IRAQ OPERATIONAL UPDATE BRIEFING
Multi-National Force-Iraq
IRAQ OPERATIONAL UPDATE BRIEFING BRIEFER: MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 8:00 A.M. EST DATE: THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2006
GEN. LYNCH: Thanks for joining us today. A lot that I want to talk about, so let me jump right into it with the first graphic, please.
As always I like to start off with an operational picture across Iraq and then zoom in on specific combat operations that are taking place as we speak. So this is the operational summary from the period 11 March to 17 March.
If we stand away from the map just for a minute, what I'd like to highlight is the fact that what's significantly different today is the fact that there are 241,000 trained and equipped members of the Iraqi security force working operations across Iraq . And that is 75 percent of the desired end state for the Iraqi security force, and those units are in the fight and on the streets as we speak. And what I continue to be amazed with is the number of operations, company level and above, that are planned and executed and led by the Iraqi security forces, and we're at the point now where a third of the operations during that reporting period were independent Iraqi security force operations. And less than 28 percent were independent coalition force operations. Five hundred twelve company- level operations across Iraq during that reporting period.
The enemy is still out there, and the enemy still has a stated objective: derail the democratic process and discredit the Iraqi government. And we're in a specifically vulnerable period right now as the national unity government forms and he continues to conduct operations to inflame sectarian violence and drive a wedge between the Iraqi population.
Of note, he continues to target civilians -- 75 percent increase in civilian casualties during this operational period. We're at the point now where if you look at the casualties across Iraq as a result of the operations, 65 percent of them are civilians -- innocent Iraqi men, women and children -- 65 percent. Twenty percent are members of the Iraqi security force and 15 percent members of the coalition force.
So the enemy is still out there and he still has an aim: discredit the Iraqi government and derail the democratic process. And I'll talk to you about what he's doing and what we're doing against him.
Let me walk around Iraq .
Up in the north we found during that reporting period attacks to be up 1 percent, but we're having significant success in finding weapons caches and in finding and clearing IEDs. During the initial reporting period in the north, 43 percent of the IEDs that were emplaced were found and cleared before they could detonate, and those that did detonate were only 20 percent effective.
Out west operations continue. We found a spike in attacks during that reporting period, but we still see this excitement on the part of the folks in Al Anbar to join the Iraqi security forces, both the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police.
As I've talked about before, the end state for Al Anbar is 11,330 police, and right now they're just over 3,000.
But there are no shortage of recruits in Al Anbar for the Iraqi police or for the Iraqi army.
Attacks down south were up 10 percent, but that was based on a handful of attacks anyway. And in Baghdad -- and I'll concentrate on Baghdad -- during that reporting period, attacks were down 10 percent and VBIEDs were down 50 percent, from 17 the week prior to eight during that reporting period.
There is not widespread violence across Iraq . There is not. Seventy-five percent of the attacks still take place in Baghdad , Al Anbar or Salahuddin. And in the other 15 provinces, they all average less than six attacks a day, and 12 of those provinces average less than two attacks a day. So the idea that Baghdad is the center of gravity for the enemy's operations is indeed a valid idea, but the concern that all of Iraq is experiencing widespread violence is incorrect.
Next graphic, please.
We are dealing with a vicious enemy. He wanted to stop the democratic process. He couldn't stop the two elections in the 2005. He couldn't stop the drafting and ratification of the constitution last October. So now he's focused on inflaming sectarian violence to drive a wedge between the components of the Iraqi community -- the Shi'as, the Sunnis and the Kurds. And there is indeed a spike in what we term ethnosectarian instances.
During this reporting period, 12 to 19 March, we found across Iraq about 100 events that we would label as an ethnosectarian incident; something that was result of someone trying to inflame sectarian violence. And they were against the Sunni population, the Shi'a population, the Kurdish population and suspected, so allow me to give you some details.
