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State Department Briefing, August 9

09 August 2005

Iran, Non-Proliferation, Saudi Arabia, Guantanamo detainees, Israel/Palestinians, Mauritania, Cyprus

State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli briefed reporters August 9.

Following is the transcript of the briefing:

(begin transcript)

Daily Press Briefing Index
Tuesday, August 09, 2005
1:10 p.m. EDT

Briefer: Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman

IRAN

-- IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in Vienna
-- U.S. Continuing Consultations with EU-3 Partners
-- International Community's Concern Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program
-- Prospects for Referring Matter to UN Security Council
-- Status of the Visa Request by Iranian President
-- Iran's Missile Program/Shahab-3
-- Imprisonment of Journalist Akbar Ganji

NON-PROLIFERATION

-- Non-Proliferation Treaties and International Agreements and Obligations
-- Reported Claim that US Did Not Want Prosecution of A.Q. Khan

SAUDI ARABIA

-- Status of US Embassy and Consulates
-- Saudi King's Pardon of Three Reform Activists
-- Saudi Arabia and Religious Freedom Report

MISCELLANEOUS

-- Detainee Transfer Issues from Guantanamo Detention Facility

ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS

-- Status of Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza

MAURITANIA

-- Situation Update/Status of US Embassy
-- Need for Constitutional Legitimacy

CYPRUS

-- Congressional Travel to Northern Cyprus

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 2005
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

1:10 p.m. EDT

MR. ERELI:  Welcome to our briefing today, everybody.  I don't have any statements, so I'm happy to begin with your questions.

QUESTION:  Anything on the IAEA meeting on Iran in Vienna?

MR. ERELI:  As you know, the IAEA Board of Governors met today in Vienna.  We heard statements from the member delegations with regard to the latest Iranian actions and decisions.  I would note that there was widespread condemnation of Iran's decision to resume conversion activities and there were numerous calls for Iran to resume suspension of those activities, as provided for in the Paris agreements.

We continue to consult with our EU-3 partners as well as other members of the Board of Governors on next steps.  I would expect a resolution to be introduced, perhaps tomorrow, based on the views we heard today.

Yes.

QUESTION:  A U.S. resolution?

MR. ERELI:  No.

QUESTION:  A resolution?

MR. ERELI:  A resolution.

QUESTION:  Does Iran have to go back to its suspension, as it agreed with the Europeans, in order to avoid being referred to the Security Council?

MR. ERELI:  I don't want to get ahead of discussions in Vienna.  Let's look forward to discussions tomorrow.  Those are issues that I think are under discussion.  What's clear is I think a widespread view that we heard today by many members of the Board of Governors that Iran's resumption of conversion activities is regrettable and that there is a widespread view that adherence to the suspension is what the Board of Governors -- or many members of the Board of Governors would like to see.

Now, how that is operationalized in terms of a resolution or next steps, is being discussed in Vienna, and obviously, between us and our partners on the Board of Governors and in the international community.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Is the U.S. pressing for a mention at least of the sanction, UN Security sanction, Security Council sanction, in this resolution?

MR. ERELI:  The United States is pressing with its EU-3 partners and others who are concerned about Iranian action for Iranian adherence to previous agreements it's made, for transparency in the Iranian nuclear program and for Iran to answer outstanding questions that the IAEA has presented to it.

So I would -- again, as I tried to speak to you about yesterday, I would look at this issue as -- look at this issue in terms of the United States working together with the EU-3 and others to make it clear to Iran that the choice is Iran's to make and the choice is one between acting in accordance with international norms and standards and understandings, and those that don't raise concerns about its intentions, and that don't violate commitments that Iran has made -- that's choice number one; or, choice number two is to continue to engage in activity that the international community has said is dangerous, is threatening and raises questions about Iran's desire to be a responsible member of the international community.  Those are the choices before Iran, and what we're trying to do in our diplomacy and in working with our partners is to help make it clear to Iran that they have an interest in choosing the path of transparency, disclosure and respect for the concerns of the rest of the international community.

QUESTION:  Can you just make clear why you're not yet calling for Iran to be referred to the to the Security Council?  Because you've always -- U.S. policy has been clear about the consequences of the choices and you have always said during these negotiations, which you supported, that if they fail then you want the Europeans and everyone else to back you referring them to the Security Council.

So is it that you actually think the talks haven't yet failed?  They've rejected the offer, they've resumed their activities, but you still don't think those talks have failed, you think there's life in them yet?

