BRIEFING WITH MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ
Multi-National Force-Iraq
BRIEFING WITH MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, SPOKESMAN, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ SUBJECT: MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PROGRESS IN AL ANBAR PROVINCE LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ TIME: 8:00 A.M. EST DATE: THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 2006
GEN. LYNCH: As always, thanks for taking the time. It seems like we just met here last Saturday. Well, we did.
A lot of things I want to talk to you about today. I want to first look at Iraq and talk about operations across Iraq. I want to then zoom in on what we we've seen happen in Iraq since the bombing of the mosque in Samarra a week ago Wednesday. I want to talk specifically about what's happening in Baghdad, and then I want to talk some about detainee releases.
So with that, first chart, please.
A reminder. When I show you these charts, what I'm talking through are attack averages, and the period of time for this particular chart is the average number of attacks per province during the period of time between 11 February and 24 February. Let me zoom in on a couple things. Last week -- the week that ended last Friday -- we saw 522 attacks across Iraq, which was down from the 555 the week prior. We did see some increases. We saw a 120 percent increase in attacks in south Iraq -- from 15 up to 33 attacks -- and we did indeed see a 27 percent decrease in attacks out in Al Anbar, from 145 down to 104 attacks.
So I'd like to spend some time and zoom in on Al Anbar and tell you why we think that's happened. Remember, all along I've briefed you on Operation Sayyid, which is the operation in Al Anbar that was focused on defeating al Qaeda in Iraq and disrupting the insurgency, and create conditions so that the people for Iraq, specifically the people of Al Anbar, could participate in the democratic process. And the operation continues with good effect.
Just on Monday, targeting Zarqawi in an area 30 miles northeast of Fallujah, coalition forces had intelligence of a(n) al-Qaeda-in- Iraq facility. It was used for training and for bomb making. Detailed planning and execution led to the apprehension of 61 members of the Zarqawi network in Iraq, to include some of his critical facilitators. Inside this facility was clearly indications of bomb making, munitions -- many weapons were confiscated. So know that we continue with Operation Sayyid in Al Anbar, focused on defeating Zarqawi, and operations like the one I just described to you contribute to that.
But we have reached a point in the operations in Al Anbar where we're convinced it's no longer just a kinetic solution. And what we have to do is work to meet the needs of the people of that province so when they've got a choice between being a member of the insurgency or part of the solution, they choose to be part of the solution. And we are indeed seeing process in those areas, so let me talk you through that.
We've seen great outreach from the national government to the provincial government in Al Anbar, and we've seen sessions chaired by the prime minister, including his ministers of Defense and Interior and his national security adviser, with the governor, members of the provincial council, and members of the security council in Al Anbar. And they were talking about how collectively could they improve the security situation in Al Anbar and meet the basic needs of those people, and they came up with five points of agreement that they continue to work through. And I'd like to highlight a few of those for you.
One is ensuring that the security forces in Al Anbar are representative of the people of Al Anbar. A decision was made that Al Anbar, the province, should have 11,330 police by the end of this year. They currently have just over 3,300, so an 8,000-person delta for police that are necessary in Al Anbar. And there's going to be an active recruiting program and a training program to outfit the Al Anbar police with folks from Al Anbar to the point that by the end of the year they'd be at 11,330. As we've talked about before, there are already two Iraqi army divisions in Al Anbar, the 1st Iraqi Army Division and the 7th Division. And if you look at the roles of those two divisions, there is a 5,000-person shortfall from what they should have to what they do have. So active recruiting and training from the people of Al Anbar to fill those gaps in the two Iraqi army divisions as well. So that was important to the people of the province and important to the national government: improve the security forces in Al Anbar, but include the people of Al Anbar, and that has indeed happened.
Great discussion and now obvious progress on reconstruction and some economic development in Al Anbar. The prime minister has dedicated $75 million for reconstruction. The provincial governor and his council have submitted a list of projects that they want completed. The Iraqi prime minister has approved that list, and plans are under way to start construction on those projects. So we're seeing progress in Al Anbar not just along on the security line, but also on the governance line and the -- and the economic line.
Next graphic, please. And you guys are getting better at that every week. Well done.