The people of Iraq just finished the Arba'in commemoration ceremony. Remember, in 2004, there was significant suicide attacks both in Baghdad and Karbala during Arba'in. This year, all we saw was small-arms fire and some IED attacks, with minimal casualties; still ethnosectarian incidents directed against the Shi'as, but limited in number. And we contend that the reason it wasn't like 2004 -- remember, it was still 2 million to 3 million pilgrims moving to Karbala . The target was still there and the enemy still wanted to kill those innocent people, but he couldn't because of an effective Iraqi government who put in effective security measures and an effective Iraqi security force.
There are ethnosectarian incidents against the Sunni population as well, to include some attacks on Sunni mosques.
There was an attack against an Iraqi Kurd, and then there were 82 that we labeled as suspected ethno-sectarian violence. Based on the nature of the incident, we believe it had something to do with ethno- sectarian relations.
And that included these operations in Baghdad . During that reporting period we had 58 instances of bodies that were clearly executed -- 134 bodies. And we believe that was the result of ethno- sectarian instances.
The enemy is still out there. He continues to want to drive a wedge between the Iraqi population and inflame sectarian violence, and this is what we're seeing -- murders and intimidation.
Next graphic, please.
We are in an extremely vulnerable period with the Iraqi government, and that's the formation of the national unity government. They recognize it and we recognize it. So together, the coalition forces, the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government have come up with a series of operations to prohibit the enemy from doing what he wants to do to us, which is inflame sectarian violence, one of which I talked to you about last week -- Scales of Justice. And I'd like to give you more details.
There has always been 26,000 members of the Iraqi security force and 10,000 members of the coalition force conducting operations in Baghdad . That was the steady-state number. The bad guy is focused on Baghdad . He wants to inflame sectarian violence.
What are we going to do about it? Let's increase security force presence on the streets of Baghdad . So Scales of Justice brought in eight additional battalions from around Iraq and one battalion as part of our call forward force down in Kuwait . Three of those were coalition battalions, three of them were Iraqi national police battalions, and two of them were Iraqi army battalions, which plussed- up the security presence in Baghdad by 3,700 troops.
I'd like to remind you what I talked about last week. This call forward force that came up from Kuwait, 651 strong -- from the time it was notified to move till the time that it arrived in Baghdad to start operations was less than 48 hours. That shows the capability we have with that call forward force. The Iraqi government, the prime minister, General Casey decided it would be appropriate to get additional support. We brought in that call forward force and it came up there that quickly. When you increase the security force presence in Baghdad at that level, an additional 3,700 troops, you can increase the number of patrols by 100.
So now in Baghdad we're experiencing about 300 patrols per day. And we are manning with the Iraqi security forces about 130 checkpoints. So an increased security force presence to counter the enemy's ability to conduct acts of sectarian violence.
Let me show you the effects.
Next graphic, please.
He wants to kill people. He wants to drive a wedge between the Shi'a population, the Sunni population and the Kurdish population. He does that in a variety of ways. He does that by murders and executions. We talked about that already. And he does it by car bombs, suicide car bombs and suicide vest attacks -- 75 percent increase in civilian casualties; 65 percent of the casualties these days are innocent Iraqi men, women and children.
So on the 12th of March we started Operation Scales of Justice -- increase security force presence inside of Baghdad , increase the number of patrols, increase the number of checkpoints. And the effect was that -- was the -- preclude the enemy's ability to put in car bombs, suicide car bombs and suicide vest attacks.
And you can see, over the last five days we had a period of time where those were nonexistent in Baghdad . It wasn't because the enemy didn't want to put them out there; it's because he didn't have the capability.
As you're well aware, today he surged. We had a car bomb against a funeral procession, we had a suicide car bomb against a security patrol and a checkpoint, and a car bomb against the Iraqi major crimes unit. So he still has that capability. But I got to tell you, during this period of time he wanted to do what he did today, and the security force presence precluded that from happening.
Next graphic, please.