MR. ERELI:  We think that the EU presented a good proposal to Iran, that it's in Iran's interest to accept that proposal and to negotiate with -- and to negotiate and work with the Europeans on the basis of that proposal and to continue the suspension on activity.

At the same time, one should not read into what we're saying any change in our policy on this and any change in our view that violations of NPT-required safeguards obligations is a matter that should be referred to the Security Council.

We are, as I said earlier, working with the Europeans, working with the other members of the Board of Governors, to fashion a response that fully reflects the concerns of the international community, sends a strong message about the importance of reestablishing suspension on uranium conversion and on fully cooperating with the IAEA, and has the best chance of producing that result.

There are a variety of elements to that approach, but I don't, at this point, want to get into detail about what those elements are.  Let's let the diplomats in Vienna and in capitals work it and then we can talk about it more fully once it's out on the table.

QUESTION:  Well, just as a follow-up, on working with capitals, the new president of Iran has said he has new ideas.  Is this all- do you see this as all part of a bargaining/negotiating strategy or -- you don't seem to be taking it as the final word.

MR. ERELI:  I think what's become clearest or -- certainly in today's meetings with -- in Vienna and -- is that, again, there's a clear choice and there's a clear dividing line.  The choice and dividing line are either:  play fast and loose with international agreements and pursue programs that are of concern to the international community, or; address what everybody says is a problem, come clean and act like a responsible member of the international community and of an international organization under which you have obligations to be open and transparent, and which so far they haven't shown themselves to be.

QUESTION:  The new president says he has new ideas.  Are you willing to listen?

MR. ERELI:  You know, we've got the -- the opportunity is now and the concerns of the international community are clear and so are what the international communities are asking Iran to do.  So I think what the international community expects of Iran is very explicit and it doesn't take a nuclear scientist to figure what they need to do.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Maybe just to understand more what you're doing.  Yesterday, you said that they --

MR. ERELI:  No, just a journalist.  (Laugher.)

QUESTION:  Yeah, well, okay.  I'm only a journalist, not a nuclear scientist.  Yesterday you said they had thumbed their nose at this EU proposal.  But tell me if I'm wrong:  It looks today as if you're saying but we're giving them a chance to change their mind.

MR. ERELI:  What was -- the views that were expressed in the Board of Governors meeting was that -- was a desire to see Iran resume suspension of the -- resume suspension of nuke conversion activity.  That's important.  And if there's a way to put this genie back in the bottle, great.  But again, I think as I said to your colleague, the choice is clear and it's Iran's to make.

Yeah.

QUESTION:  Just to follow up on that.  It seems that maybe Iran has already made its choice.  I mean, for the last couple of weeks, the last several months, we've been hearing from West -- from Germany, from France, from Britain, that if they resume nuclear conversion activities, that this will go to the Security Council.  We heard that from the United States. What more can be said now that can deter them from doing what they're doing than you've already said?

MR. ERELI:  I don't want to speak for Britain and France and Germany.  I think they've spoken very clearly yesterday, they spoke very clearly today at the Board of Governors meeting, that this is a regrettable step, this is a step of concern, that Iran needs to take actions to show its commitment to the -- to its international agreements and that that's what the international community is looking for.  As far as what follows from that, that will be discussed at the Board of Governors meeting.

QUESTION:  Well, my question was why should Iran take that seriously, since after hearing for several months that they will be taken before the UN Security Council, they're not.  Why should they take anything else seriously now?

MR. ERELI:  Iran should -- any country that is the subject of repeated Board of Governors -- critical Board of Governors resolutions and the subject of concerted international diplomacy, I think should take the consequences of flaunting the will of the international community and calling into question its sincerity toward international agreements, should take the consequences of those actions seriously.

QUESTION:  Adam, I have a question about the Iranian president.

MR. ERELI:  Are we done?  Yeah, sure.  Go ahead.

QUESTION:  Will he be granted a visa to come attend the United Nations --

MR. ERELI:  That's a question that we covered yesterday.  We've received a request for visa and we are evaluating that request.

Yeah.

QUESTION:  Still on Iran.  Non-nuclear.

MR. ERELI:  Anything on the nuclear stuff?

QUESTION:  A follow-up on the visa one.

MR. ERELI:  Let's follow up on the visa.

QUESTION:  Yeah.  Was the request made for the president to go only to the UN meeting or does he want to travel within the United States?