But now let's focus on the period of time from the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra a week ago Wednesday until now. And I showed you a slide like this last Saturday, but I wanted to update it and give you some more detail.
The numbers in red are the numbers that are reported both by the National Joint Operations Center and the National Command Center. The numbers in blue are those numbers that we, the coalition, can indeed confirm. And as I told you last week, as we get reports, we work to confirm or deny those reports. So as of today, what we can confirm is 33 attacks against mosques -- seven of which resulted in significant damage, and two of which resulted in the mosque being destroyed, to include the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
We today can confirm 319 civilians killed across Iraq in the period of time from the bombing of the mosque until now. And we can confirm that there have been 21 protests of numbers greater than a thousand people. Now an interesting point about the protests is the majority of them -- the vast majority of them -- were peaceful protests where the people of Iraq gathered together to demonstrate their concerns in a peaceful fashion. Now there have been a variety of other numbers that are working through both the Iraqi population, and the Arabic and Western press, that are numbers different than these. What I said last Saturday and what I say today still stands: as we get reports, we'll work to confirm those reports, and I will report to you the confirmation of the reports. What I chose to do today is to tell you what the Iraqi government is seeing in their command centers, and those are the numbers in red. And clearly there is a difference between what the NJOC's receiving and what we can confirm, and we will continue to work to close that gap.
As you know, just yesterday the Iraqi government made an official declaration that they can confirm 379 deaths as a result of the sectarian violence and the attack on the mosque. So just know we'll continue to work through the delta. We will work to confirm the reports, but that's what we see as of today.
Now let me use this to talk about a couple of things we saw since the Samarra bombing in terms of capabilities of the Iraqi security forces because we found them to be most effective. The Iraqi government, at the point of crisis, decided to impose certain emergency security measures, but they relied on the Iraqi security force to implement those measures. And the coalition forces, I've told you now two press conferences in a row, were in support of those operations.
The Iraqi police across Iraq, as demonstrations would occur, would work to ensure those demonstrations were peaceful. The reason that we believe that the majority of these demonstrations remained peaceful was because of the active involvement of the Iraqi police. The Iraqi police manned checkpoints and the Iraqi police controlled the streets. The Iraqi police were effective.
Same with the Iraqi army. Where the government of Iraq needed those forces, those forces deployed. They deployed in the areas that might have been mixed areas, that could have been tension spots. The Iraqi government decided that they needed a brigade from the 9th Iraqi Army Division in the streets of Baghdad -- tanks and BMPs -- and they were deployed, and I'll talk more about that in some level of detail.
But this is what we've seen since Wednesday a week ago in terms of attacks across Iraq that could relate to sectarian violence, and I'll come back to that at the end.
Next chart, please.
I have to emphasize that, at the point of crisis, the Iraqi leadership came together and made conscious decisions to improve the security situation in Iraq. They knew they were in a situation that could erupt in large-scale sectarian violence, and they imposed measures to keep that from happening. So if you look very closely from the point of the attack across the top tells you the decisions that were made by the Iraqi government and then implemented by the Iraqi security forces.
So right away, the prime minister and the Iraqi security ministers decided we have to bring the Iraqi security forces to full alert. We have to bring everybody off leave, put them back to their place of duty, and let them get prepared for particular missions. They decided where in Iraq these forces should be deployed based on where are the points of friction. Then they thought through, what do we need to employ in terms of emergency measures that will improve the situation, and they used things that they used successfully during the referendum and the two elections last year.
So they imposed a curfew, initially just in Baghdad and Salahuddin, and then they expanded it to both Diyala and Babil, and they carried them through the 27th. They decided that, based on the tensions that they sensed, that a daylight curfew was also important. And they imposed a daylight curfew on the 24th, and it lasted the 24th and 25th and then evolved to a vehicle ban only in Baghdad on the 26th.
And then the Iraq government decided that, based on what was happening in Baghdad, that it would be appropriate to deploy their only mechanized division -- the 9th Iraqi Army Division -- into Baghdad, a single brigade. Now I got to tell this story because last week I showed you a tank gunnery demonstration video of the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Brigade. It was that brigade that was pulled from training, that was told to change of mission, that moved from its location to the streets of Baghdad in an extremely professional manner. Now, I am an armor officer, and I've commanded an armor brigade, and I know how difficult that is. They were in the middle of training. They had to stop the training. They had to load their kit. They had to plan and execute a move into Baghdad and then conduct operations inside of Baghdad. And they've been doing that, and they've been doing that extremely well.