And it's not just about increased patrols and more checkpoints; it's about offensive operations dedicated to kill and capture anti- Iraqi forces, destroy weapons caches, destroy VBIED materials, and disrupt attacks on Iraqis. So over the last 48 hours, we've been involved with the Iraqi security forces on an operation we call Northern Lights, and it started on Tuesday. Four hundred Iraqi army soldiers, 700 coalition soldiers the first event, and these are all intelligence-led operations. We have human intelligence, signal intelligence, locally provided intelligence that tells us that there's a presence of caches, VBIEDs and insurgents.
First operation on Tuesday was by the Iraqi army to secure an area to conduct this operation, and that does two things: that keeps the insurgents from leaving and keeps innocent civilians from going into the combat zone. That started on Tuesday.
This morning we started an offensive operation that was, indeed, an air assault. There were two coalition force companies and five or six helicopters that moved to set and conduct air assault operations to kill, destroy and disrupt.
The effect of that was they found today eight weapons caches; they were able to detain 18 insurgents, to include one high-value target; and they're continuing the operation at the point now where they've cleared 30 percent of their objectives and their objective they call Charleston. So that's an effective operation that's ongoing in Baghdad to improve the security for the people of Baghdad .
All of our operations are interconnected, and there was another successful operation this morning I'd like to talk to you about. At 8:00 this morning, members of coalition force -- coalition forces were successful in rescuing the three hostages from the Christian Peacemakers Team. Based on intelligence that we have recovered over the last 36 hours, an operation was planned and conducted, and those three hostages were rescued. I'm happy to report all three are in good condition. They've had a medical screening, and they're anxious to be reunited with their families.
Next graphic, please.
Operations aren't just confined to Baghdad . As I told you, we worry about Al Anbar; we worry about Baghdad , Baghdad Province ; and we worry about Salahuddin.
A week ago, we conducted Operation Swarmer. Operation Swarmer was an Iraqi-led operation. It had about 850 members of the Iraqi security force, about 600 members of the coalition forces, using about 65 coalition force helicopters to conduct this air-assault operation. Again, intelligence-led; we had detailed intelligence that there were terrorists there, there was ammunition there, there were surface-to- air missiles there, and we conducted this operation -- 850 Iraqi security forces, 600 coalition forces, 65 U.S. helicopters. And this was the result: 95 suspected terrorists were found and have been detained and are being questioned; we found 24 weapons caches that included 350 mortar rounds, 116 rockets, four surface-to-air missiles, and explosive materials for IEDs, and terrorist training materials.
Operations like this continue all across Iraq . This happened to be a brigade-level operation in the Salahuddin Province with that effect.
Take that graphic down, please.
And with that, I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.
How are you today?
Q Kirk Semple from The New York Times.
Do you have any further details about the rescue of the three hostages this morning -- the circumstances under which they were found, the number of troops and security forces involved in the operation?
GEN. LYNCH: Well, let me walk you through what I can talk about because this operation continues.
Late last night, coalition forces conducted an operation and came up with two detainees. These two detainees provided actionable intelligence about the location of the Christian Peacemaker Team hostages. We got that information; at 8:00 this morning we conducted the operation. It was a coalition operation. We moved to the location in western Baghdad that was reported for the location for the Christian Peacemaker Team. We conducted an assault on the house, and inside the house we found the three hostages in good condition. There were no kidnappers there at the time. The three hostages were by themselves. They were gathered up, moved, debriefed, taken to a hospital for medical checks, given proper nourishment. And as I say, they're excited about moving back to their family.
The key point is it was intelligence-led and it was information provided by a detainee. We talk all the time about our detention operations, and an effect of the detention operations is to be able to gather actionable intelligence.
In this particular case, of those two detainees, one knew where the hostages were and provided that information. Operation was planned and executed, and the effect is the safe return of the three hostages.
Please.
