OPERATIONAL UPDATE BY ARMY MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ
Multi-National Force-Iraq
OPERATIONAL UPDATE BY ARMY MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2006
GEN. LYNCH: Again, thanks for taking the time today. You know I appreciate you coming in. And there's lots of things that I want to talk to you about today, so let me just dive right in.
The first, and candidly, the most important thing I want to do in this press conference is join both Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey in denouncement -- in the most strongest denouncement of the terrorist attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra yesterday. This is a heinous crime committed against the people of Iraq, and it was conducted by terrorists that are intent in inflaming sectarian violence here in Iraq and across the region.
We've talked about this many times. The insurgents' objective is to derail the democratic process and discredit the Iraqi government. He couldn't stop the democratic process. Elections happened in January. The people of Iraq drafted and ratified a constitution in October. And elections happened in December. So now he's saying what can I do between now and the formation of the government to derail the democratic process? And the people of Iraq are working towards a unity government -- Kurds and Arabs, Shi'a and Sunnis. And the insurgents, they want to stop that unification, and they're going to do whatever they can to inflame sectarian violence. And that's what they did yesterday. Deplorable act. And it shows you the terrorists will stop at nothing and they care about nothing.
The first chart, please.
It's important that you understand from our perspective the repercussions from that attack yesterday. Candidly, I'm watching the media, I'm listening to discussions about attacks across Iraq that we, the coalition, can't see, we can't confirm. So I'm going to tell you in detail what we've seen since yesterday when the attack occurred until the time of this press conference so that you understand what we have indeed seen and we can confirm.
In general terms, across Iraq, based on the direction of the prime minister and the Iraqi government, and religious leaders like Sistani, we're seeing peaceful demonstrations. Sistani put out three fatwas yesterday and he called for calm, and he directed peaceful demonstrations. And that's what we're seeing. We've seen peaceful demonstrations, about 20 all across Iraq over the course of the last 36 hours.
Now, there have been violent demonstrations and there have been some attacks against mosques. And let me talk to you about that in some level of detail. We've seen across Iraq seven major mosque attacks. The one that we're most concerned about happened in the vicinity of Dora here in Baghdad, which was a complex attack of both small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades that caused significant damage to two mosques.
We're also concerned about the killings that we have seen. We've seen a Sunni imam killed in Basra, and we've seen a Sunni imam killed up the vicinity of Baghdad, an we've seen a Sunni sheikh killed and his son kidnapped in the vicinity of Husiniyah (sp) here by Baghdad.
There are demonstrations taking place around Iraq today. But think about what the government of Iraq did immediately. The government of Iraq said, okay, we need to calm the situation. The leaders of Iraq -- political leaders and religious leaders -- said we have to ensure that this doesn't ignite into a civil war.
So they've taken a lot of prudent measures. The government of Iraq has recalled all the Iraqi security forces. Everyone that was on leave or away from his place of duty has been recalled back to duty. The government of Iraq, with the leadership of the Iraqi security force, has directed detailed security around shrines, around mosques and around certain areas here in Iraq. The government of Iraq has imposed a curfew -- 2000 to 0600 -- specifically in Baghdad and in Samarra, and they've done many other things to indeed calm the storm, just as you would expect any representative government to do.
And as we've talked about, leaders, both Sunni and Shi'a, have continued to call for calmness, and that's what we're seeing the effect around Iraq.
Now there are unconfirmed reports -- you know, as I left my headquarters today -- I get an unconfirmed report about a demonstration in Diyala, where four individuals in a car drove by, and with small arms fire killed 47 people. But we can't confirm that. We have no knowledge in the Multinational Force Iraq Headquarters of that particular attack.
We're hearing reports about bodies being found. And again, we can't confirm those reports.
What I've shown you is the things that I can indeed confirm, and over time, the reports will come in, the exact situation on the ground will become clear. But that takes time.
