State Department Briefing, October 11
11 October 2005
Pakistan, Central America, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Venezuela/Argentina, United Nations/Sudan, Federal register notice on designation of Moroccan Islamic Combatant, Group as foreign terrorist organization, Iran, China, Iraq, Syria, Middle East, Israel/Palestinians, Germany, Romania, Northern Ireland
State Department spokesman Adam Ereli briefed the press October 11.
Following is the transcript of the State Department briefing:
(begin transcript)
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing Index
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
1:14 p.m. EDT
Briefer: Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman
PAKISTAN
-- US Assistance to Pakistan for Earthquake Relief Operations
-- Delivery of US Assets and Commodities
-- Humanitarian Response to Disaster
-- Prospects for Secretary Rice to Visit Pakistan
-- Assets Redeployed from Afghanistan/Effect on Afghan Operations
CENTRAL AMERICA
-- US Assistance to Guatemala for Hurricane Stan Relief Operations
-- US Assistance to El Salvador for Relief Operations
-- US Assistance to Costa Rica for Victims of Flooding
-- US Assistance to Mexico for Disaster Victims
MACEDONIA
-- Macedonia Name Issue
AFGHANISTAN
-- Taliban's Activity/Violence in Afghanistan
VENEZUELA/ARGENTINA
-- Reports of Venezuelan Interest in Purchasing Nuclear Reactor from Argentina
-- President Chavez's Statements on Acquiring Nuclear Technology
UNITED NATIONS/SUDAN
-- UN Security Council Darfur Briefing
-- US Condemnation of Attacks on African Union Mission Personnel in Darfur
-- US in Contact with Sudan Government and Rebel Groups in Darfur
-- Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Frazer and Special Representative for Sudan
-- Roger Winter Travel to Sudan
DEPARTMENT
-- Federal Register Notice on Designation of Moroccan Islamic Combatant
-- Group as Foreign Terrorist Organization
IRAN
-- US Contacts with IAEA Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program
-- US Support for the EU-3 Initiative Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program
CHINA
-- Beating of Rural Democracy Activist and Intimidation of Journalists
IRAQ
-- Iraqi Constitution/October 15 Referendum/Sunni Participation
-- Reported Lack of Public Distribution of Iraq Constitution
-- Adjustments/Changes to the Constitution/Legality of Changes
SYRIA
-- Reported US Policy Considerations Regarding Syria
-- US and International Diplomatic Efforts Regarding Syria
MIDDLE EAST
-- Assistant Secretary Welch's Travel to Region
ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS
-- Postponement of Sharon/Abbas Meeting
-- President Abbas' Upcoming Visit to Washington
GERMANY
-- Designation of Angela Merkel as Chancellor
-- US-German Bilateral Relations
ROMANIA
-- Reported Outbreak of Avian Flu in Romania
-- US Efforts/Planning Regarding Avian Influenza
NORTHERN IRELAND
-- Reports of Arrest of IRA Member on Charges of Assisting North Korea
in Distributing Counterfeit US Currency
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2005
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
1:14 p.m. EST
MR. ERELI: Let me begin with an update on U.S. assistance to countries suffering from natural disasters. Since we last briefed, there's been a terrible earthquake in Pakistan, as you all are aware. In response to that disaster, the United States has announced an initial contribution of up to $50 million. We announced that on Sunday. We have provided eight military helicopters to the region, to Pakistan, and they're helping to ferry supplies and support the relief operations.
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has delivered plastic sheeting, blankets, and water containers for up to 2,500 families. The leader of a Disaster Assistance Response Team from USAID arrived in Pakistan on Sunday. That team will be complete today, Washington time, and will begin assessments in the region for the provision of additional assistance.
Numerous flights of U.S. military C-17s and C-130s are arriving regularly in Pakistan, delivering blankets, tents, cots, halal MREs -- in other words, MREs that are consistent with Islamic dietary laws -- and also providing important cargo handling equipment to facilitate the offloading of materials. And the U.S. military has set up a disaster assistance center headed by a one-star admiral to help coordinate the military's operations there.
Looking ahead to next steps and what we're hoping to accomplish in the near future, USAID is preparing additional relief commodity shipments. These will include more shelter, more blankets, more tents and probably some medical supplies, although the details of those haven't been finalized. Our DART team will deploy to affected areas. They will do a needs assessment and coordinate provision of follow-on assistance. Our military is organizing delivery of other assets. There are four additional helicopters on the way. I'd expect that number to increase, but identifying where they come from and getting them there might take some time.