Q Tom Frank from USA Today. Can you tell us about the hostages themselves? Were they bound? Were they in separate rooms? How many -- and it was only coalition forces -- how many people were actually involved, and how did you get to the site?
GEN. LYNCH: There are certain pieces of the operation that I just can't talk you through, but let me try to answer some of your questions. From my understanding, that the hostages were indeed together. They were bound. They were together. There were no kidnappers in the area. You know, as we study who could conduct these kinds of operations, there seems to be a kidnapping cell that has been robust over the last several months in conducting these kind of kidnappings. It was a coalition force operation, so it involved all sorts of members of the coalition force. The size and magnitude of the operation I'm not going to walk you through because we got other operations that continue.
Q When you say they were together, meaning they were in the same room? And can you describe how they were bound? And also, did it appear like they had been well taken care of?
GEN. LYNCH: We are happy to report that the three hostages were in relatively good condition. Remember, they've been in captivity since the 26th of November, some of them are elderly gentlemen; so there was indeed an effect of the detention, but they didn't seem to be in poor condition. They were together in this house in western Baghdad . The actual degree of how much bondage they were under, I'm not sure, but I can get that for you.
We got a lot of questions today. Please.
Q General Lynch, further on the hostage rescue, why were the kidnappers not there? What have you learned about that? When had they been there most recently? How many were there? And are you pursuing them now?
GEN. LYNCH: I've given you at this point all the details I can give you on this particular hostage rescue. And you can appreciate that there are other operations that continue, probably as a result of what we're finding at this time. So you got to give us the opportunity to work that. And I really can't talk any more about what we've done this morning. Just know it to be true that they were rescued, they're in safe condition, they're in good medical condition, and they're excited about returning to their families.
Please.
Q Sir, any word on Jill Carroll?
GEN. LYNCH: None that I can discuss at this time.
Please.
Q Thank you. I'm Gina Cavallaro from the Army Times.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi.
Q Hi. Can you tell us what units or what types of soldiers or coalition forces carried out the mission, the numbers of the units, numbers of soldiers, different services, different countries?
GEN. LYNCH: This was a coalition force operation. It wasn't a U.S.-only operation. Members of the coalition force were involved. The actual details of the operation, I'm not going to tell any more than I already have because there's other operations that will continue, and we're not going to violate operational security.
Please.
Q I am from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi.
Q Excuse me. What's the role of the Canadian police in this operation?
GEN. LYNCH: I can't talk any more about the -- other than the details I've already provided.
Anything else? Nick?
Q Hi, sir. When you were talking earlier about the sectarian incidents and the sectarian violence and the enemy's intent to drive a wedge, you were talking about "he" wants to do this, "he" wants to drive a wedge, "he" is trying to incite. When you say "he," in terms of the enemy, the broader insurgency, who are you talking about? What elements are you talking about in this regard? And is it your assessment that there's a homogenous view with regard to the sectarian violence among the enemy, or are we talking about particular elements of it? GEN. LYNCH: Thank you for that. As we study the enemy, we think through which portion of the insurgency -- and you and I have talked about this at length, Nick, and we've talked about it in the past as a collective group. There's the terrorists and foreign fighters, there's the Iraqi rejectionists and there are the Saddamists. We believe that the group that has the most to gain by derailing the democratic process, to stop the formation of a national unity government, are the terrorists and foreign fighters led by Zarqawi, the Zarqawi network, the al Qaeda network here in Iraq . And we believe he was directly associated with the bombing of the Samarra mosque on the 22nd of February; we believe he's directly associated with these horrendous attacks against innocent civilians with an intent to drive this wedge amongst -- between the populations.