If you look across the emergency measures and the events that took place, you can see what we believe was the impact of those decisions. Right away there was a spike in civilian murders. Let's look at curfews, let's look at daylight curfews, let's look at vehicle bans to drive that spike down. There were, indeed, attacks against mosques and demonstrations. What can we impose to keep those things at a manageable level? Decisions made by a capable Iraqi government, executed by capable Iraqi security forces, to limit the damage and, most importantly, to save lives.
Next chart, please.
You got to think like the enemy. He still wants to derail the democratic process and discredit the Iraqi government. He's going to do whatever he can to inflame sectarian violence. And during the period of time when there was a ban of vehicle movement in Baghdad, he used that period of time to prepare for surge operations. And we've seen those surge operations over the last three days.
Over the last three days, just inside of Baghdad we've seen seven VBIEDs, one suicide attack, and one IED. And the effect of those attacks was 71 civilians killed and 62 civilians injured. We have seen a 55 percent increase in civilian casualties in the last week, because the insurgents are targeting innocent civilians.
The most horrendous of the attacks was the suicide attack at the gas station on the 28th, in which 25 civilians were killed. Again, innocent civilians, trying to go about their day-to-day life here in Baghdad, were killed by these terrorists.
And the last graphic, please.
Repeatedly I get questions on detainee releases. And I thought it would be appropriate on a routine basis to stop and show you over time the numbers of detainees that have been released. And this graph shows you since last October. Remember, there's a very detailed process called a combined review and release board. And on this board are six Iraqis and three coalition force members. And what they do is they look at each of the files of people who have been detained for over six months. And they review those files every 90 to 120 days. And if a determination is made that that individual is no longer a threat to the security of Iraq, then those individuals can either be released, or released with a guarantor.
Since we've been doing this, since August of 2004, over 28,000 files have been reviewed. And of those 28,000 files, 15,000 people that were detained were, indeed, released. And these are the numbers over the last several months. So it's a dedicated process in terms of all established procedures to review the file and determine whether or not the individual should be released. And that's the -- that's the pace of the releases.
Okay, put the chart back up that shows the attacks in -- since the mosque attack. I promised you that routinely I'd come back and I'd tell you what we're seeing. What can we confirm? There was, indeed, a deliberate attempt on the part of the enemy to inflame sectarian violence. He sat back and said, hey, I couldn't stop the drafting and the ratification of the constitution, I couldn't stop the elections, now the people of Iraq are trying to build a unity government; how can I stop that? Well, I must inflame sectarian violence. So he made a conscious decision to blow up the Golden Mosque in Samarra, a week ago Wednesday. And that did, indeed, incite sectarian violence. A capable Iraqi government stopped and said what should we do? Let's impose emergency measures. Let's bring back all our security forces, let's impose a curfew, let's impose a vehicle ban, let's deploy our mechanized division, let's get our army and our police in those points of friction areas.
And as a result of that, we had this level of attacks, but it could have been much, much worse.
The enemy's still out there. He still wants to inflame sectarian violence. He wants the people of Iraq to fight with each other. That's what he wants to do, and he will continue attacks to inflame that level of violence. In addition to that, he will use information operations to make the impact of the attacks seem worse than they truly are. He will use every mechanism that he can to take the number of attacks, and somehow portray to the world, most importantly to the people of Iraq, that the number of attacks were greater, that the sectarian violence were greater to create this perception of an unsecure environment.
And with that, I'm happy to answer any of your questions.
Sir?
Q General, talking about what you just said, the deliberate -- pardon me --
GEN. LYNCH: Sure.
Q General, Mike Besher (sp) with NBC.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi, Mike.
Q You talked about the deliberate attempt to inflame sectarian violence, and then, you talked earlier about the arrests and -- near Fallujah I believe -- and I believe Abu Al-Farouk may have been one of those. He's one of the top people under Zarqawi.
Is there any intelligence gathered from those arrests or elsewhere that indicates why this acceleration by al Qaeda, by Zarqawi, if you believe it was Zarqawi? Is there anything out there that says why now and what are the tactics and what's next?