Remember, we have about 160,000 coalition soldiers all around Iraq, and they report to their chain of command what they're seeing, which gives us great fidelity on operations around Iraq. In addition to that, the Iraqi security force and the Iraqi government has their reporting chains, and those reporting chains do indeed come together at the very top. So over time, as those reports come in and are confirmed, we'll ensure we share those with you.
But today, as of now, seven attacks across Iraq that resulted in damage to mosques; two Sunni imams murdered and one sheikh murdered; and then other less significant attacks. We've seen some drive-by attacks -- people driving by mosques, sticking a weapon out the window and firing rounds at the mosque, with no resulting damage. But that's where we are.
So we're not seeing civil war igniting in Iraq. We're not seeing 77, 80, 100 mosques damaged. We're not seeing death in the streets. We're seeing a confident, capable Iraqi government using their capable Iraqi security force to calm the storm that was inflamed by a horrendous, horrific terrorist attack yesterday against the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Next chart, please.
I continue to try to find ways to tell the story of operations across Iraq, so allow me a new technique today. We always talk about attack numbers and casualty numbers, but I want to give you an operational view through the lens of an operational assessment.
The end state remains the same: an Iraq that's at peace with its neighbors, that's an ally in the war on terror, that has a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, that has a security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.
So given that end state, there are certain things that we track routinely to assess the progress. We track the status of the Iraqi security forces, we track the status of the insurgency and we track the things that we need to see as Iraq moves towards a democratic society and truly becomes independent. So allow me to walk you through a level of detail on what we saw last week in those specific areas.
What we're seeing across Iraq is we're seeing that the police forces are indeed gaining capability and gaining public confidence. There are today 123,000 members of the Iraqi police service trained and equipped, and they continue to grow in not just quantity but in quality and capabilities. We're working hard as the multinational force and the coalition to embed police trainers with the Iraqi police, and to give them more detailed training on a variety of tasks. But we're seeing the police forces gaining capability and gaining public confidence.
We continue to be amazed with the capabilities of the Iraqi army, their performance and their ability to conduct, plan and execute independent missions.
Last week, 521 operations, company and above, across Iraq; 25 percent of those, 130 of them, were independent operations by the Iraqi security forces, operations that they, based on intelligence, planned and executed. And they continue to improve in capability at company level and above.
We're looking for and we're seeing increased cooperation between the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. We've said all along that last year we focused on the Iraqi army by design, and today there are two Iraqi army divisions, 10 Iraqi army brigades and 43 Iraqi army battalions that own battlespace in Iraq and are leading counterinsurgency operations. This year is the year of the police, and we're going to focus on improving capabilities of the Iraqi police force. Part of that is improving the coordination and cooperation between the Iraqi security force elements -- the Iraqi police and the Iraqi army -- and we're seeing detailed indications of improvement in cooperation.
And even though the terrorists continue to conduct these horrific attacks against the people of Iraq, there's no shortage of recruits either for the Iraqi army or for the Iraqi police. You've got to applaud the courage and conviction of the Iraqi people. Remember, there are 26 million Iraqis, on or about, and we believe that less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the Iraqi population are part of the insurgency, and the rest of them want to have a place where they can go to work, they can send their kids to school, they can have a job and flourish in a democratic society. And as a result of that, they standing in recruiting lines to join both the police and the army. So we see the improvement of the Iraqi security force capabilities on a general basis continuing to improve.
Now let's talk about the insurgency. Last week, 555 attacks across Iraq, exactly the same number of attacks as the week prior. Of those number of attacks, only 23 percent were effective in that they resulted in a casualty, an Iraqi security force casualty, an Iraqi civilian or a coalition force member. Even though the numbers of attacks are the same, we saw last week an increase in the number of casualties. We saw an increase in the number of casualties in the civilian population, up 34 percent from the previous week; and the Iraqi security force, up 12 percent.
And I talked about this last week. We're dealing with a cowardly insurgency. And what they've done now is they've shifted their sight group, their target, to the Iraqi civilians and the Iraqi security force and away from the coalition. We're continuing to see a downward trend in coalition casualties.