Q So to follow up, so that begs the question, sir, with regards to then given that the foreign fighters and the Islamic extremist element, particularly led by Abu Musaab al Zarqawi, is such a proportionally minute fraction, the bulk, the mainstay of the insurgency, what do you assess is their attitude with regards to this?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, we -- we are in a period of increased sectarian violence. And we do believe that what we're experiencing is cycles of violence that are directly related to retaliation. So what Zarqawi does, the terrorists and foreign fighters do, the people who want to disrupt the formation of a national unity government, is they fan the flame. They blow up a mosque, they do a VBIED, they conduct a drive-by shooting to cause people to retaliate. So there's a group in the middle -- the Iraqi rejectionists -- that we believe are involved in this cycle of violence, particularly in terms of retaliatory acts.
Please?
Q The Christian peace activists are saying that when the -- are saying that when the Iraqis kidnapped the three men they were not in the building when the raid happened. Can you please confirm this? And can you also confirm that this was the first attempt to free him?
GEN. LYNCH: As I said, when we -- we got the actionable intelligence. You know, it's interesting to me -- hopefully to you as well -- that from the time we found the intelligence to the time we released the hostages was eight hours -- or correction -- three hours. The hostage rescue took place at 8:00 in the morning. So 5:00 in the morning, on or about, we got the actionable intelligence, we did some preliminary surveillance, we did some preliminary missions, and then we conducted the hostage rescue at 8:00 in the morning. And as I said, when we got to the house where the hostages were located, there were no kidnappers; no one was there. The three individuals were by themselves.
Please?
Q You mentioned that there's increased sectarian violence. What impact do you think the delay in the formation of the government is having on that?
GEN. LYNCH: The enemy wants to delay this as much as he can. Candidly, there'd be much less opportunity for sectarian violence if the Iraqis could form a national unity government sooner rather than later. So all optimism is that together they will form this government. And when the government is formed -- just like the elections, what we found is when the insurgents, the enemies realize that their efforts are for naught, they back off. So when they couldn't stop the elections in January, they backed off. They tried again the referendum in October, backed off. The elections in December, they backed off. And we believe that once a national unity government is formed, then the incentive for the insurgency to incite sectarian violence goes away. So the sooner that happens, the better.
Please?
Q General Lynch, I've been out with some of your soldiers who told me that whenever they hear of an Iraqi police raid or mission being conducted by Interior Ministry troops, they have to be present, they have to photograph the commanders, they have to photograph the detainees, make sure they take names, just so they can track the detainees, because otherwise, in the words of one soldier, "they're never seen or heard of again."
Do you have any concern about the fact that we're equipping and training an Iraqi security force that is carrying out these kind of acts? I mean, everyone admits -- even the ambassador admits that death squads are fully functional and operating every day across Baghdad and other places. And even your own soldiers, you know, say the missions they can find out about they try and stop, and if not try and stop, they have to keep track of just to make sure the Iraqi police do their job in a way that U.S. forces would approve.
GEN. LYNCH: No, thank you for that question. Remember, in 2005 we made a conscious decision to focus on building a capable Iraqi army. And we're at the point now where two Iraqi divisions and 13 brigades and 49 battalions lead combat operations in their respective areas.
The conscious decision now is we got to focus on the police. We got to improve their capabilities, their level of training, their level of equipment, their fidelity, their loyalties to the Iraqi government, and that all has to happen now. So there's a variety of things that we're doing, some of which you're already aware. We're trying to put training teams with the police -- local police police- training teams, national police/special police training teams -- to have coalition force soldiers with these units while they plan and they conduct operations to facilitate their training, facilitate their effectiveness.
A thing we're concerned about is when the Iraqi police conduct an operation, they have to gather evidence, proper evidence, so those individuals can be tried in Iraqi courts. And we have to work with them on that.
So this is a period of time where we really have to focus on the police, be with them in the conduct of their operations, help them gather evidence, ensure that the right activity is taking place. So we're very sensitive to that, Laurie (sp). This year is the year of the police.
(Nick ?)?
Q Just following up on that, I mean, can you tell us how many, if any, cases there have been of investigations or arrests of police or Ministry of Interior troops involved in extracurricular activities, for want of a better term? I mean, have we actually achieved anything on this? I mean, we know that the Ministry of Interior really doesn't engage that well with us. So I mean, what real tangible progress has been made there?