MR. ERELI:  I believe it's only to the UN meeting, but I'll check and if there's anything more, I'll let you know.

QUESTION:  Adam, is there usually a kind of deadline in which you would give them a response or feasibly you could give it to them immediately before --

MR. ERELI:  No deadline that I'm aware of.

QUESTION:  How long does such a request usually take?

MR. ERELI:  As long as we need to make a decision.

QUESTION:  Secondly, Adam, would the Port Authority -- in this case, they say, you know, he was involved in a criminal act against American citizens, something like that?

MR. ERELI:  You're talking -- look, I don't really have much to share with you in terms of the deliberation of this issue.  We will look at it very mindful of responsibilities under the headquarters agreement, but it's a determination that will be made by the competent authorities.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Iran says that it has improved its range and accuracy of its Shahab-3 missile from 1,800-kilometers to 2,000-kilometers.  It also says that if U.S. and Israel attack its nuclear facilities, Tehran would halt its international cooperation on its nuclear development.  Do you consider this a threat?

MR. ERELI:  I haven't seen those remarks.

QUESTION:  This was delivered by their defense minister, outgoing defense minister.

MR. ERELI:  Yeah, well, like I said, I haven't seen those remarks.  The issue is not one of attacking or not attacking.  The issue is one of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons capability and a very clear message from the IAEA and the international community that this is a program of concern and offering Iran a way out of the box that they've put -- or walked themselves into, or the corner that they've walked themselves into.

As far as the missile program goes, I don't have anything -- any new assessment or new reaction to the Iranian missile program to share with you, other than to reiterate our longstanding concern that Iran has both -- has development programs both for nuclear weapons and delivery systems that are troubling, that are threatening and that, I think, inform our policy of trying to contain a threat and marshal international support for that.  And what we're seeing is that that policy is gaining a lot of ground and, I think, producing a lot of consensus.

QUESTION:  Second question is on Akbar Ganji, the reformist Iranian journalist whose continued imprisonment has been a special concern to President Bush.  Today, there was a report by the Iranian authorities that he has ended his strike.  However, the close family member has told VOA that they cannot confirm this matter.  Do you have anything new --

MR. ERELI:  I can't confirm it.  What I can confirm is that Akbar Ganji is still in jail and he shouldn't be in jail and it's wrong and the time is long overdue to release this valiant defender of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  And it's telling what kind of regime we're dealing with when somebody of Akbar Ganji's stature and integrity continues to be not only kept in prison, but subjected to such inhumane treatment.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Just that -- what's the inhumane treatment?

MR. ERELI:  He's sick.  He's not getting adequate medical attention.  And he's suffering greatly under very difficult conditions, entirely inappropriate to his status and to what he's accused of, which he shouldn't be in jail for anyway.

QUESTION:  Are you also calling for the release of other political prisoners?

MR. ERELI:  Obviously, yes.

QUESTION:  Back on Iran's nuclear program.  You've probably made six references to the international community thus far.  Who besides the U.S. and the EU-3 are exercised about what the Iranians are up to?

MR. ERELI:  I think if you look at -- there are numerous other members of the Board of Governors who expressed concern about what Iran's decisions and the importance of Iran resuming suspension -- that's number one.

Number two, I think, you know, if you look at, for example, what Russia has done in terms of altering its approach to Iran's nuclear program, you see a very important member of the international community that had once -- I think, that had once had a certain position on Iran's nuclear program that, in response to Iranian actions, in response to international community concerns, has now recognized the proliferation potential of Iran, has taken into account the broad skepticism about Iranian intentions based on its pattern of deception and obfuscation and, as result, has concluded a closed fuel cycle agreement with Iran on Bushehr.

I mean, these are all indications that this is not just, you know, as many want to portray it, a U.S. versus Iran issue, but is, rather, a widely shared concern about a persistent pattern of deception that raises questions about intentions.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Do you then believe that this resolution that you expect to be introduced tomorrow will get more support than previous attempts to gather the necessary consensus for such a resolution?

MR. ERELI:  I'm not going to make any predictions.  I think that what we're seeing is a -- especially in -- you know, especially in the EU-3 initiative, what we're seeing is a growing recognition that, despite every opportunity to the contrary, Iran persists in pursuing a program and activity that contravene international understandings and what the international community view as responsible behavior.