Last week we saw an increase in VBIEDs, 12 last week, 10 the week before. And these VBIEDs are targeted against Iraqi civilians. Sixty percent of the casualties last week were Iraqi civilians. Innocent civilians. Iraqi men, women and children who were trying to go about their day-to-day business, and they were attacked by the insurgency using these VBIEDs. Increase in suicide bombs last week, as well. Four last week, three from the week prior.
One of the things that we're seeing as a trend with IEDs is there are more of them in place but there are more of them found and cleared. What we're seeing is, the capabilities they need to create effective IEDs -- the bombmakers, the proper munitions, the proper supplies -- we have depleted those capabilities, so we're seeing a lot of poorly emplaced, poorly functioning IEDs, to the point where we are indeed finding and clearing more than 40 percent of the ones we encounter on the streets of Iraq.
And we continue to see this fracturing, the fracturing between the terrorists and foreign fighters and local insurgent groups. And I'm going to talk to you about that in some detail because it's very important that you understand what we're seeing, but in general terms, we're seeing the people of Iraq -- to include the local insurgency -- telling Zarqawi and the terrorists and foreign fighters, "We've had enough. Get out of our country. This is not your area, this is not your training ground, this is not going to be an Islamic caliphate from which you can spread violence across the region."
Counterinsurgency operations average nine years. If you study history, successful counterinsurgency operations took at least nine years. We're three years into this operation.
And it's not just about kinetic operations. It's not just about capable security forces that can defeat a less capable insurgency. It's about improving the government's capability. It's about improving the economic situation. It's about improving the communication across Iraq. And we're seeing improvements in that area as well.
We are deeply involved, as the coalition, as well as the embassy, on working through communication between local leaders, provincial leaders and national leaders. And we're seeing this overwhelming desire on the part of the leaderships to be Iraqi nationalists, Iraqi nationalists. And we're seeing much better communication from the national level through the provincial level down to the local level.
Across Iraq we're seeing the people at the local level, public and civic leaders, holding their government responsible, as you would expect them to in a democratic society. And they're saying, "Hey, we're not getting our basic needs met. Our quality of life is not what it's supposed to be, and we need your help, provincial council. We need your help, Prime Minister."
And we're seeing improvements on the economic line of operation in the areas of business, banking, industry and agriculture. Those aren't quantum leaps in terms of improvements, but there's steady progress.
But to be effective in this counterinsurgency operation, we've said all along that there's got to be a capable Iraqi security force, there's got to be a low level of violence, and there's got to be a(n) independent Iraq that has capable governance and an economic foundation and a rule of law foundation. So we're seeing progress.
Next graphic, please.
Today: 232,000 trained and equipped members of the Iraqi security force, 123,000 in the Ministry of Interior, 108,000 in the Ministry of Defense.
Just last week we graduated 1,000 police cadets from the Iraqi police academy. Fifty of those cadets were identified as distinguished graduates, meaning that they did very well in their course of training, just like in all courses of training. I want to highlight one specific capability today that we talked about some over the course of the week. Could I get the video, please?
There is one mechanized division in the Iraqi army, the 9th Mechanized Division. And in November of this year, Hungary donated 77 T-72 tanks. (Plays video.)
That is the commander of the 9th Iraqi Army Division. (Video continues.)
Those are the T-72 tanks donated by the nation of Hungary. The 9th Division has two brigades, an armored brigade -- (inaudible) -- brigade, three tank battalions altogether.
They've progressed through all the gunnery training that you would expect them to do to be able to (culminate ?) this level of collective gunnery. (Video continues.)
(Inaudible due to video) -- more and more professional, and more and more capable.
That division will become fully -- will become initially operational-capable -- we call it IOC -- on the 1st of March of '06.
So significant improvements in the Iraqi security force. A year ago, January '05, 127,000, now 232,000 -- amazing progress.