GEN. LYNCH: Let me give you a couple instances.
We do think progress is being made. Is it being made as quickly as we'd like it? No. But this is indeed the year of the police, and our expectation is by the end of this year we put significant effort into the training of the Iraqi police.
Every incident, (Nick ?), that comes across that leads us to believe that the Iraqi police act in an inappropriate fashion, we do indeed conduct an investigation, and we share the results of the investigation with the Iraqi authorities. We told a story a few weeks back about highway patrolmen -- individuals dressed in highway patrol uniforms that abducted a Sunni individual and took him off to kill that Sunni individual. And those individuals were reported, they were detained, and they're now incarcerated, awaiting trial. So actions like that take place.
If you remember back in November of last year, an illegal detention facility was found that was MOI-affiliated. An investigation took place, results reported to the prime minister. Since that point in time, we've worked with the prime minister's office and the Iraqi government to inspect other detention facilities, and that operation continues. So it's a very detailed, deliberate process to improve the capability of the Iraqi police and basic rule of law: the courts, the prisons and the police.
Q You mentioned the bunker -- sorry -- (comes on mike) -- you mentioned the bunker, (at the right ?) of the MOI facility in Jadriya. I'm just wondering, the National Joint Operations Center , the chief liaison --
GEN. LYNCH: Sure.
Q -- who commands that at that at the moment? Or who's the Iraqi command leader of that at the moment?
GEN. LYNCH: It's led by an Iraqi two-star, but I don't know the name now. I'll get you the name. I don't know it, and I apologize.
Please.
Q Going back to the hostages, who debriefed them?
GEN. LYNCH: You keep wanting more details on the hostage situation that I'm not going to give you, and I apologize for that.
Q You said that they were debriefed.
GEN. LYNCH: Sure they were. Yeah.
Q And --
GEN. LYNCH: What we need to do -- and we'll continue operations to free all hostages, and all these operations are intertwined, and you can learn from one operation to benefit another. And if I were to go into the level of detail you want me to on this operation, it could indeed preclude the next successful operation, and I'm not going to do it.
Q Yeah, I was just --
GEN. LYNCH: Know it to be true that the individuals are rescued. We've talked to them in detail about what they experienced during the four months that they were in captivity, and we'll use that information for future operations.
Q And who's "we"?
GEN. LYNCH: The coalition forces.
Back there, please. You guys have got to come stand over these lights. They're pretty warm. Next time I'm going to sit out there and let you guys be here, you know.
Q Yeah. General, Rod Nordland from Newsweek.
GEN. LYNCH: Sir. How are you?
Q I'd just like to follow up on a couple things from the last couple briefings that you said you were going to be looking into more.
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q First of all, the case of the Al Rafidah security company, where some 33, 34 --
GEN. LYNCH: Thirty-five.
Q -- thirty five -- sorry -- were kidnapped. Some of them, I understand, have been released, and there are increasing reports that that was indeed an Interior Ministry operation. And I'm wondering if you got to the bottom of that yet.
And then the second one was that reported infiltration of al Qaeda -- 415 al Qaeda members trying to get into a battalion that was supposed to be guarding the Green Zone.
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q Okay. Thanks.
GEN. LYNCH: We proved the second report to be false, that there was not an incident we can record where 421 members of the al Qaeda Organization were trying to infiltrate the Green Zone. There was indeed information that was provided. There were lists that were exchanged. But in research, based on a conversation you and I had, we found that that is indeed an inaccurate report, and that never happened.
We're still working with the Iraqi authorities to get the details on the 35 individuals from the security company that were detained. And whether or not it was an MOI operation or not, I don't have that information. I know you want it. I know I owe it to you. But I don't have it.
STAFF: Next question.
GEN. LYNCH: Please. I'm sorry.
