PRESS CONFERENCE WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ ZALMAY KHALILZAD
Multi-National Force-Iraq
Saturday, 18 February 2006
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ ZALMAY KHALILZAD LOCATION: COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 2006
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, I'm very happy to be here and welcome you to Ocean Cliff, I understand this room is called. Didn't see an ocean on my way here. It's been a while since I have done one of these. I thought it's a good time to do it. And this is obviously an important time for Iraq and Iraqis.
The formation of a government of national unity is very important. The fundamental problem of Iraq is one of sectarianism and ethnic conflict. Iraq is going through a difficult transition period. This polarization along sectarian, ethnic lines affect every aspect of what's going on here. The various communities need to come together in a national compact. And that can be achieved through first the establishment of national unity government.
At the present time, the Iraqis' leaders are discussing key issues with regard to the formation of a national unity government. First they're discussing what should be the constituent elements of a national unity government. Which forces should form, in other words, this national unity government? Second, what should be the structures for decision-making in the national unity government? And three, what will be the processes for decision-making? And fourth, obviously is the composition in terms of people and ministries and presidency and the leadership of the assembly.
And of course also, it's important that there is an agreement on a program, because a national unity government should not mean to divide the government between various forces, a divided government, but a government that brings various forces together in support of a program that everyone can support -- governing from the center, as I have called it. We are doing what we can to be helpful. I'm meeting often and regularly with Iraqi leaders.
As I have said before, Iraq's success is very important to us. This is no secret. We have spent a lot of blood and treasure here, and we regard Iraq's success to be our success. And as I've said before, God forbid Iraq's failure will be also ours. And we'll do whatever we can to be helpful. I'm available, I've told Iraqi leaders, at any time to offer my services, advice, suggestions, bridging proposals, and that's what we're doing.
I'll be glad to take your questions.
Oh, sure. Please.
Q (In Arabic.)
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, as I said in my opening statement, that sectarianism and ethnic conflict is the fundamental problem in Iraq.
Iraq is going through a period of state and nation building. The insurgency and the terror that is part of the scene is a reflection of this conflict along the lines that I described, and also taking advantage of it, particularly terror. And to overcome this, there is a need for a government of national unity. That's the difference between what exists now and the next government, that it'll bring the key forces together. Iraqis say they would like to have the key forces from different sects and ethnic groups coming together to form this government.
And two is that the ministries work to implement a national unity program that has been agreed to. And also, as I have said repeatedly, that the ministers, particularly Security ministers, have to be people who are non-sectarian, who are broadly acceptable, who do not represent or have ties to militias. This is the singlemost important issue that Iraq faces -- forming a national unity government that meets the criteria that I described.
And -- and when Iraq succeeds in establishing such a government, it will take a giant step in the right direction, and it will put the country on the right trajectory, and I think it will assist substantially in dealing with the issue of the insurgency. It will be difficult to do. It's going to take time. Compromises have to be made. But I see that as a solution, and we'll work with the Iraqis to -- to achieve that.
As far as our forces are concerned, I have said that we do not plan to have permanent bases here. We have started to reduce our forces already. Two brigades -- a reduction of two brigades have already been announced. I see a set of circumstances developing that would allow for continuing reduction, a significant reduction in the size of U.S. forces here in the coming months.
Hi.
Q Hi, Ambassador. Robert Worth, New York Times.
Can you tell us a little bit about the -- (audio break from source).
AMB. KHALILZAD: That has been discussed in the Salahuddin Agreement that was made a few weeks ago, that now publicly three forces support the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqiyah of Ayad Allawi and the Tall Afar group support is the idea that as far as the structure and process for decision-making is concerned, that there should be a national security council or a national policy council -- there are different names that people have given -- should be established that will bring the different officeholders and key leaders together. That would be the presidency, the prime minister and his deputies and the speaker, and perhaps in addition the leaders of the blocs that form the government who might not hold one of those positions. I say "perhaps" because that was not specifically mentioned in the Salahuddin Agreement, but I have heard some people mentioning that.
