BRIEFING BY ARMY MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ

Multi-National Force-Iraq

BRIEFING BY ARMY MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ DATE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006

Briefing Slides [PPT]

GEN. LYNCH: I want to talk today about our operations over the course of the last week, in the last 48 hours. And what I'd like to do today is zoom in on casualty trends so you better understand the casualty trends over the course of the last 18 months.

First placard, please.

Counterinsurgency operations continue all across Iraq. As you look at last week's operation summary, 443 total operations, of note, two-thirds of those were either conducted independently by the Iraqi security forces or done in combination with coalition forces, and only 150, about a third of the total operations, were coalition force only. So you see we've reached a point in our counterinsurgency operations where the Iraqi security forces have clearly taken the lead across Iraq.

If you look closely on what happened last week, operation summary is 100 weapons caches found, 150 IEDs found and cleared. An important statistic. We have reached the point in our operation where we find and clear over 40 percent of the IEDs that have been emplaced. And I'll talk about that in some detail later.

We detained 320 anti-Iraqi force individuals, and we detained 11 foreign nationals. And if you look closely at the graphic, five of those were detained out west and six were detained here in Baghdad.

Remember, a small population of the insurgency are foreign fighters, but 90 percent of the suicide attacks are directly attributable to those foreign fighters. So the more of those foreign fighters that we kill or capture, the less likely there will be suicide attacks here in Iraq.

Operations continued all across Iraq, Allow me to zoom in on two specific things that happened in the past week. The first was an operation here in Baghdad. Acting on a tip, a coalition force moved to detain a suspected kidnapper.

Now, this acting on a tip is most important. Last December -- correction, December of '04, there were only about 400 tips provided by the Iraqi population to the coalition force and Iraqi security force for the counterinsurgency operation; in the month of December '05, 4,700 tips; and in the year 2005, over 30,000 tips. So we find a majority now of our operations and Iraqi security force operations are intelligence-led operations based on tips provided by Iraqi citizens.

And this one in Baghdad is no exception, a tip for a suspected kidnapping. As the coalition forces moved across a soccer field en route to this individual's house, they came across three Iraqi bodies that had been decapitated. They reported the location of the bodies to the Iraqi authorities and they continued their mission.

They moved to the house, they detained the suspected criminal, and inside the house, they found IED-making material, a sniper rifle and other weapons. They decided to conduct a cordon-and-search operation for the surrounding houses, and in the surrounding houses they found significant amount of IED-making material -- explosive devices, detonating devices, those kinds of things.

So as a result of this concerned civilian, they were able to take out, one, a suspected criminal -- a kidnapper -- and two, significant amount of IED-making materials.

A similar situation happened down just north of Karbala in the past week. Acting, again, on a tip of an IED-making facility -- this is the place the bombs were being made -- coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted a raid on that facility.

And if you look at the -- next graphic, please -- and the picture behind me -- this was categorized as Operation Joint Venture.

It took place on the 28th of January, and by looking at the picture, you get a sense of the kinds of things that were found as a result of this particular operation -- munitions, explosive devices, detonating devices all designed to create IEDs to kill innocent Iraqi civilians, coalition force members, and Iraqi security force members.

Next graphic, please.

I want to zoom specifically on casualty trends, and when you study your chart, the blue indicates for that particular month the number of days where the number of casualties were less than 50, and the yellow indicates the number of days where the number of casualties were greater than 100. If you look closely at the information provided, you'll see that in January of this year there was 19 days where the numbers of casualties were lower than 50, and that's the lowest rate we have seen since the spring of `04.

If you study total casualty numbers -- and these are casualty numbers that include coalition, civilian and Iraqi security force casualties -- the month of January had about 1,600 casualties. If you look at November, December and January, all three of those months had total numbers of casualties a thousand less than the month of October, and less than half of the amount of casualties that we had last May. So you can see a significant trend line down in the number of casualties -- coalition, civilian and Iraqi security force casualties -- and that tracks us back until spring of `04.

Next graphic, please.

Allow me to zoom in a little closer. Where are these casualties coming from, and what population are they coming from? And if you look at the graphic, you can specifically that the predominate number of casualties are in the Iraqi civilian population. And if you work the numbers, you realize that 50 percent of the casualties in that reporting period are Iraqi civilians -- innocent Iraqi civilians -- men, women, and children; 50 percent Iraqi civilians; 25 percent Iraqi security force members; and 25 percent coalition force members. So 75 percent of the casualties in this war on terrorism, this counterinsurgency operation in Iraq, are indeed -- Iraqi -- members of the Iraqi population. So let's talk about why that is.

Last fall, Zawahiri, the number two guy in al Qaeda, wrote a letter to Zarqawi and said, "You got to establish an Islamic caliphate inside of Iraq. You have to give us an operating base in Iraq where we can spread terror around the region and around the freedom-loving world." What Zarqawi has now done since he is almost inept at attacks against the coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces, he zoomed his target on Iraqi civilians, and he's doing this for a couple of reasons.

One is he can get massive coverage of horrific attacks against Iraq civilians. Just look what happened in Baghdad just in the last week -- five attacks against churches; in Kirkuk more attacks against churches. Yesterday in Baghdad, construction workers standing on a street corner -- these are the people that are focused on rebuilding Iraq.