The military is also working to provide earth-moving equipment and medical facilities to help in relief operations.
So that's it on Pakistan. Let me go -- and we'll come back to it if you have questions, but let me go now to Central America, where we've been active for some time in responding to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Stan and flooding.
In Guatemala, the United States has provided more than $250,000 in relief supplies. These include, to date, 5,000 hygiene kits, 5,000 blankets, 15,000 gallons of drinking water, and 11,000 gallons of fuel. Our Southern Command has delivered eight helicopters to assist Guatemala in search-and-rescue assistance in priority areas. Expect that SOUTHCOM will continue to assist in transporting critically needed relief supplies to these areas. They are also preparing to provide medical equipment and equipment for rebuilding bridges in Guatemala.
In El Salvador, the United States has provided $100,000 to meet the needs of people who are in shelters as a result of severe flooding as well as volcanic eruptions. These funds are being provided to NGOs to purchase bed rolls, hygiene kits, and blankets.
In Costa Rica, the United States, through the Ambassador's emergency fund, has provided $50,000 to assist victims of flooding.
And in Mexico, the Ambassador, through his emergency fund, has provided $100,000 to the Mexican Red Cross to assist disaster victims there.
So that's an update on what we're doing in Pakistan and Central America in response to suffering of people there. Happy to answer your questions on this or other subjects.
Joel.
QUESTION: Adam, with respect to what's occurred in Kashmir, there's a line of control and since you can't necessarily get the adequate amount of helicopters in there, are you working with both the Pakistan Government and the Indian Government to --
MR. ERELI: Well, I think I'd dispute the premise. We've got eight helicopters there now, four more are on the way, and additional airlift assets are being identified. So we're moving ahead. We've got equipment there and more is on the way.
As far as the line of control goes, I think you're bringing a political dimension into this that really is inappropriate in the sense that there's a humanitarian disaster that the world is working to address. And I would note that contact and communication between India and Pakistan in response to this crisis has been good and that they are responding as good neighbors should, and that's really the takeaway from this. And there's a -- the political issue of Kashmir and the issue of -- as it pertains to the two countries, I think is a separate issue that doesn't necessarily figure in our response to this crisis.
Yes.
QUESTION: Would you expect the Secretary to change course from her current trip and go visit Pakistan?
MR. ERELI: I wouldn't make any predictions. Those are decisions that will be made by the party and I'll leave it to them to make any announcements once they've made decisions.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Do you have any update on Secretary's Burns' trip to try to get NATO to contribute more in Pakistan? And also is there concern that diverting assets from Afghanistan to Pakistan at this time, with the election coming up, might stretch your mission and the election too thin?
MR. ERELI: Under Secretary Burns left yesterday, I believe. He's on his -- he's probably there by now. I don't have anything to give you on his trip. I think he provided a pretty full briefing on Friday, so I don't know that there's anything really to add to that at this point.
As far as detracting from Afghanistan, I don't think so. A couple of points. One is I think we're well equipped, well positioned, and well coordinated in Afghanistan. General Eikenberry has spoken to that already. Second of all, additional assistance that is being prepared for Pakistan is coming from outside of Afghanistan and from other AORs, so I think the impact will be limited.
Yeah.
QUESTION: This is in the Balkans, Mr. Ereli. Any comment in the recent proposal by Matthew Nimitz on the name issue between Athens and Skopje over FYROM?
MR. ERELI: No, I really don't have any comment on it. This is an issue that is being worked by the UN's Special Representative. He is, on behalf of the Secretary General, trying to get the Greeks and Macedonians to agree on a name. That's a process that we support.
QUESTION: And did you have a chance to talk to Mr. Nimitz prior or after the announcement of his proposal, which is very detrimental to the Greek national interest?
MR. ERELI: I'm not aware of what -- of when we talked to Mr. Nimitz, but I would simply state that our role in this is a purely supportive one and not directly involved.
QUESTION: One follow-up. Since the Greek Foreign Minister regarded Mr. Nimitz' proposal as exceptionally provocative and sharply criticizes him as promoting only the position of Skopje with the results of new deadlock on this. I'm wondering if under the present circumstances your government is going to support FYROM of becoming a candidate member of the European Union and NATO, taking into consideration that the Greek Government stated that it's going to exercise veto?
MR. ERELI: Yeah. You're taking this way beyond where we are. Where we are right now is that Mr. Nimitz is working with both sides to deal with the name issue and we're supporting his efforts, and what happens in the future other issues is, I think, pretty speculative.