That will, I think -- the idea is that key leaders will coordinate and decide on major policy issues in a forum such as that. And it will focus on the longer-term, big policy issues, not to get involved in the day-to-day running of the government, which will be of course the job of the prime minister and the cabinet. They do not make laws. That's the job of the legislature. But there is a belief that in the current circumstances, there hasn't been enough coordination between different elements of the government, which is the presidency, the prime minister and the legislature, the speaker representing it, and other forces that this institution could give political cover to the government, especially the cabinet, for some of the difficult decisions that it'll have to make in the coming period -- what to do about the militias, what to do about the de- Ba'athification, what to do about, you know, the insurgency. Should there be changes or agreements that might come up as a result of progress that Iraq makes?
So there is a difference of view. I think the idea in concept has broad support, even from people that I've talked to within the UIA support the idea. There is a difference of view on whether it should be an advisory, coordinating body or should it be a decision-making, executive body, and I think there are ways that that could be bridged. But this is of course something very important as a whole government of national unity -- making it, building it -- it is a tough decision they face, so I'm not surprised that there are some differences of view on it.
Yes, welcome. Good to see you.
Q Ambassador, Anne Garrels from National Public Radio.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Sure.
Q It's clear that Muqtada al-Sadr and his movement are playing a far greater role politically than in the past. Have you met with any members of the Sadrist movement, and how do you -- how is this going to complicate, given his public statements so far, the formation of a national unity government?
AMB. KHALILZAD: I have met with people associated with that movement. They are in the government. Of course, the present government -- some of the ministers are from the Sadrian or Sadrist movement. Of course the Sadrists played an important role in -- within the UIA in the selection or nomination of Mr. Ja'afari as a candidate of the UIA for prime minister.
And it's very important that the forces that participate in the government -- that they subscribe to the same set of programs and policies. That would have to be a renunciation of violence, of course. Working within the law, there cannot be two justice system(s) -- the one that is by the Iraqi state, based on the Iraqi constitution and laws, and then, on the side, people forming Shari'a courts and forcing those. There has to be the cooperation with the law, with the constitution, which calls for disbanding of militia forces. The government in the coming period needs to develop a program -- and we will work with them -- to disband militias. Otherwise, Iraq faces the risk of warlordism that Afghanistan went through for a period. There are lessons to be learned from the experience of other countries when unauthorized military formations have been allowed to operate.
So there are issues that everyone would have to agree to and challenges that are there and -- with regard to the Sadrists.
Q Borzou Daragahi, Los Angeles Times.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Yes, sir.
Q It's now been two months since the elections, and we're, you know, just sort of talking about setting up a process for coming up with a government policy.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Right.
Q Is there a danger of a repeat of last January, where the sort of good will and stability generated by an election is squandered as politics gets mired -- and is there a concern about that at the embassy, that this could drag on too long and destabilize, rather than stabilize, the country?
AMB. KHALILZAD: I think it will only be a few days since the results were certified. So you couldn't really move to form a government. You could have preliminary discussions, but seriously, until the results were certified -- and I think that happened only a few days ago. I think it's very important that there be a balance between speed and getting the right results. A government of national unity along the lines that I described, as I said, is the right remedy for the circumstances that Iraq is in. This -- as I said, the fundamental problem of Iraq is the polarization along ethnic and sectarian line that is feeding the insurgency, providing a context for terror to operate here.
And the fundamental issues -- issue of state- and nation-building that's taking -- we have entered a new phase in this conflict, and this phase is one of state- and nation-building, with messy circumstances having to do with the insurgency and terror that is a result of what I just described, but also takes advantage of and operates in the context. And the right answer is a government of national unity, along the lines that I described.