Individual walked up, had a black plastic bag, dropped the bag, walked off. Bag exploded, killed and injured over 50 of those construction workers. That is indeed the target of Zarqawi because he can get mass effects -- he can get mass coverage, and he's trying to create a sectarian divide here in Iraq. He said, "I declare war against the Shi'as in Iraq." He said the Shi'as in Iraq are in cahoots with the coalition forces fighting against the Sunnis. So what he's doing now is he's focusing his attacks against the Shi'a population, and we're seeing that all across Iraq.

We are concerned about the upcoming Ashura commemoration -- 9 February -- commemoration of the death of the third Imam. Forty-day period of mourning, and then a pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala. If you look at what happened in 2005 and in 2004, significant attacks by terrorists and foreign fighters against those pilgrims -- suicide bombs, RPG attacks against the marchers. And that might indeed happen again this year. So just know that in conjunction with the Iraqi military, the Iraqi police and the Iraqi government, we are working to take appropriate security measures for Ashura this coming year -- the period 9 February until 20 March.

Before I close, I'd like to send out our continued best wishes to Bob Woodruff, Doug Vogt and their families, and continue to pray for their speedy recovery. And for those individuals and their families and for all the victims -- individuals and families -- for this war against terror here in Iraq, our prayers continue.

And with that, I'll be happy to answer your questions.

Jon?

Q Jon Finer from The Washington Post. A couple of the graphics that you've put up today have some figures related to civilian casualties. Often when we ask about these things to the military, we're told that these are not numbers that are collected and that there's no data available. I mean, do you guys count civilian casualties? And if so, why aren't they sort of more readily made available in terms of the overall numbers?

GEN. LYNCH: Jon, thanks for that question. Routinely we get questions from you all about numbers of civilian casualties, which cause us to go back and look at all the reports. Over a period of time, we gather reports. And in the reports we reflect casualties against coalition forces, Iraqi security forces and civilians. So based on your questions we decided to tabulate that information. And I wanted to provide that to you now.

Q But it's not -- sorry. Just a quick follow-up. It's not something that's continually tabulated in the absence of any questions from the media. I mean, it's not something you always keep numbers on? Is that what you're saying?

GEN. LYNCH: No, for every attack we look closely at who originated the attack or the results of the attack and what were the casualties as a result of the attack. Remember, we talked before about -- only about 25 percent of the attacks in Iraq result in a casualty. So we do, indeed, based on investigation, tabulate the number of casualties and categorize them as civilians, Iraqi security force, or coalition force. And what I tried to do here is tabulate that for you and show you what's happened over the last several months.

Q A quick follow-up --

STAFF: Wait for the microphone, please, so everybody can hear.

Q Just a quick follow-up. Did that change when you went back -- when you went back, did that change your figures in terms of -- when you re-tabulated it, did it change what you had previously reported? Did you find more casualties?

GEN. LYNCH: Oh, no. No. I --

Q Okay. So -- so overall, since the beginning of OIF 1, how many civilian casualties are we at?

GEN. LYNCH: Yeah. We'll have to get that to you. And we will. We --

Q Oh, I thought maybe it was in that chart and I just didn't see the --

GEN. LYNCH: No, no, no. The chart that showed civilian coalition and coalition force and Iraqi security force was only till last October or so. But we can run down that data for you. Q Okay. Since I have the microphone, I'll --

GEN. LYNCH: Sure. Makes it easier.

Q There was an interesting report today out of Kabul that one of the governors in a remote desert city had captured an Iraqi and questioned him. And he claimed to be a member of al Qaeda and said that a number of members of al Qaeda were being sent from Iraqi training camps to Afghanistan to start conducting attacks on forces there. Have you heard anything about this, and does this surprise you? Is there any way to combat it?

GEN. LYNCH: I have not heard that, but it doesn't surprise me. I mean, we know -- we study our enemy. And we're going to defeat Zarqawi and the terrorists and foreign fighters. That is our focus. So we study him continuously. And he's under clear instructions to establish his Islamic caliphate in Iraq that can spread across the region. So it doesn't surprise me that he might be using Iraq now as a training base to populate terrorists that will go outside of Iraq to conduct horrific acts of violence. We saw that in Jordan with the two suicide bombers from Iraq into Jordan, and it doesn't surprise me it happened there. Remember, he wants Iraq as a base so he can spread out across the region.

Q So does the strategy remain a hearts and minds campaign on one hand combined with trying to increase your eyes and ears everywhere, almost increase the powers of a police state, to catch these people?

GEN. LYNCH: The strategy remain intact. The end state remains intact. We're going to focus our efforts on defeating the terrorists and foreign fighters and disrupting the insurgency. That is job one. At the same time, we want to reach out to all the people of Iraq through governance, economic development, capacity building, to improve their conditions. Because we do believe that if you study the insurgency, as we've talked about before, the Iraqi rejectionists, the group in the middle, those who are making a conscious decision every day -- "Am I going to become an insurgent or not?" -- by engaging with them political means, economic means, governance means, they are less likely to be part of the insurgency.

But the strategy remains intact. We are going to focus our efforts on defeating al Qaeda in Iraq, and we're well on the way for progress. We're not going to allow any safe havens. We're not going to allow them to use this as a training base. We're not going to allow them to have munitions here, allow them to continue to attack Iraqis. We're just not going to let that happen.

Military

BRIEFING BY ARMY MAJOR GENERAL RICK LYNCH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