Q Sir, do you have anything further to say on allegations of U.S. atrocities, such as where 11 civilians were supposedly killed?
GEN. LYNCH: As you're well aware, we've got today 131,000 U.S. coalition force members on the ground, 150,000 members of the coalition. They're all under detailed levels of training and detailed rules of engagement. And if there's any incident that happens that we believe either the training fell short or they didn't comply with the existing rules of engagement, an investigation has taken place. And we currently have two investigations ongoing -- one on the incident you just described and the other incident out in Hadithah last November. But all those are under investigation.
Please.
Q General, can you just clarify if Operation Scales of Justice is still ongoing? And then just looking at -- you know, the charts showed in the last few days before today those attacks had dropped off very heavily.
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q If the operation is still ongoing and today was a surge for the enemy that showed that they can still launch these attacks whenever they want to --
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q -- I mean, what does that really tell you about the overall picture? I mean, to take an isolated week and point to successes over a week is one thing --
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q -- but in terms of where we stand, you know, as far as this enemy is concerned, and whether there's a shift toward sectarian violence as part of the enemy's strategy -- so I mean, I'm just trying to determine -- I don't really see any overall weakening --
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah.
Q -- of the insurgency at this point.
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah. Thank you for that. Operation Scales of Justice will continue until a national unity government is formed. It'll stay going. The 26,000 Iraqi security force, the 10,000 coalition force, the 3,700 additional soldiers will stay on the streets of Baghdad -- increased patrols, increased checkpoints and increased offensive operations to keep the enemy from doing what he wants to do, which is to disrupt the formation of the national unity government.
If he had his way, he'd be killing people every day. He'd be blowing up car bombs, suicide vest attacks. If he had his way, he would have had significant impact on the Arba'in commemoration, and he couldn't do that. He still has the capability out there. Nobody's denying that. He still has VBIEDs that he can employ. He still has suicide bombers that he's trained and ready to employ, and he'll do that when he can. Our operations preclude that capability.
So for the last six days, like I showed you, he couldn't blow up a car bomb, he couldn't send in a suicide vest attacker. He wanted to. Today he found gaps in security and was able to employ three car bombs. He's still out there. He still wants to do it. We'll continue to conduct operations to keep him from doing it.
I got time for one more question.
Okay. Sure. Nick, there's no such thing as a simple question.
Q Sir, this one's right up your alley. You're great on the numbers. What is the daily attack numbers at the moment nationally?
GEN. LYNCH: We are averaging about 75 attacks a day nationwide. What we've found since August of last year is the attack levels stay at about 560 attacks per week -- 560 attacks per week. What we've found is of those 560 attacks, only about 25 percent are effective. They actually result in a casualty -- an Iraqi civilian, an Iraqi army or Iraqi -- or coalition force casualty, and about 20 percent of those significant activities I just described are coalition initiated. They're events that we started.
So on average, it's about 79. I think over the last couple of days it's peaked at 79. It's down to about 74.
You like those numbers, don't you?
Q Well -- (off mike) --
GEN. LYNCH: Okay.
Q -- I mean particularly given many of us are going into our fourth year -- just ain't going anywhere.
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, this is tough business, no doubt about it. I mean, the insurgency, again, considers democracy to be a failure, and he's doing all he can do to stop that from happening. Zarqawi's been told by Zawahiri and by bin Laden -- "Hey, I want Iraq to be an Islamic caliphate, and from there, I want to be able to spread terror across the region." And they're continuing to fight. They're continuing to fight. Nobody says it's easy, but we believe we're making progress in two areas.
If you focus on the end state, you got to be successful in two areas. You got to form a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and we believe that the Iraqis are the right path to do that. They seated their council of representatives. They will form a national unity government. All indications are indications of progress.
And the other one is training and equipping Iraqi security forces. The end state says we want to have a security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists. Last year, this time, 100,000 Iraqi security force members; today, 241,000; 75 percent of the end state. And that's just not numbers, that's capable units -- two divisions, 13 brigades, 49 battalions lead combat operations in their respective areas.