GEN. LYNCH: Okay. I'm not sure if you were here, Mike, a couple of weeks ago when I handed out letters from the Zarqawi network -- where individuals that were out there doing the deed that Zarqawi tells them to do, wrote back to their leadership and said here's the problems that we see. We're convinced on everything we study about terrorists and foreign fighters, al Qaeda in Iraq and Zarqawi that his stated purpose right now is to inflame sectarian violence, and he's going to do whatever he can do to create a wedge between the people of Iraq. He's going to continue those operations.
As we did the operation last Monday and detained 61 of those individuals, we took them off the battlefield, and they can no longer be part of that. The munitions that they had stored we now control. The weapons that they had are now under our control as well, so we continue those operations. But we know that's what he wants to do.
So today, the vehicle ban was lifted. All these VBIEDs that he had had staged, he deployed into Iraq and detonated those over the last three days, killing 71 and injuring 62. So that's going to continue until we defeat Zarqawi and continue to disrupt the insurgency.
Q It took a lot of planning to do that. Do you have any insight from these arrests or from any intelligence of why now? What -- has there been any new thinking by Zarqawi that he feels that he needs to accelerate this move towards civil war?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, I'll talk to you to the level I can talk you through. As you guys well know, I can't compromise intelligence nor will I talk about future operations. But we do know, based on correspondence between Zawahiri and Zarqawi, that Zarqawi's getting a lot of pressure. He's getting a lot of pressure from, but he's getting a lot of pressure from his leadership as well and say, "Hey, we told you to disrupt the democratic process in Iraq. We told you to take the people away from being able to vote," and he couldn't do that. Now, they say, "We still got to establish this Islamic caliphate in Iraq to spread violence across the region, so do what you got to do." And that's why he's doing these bombs to incite sectarian violence.
Please.
Q Louise Rourke (sp), LA Times.
GEN. LYNCH: Sure. How are you?
Q I'm good. How are you?
GEN. LYNCH: Fine, thanks.
Q I was hoping you could talk a little bit about what you've seen in terms of attacks against U.S. troops, and also if you track so-called green-on-green violence and what you've seen since Wednesday?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, I'll address the first question first, and then I'll have to defer the second question.
We have seen a general downward trend on attacks against coalition forces, both in terms of numbers of attacks and resulting casualties. And that trend continues even through this period of sectarian violence. What we've seen at the same time, however, is a marked increase on attacks against civilians. The fact that there were indeed an increase of 55 percent casualties of civilians last week shows you that. And if you compare it to previous weeks, it's even much, much more. In addition to that, a marked increase on attacks by the insurgency against the Iraqi security forces, because they've now labeled them as a capable force that are now able to keep them from doing what they want to do.
So the answer to your question is: less attacks against the coalition forces; much, much more attacks against civilians and Iraqi security forces.
And I don't have any figures on green-on-green incidents now, but we'll chase those down and get you what we can.
Okay.
Q The Muslim Scholars Association was claiming yesterday that some of the violence is being done by Shi'ite government forces. When you all are out there in joint patrols in some of these neighborhoods, are the coalition forces, together with Iraqi army forces, stopping and checking some of the IDs of the Iraqi police who go by? Are you on the lookout for this sort of thing?
GEN. LYNCH: We're very sensitive to the allegations that members of the Iraqi security forces are conducting acts of violence that are part of the problem as opposed to part of the solution, so that members of the coalition forces --
(Referring to crashing sound.) What did you do? (Laughter.)
(Continuing) Members of the Iraqi security forces and members of coalition forces have direct orders to watch for that, if they see that, to report that.
Now, we're not seeing that. I mean, I've heard instances of members of the Iraqi security force being part of the problem not part of the solution, but we can't confirm that. Just know we chase every one down, every report, and see what we come up with. But now it's nothing.
Okay.
Q Hi. This is Jerry (sp) from AFP.
GEN. LYNCH: Sure.
Q The graphic here clearly shows that in the last couple of days the Iraqis have calmed down. But last week, immediately after the shrine bombing in Samarra, Ambassador Khalilzad had said that U.S. troops and patrols had significantly increased immediately along with the Iraqi security forces. And Iraqi security forces authorities were asking for more U.S. backup. What is the position on that front now? Have you kind of withdrawn your patrols a bit down after the lowering of attacks or what's the status of that?