QUESTION: Any communication between Washington and Athens and Skopje for this issue?
MR. ERELI: Not that I'm aware of.
Yeah.
QUESTION: On Afghanistan, I was pretty surprised on Friday to hear two senior officials saying there was no resurgent Taliban. I was so surprised I couldn't even ask a follow-up. I was too shocked.
MR. ERELI: So this is a follow-up from Friday?
QUESTION: This is a follow-up. I mean, this is like the deadliest year for U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. More than 1,200 Afghans have died in the last year, or even in the last six months maybe, at the hands of what Afghans call a resurgent Taliban. The area of, you know, that the UN considers at risk, too risky to travel to, has doubled, more than doubled, in the last, you know, since 2002. And you know, even Bush's Special Envoy, or former Special Envoy Dobbins, is calling it a resurgent Taliban. So if this doesn't mean a resurgent Taliban, what does?
MR. ERELI: I guess I would take issue with the word "resurgent." I mean, the fact of the matter is the Taliban never went away. They've always been there. But it's important to put these in the proper context. First of all, their senior leadership is either in jail or in hiding. Second of all, you might have violence, but it is not of a scope or effectiveness to have a meaningful impact on the political process and on the future of Afghanistan.
Why? You just look at what's happened. You've had the election of a President. You've had a constitution drafted and approved. You've had parliamentary elections throughout the country with thousands of voting booths happening and 53 percent, I believe, of the people voting, 40 percent of whom are women.
So whether or not you have a discredited and marginalized armed element active in Pakistan is not the critical question for us. The critical question is how are Afghanis dealing with the political realities of their country to establish a functioning democracy and a state that is resolute in fighting terror. And they've done both. And events of the last four years, we believe, have demonstrated that.
Now, do you have incidents of violence? Yes. Are those incidents increasing, decreasing? I don't keep a running tally on my desk, so I couldn't give you a bar graph that says they're up this month versus last month. But what I would tell you is that in our analysis, and in our understanding and appreciation for what's going on in Afghanistan, this is a problem that obviously needs to be watched, obviously needs to be dealt with, but that is contained and that is not affecting the future of Afghanistan in a significant and material way. And to the contrary, what you see happening in Afghanistan shows you that the country is coming together and moving forward.
QUESTION: A follow-up to that?
MR. ERELI: Yeah.
QUESTION: I mean, is the State Department worried and acting on the evidence that the attacks are becoming more sophisticated, that you're seeing Iraq-style attacks, like a suicide bombing of a police recruit station in the middle of Kabul? I mean --
MR. ERELI: Well, like I said, you know -- like I said, we are mindful of and aware of the threat posed by Taliban or other terrorist elements in Afghanistan. We do not discount it. We do not ignore it. We are mindful of and active in coordination with NATO and the Government of Afghanistan against it. But at the same time, it's important to look at it in context and when assessing Taliban violence, assess it in, again, in the broader context of everything else that's going on in Afghanistan.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: Yes. I would like to know if you have something on the interest that Venezuela has shown on buying a nuclear reactor in Argentina and also what would be the U.S. position if really Argentina sells this kind of technology to Venezuela.
MR. ERELI: Well, I don't know much more than what we've seen in the press reports, so I can't add more to that. What I would say from the United States perspective is that, you know, we would expect that all states would adhere to their Nonproliferation Treaty obligations and that any and all civilian nuclear programs or developments would take place in strict adherence to both NPT obligations and safeguards agreements.
Yes, Charlie.
QUESTION: There's a report in a paper yesterday out of New York that Ambassador Bolton had -- I don't know if veto is the right word, but had prevented a Security Council -- the Security Council from hearing a report on Darfur. Is that accurate and, if so, why would that have happened?
MR. ERELI: Well, first of all, it's not accurate. Second of all, what happened is -- second, what happened is there was a meeting on Sudan yesterday. The Security Council met to hear the report of the Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Mr. Hanidi, on developments in Darfur.
So point one is there was a report delivered by the Assistant Secretary General on Darfur to the Security Council and it was an important report. It was a report that we, along with the rest of the Security Council, thought needed to be heard. So that's point one.
Point two, there was some discussion about following that report with another report from the Assistant Secretary General's Deputy providing the same information. There was a debate about that. Our view was that, you know, whether or he briefed was not the real issue; the real issue was what are we going to do about what we hear happening in Darfur, which we're all concerned about and we all want to address in a meaningful way. And the decision was made not to hear the second official provide another report, but that was a decision that was made by others on the Council, not by us.