QUESTION:  Adam, what do you say, though, to the argument that many people believe you are not actually following through on what's U.S. policy of referring to the Security Council yet because while this consensus is growing, it hasn't grown enough to actually get enough support on the Board for that referral because, as Teri is alluding to, in the past their behavior of all this deception that you've cited so often wasn't enough for people to think they deserve to go to the Security Council for that?

MR. ERELI:  We'll keep at it.

QUESTION:  Is that an acknowledgement that you have to keep at it because you don't yet have enough support on the Board to take them to the Council yet?

MR. ERELI:  I think it's an acknowledgement that dealing with Iran is a multilateral effort and the best way to manage this issue is to ensure as broad and firm a consensus as possible.

QUESTION:  A follow-up?

MR. ERELI:  A follow-up.

QUESTION:  Yes, Mr. Ereli, why Iran must not have nuclear stuff and other countries must have such -- United States of America, Israel, India, Pakistan, et cetera, et cetera.  There is a list.  Why you do not follow a universal policy of none, period?

MR. ERELI:  I think our views on nonproliferation and nuclear power are well known.  I would also say that, you know, in the case -- people ask for comparisons all the time.  We dealt with this a lot yesterday.  There are international treaties.  There are international obligations.  We expect those treaties and obligations to be complied with.  And when they're not, we take the actions, together with our partners, that we think are appropriate and necessary.

Each case is different.  The history, the circumstances and the history and considerations in each case are different.  With regard to Iran, we are, given where they are in the program, given what they've said they're going to do and what they actually do, we believe that the approach that we're taking is the most effective and appropriate one.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible) this strategy is very detrimental to everyone.   Why you do not follow a universal policy of none, period.  Why?

MR. ERELI:  I think we have universal principles that we follow that are enshrined in international agreements and international obligations and international practice, and that based on those principles, we apply them to each case and manage our diplomacy consistent with the principles, consistent with international standards, and recognizing the unique circumstances of each case.  Thank you.

Yes.

QUESTION:  Same subject, broadly.  What can you say about the Dutch ex-prime minister's claims that the U.S. Government asked in '75 and again in the '80s not to have A.Q. Khan prosecuted and to allow him to go on so that he could be tracked?

MR. ERELI:  I don't have any comment on that.

QUESTION:  Is it just because you didn't prepare any or you're not going to?

MR. ERELI:  Both.  I saw the report, looked at it.  It's not something that I feel we really have anything to say about.

QUESTION:  Why not?

MR. ERELI:  Because it deals with -- (a) it deals with events long in the past; (b) it deals with intelligence matters; (c) for those reasons, I don't have anything to say about it.

QUESTION:  Well, I mean you're talking about consistent practices.  This would seem to fall out of line a bit.

MR. ERELI:  Okay.

QUESTION:  Okay.

MR. ERELI:  Yes. Ms. Kupperman.

QUESTION:  Mr. Ereli.  Saudia Arabia -- has a decision been made on reopening the U.S. Embassy and Consulates?

MR. ERELI:  The short answer is no, a decision has not been made.  The issue is under review.  We continue to assess the facts and the information available.  And obviously we'll make a decision before opening of business tomorrow, but it hasn't been made yet.

QUESTION:  A follow-up on Saudi Arabia.  Do you have any comment on the King's decision to pardon the three jailed dissidents?

MR. ERELI:  We welcome King Abdullah's decision to pardon three Saudi reform activists and their lawyer.  I would note this is an issue that the Secretary raised during her last visit to the region, both in her speech in Cairo and in her dealings with the Saudi -- or in her meetings with the Saudi Government.  So we applaud this decision.  President Bush has said that Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of people, of the Saudi people, in determining their future, and we would welcome steps by the Saudi Government in this spirit of this release toward advancing reform.

QUESTION:  Speaking of reform, about five months have passed since the deadline concerning a U.S. response to the finding that Saudi Arabia is a Country of Particular Concern because of restrictions on religious freedom.  I suppose that we're going to have to wait a little longer to find out what the conclusion of your deliberations is.

MR. ERELI:  At least long enough for me to find an answer to the question.

QUESTION:  On the decision on the reformists, obviously you welcome it.  What about the fact that it's the new King and one of his very first decisions that he's making public; does that give you hope for reform under this particular leader?

MR. ERELI:  King Abdullah has always, I think, been a forward-looking and -- a forward-looking leader.  And certainly this step is a noteworthy one, given the prominence of these three individuals in terms of peacefully petitioning for political change.  What it signals or represents beyond that, I wouldn't want to speculate.