GEN. LYNCH: A conscious decision was made after the Samarra bombing for the coalition forces to be in a support role to the Iraqi security forces. And we watched that mature. We watched the decisions made by the Iraqi authorities and the implementation of those decisions by the Iraqi security forces.
About a day after, a request was made, and a decision was made to increase the presence of security forces in areas, particularly mixed areas where violence could occur. So there was a conscious decision to increase the presence of Iraqi security forces and coalition forces.
We did increase the use of our intelligence-gathering assets to understand what was going on. So, for example, the UAVs -- we made a conscious decision to focus our efforts to be able to gather intelligence about what is happening. So when you get a report about a demonstration, you can take your UAV, vector it, and see how big that demonstration is. So that's what we did is we used the Iraqi security forces as the primary lead, with direction from the Iraqi government; we were in support.
In those areas where we needed increased presence, we made a conscious decision to increase the presence of both the Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces.
And on Saturday last week, I talked about the number of patrols, for example, in Baghdad and the number of checkpoints in Baghdad, so there was indeed an increase, both from the Iraqi security force and the coalition force.
And no one believes that the crisis is completely over because we still got a thinking enemy out there who wants to create sectarian violence. So no one should stop and say, "Hey, since the attacks are all down to this level, we should just now walk back from the battlefield and go back to business as usual." That's not the mode that we're in.
Sir, please.
Q Nick Olivari, Reuters.
General, you're giving out figures -- and I assume you keep them on a weekly basis -- and you say that you try and lay to correlate the U.S. figures with what you got from civilian Iraqi sources?
GEN. LYNCH: Yes.
Q When was the last time you were able to correlate those figures? And how often do you get close to those Iraqi numbers?
And then I have a second question: how many combat troops are in Baghdad right now as opposed to logistic and support troops?
GEN. LYNCH: Okay.
First question -- remind me what it was.
Q When was the last time you were able to correlate your numbers with the Iraqi -- (off mike)?
GEN. LYNCH: You know, we have coalition force members in the National Joint Operation Center. Individuals are working there side by side so that the intent for the correlation is on a daily basis. And what we do is we vector our tactical units -- divisions, brigades and battalions -- to confirm or deny reports of violence and find out what we can find out. So it's an ongoing effort. It's a daily effort at the NJOC between the coalition forces and the members in the National Joint Operation Center. But this is hard business. You know, what I've found in the course of my military career is you never believe the first report. And there's many times when I've taken my tank battalion or my tank brigade out, and my scouts would see a vehicle, and multiple scouts would see the same vehicle, and then you'd get multiple reports of the same vehicle. So that is a phenomenon that occurs on a battlefield anywhere in the world, and that's what's happened here.
So you have to make a conscious effort to say, "Okay, that's the report. Let's go check it."
So, for example, in the number of civilians killed, there are a variety of ways to check that. One of the ways we checked it is to use our logisticians to work with the Minister of Health and the director of the Baghdad morgue and say, "How many bodies have you seen?" And the number we got from that was 250; 250 bodies at the Baghdad morgue.
So just know each one gets pursued, and we get as much fidelity as we can.
I don't -- the truth is always somewhere between the two numbers, somewhere between the two numbers. And over time, you get more fidelity on what the exact truth was. But the numbers we're seeing here, and the truth somewhere between those numbers, is much less than the numbers we're being seen reported in the media.
Liz?
Q Hello. Yes, how long have you been tracking these civilian casualties in such detail for -- or did you only start doing it after the attack on the mosque? And if you have been tracking them in this much detail prior to the mosque, would it be possible for us to see, like, how this past week compares to previous trends? And would we be able to get these figures from you in the future if you intend to continue tracking the casualties in such detail?
GEN. LYNCH: Sure. If you recall a few press conferences ago, I made it a point to talk specifically about casualties -- civilian casualties, Iraqi security force casualties, coalition force casualties -- so we have those figures.
And if you'd like to see the casualty figures this week compared to previous weeks, we'll work that, and I'll give that to you either next week or whenever it's convenient for you. But we can track those numbers.