It will help substantially if we do this. And if it takes time to get the right answer, I think that that's time well spent. We have to -- we should do -- the Iraqis should do and what -- we will help to get the right answer for Iraq, as soon as possible, but not to get a government as fast as possible, whether it's the right government or not.
And so I plead with you, as the people who inform the American people and others, that, you know, this is a difficult set of circumstances, that we should be patient to get -- to get the right answer. There could be a quick government formed, yes, but it may not be the right government. So we better get -- make sure we get the right government as quickly as possible. That's what is guiding my approach to this.
Yes, sir.
Q Mr. Ambassador, Francis Kurdt (ph) from AFP.
Are you not concerned, however, that a long, drawn-out process in setting up a new government could delay the whole process of withdrawing coalition troops?
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, the coalition force presence is driven by conditions in Iraq. Good government along the lines that I described would help facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces because it will assist with creating the right circumstances for Iraq to succeed. And so I'm not concerned about it, if it produces the process that takes time that produces the right government. Ultimately that will be advantageous for everyone, including for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Now, of course we would like to see the formation of government be as soon as possible, but as long as it's the right government. So there has to be a balance between speed and -- and the kind of government that -- that we should get or the Iraqis should get. Yes, ma'am?
Q I'm Liz Sly with the Chicago Tribune.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Yes, ma'am.
Q You talk about what you want from this government. You talk about having ministers who do not have associations with militias. You talk about the kind of spirit in which the government should be formed and all these things. But what if Iraqis just don't turn -- I mean, how do -- how can you pressure them to achieve that? What leverage do you have over them to make them do what you want and to not put -- not put militias into the government and to dismantle some of these structures that have been occurring in the government?
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, I believe that what I have described is the aspiration of the Iraqi people. I think the Iraqi people want a national unity government. They want services. They want security. There is no question about that. Opinion poll surveys, one after another, indicate that. And what I've just described is aimed to respond to that, to that yearning which is -- which is very normal, very natural that they would want those things.
I said for security, the problem is polarization. These death squads, lack of trust in some of the institutions. So what is the answer to this polarization? It is the key forces coming together. They want services, you need competent people to be able to do their jobs in the ministries and a program. We're willing to help.
The international community is willing to assist, but Iraqis, without help, you know, they're going through a difficult transition. It's no -- it's not a surprise. Other nations have gone through a difficult period. Our own country went through some very, very difficult periods. I mean, after the united was established, there were a lot of people who thought we wouldn't make it, and then we went through a period of civil war, of course.
I mean, the -- and this nation- and state-building that I've talked about ordinarily takes decades to do. I mean, look at the history of Europe. But we, of course, with you all being present, with the 24-hour news cycle, of course things have to happen at a much faster pace than would have been normally the case.
I have to report on a daily basis what we have done today to succeed. When some of these things happened in Europe, probably an ambassador, took him months to get a message to a capital, took months to get another message back. So it's -- we're -- proof we're in a different environment.
But what I have proposed -- what I am saying -- is -- reflects the aspiration of the Iraqi people. It reflects their need. And I think the political forces are -- have to come to terms with this. Some of them already have. As I said, some people have signed up, saying they agree with that. I think within the UIA there is discussions and deliberations going on on this. I think -- I'm optimistic that, given the aspiration of the Iraqi people, that they will do the right thing.
Now, they have to make their own decisions, but they have to recognize that others will make their own decisions in response to their decisions as well, and Iraq needs the world, as I described. And I hope they will make the right decision, and we are prepared to help. That's my message.
Yes?
Q Nancy Youssef with Knight Ridder.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Yes.
Q Ambassador, are you concerned that Dr. Ja'afari will not be able to lead a national unity government, given that he won his slate's nomination on the backs of the very decisive Sadrists?