And there are skeptics out there who say, "Okay, Lynch, those are just numbers, and we're not impressed with the numbers." What I do is I rely on the transition teams that we've embedded in these battalions, both military and police transition teams, and they report the readiness of their assigned unit. And remember, those transition teams are embedded in that battalion. They planned with that battalion. They conduct operations with that battalion. And they're the ones that attest that these guys are indeed becoming more and more capable.
And the next graphic, please.
And this shows you where we are.
And if this is not an indication of progress, I don't know what is.
In accordance with our readiness reporting procedures, we have now determined that two of the Iraqi divisions out of the 10 are now capable of assuming battlespace and leading in counterinsurgency operations, 10 of the Iraqi brigades and 43 of battalions. And the graphic shows you the areas that they indeed have assumed control of that battlespace and have the lead in counterinsurgency operations. Look four months ago until October. Look at the number of units that were adapted to the level of readiness; less than half of what we have now. Look at the battlespace that was controlled by the Iraqi security forces. Look what we have now. Amazing progress.
We believe that by the summertime, given projections, that 75 percent of the Iraqi army brigades will be capable of assuming control and leading operations in their battlespace, and by the fall, 80 percent of the division. So we are clearly on a great glide path to creating this domestic security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraqis a safe haven for terrorists.
Okay. I want to tell you a story about what we're seeing between the terrorists and foreign fighters and the local insurgents, and you're going to leave here today with a copy of three different letters. But let me tell you the story, so as you read the letters, you can understand what I'm talking about. They're not in your packet, but you'll get them -- you'll get them as you leave.
On the 11th of February, we conducted an operation. We had intelligence that Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq were planning an operation against a specific tribe out in Al Anbar, and on the 11th of February we conducted this operation. As part of the operation, we moved to detain an individual, and we watched that individual burying something as we moved to him. We uncovered what he was burying, and we came up with letters, thumb drives, those kinds of things.
This individual was clearly an al Qaeda operative here in Iraq. He wasn't one of the leaders, he was one of the led. And in the packet there were a variety of written letters, handwritten notes and, as I say, a thumb drive. And you'll get copies of these letters.
But in general terms, as you read it, here's what you're going to see. You're going to see the led of al Qaeda in Iraq talking to their leadership and saying: Hey, in Al Anbar we got this problem. The tribal sheikhs have joined against us. They are now attacking us. We, the insurgency, we, the terrorists and foreign fighters, have become their enemy.
And as I've told you, in Al Anbar since September the local insurgents have killed six of the leaders of Zarqawi's network in Iraq. And in Ramadi, they're blocking the town to keep the terrorists and foreign fighters from coming in.
These letters, written by the operatives inside of Iraq to their leaders, are saying: Hey, they have massed against us and we have to do something about it. And what they said they got to do about it is they've got to do essentially two major things. They got to change their tactics. This is what the led was pleading to the leaders. He said: We got to quit attacking and killing the popular people because it's causing the locals to rise up against us. Our attacks ought to be against the less popular people. And then he's saying -- led to the leader -- he says: We got to quit attacking the villages because the villages have united against us, and we got to attack the major cities where we can conduct attacks and get away from them.
They say in the letters that: We got to continue to work to drive a wedge between the Shi'a population and the Sunni population because that's what's forming the basis for this unity government.
So we contend what we saw yesterday in Samarra was an indication of what's happening with the terrorists and foreign fighters. They can't stand the idea of a democratic Iraq. They can't stand it. So as a result of that, they think: Okay, they had the elections, they're forming their government. What can we do? Let's inflame sectarian violence. Let's not do it in the villages because in the villages they're going to mass against us. Let's do it in the cities, like Samarra. And they're thinking: What can we do, what can we attack that's not going to be a significant attack against the Shi'a population, but rather, attacking one of their most important things. And they said: Let's attack that shrine. Let's attack the Golden Mosque in Samarra and then see what happens. And that's what we experienced yesterday.