Q And will you -- can you -- will you provide then in the future? GEN. LYNCH: Sure. Yeah, we have to continue, Liz, to get fidelity on what's happening on the battlefield. So attacks -- the enemy wants to create sectarian violence; we have what we call Commanders Critical Information Requirements, those things that the commander needs to know to make decisions on how to use his assets.
And clearly a Commanders Critical Information Requirement is anything that deals with sectarian violence. So we will continue to track the information to this level of detail, and if it's useful to you, we'll provide it to you on a recurring basis.
Please.
Q Just to follow up to Liz's question, when did you start tracking those numbers?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, we -- it must have been now four or five press conferences ago where I showed you the details. And we've tracked them back at least over the last year. And I showed that level of detail.
Please.
Q Just before I came, I saw a wire story cross -- I can't remember it if was AP or Reuters -- quoting a representative of Muqtada al-Sadr saying that the Mahdi Army would supply -- would be the principal security force in Sadr City, would work with the Iraqi security services, but would be the principal in providing security. If that is indeed true, would the U.S. let that stand?
GEN. LYNCH: No, the U.S. wouldn't let that stand, and no, it's not true.
The Iraqi security force is here to protect the people of Iraq, and it's formed and equipped by the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government has acknowledged that the Mahdi militia exists and is doing things in its power to make the Mahdi militia go away, either go away or integrate into the Iraqi security forces. And we --
Q (Off mike.)
GEN. LYNCH: And we --
Q I'm sorry.
GEN. LYNCH: And we do see aggressive actions on the part of the Iraqi leadership to do just that.
So what Sadr is talking about, I have no idea. But no, we're not going to allow him to take control of security in any area across Iraq, nor would the Iraqi government. Q General, hi. John Anderson from The Washington Post.
GEN. LYNCH: Hey, John. How are you doing? I haven't seen you in a while.
Q Long time, no see. Yeah.
I'm wondering if these level of -- if this level of violence and killings continue, how that would affect the U.S.'s ability to draw down the number of troops this year.
GEN. LYNCH: We -- John, as well you know, because you've covered this for a period of time now, we see peaks of violence. We saw it around the referendum. We saw it around the elections. And now we're seeing it as the government is trying to form. And it's a conscious decision on the part of the enemy to do that. I mean, he is setting back and saying we -- this idea of democracy in Iraq is repulsive to the terrorists and the insurgency. It's repulsive to them. So he's doing that.
So we believe what we just saw was another surge, but we don't have any indications that surge will continue. They will continue to have points of sectarian violence, but not to the level that we've seen over the last several days.
The conditions for the U.S. force withdrawal are still the same. The level of the insurgency, the capability of the Iraq security force, and the level of governance at the national and regional levels -- and we'll continue to watch that.
So there's been no decisions on anybody's part to reevaluate troop levels based on this most recent incident.
Sure.
Q Just to follow up to that, I know last week there was a hand-over ceremony scheduled for a forward operating base near Sadr City.
GEN. LYNCH: Right.
Q Were some of the hand-overs delayed because of the violence? Because that one, of course, was cancelled. Have you just had to slow down some of your hand-over of territory to Iraqi forces?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, that one wasn't cancelled. It was delayed. And I believe it's rescheduled for the 9th of March, or maybe the 4th of March.
But we, with the Iraqi security force, the Iraqi government, right after the point of crisis, when the mosque was blown up, looked closely -- we had all sorts of things going -- looked closely across Iraq and said: Where, if you were the enemy, could you attack? Where would be a very lucrative target that you could establish and allow him to create significant damage? And that was one, that FOB transfer ceremony in Sadr City. So a conscious decision was made just to delay it; not to cancel it, but to delay it. And we have no intentions to delay or change any of those transfer ceremonies.
Please.
Q Sir, repeating my earlier question, how many troops -- U.S. troops in Iraq now -- sorry, in Baghdad now? And how many of those are combat troops?
GEN. LYNCH: I'm sorry, I'll have to get you those numbers, but we will. (To staff) Jeff, make sure we chase down those numbers.
We just did an analysis of force levels across Iraq and did a division of combat versus combat support. We can get you those numbers.
Any other questions? (No response.) Okay.
As always, thank you very much. Take care.
END.
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