QUESTION: Ambassador Bolton didn't have any role in that?
MR. ERELI: Ambassador Bolton -- the United States and Ambassador Bolton were not the ones who decided or not the ones who made the decision not to have that second briefing, number one.
Number two, whether or not there was a second briefing is, frankly, beside the point. The point was that the information was presented. The states, included the United States, that heard it were concerned.
And number three, that I think we all want take meaningful, concerted action on it.
QUESTION: Did the U.S. have a position on the second briefing?
MR. ERELI: The U.S. position was that whether or not there was a second briefing was not the major point. The major point was we needed to move from a discussion of -- from a continuing review of what was being discussed on the situation in Darfur to a real discussion about what to do about it. But the United States was not opposed -- I'll make this clear: The United States was not opposed, we did not reject and we did not prevent a second briefing from taking place.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Adam, the reason for this meeting at the United Nations is because over the weekend the situation in Darfur has worsened and is it time to bring in, if we ourselves don't do it, other armies and governments, not just necessarily from the African continent, to impose some type of blockage around Khartoum so they can't send military weaponry out to the western region of Darfur and/or fly military flights and bombing and such?
MR. ERELI: The time, frankly, has long since passed for both the government and the rebels to take effective action to both stop the violence and to arrive at a political settlement of their differences. That's what the moment calls for and has long since been -- has for a long time been necessary.
As you'll note, we put out a statement over the weekend strongly condemning two attacks, one on October 8th and one on October 9th. On October 8th, there was an attack on African Union Mission personnel by rebel forces in which two Nigerian peacekeepers and local Sudanese were killed. We expressed our regret for that attack, our condolences to the family and our condemnation of those responsible for that attack.
There was a second incident the next day in which UN personnel were taken hostage by rebel groups. They were subsequently released.
We have made it clear that our information is that two rebel groups were responsible for these two attacks. We have reiterated our support for the African Union and its mission in Darfur. They play a critical role in monitoring the ceasefire and serving to help facilitate humanitarian work as well as help control the violence. There's a limit to what they can do. Their mandate is not -- their mandate has limits, but those limits are appropriate and we believe that that mission is effective and playing a strong role and needs to be supported.
We have been in contact with leaders of both the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, urging them to stop the violence, focus on peace talks in Abuja. We've also been in touch with the African Union, the UN, the European Union and other governments to coordinate our response to the violence in Darfur.
I would add finally that Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer and our Special -- the Deputy -- the Secretary's Special Representative for Sudan, Mr. Roger Winter, will both travel to Sudan in the next few weeks to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to push for resolution of the crisis in Darfur.
QUESTION: Can I follow up? You said the time has long since passed for the government and the rebels to take steps to end the violence. Are you considering further measures or any measures against the government? I mean, you've been saying that the time has long since passed for a long time, there was action at the Security Council and yet the government really hasn't done -- taken too many steps to end the violence. So what are you going to do about it?
MR. ERELI: Well, that's one thing that, again, that we -- the point we're making in the Security Council is that there are Security Council resolutions that do provide for actions to be taken. It's important for the Security Council to consider recent events and decide what's appropriate to do.
Let's remember we've got a -- I would say a integrated approach to Sudan where you've got different things going on at different levels, all of which reinforce each other. You've got the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and an effective Government of National Unity that brings in people from the South that can have leverage over the rebels will make a difference in Darfur. You've got the Abuja peace talks going on which just last week really began to address the substantive issues between the government and the rebels, those being the issues of power sharing and wealth sharing.
And you've got obviously events on the ground in Darfur, which over the past couple of weeks have taken a turn for the worse and are troubling and need to be contained. And I think that's where a large focus of our diplomacy is, both in terms of sending Roger and Assistant Secretary Frazer out there, as well as hearing reports in the Security Council, as well as coordinating with the AU, with the EU, with the UN, and others.
But I think as Deputy Secretary Zoellick makes clear, we have an inherently unstable situation in Darfur as long as the political causes behind this violence remain. And it's critical to address those political causes, to get the rebels to participate meaningfully in Abuja, as well as the government.
I think a lot of effort's been expended in ensuring that the rebels are fully represented in Abuja, that all the different factions of the rebel groups are there, that the government has a delegation that is representative of both the northern elements in the Government of National Unity as well as the southern elements.
So it's, frankly, a full-court press politically in terms of Abuja, logistically in terms of supporting the AU, and diplomatically in terms of coordinating our efforts with the other international organizations and parties that are concerned by what's going on in Darfur.
