, we cannot tackle these issues without evidence, because we need the documentation and the evidence to support these claims. I don't have much information about this issue. And you can make an interview with the officials in the Ministry of Oil and they can provide you with the documents.
Thank you.
Q Thank you. Jonathan Steele from the Guardian.
Two questions for Mr. Muklas Abdul Arazak (ph) arising from the printed statement we were given.
First of all, you say that seven ministers from the Iyad Allawi have been accused of corruption. When you say accused, does that mean that they have been formally charged? Have those cases gone right up through these various institutions to court? And if they have been charged, what's happening about the trial? When will the trials take place?
And secondly, you say that corruption during the former regime began, of course, during the former regime and it was partly due to weak salaries of government employees. The salaries of government employees have now increased substantially, but yet you say the phenomenon of corruption has expanded since the regime change.
Can you give some explanation of why corruption has expanded over the last three years, please? What are the reasons?
MR. ARAZAK (ph): (Through interpreter.) As for the first question, all the cases, corruption cases against the former ministers have been referred to the courts, and we don't have an authority over these courts. So you can make this question to the Iraqi courts.
As for the corruption for weak salaries, (doesn't mean ?) that if we raise their salaries this will not end corruption. Corruption is a disease inside human beings. So we need to build the trust with the Iraqi people. We need a better education and better awareness, and you need an authority; you need laws; you need fairness.
So the ethical situation should help in this. We know that dangerous crimes are committed in the Iraqi streets, and the economy of Iraq is still deteriorated. So this deterioration leads to corruption. MR. : (Through interpreter.) I would like to comment on what my colleague said. Thank God we are Muslims, and God says in the holy Koran there are some people who are honest if you give them money and those who are not honest. So corruption is related, linked with the nature of human beings. Salaries are not a main important factor about corruption.
We (know/learned ?) that during the days of the economic -- (inaudible) -- and we learned through very crucial circumstances between -- (inaudible) -- not corrupted. So salary is not the main issue behind corruption. The press should play an important role in this, and the clergy should also educate people in this. The clergy and the press should educate people against corruption.
And I say this frankly: If we are left alone to fight corruption, we cannot do that. We need for the Iraqi officials and the press to help us.
Two months ago there was a journalist who wrote an article in one of the newspapers, a very bad article, and at that time I intended to answer for this article. He talked about the general inspectors, and he didn't visit any of these officials (or/of ?) the general inspectors.
I think they should be honest in this, and the press should be honest when they talk about us. The press should read write about us after they gather correct information about us. There are -- but unfortunately, there are some journalists who came to this field and they don't deserve to be journalists. And there are those who even encourage corruption.
MR. DELARE: (Off mike) -- about the Baiji refinery. Our colleague I think responded to you quite correctly, Mr. Steele. But there is an intensive inquiry going on on the part of Iraqi authorities on a number of levels into uncovering the extent of the corruption, who's involved, and what can be done about it. But it's absolutely appropriate that those details not be shared right now, because it's in process.
Q You said that there are differences between ministries like the Interior, Oil ministries. You know that there is much corruption. Let us talk about the situation now, not two years ago. When I go to the Interior Ministry, I saw some corrupted people inside the Ministry of the Interior.
So what is the mistake here? I don't want to accuse the general inspectors, despite the fact that I know they are threatened -- (inaudible) -- the system. Corruption is rampant in Iraq. The general inspectors have a contract of five years. Can these contracts be terminated?
MR. : (Through interpreter.): First of all, it is two years and not for five years.
As my colleague said, general inspectors cannot succeed in this mission because they need cooperation. The ministers take the decisions. And according to Law Number 57, the public integration (sic) committee can refer these cases to the courts.
As my colleague said the general inspector, if you ask him to fight corruption alone, he cannot do that. All the organizations should take part in combating corruption and the end of that.
There should be a clear strategy to be adopted by the government to fight corruption, because it is very difficult for general inspectors to fight corruption alone.
This is a very important question. And I want you to change your idea about us. This is a very dangerous statement when you ask about where is the general inspector in the Interior Ministry? Where is the general inspector in the Ministry of Education? If you had enough information, you shouldn't have made such question.
Let me finish, please.
You should have asked how many officials are working in the office of the general inspector. Is -- an X ministry has 20 officials. You asked me about the role of the general inspectors in the Iraqi ministries. This is very dangerous. Instead of asking this question, you should pay a visit to the office of the general inspector and see how -- (inaudible). And you can compare the number of people who work with him. If I had only 10 officials in my office, and you compare this with another office which employs more than 100 employees, this is not fair, because you can't ask me, why don't you fight corruption? You know there is difference.
Yes, I agree, there is difference between in the performance of the ministries. And this is very natural. This is the natural course.
Q (Off mike) -- questions continues? And from higher education -- he is the inspector general? Okay, but he's the inspector general for the Ministry of Higher Education?
MS. : No.
Q No. What are we here for? And he's --
Q Why are we here?
MR. ROBERTS: This is an on-the-record press conference. Your name will have to be divulged -- (off mike).
Q Thank you. Anyway, could you -- I have a question actually also in addition to that. Could you just tell me a little bit about the public relations campaigns that you guys run? I see posters in the city sometimes encouraging people to try to stop corruption or stamp it out. Do these kinds of things work? Or is this coming out of your office? Where is this coming from?
MR. DELARE: We're cooperating with the Iraqi government in producing some of this material, and some of the material is produced by them quite independently.
You see a number of things. Some of the posters you've seen are a purely Iraqi creation, and they're basically exhorting people to turn in certain kinds of corrupt behavior via hotlines that -- (end of available audio).
END.
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