So if I could get the first graphic back up, please.
And while they're transitioning to the first graphic, let me transition to you and answer whatever questions you might have. And you got do the microphone.
Q General, this is Nelson -- (inaudible) -- The Washington Post.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi, Nelson.
Q You spoke of the Iraqi army and Iraqi security forces' response to the attack on the Al-Askariya mosque. I was wondering, have coalition forces done anything in particular in response to this attack?
GEN. LYNCH: We -- from the time the attack started, we saw a capable government mass forces to counter the problem. We saw the prime minister call in his security ministers and his collective leadership and issue decisive action: Let's recall the Iraqi security force now. Let's reassign members of the Iraqi security force to guard shrines and mosques and political buildings. Let's do that now. Let's control public display of weapons now. Let's put in a curfew now.
Watching that, as a coalition we realized that we could indeed stand back, just like we did for the elections, just like we did for the referendum, and allow the Iraqi government and Iraqi security force to take the lead to calm this situation. So the coalition forces are still out there, but they're not in the lead. And we're not directing activity, the Iraqi government is and the Iraqi security force is.
Q General, Mike Dutcher (sp) with NBC.
GEN. LYNCH: Hi, Mike.
Q How you doing?
GEN. LYNCH: Good.
Q The figures -- the higher figures you're seeing on the media, you said you've been watching, are coming from the Ministry of Interior. Do you not trust those figures?
GEN. LYNCH: I didn't say anything about not trusting figures. We're in a complicated environment. You know, in the military -- I've been in the Army now for 29 years, and you're taught: Never believe the first report, especially in a complex situation like this. There is so much going on out there across Iraq today, you got to allow those reports to come up and crystallize before you say yeah, that's a confirmed report.
We've got great dialogue with the National Joint Operations Center. The idea of 47 people killed up in Diyala in a demonstration came from that National Joint Operations Center.
I'm just telling you that we have to confirm that report, and once we confirm the report, we'll tell you. And this is what I can confirm as of right now.
Now, I am concerned, Mike, about this idea of, you know, 77 mosques being attacked, because even today when I'm starting to get unconfirmed reports, I'm not getting anything that would look like a delta between 7 and 77.
Kimberly?
Q A lot of the Sunni public -- population -- and also the Shi'ites are believing these figures.
They're not waiting to hear proper information; they're acting. A lot of Sunnis are angry both at the Iraqi police force, Iraqi security services and the coalition for allowing the violence of the past 24 hours. How are you going to contain that?
GEN. LYNCH: We work hard to communicate reality to the people of Iraq and to the people of the world. So much like I'm talking to you right now, Iraqi spokesmen are talking to the people of Iraq and explaining here's what we're seeing. It becomes a perception of security issue. And if the people of Iraq are convinced that their Iraqi security force is not protecting their interests, then they're going to be concerned. And as a result of being concerned, they might do things that this democratic government might not want them to do.
So it's about information, it's about informing people what we're seeing, and it's really about competent, capable leadership. What we saw yesterday with the prime minister -- and oh, by the way, what we saw with the minister of Interior as he went to Samarra -- is capable leadership talking to the people of Iraq, and saying, calm down; Sistani issuing fatwas and saying, hey, we don't -- now is not the time for violent demonstrations, calm down. And Kimberly, what we're seeing is that calmness.
Now, as I talked to Mike about, we'll continue to really pursue what's really happened out there that we might not be aware of and confirm whatever reports we can confirm.
Q Hi. This is Gerry (sp) from AFP.
GEN. LYNCH: How are you?
Q Good, good.
We just had some reports also saying that there some clashes between U.S. forces and the Mahdi militia in the eastern side of Baghdad last night. How true is it? And there are also reports that 17 militia member killed in that. Could you throw some light on this?
GEN. LYNCH: It's not true. We have no reports that indicates that any coalition forces were in any kind of conflict with members of the Mahdi militia, and that would -- a report that I'd have seen right away, especially with what happened yesterday. So to answer to questions is it's not true. Q Hi, General. Michael Hastings from Newsweek.