Let's go to somebody else. Peter.
QUESTION: Adam, today the Federal Register was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, this GCIM from Morocco. This group's been around a while. Can you explain what is the timing right now, why it's listed? And what -- are there any specific incidents, attacks that you are attributing to this group that has prompted this move?
MR. ERELI: Yeah, I'd really refer you to the federal notice and a statement, which I'll be putting out later. The attacks that the Morocco Islamic Combatant Group was involved with that led to this designation are: the bombing of a residential compound in Saudi Arabia in May 2003 that killed 20 people, including nine Americans; five near-simultaneous suicide bombings in Casablanca on May 16th, 2004; and the March 11, 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings that killed over 190 people and injured at least 1,400.
I would note that this designation does a couple of things: It makes it illegal under U.S. law for persons in the United States or subject to U.S. jurisdiction to knowingly provide material support to the group; it blocks all funds in which the organization or its agent has an interest; and it provides a basis for the United States to deny visas to representatives and members of the organization.
I would also note that the designation of a group like this is based on, number one, the evidence available. And as you can see by their involvement with these groups, this is evidence that is about 18 months old. So review of the evidence, coordination and consultation with the interagency, so it's a normal review process that takes some time. And I think the designation is based on full consideration of the facts and what are the appropriate steps to take.
I would also note that the group was placed on the terrorist exclusion list in April 29th, 2004. It was also designated under Executive Order 13224 in 2002. What this new FTO does is allows us to bring criminal charges against persons in the U.S. or subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
QUESTION: Did you say Casablanca was 2004?
MR. ERELI: Yeah. Five near-simultaneous suicide bombings in Casablanca, May 16th, 2004.
QUESTION: That was 2003, isn't it?
QUESTION: 2003. Yeah. The two of us vote for '03.
MR. ERELI: I'll change it. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Adam, just a resumé. So, basically, what this last --
QUESTION: (Off-mike.)
QUESTION: Rewrite history just like that. What this last measures does then -- the increment that it does is allow there the criminal charges because everything else was already provided under these previous measures? Is that --
MR. ERELI: That's my understanding.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. ERELI: Yes.
QUESTION: A follow-up to the question that Venezuela is reportedly talking to Argentina about nuclear technology. First of all, that may be just reportedly happening but President Chavez has publicly stated that he wants to pursue nuclear technology for Venezuela and I'm wondering if that's a concern for the U.S.
And secondly, it is my understanding that the U.S. has approved sales of nuclear technology from Argentina in the past to other countries -- Australia. So I'm wondering if it were carried out in similar ways with Venezuela if that would be --
MR. ERELI: Well, I don't know what's going to happen, frankly. It depends on what Venezuela and Argentina do, so I won't -- don't want to sort of speculate on that. And as far as the first part of your question, again, what I said before is that we would expect that any kind of activity related to civilian nuclear -- a civil nuclear program would be fully consistent with NPT Treaty obligations and respectful of all safeguards agreements.
QUESTION: Change of subject. On Iran. Have you been in touch with anybody from IAEA or diplomats who may be talking to the delegation that's now in Tehran about a possible new offer from Iran to allow access to some of its nuclear sites?
MR. ERELI: No. That's really not -- that's not something that -- well, our mission in Vienna is obviously in regular contact with the IAEA. I don't know if it's dealt with that -- the reports that you're referencing. But I would say simply that really the place to ask or the place to raise these -- pose these questions are either with the Iranians or with the EU-3 because those are the two parties that are -- have the ball on this right now.
In other words, the IAEA made clear that it's time for Iran to re-suspend and resume negotiations. Iran has not yet done that, which is unfortunate, which the EU-3 wants to see and which the rest of us want to see. The EU-3 has got the action for the negotiations. They're the ones that are in the best position to tell you what they may or may not be hearing from the Iranians or where things will stay with the Iranians -- stand with the Iranians.
As far as we're concerned, we're supportive of the EU-3 initiative. I think the IAEA wants to see it -- see negotiations resume. That hasn't happened yet and that's unfortunate.
QUESTION: But this is not an EU-3 delegation. Are you saying that you're not really paying that close of attention to this delegation?
MR. ERELI: No. I'm saying that, you know, we have regular -- our contacts and communications with the IAEA are regular and sustained and, you know, as they make these trips they report back to the IAEA, back to Vienna. And we'll be, I think part of those consultations, part of those reports, part of those information sharing, as they do their job and as they follow the procedures that are set out for them.
QUESTION: It appears that this is not about shutting it down but rather letting them observe what they may do at this point.