This past week, as I told you, 33 percent of the operations had no coalition thumbprint. They were Iraqi planned, based on Iraqi intelligence, they were Iraqi conducted and, most importantly, Iraqi led. So we're making progress here, (Mick ?). The enemy's still out there. The enemy still has a vote. He's going to continue to conduct these horrific acts of violence to discredit the Iraqi government and derail the democratic process. And the sooner a national unity government gets formed, the sooner there's a robust government here in Iraq , the less likely he's going to have any success.
I'm sorry, I guess I had more than one more question.
Q Brian Bennett from Time Magazine.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi, Brian.
Q I wanted to ask you about your statement that the violence is not widespread. And to back that up, you cited that in some provinces there were only two attacks per day.
GEN. LYNCH: Average.
Q I mean, does that reflect a certain tolerance by the coalition forces for a certain "white noise" level of violence?
GEN. LYNCH: I'm not sure I understand your question.
Q Well, I mean, only two attacks per day in a province still sounds like two attacks a day.
GEN. LYNCH: You're in a country that's got 26 million people. You have indeed a concentration of violence in three of the provinces -- Baghdad , Al Anbar and Salahuddin. Seventy-five percent of the attacks take place in those three provinces. My point was there are pieces of Iraq that have little to no violence. And if you've got a large province like Najaf or Karbala and you're averaging less than two attacks a day, that's not a perfect, utopian society, that's not a society where there are no acts of violence, but I got to tell you, I think you're hard-pressed to find something like that worldwide.
Back there, please.
Q General, Edward Wong from The New York Times. GEN. LYNCH: Hi, Ed.
Q I'm just wondering if there's specific intel or chatter that you've picked up that ties either the sectarian killings or any surges in violence to the lack -- to the power vacuum or the lack of a national unity government at this time. I mean, you've seen theory that you -- that theoretically that that's the supposition you're working on just because of previous patterns, but is there any specific intel or chatter that you've picked up that shows that the insurgents are using this vacuum to foment violence?
GEN. LYNCH: Yes. Obviously, what we're not going to do is go into detailed intelligence sources or information at these press conferences, but I got to tell you our assessment, our professional judgment that he's trying to fill this vacuum by inflaming sectarian violence is based on reports, human reports and signal intelligence and our own assessment of the situation. This is not pure conjecture on our part. What he wants to do is -- they guy that's got the most to lose if a unity government is formed is Zarqawi and his network in Iraq . No doubt about it.
One more question. Liz, please. Yeah, there's two Lizes in a row there.
Q Hi. I just had a question about the Airport Road . In the fall you were standing here talking about how it's the safest road in Baghdad , and this week we've had two incidents.
Is there anything you guys are going to do to augment the Iraqi security forces out there?
GEN. LYNCH: You know -- thank you for that. I did indeed stand up last October and talk about Route Irish and how Route Irish has indeed improved in security. And we have had, in the last week, incidents of violence taking place on Route Irish. The commander who owns that battlespace has decided to move forces to increase the security around that particular area.
The enemy's out there, the enemy's got a vote and he decided to focus efforts, for whatever reason, with small-arms fire attacks on Route Irish, and there were indeed coalition casualties and some Iraqi security force casualties and some civilian casualties.
But a conscious decision has been made by the operational commander to vector security forces to improve the security situation on Route Irish, to get it back to what we talked about in October.
It is not now the "highway of death"; it has not went back to what it was before. Over the course of the last several days there have indeed been attacks, and those attacks are being addressed.
Okay, I enjoy this. This is great. Thank you for your good questions over the course of the day.
And I want to make sure that we're all aware that the operations against the insurgents continue and that we see ourselves moving towards an end state with the Iraqi people that's good for them and good for us.
Thank you very much.
END.
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