GEN. LYNCH: Michael, how are you doing?
Q Good, how are you? How are you?
GEN: LYNCH: I'm doing great.
Q I was wondering if -- great -- (chuckles) -- if we could focus on Samarra for a second. Would you be able to talk about what kind of threat level that city has faced over the past couple weeks? What kind of attacks -- have they seen against coalition forces? Have the insurgents been heavy on the sectarian violence? And were there any kind of signs in the days leading up to this attack that something big was coming?
GEN. LYNCH: You know, Michael, that we watch closely the operations all across Iraq, to include Samarra. And if we had had an indication that something bad was fixing to happen, you could it to the bank that we would have done something about it.
We saw no indication along those lines. We didn't see a growth of -- remember, Samarra has 89 percent Sunnis and only 4 percent Shi'as, so it's a predominantly Sunni population. So watching -- and we were very aware, as is the world, of the importance of the golden mosque in Samarra. We had no indications of an attack, we had no indications of growing violence inside of Samarra, and if we'd have seen that, we'd have worked with the Iraqi government to place additional security measures inside of Samarra.
Q And have most of the attacks in Samarra been against coalition that you had seen? I mean, is it -- has it been consistent; you have 10 attacks a day against U.S. forces there, two attacks a day? Do you have any sense of --
GEN. LYNCH: Let me chase those figures down for you. I didn't come prepared to talk about attack figures inside of Samarra.
But again, what we're seeing, because we've now reached the point where I'm convinced we're fighting a cowardly enemy, and what he's doing is he's going against soft targets, and 60 percent o the casualties last week were Iraqi civilians -- Iraqi civilians. Attacks against coalition forces, in general, are going down. Casualty rates are going down. And what's going up is the attack against civilians and against the Iraqi security forces.
I got plenty of time. We'll get through all these questions.
Q General, Charlie Hanelly of the AP.
GEN. LYNCH: Hey, Charlie.
Q I wonder whether -- the tempo and the magnitude of U.S. operations the past 36 hours or so, has there been a change in that? Has there been a tendency to stay on base? And if so, why?
GEN. LYNCH: There's been no change into the tempo of our operations. General Casey has issued no orders that would cause the operational forces to change their tactics, techniques and procedures. We're doing what we have always been doing.
In the particular case of working through potential civilian unrest, we've deferred to the Iraqi government and the Iraqi security force, and they have the lead and we are in a support role. If they say, "Hey, we need some help securing this shrine," or "Need some help around this area where a demonstration is planning to occur," then we would support that. But we haven't got those requests. So all operations continue.
Q Just a quick follow-up. Given that many in the Sunni community believe and that also Western diplomats have talked about the fact that Shi'ite-sponsored death squads are operating out there, and that the Ministry of Interior is saying dozens of people were killed just inside Baghdad last night, might you not be stepping up your operations tonight just to give the people confidence?
GEN. LYNCH: Well, again, with the great work that the Iraqi security force is doing and has done over the last 24 hours with this specific incidence, we're not sensing that the people of Iraq are feeling uncomfortable or that the people of Iraq have any heightened sense of unsecurity.
Now, no one denies, Kimberly, that there have been acts of sectarian violence. Zarqawi terrorists and foreign fighters, that's what they want to have happen, so every opportunity they get to kill a certain group of populations and blame it on somebody else, they're going to do that. They're going to do that. So that continues. But we don't see a need, based on our read of the battlefield, our cooperation with the Iraqi government and our cooperation with the Iraqi security force, to increase our operations. We continue at the pace that we have been continuing.
Q General, Tom Lasseter, Knight Ridder.
GEN. LYNCH: Hey, Tom.