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, we'll have to see. He has passed the first step, which was to be nominated by the biggest bloc that exists at the present time. And you know, there are further steps that has to be taken for the government as a whole to be formed. On the presidency, you need two-thirds to agree to. Of course, on the prime minister, you need a majority. So there has to be, I think, a lot more work done to -- agreement, with regard to what I said. And the forces that should form the national unity government and the program and so on to get a -- then to get a -- what it will take as a kind of a package agreement.
I believe it will take agreement on the presidency, on the prime minister, on the program, on the constituent elements and on the process for this thing to come together. And these are very difficult issues to deal with, so that's why I'm saying, if it takes a bit of time, it's understandable. But it's sometimes good to keep pressing for it not to -- for it to happen as soon as possible.
And you -- I think you wanted to ask another question.
Q I mean, over the -- under the last -- under the first Ja'afari government, as the months went by the militias became far more active, and sectarian violence grew dramatically.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Right. Right.
Q Finally, the government has said that it will investigate, but it only -- it took the U.S. publicizing the arrest of Iraqis involved in the death squads --
AMB. KHALILZAD: Right.
Q -- or whatever you want to call them.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Right.
Q Can you go into detail about how you have tried to push the government, what you have had to do, why they have been so resistant? I mean, this is key, but it's only under your pressure. And do you think these investigations will be serious?
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, we will press for a serious investigation. We have done our own investigation, both with regard to Jadriya and with regard to this recent death squad. We've talked to the government on the recent incident. We have four people under arrest, and as one of our general's briefed, two of them have confessed that they were involved in wanting to kill someone because of his sect. And we've talked to the government, to the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of -- the Ministry of Interior said they will investigate. We will brief the prime minister in the coming couple of days on both our Jadriya investigation and on the -- on this recent incident. And we will be monitoring what the government does, pressing, encouraging, helping, facilitating a solid, good investigation.
And as far as the next government is concerned, which is a critical time, the lessons of this government, what we have experienced will -- has to inform the selection of people, and that's why we have said that the ministers of Interior or Defense, National Intelligence, National Security advisers have to be people who are non-sectarian, broadly acceptable, non-militia related, that will work for all Iraqis.
And there are two reasons for this. One is that's the right thing to do. Second is the United States is investing billions of dollars into these forces, the military and police forces of Iraq. And the taxpayers work very hard, and -- there -- some of you are sitting here. And they -- the American taxpayers expect their monies to be spent properly, and we're not going to invest the resources of the American people to build forces run by people who are sectarian; that, therefore, the forces are going to -- not going to be trusted by the Iraqi people. They're not going to be able to do the job for which we are investing resources in.
So that's why I said they make their decisions, and we will have to make our own decision in the face of their decisions. But we want them to make the right decisions, because their success is -- Iraq's success is important for us. And I have been very concerned about this, and I've made this point repeatedly and clearly for the past many months. And we will insist on it with the -- as best we can -- that these ministers have to be broadly acceptable, non-sectarian, no ties to militia, that this is an important -- this is an important imperative for us.
Okay. You and then you.
Yes?
Q The -- sort of the steps that you outlined bringing Iraq's forces, its constituent elements, into a structure process program -- this supervisory council, I mean, wasn't that what the constitution was for to sort of bring various forces -- the constitution, the elections? Are we talking about creating a sort of extra- constitutional mechanism?
AMB. KHALILZAD: No, no. I mean, I certainly -- I'm not talking about anything that's extra-constitutional. We would not support something that's -- goes against the constitution of Iraq. What we're talking about is within the constitution, within government, executive branch or government as a whole, in terms of the processes, coordination and the participation of the various forces for key decisions to be made is not extra-constitutional, in my view.
We have a national security council. Although our system is very much of a strong presidential system, here they've gone for a parliamentary system, and at the present time -- and there is a presidency that -- the constitution -- each of the three members of the presidency can veto legislation not the president alone -- each of the three. Because of the ethnic and sectarian factors, that that's why this has been done in that way. And what this kind of national security council or national policy council that has been (called ?) to bring the presidency, the prime minister -- they speak together in some forum where they can coordinate on big issues. I don't think that is extra-constitutional. If the role is defined and the role ought to be defined, in my view, consistent with the constitution, whether they should not be defined as something that's extra- constitutional.