MR. ERELI: I'll let the IAEA speak to it. I don't have anything to add.
QUESTION: Well, but are you precluding any support for any agreement that Tehran might make with the IAEA regardless of --
MR. ERELI: I'm not aware of -- I mean, if you ask me what's your position on anything Iran may do with the IAEA, that's an impossible question to answer.
QUESTION: Well, but you've said in the past that you don't want anything done by the IAEA Board of Governors in North Korea, for instance, to impede upon negotiations on the six-party talks. Are you saying the same thing about the EU-3?
MR. ERELI: What we're saying is that the Board of Governors resolutions should be respected and adhered to by Iran. Those resolutions call for Iran to answer outstanding questions, which they haven't done, permit access to areas that they haven't allowed access to, suspend all enrichment-related activity and resume negotiations. So to the extent that they're cooperating with those resolutions, that's a good thing, but they're not. So let's not get all twisted around procedural issues and rhetorical statements. The standard for measurement are concrete actions and we haven't seen those.
Let's go in the back.
QUESTION: On China. Do you have anything on Taishi village where people want to have their own -- want to elect their own officials but were suppressed, obviously? And there were also journalists, Western journalists, who want to do the report, but there some (inaudible) company were beaten up almost to death by the mob, obviously hired or mobilized by the authority there.
MR. ERELI: There was violence in the town of Taishi and Guangdong that we view with concern and we've expressed this concern to the Chinese Government. The violence included the beating of a rural democracy activist, Mr. Lu Banglie, as well as intimidation directed at international journalists.
Obviously, a free press and an active civil society are things that we value and want to see respected, and neither civil society nor journalists should be beaten or harassed. We've made that point to the authorities in China. Our Embassy has been in contact with associates of Mr. Lu. We will continue to follow this case closely and we've urged China to investigate the case thoroughly and hold those responsible for this gentleman's beating accountable.
QUESTION: In what way you should -- you conveyed your concern to the Chinese?
MR. ERELI: Our Embassy officials have met with MFA officials.
Yes.
QUESTION: On Iraq?
MR. ERELI: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: Is the U.S. Ambassador having any success in trying to shore up support from some of the Sunnis before this weekend? I shouldn't say from the Sunnis, but I mean --
MR. ERELI: Yeah. I would put it this way. Conversations among Iraqis are continuing, and there's obviously an effort underway by the Iraqis to maximize support for the constitution that will be voted on in a referendum on October 15th. Our position has been that what's important is that the process work, that as many people participate as possible including the Sunnis; that access to and transparency of voting be guaranteed; that the result, whatever it is, is reflective of what the people of the country want and that anybody who votes can be confident that their desires and views were given a fair hearing.
So the Iraqis, I think -- the Government of Iraq, I think, shares that view. They are working, I think, to both maximize participation and maximize support for the constitution. I'll leave them to comment on how that effort is moving forward.
I would note that there are some positive signs in the sense that the number of Iraqis registering to vote is increasing, the number of polling centers are up, the volunteers for election observers are rising. So that there's certainly a groundswell of activity and support for the elections themselves, but, you know, maximizing it is what it's all about.
Yes.
QUESTION: Are you concerned that -- about these reports that so few people have even seen the constitution or are talking about it? You say conversations are continuing, but wouldn't you like them to be about the constitution?
MR. ERELI: Well, I meant conversations among the Iraqi political classes. I mean, obviously, popular participation in this process is key. Millions of -- tens of millions of copies of the constitution have been produced and are being distributed. I can't really speak to the latest on how that distribution is taking place, but I would say that for many weeks now there has been an active and vigorous public discussion of the constitution and that I think you could confidently say that there is an informed Iraqi electorate.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Adam, with respect to this upcoming election on the 15th, is -- in your view, is cleric Sistani intimidating the vote in that --
MR. ERELI: I don't know where that comes from.
QUESTION: Well, he's come out. He's not -- he said in a statement in the news that the -- he doesn't want -- he doesn't expect or want the Shiite population to vote and they want 45 --
MR. ERELI: I don't -- I'm not aware of that statement and that's contrary to everything I've seen --
QUESTION: This was --
MR. ERELI: I'm sorry, let me finish.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. ERELI: I haven't seen that report. It's contrary to everything else I've seen. Ayatollah Sistani is a venerable and respected member -- venerable and respected religious leader in Iraq. He's, I think, been an important force for dialogue and a supporter of democracy, and I haven't seen anything to suggest otherwise.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on the constitution and the informed vote. Is it the view of the United States that any -- because there's discussion that their changes might be made even up until the last minute to try to make the document more amenable, but will these changes actually be legal, because you have document that's printed up, they'll have no body to submit it to and you don't know how many people will even know that these changes have been made? So at this point there, isn't the process closed or not?