Q I wanted to talk about what happened in Samarra in the context of handing over battlespace. Is there any concern that as that continues to happen, that areas will be laid more bare for what happened in Samarra yesterday? Certainly there are far fewer U.S. troops in Samarra right now than there were when 3ID was there. What's taking a lot of that space are commandos from Baghdad -- primarily, overwhelmingly, Shi'a, who don't always seem to have the trust of the local populace there. Is there concern that as you hand over the battlespace, that it might lay it again more bare toward what happened in Samarra, where you might perhaps not have as many people patrolling, you might not have as regular a tempo of patrols as you did a year ago, and it becomes easier for them to identify these sorts of targets that get such a large reaction?
GEN. LYNCH: Thank you for that question.
We've got a very deliberate procedure that we go through before we transition security responsibilities. And we're adamant that three conditions have to be met. And we look across Iraq -- (to staff) -- put the map back up, the last graphic, please. None of this transition of security responsibilities happens unless three conditions are met.
We had not transitioned security responsibility in Samarra to the Iraqi security forces. That's not a green area on this particular map. The level of the insurgency has to be at the point where it's manageable by the security force that's present. Regardless if it's the coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, you have to maintain sufficient security force to be able to quell the insurgency in that area.
In addition to that, the governance capacity at the local level and the provincial level has to be robust enough to be able to control these security forces. So as we look all across Iraq, we make that determination, and in these areas those conditions were indeed met. Those conditions have not been met in Samarra.
As you look closely at Samarra with the tactical commander, a decision was made to bring in two special police commando battalions, and that's what's on the ground now and was on the ground yesterday during the course of the attack. In addition to that, there are Iraqi police there and coalition forces inside of Samarra. So we have not transitioned security responsibility of Samarra there. We do take in consideration those three factors before we transition anything anywhere.
Q A follow-up?
GEN. LYNCN: Sure.
Q There's certainly significantly less or fewer U.S. troops there than there were six months ago, for example. Is there any -- you know, do you think that if you start to see those sorts of events happening more often, that there might be a step, you know, back toward larger U.S. troop presence in these areas? GEN. LYNCH: We're never going to change the conditions that I just described. And only when the Iraqi security forces at the point where we believe they're capable enough in that local area to control the security environment, will we withdraw coalition forces.
And the tactical commander on the ground in Samarra made the call. If you look closely to the coalition presence there, there is indeed a battalion of coalition forces there. Some are outside the city, some are inside the city. But the tactical commander said, "Hey, with what I've got on the ground with the Iraqi security forces, I've got sufficient security forces."
Now remember, what we're seeing on this attack against the mosque -- this wasn't a large-scale uprising of the insurgency attacking this mosque. That's not what we saw. And the actual reason that the mosque was attacked and how it was attacked is still under investigation.
So we're not at all, Tom, second-guessing our decisions on transition of security responsibility. And we're not going to transition anything until we're convinced the Iraqi security force is where it needs to be, the level of insurgency is down and the capability of the governance is where we want it to be -- where the Iraqis want it to be.
Q General, there were some arrests made after the bombing. Do we have any indication -- the United States has any indication of -- from these arrests or any intelligence who exactly did this or, you know, suspicions or -- being pointed towards foreign insurgents?
And the second question I have is about the murder of the three Al-Arabiya reporters, and do you have any more information on that, who might have done that as well?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, I'll answer the second question first because, no, I don't have any more information. We continue to watch that.
Reference your first question -- again, you never believe the first report. You know, yesterday, we as the coalition, along with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi security forces, were trying to digest all these different reports on what might have happened. It's under detailed investigation by the Iraqi government. The prime minister's put together a Sunni-Shi'a-Kurd party to move to Samarra to investigate what happened inside the mosque. The members of the facilities protection service that were inside the mosque, they're all being talked to to try to understand what happened, and as we get better fidelity on what happened, we'll let you know.