The other elements as to which forces should come together to form the government, it's -- the need for coalition building because no party has a majority.
And the constitution here pushes towards broad agreement on things because of, again, the polarization, and therefore, it is two-thirds requirement for many things.
At one level, one can say this makes for an inefficient system because you have to bring a lot of people together to make decisions, but on the other hand, what is the problem right now of Iraq? The problem is you need to get a lot of people together on key issues from across ethnic groups and sects. And therefore, for now this is the right thing to do, but perhaps in 10, 15 years, they may have to amend their processes where there is trust across ethnic and sectarian groups. Then they may not need to have such high requirements in terms of support for key decisions.
So the constitution reflected what I've just described, what's the fundamental problem. And this government, the way I described it, how it needs to come together is, I think, what's needed for the circumstances at the present time for Iraq. I'm not saying this has to be the case forever in Iraq.
Yes, ma'am?
Q To follow on to your answer to Annie's question.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Yes, ma'am.
Q Have you specifically threatened to cut off funding to the security forces in your conversations with Iraqi officials? Isn't it far-fetched to imagine that you would, given that the withdrawal strategy is supposed to be based on handing over to effective Iraqi security forces?
And I'd also like to ask you why has the coalition report on the Jadriyah prison not been made public yet.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Well, on your first question, I've made it clear that the decisions are theirs. We as their friend, as their supporter, as a country that has invested a lot in Iraq's success, defines Iraq's success as our success, as what we think is the right thing to do. And I have to tell you a lot of Iraqis, forces and people -- I don't talk myself to a lot of Iraqi people, I do look at opinion polls and I do talk to a lot of Iraqi leaders, and what I've said, already the Salahuddin principles reflects it. It states it. And if you just look at the numbers of members of groups that support that, that's a huge number already, maybe as big or bigger than the number of the UIA numbers. Two, I've talked to UIA leaders, so I'm not seeking to polarize this, and quite a few of them say they support this as well.
So I'm not pessimistic that this will not take place. I have said, stated repeatedly that we will have to take a look at what we do if they don't make the right decision. And I've said that to them and I've said it publicly, so it's not a surprise, should not come as a surprise to anyone.
But I am quite optimistic that we will succeed in this effort, because it's not only -- it's not an American requirement alone, it's a requirement of the Iraqi people with which we associate ourselves and of many Iraqi forces, political forces.
I don't know what your second question was.
Q Why has the coalition report --
AMB. KHALILZAD: Oh. Well, because we have a process. At this point, of course we have not even briefed the prime minister yet -- (chuckles) -- so it would be a little too soon to talk about discussing it publicly at this point.
Yeah?
Q Babak Dehghanpisheh with Newsweek.
AMB. KHALILZAD: Please.
Q I just wanted to ask you, do you see a move within the Kurdish Alliance and some members of the UIA list to try to marginalize Sadr's group and their influence?
AMB. KHALILZAD: I don't know whether I can say that. I think there is, of course, a political competition and rivalries that exists. Everyone recognizes that Sadr has played a key role in the nomination of Mr. Ja'afari; that that was a close vote of 64 to 63; that that was the first step; there are more steps that need to be taken for Mr. Ja'afari to become prime minister. Those other steps, including the majority vote in the Assembly, and this overall agreement on the program, on other people, on the process. So there are discussions going on across alliances and groups. I'm not prepared to predict what the outcome would be ultimately in terms of people and positions at this time.
All right? Well thank you all very much. Appreciate this.
STAFF (?): Just a few more?
AMB. KHALILZAD: No, I think that we've exhausted them. That's -- you know, why -- any more. That's good enough. Thank you. Thank you. Bye-bye.
END.
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