MR. ERELI: My understanding is there can still be some adjustments to the constitution and that there's still -- that's still possible. Obviously, you know, it's important that whatever changes be made, if there are changes, that they're widely known. But again I think this would be something for the Iraqis to address, number one. Number two, given the intensity with which this debate is being followed in Iraq, I would expect that -- and certainly we'd expect that -- that whatever developments we see over the next couple of days will get pretty wide play.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. ERELI: No, no. Not even close.
Yes. Ma'am. Teri.
QUESTION: It's a briefing. Yeah, I know. Responding to comments.
What can you tell us about reports that Secretary Rice -- that the Administration was considering air strikes inside the territory of Syria against Iraqi insurgents and that Secretary Rice argued against this?
MR. ERELI: I can repeat for you what Secretary Rice told the traveling press, which is that I've got absolutely no comment on things that -- on suggestions that were made by people that weren't in meetings, and the subject of internal administration deliberations is not something that we're going to talk about, and that our position on Syria is clear. The Secretary's made it clear and every leading member of this Administration has made it clear what's expected of Syria, and that is to comply with 1559, stop supporting the insurgency in Iraq and stop supporting Palestinian terrorists. So our policy on Iraq is clear. What we expect of -- I'm sorry. Our policy on Syria is clear. What we expect of Syria is clear. And as far as purported discussions within the Administration policy councils, I don't have anything to say.
QUESTION: Well, is the Administration considering air strikes on the --
MR. ERELI: I think we've made clear what our position in regard to Syria is. As far as what internal deliberations may or may not be going on, again, I don't have a comment.
QUESTION: Well, I mean, you've been talking for quite some time, in fact, since Secretary Powell was here, about how you're dissatisfied with Syria's behavior. Are there any further measures being considered against Syria for all the things that you -- I mean, just saying, you know, stop it, obviously isn't working?
MR. ERELI: I would say that what's working is: number one, an effective diplomatic effort to isolate Syria internationally; number two, coming from that, a political cost for Syria for its behavior; number three, looking ahead, there are a number of events out there that I think will inform our next steps. An important one is the Mehlis report, obviously, which is due later this month.
So clearly, Syria -- you know, Syria has before it a choice. It has not taken the option that we think and I think the rest of the international community thinks is in Syria's best interest. We will continue to work, again, with our partners in the international community to move Syria in the right direction and look at options and ways of doing that. But if you ask me, are you considering this, are considering that, are you -- whatever -- then, you know, those are the kind of hypothetical questions, speculative questions, that I just -- that just we don't get into.
QUESTION: I understand that you're not going to talk about specific things, that you may or may not be doing, but, I mean, and I understand that the Mehlis report will inform your next steps about, you know, that particular aspect in terms of Syria and Lebanon, but would you really say that isolating Syria diplomatically has been working with the insurgency or working with supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups -- extremist groups? I mean, clearly it's not if you're still saying today that they're supporting those things.
MR. ERELI: I mean, look, if you ask me, "Is Syria doing what you want them to do," I'd say not really. If you ask me, "Do you think your policy towards Syria is producing results," I'd say yeah. We have achieved important -- we have achieved some important successes with regard to Syria. We haven't gotten everything -- we haven't gotten as far along as we want to. But look, Syria is out of Lebanon. That's a good thing. Syria is not received internationally the way it used to be. They are more isolated now than they used to be. I think the pressure is on them to make some decisions and that the chances for them doing the right thing are enhanced by international coordination, which we see.
And the final point I would make simply is that I think they are much more constrained with respect to their trouble-making capability than they used to be.
Yeah.
QUESTION: A follow-up on that. Adam, I understand that, you know, you may or may not want to characterize what discussions were within the agency and stuff, but we do have a report out there that these air strikes were considered so I'm asking you: Are you denying that this was discussed?
MR. ERELI: Look, I'm not going to talk about it because it's a -- it's a very uninformed discussion. It's a discussion that is being carried out by those who are not in a position to know. And so I'm just not going to contribute to that uninformed discussion. I think what I've said is I'm not going to comment on it, so end of story, end of questions that I will entertain on that subject.
Yes.
QUESTION: Do you have an update on Assistant Secretary Welch visit to the Middle East and will he visit Lebanon tomorrow?