But right now, it's -- it would be a guess on my part or anybody's part to say, "Here's how this went down." Having said that, it's clearly the signature of Zarqawi and terrorists and foreign fighters. I mean, they want to drive this sectarian wedge. Just think like the enemy, Mike. That's what they train us to do. If you really want to derail the democratic process and discredit the Iraqi government, and you know that they're trying to form this national unity government, let's drive a damn wedge. So how are we going to do that? Well, let's go somewhere where it's -- the majority population is Sunni but there's a Shi'a shrine there and let's blow up that shrine and see what happens. So we're absolutely convinced that the thumbprints of terrorists are all over this, regardless who actually set the bomb.
Q Just following in that vein -- is there any intel in, for instance, what sort of explosives were used in Samarra? Was it high- quality weapons grade, leftover shells, that sort of thing?
GEN. LYNCH: Yeah, we got all sorts of different reports on the number of explosive devices were there and what exactly went off and when, how did that work? So I'd be hazarding a guess right now, Kimberly, to give you something.
But it is under investigation, and as we get more details, we'll get those details to you. I know you don't like that answer, but that's the best answer I can give you.
Q General, on Arab television yesterday and certainly driving through the streets of Baghdad, you could see that the Mahdi Army was out in force, a militia group. What have the Iraqi security forces or coalition forces done to rein them in, to keep them from walking the streets with RPGs and AKs?
GEN. LYNCH: Now remember, there is a conscious decision by the Iraqi government to rein in militias, and the Mahdi militia is not supposed to exist, but it does exist. Nobody denies the fact that it does exist. We know for a fact that the Iraqi government is working through their channels to control any kind of operations by the Mahdi militia. We've got no reports of the Mahdi militia being in contact with coalition forces. I've got no reports that talk about them doing specific operations anywhere other than normal, routine reports.
But the prime minister and the leadership of Iraq are very sensitive to the operations of the Mahdi militia, and are working to keep that under control.
I've got time for one more question. Q General, you mentioned that there were more -- if I heard you right -- there were more IEDs and more are being removed. And I don't imagine -- well, if you do have stats at your fingertips, we'd appreciate them -- but otherwise, could you just explain the phenomena you were talking about here? Why are there more, and why are there more being removed?
GEN. LYNCH: The weapon of choice for Zarqawi terrorists and foreign fighters are suicide bombers. Remember, if you were to add up all the group that we believe to be terrorists and foreign fighters, that's a very, very small group, but they are responsible for all the suicide attacks across Iraq, and we believe to be responsible for this attack against the Golden Mosque yesterday.
The Iraqi rejectionist group in the middle -- their weapon of choice -- the larger group -- their weapon of choice is IEDs.
So we have mounted specific operations to kill or capture bombmakers and to take out the munitions that the insurgents need to build these IEDs with great effect.
I mean, I think you all get tired of me showing pictures of caches that we've found, but every Thursday I highlight the amount of munitions we've taken off the battlefield.
So given the fact that they're bombmakers, the guys who've got the experience are being killed or captured, and their munitions that they want are being taken away from them, they've now resorted to people to make these IEDs, who candidly have less idea of what of they're doing, and people to then place the IEDs, who candidly have less idea of what they're doing. So IEDs, in general, have become ineffective.
Now, we've created in our own operations detailed training on how to find IEDs, advanced technology to counter the IEDs, and as I say, deliver operations against the bombmakers to counter their capability. So we have reached a point where the IEDs on the battlefield, 40 percent of them are being found and cleared.
Okay. I don't want to leave without talking about this again, because in my nine months in Iraq, if I were to put my finger on the thing that's the most progress, it'd be the growth of the capabilities of the Iraqi security force. And to have a year ago, to have 127,000 and now have 223,000; and just like last October, to only have one division, four brigades and 23 battalions controlling battlespace and now to be here; and to project by the summertime 75 percent of the brigades having the ability to control battlespace, to me, is absolutely phenomenal. Absolutely phenomenal.
So as the Iraqi security force stands up, the coalition forces can stand down, and that's what we're seeing now across Iraq.
Okay. Thanks for your time.
END.
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