MR. ERELI: Assistant Secretary Welch is in Jerusalem today, I believe, having discussions with Palestinian and Israeli officials. I expect he'll be making other stops in the region, but I'm not prepared to tell you exactly where until I check a couple of facts first.
QUESTION: Any reaction to the delay in the Abbas-Sharon summit?
MR. ERELI: I would say that obviously for reasons why they delayed it, you'd have to ask the Israelis or Palestinians. Our view is that dialogue is important. We're seeing coordination and cooperation between the two parties. That's a positive thing and that continues.
Assistant Secretary Welch, as I just mentioned, is out there. He is, I think, helping to support follow-on activity to Gaza withdrawal, the movement of goods and people, security arrangements, next steps in the process, in the withdrawal process and on the roadmap.
So the specifics of whether they'll have a meeting at the top or not, again, is something you'll have to get from the Palestinians and Israelis. But I would simply note that dialogue is there. They continue to coordinate. They continue to cooperate. As you know, Prime Minister Abbas -- President Abbas will be here in about ten days for a meeting with the President and we've got a lot of work ahead of us.
QUESTION: A follow-up.
MR. ERELI: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: The fact remains that the United States had said they'd been hoping the Gaza withdrawal would give an impulsion towards a move back to the roadmap. Are you a bit disappointed that the efforts to get the two parties together, to get on that road aren't further down the road than they are now?
MR. ERELI: No. I mean, the point I was trying to make is the Gaza withdrawal and the subsequent steps of the withdrawal have, in a sense, accomplished what they were -- what we hoped they would, which is to serve as a catalyst for coordination, cooperation on steps that improve the lives -- that enhance Israeli security and improve the lives of the Palestinians, and move the ball forward in terms of eventually getting to an independent Palestinian state that can live in peace.
So on all those accounts, our reasons for supporting the idea of Gaza withdrawal are, I think, proving well founded. And that's why I suggest to you that as evidenced by Assistant Secretary Welch's presence there, that -- and the ongoing Israel-Palestinian contact in coordination on a whole variety of issues, that this is a process that has some momentum, that is moving forward. Obviously, it's not predictable and always meets every timeline, but it's going forward.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Excuse me. Any comment on the outcome of the German political election, and also is there any hope in Washington that at least the atmospherics of the bilateral relationship might improve with the new Chancellor?
MR. ERELI: Oh, I wouldn't agree with the premise of the second part of that question. I think our bilateral elections -- our bilateral relations are excellent. Germany in so many ways is a bedrock and fundamental partner of the United States, no matter who's the chancellor or what government is in power. Clearly, there have been developments over the weekend in Germany. We congratulate Angela Merkel on being designated as Chancellor.
We also note that formal coalition negotiations will begin on October 17th. We welcome the announcement that those negotiations will begin and we look forward to working with the German Chancellor and the government that is formed to improve what I characterized as a bedrock partnership.
Sir.
QUESTION: Mr. Ereli, on the killer flu. The bird flu strike Romania last weekend, infecting in the entire Balkan southeast and some parts of Central Europe. I'm wondering if you are coordinating any effort or any contingency plan to stop the spread of this deadly disease in Europe.
MR. ERELI: Yes.
QUESTION: Can you elaborate on it?
MR. ERELI: No. I don't really -- look, we've spoken to this extensively over the last week, both in terms of talking about the meeting here at the State Department with 65 other countries and international organizations, in terms of briefing out on that meeting with our Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Environmental Sciences. I'm not aware of the specific outbreak in Romania that you refer to. What I can tell you is that the United States, the international community, the World Health Organization, are -- have put top priority on identifying threats as they emerge, acting quickly to share information, so that the problems can be contained, and on moving resources both in terms of people and care to those areas that need it. But as for the specific case of Romania, I don't have details because I'm not aware of what specifically is going on.
Sir.
QUESTION: Over the weekend, a member of the official IRA was arrested over charges that he assisted North Korea in distributing counterfeit U.S. currency, and it was reported that the State Department was involved in the investigation. Do you have anything on that?
MR. ERELI: I don't. I don't. I'll check to see if we've got anything, but my expectation would be that it's a law enforcement issue, but I'll see if we have anything.
QUESTION: Can you say anything about how it affects the U.S. fight against counterfeit currency out of North Korea?
MR. ERELI: It doesn't. Our fight against counterfeiting by North Korea, as well as others, is intensive and ongoing.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing was concluded at 2:10 p.m.)
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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