QUESTION:  He's always been a forward-looking leader and he's been running the country for the past ten years.  Is he unleashed now in a way that he wasn't before?

MR. ERELI:  I'll leave it at what I said.

QUESTION:  Adam, sorry to split hairs, but he's only pardoned these guys.  They've still got this stigma of guilt.  They were found guilty and they had to have a pardon.  Why not call for the whole thing to be reviewed again so that, in fact, they are shown not to be guilty, and therefore that would be a signal to other reformists that they can be activist without being thrown in jail?

MR. ERELI:  I guess that -- that, to me, borders on the editorializing.  I think it's -- a pardon is significant.  It sends a signal that people that had been jailed for political activity and for exercising their fundamental rights are released, and that's the message that we take away from it.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION:  Adam, there is a report in the press today that the United States is an advanced stage of negotiations with several Muslim countries about the transfer of detainees from Guantanomo back to their places of origin, or, in the case of the Uighurs, third countries.  I was wondering if you could bring us up to date on that.

MR. ERELI:  Yes.  From the very beginning of Guantanomo, it's been our policy to maximize the number of detainees we can return to their home country.  So over the course of the last several years we've transferred -- under that general policy, we've transferred 70 detainees to host country detention and given responsibility or transferred responsibility for the security and the disposition of these individuals to their home countries.  We are now looking at moving forward on understandings with a number of other countries for an even greater number of transfers.

As you know, we've already reached one with Afghanistan, and that we hope will lead to the transfer or we expect will lead to the transfer of a significant number of individuals.

There are ongoing discussions with other countries, including the ones that you referred to, for the transfer of their nationals.  In all of these discussions there are two sort of common elements.  Number one is we need to arrive at an understanding that these individuals will be handled in such a way that they do not pose a threat to the international community given their previous activity.  That means procedures for consideration of evidence, incarceration, prosecution and other means of follow-up.  That's number one.

And number two, that if they're transferred, that they will be treated humanely and consistent with international humanitarian standards.

So that's -- you know, once those standards and provisions are reached in a mutually satisfactory way, the transfers can take place.  And as I said, we've already done 70 of them, in addition to 200 other releases, just outright releases as opposed to transfers, so actually reducing the numbers in Guantanomo by 270 to date.  But we've already done 70 transfers and we would expect to do -- to increase that number as we reach understandings with the countries from which these individuals originate.

And it's important to look at this in the broader context of, I think, addressing or making Gitmo or Guantanomo and the operations there effective, responsive to international concerns and serving the purpose of protecting America and protecting the international community from real threats that are out there and doing it in the sense of partnership and cooperation with our allies in the war on terror.

QUESTION:  Are agreements, would you say they're imminent?  And can you address that issue of the Uighurs in particular?

MR. ERELI:  I don't want to speak to the question of imminence.  I think, as I said, we are committed to moving forward in maximizing the number of transfers, consistent with our policy from the very beginning of this issue, and each understanding is in a different stage of discussion, so, frankly, I'm not up enough on all those individual discussions to give you an informed answer.

Sir.

QUESTION:  Following up on this, you're talking about the 70 previous transfers, but it seems like in this case what you're seeking is guarantees that the detainees, when they're transferred, that they will remain under incarceration.

MR. ERELI:  I don't think it's that specific.  I think that the standards in all cases are the same, is that the country of -- the receiving country takes responsibility for these detainees and ensures that they do not pose a security threat.  That can be continued incarceration, it can be continued access to third countries, it can be sharing of intelligence and updating of information.  Each case, I think, is different, depending on the circumstances of the case and who we're talking about.

QUESTION:  But hasn't that already happened under these previous transfers?

MR. ERELI:  Yes.

QUESTION:  I mean, well, why the need then to have these signed agreements with these other countries --

MR. ERELI:  Well, first of all --

QUESTION:  -- if they've already had effect --

MR. ERELI:  First of all, I was very deliberate in calling them understandings, number one.  Number two, these are -- in some cases, they're with countries that we haven't reached understandings with before; but also, in other cases, they're concerning individuals with a history that is different from previous; and in other cases, it's just because of the scale, or the number of people we're talking about, there are additional arrangements or additional measures that need to be taken.

QUESTION:  Among those 70, about 10 or 15 have actually been -- I'm not certain how many have been released by their countries, but I think 10 or 15 have resumed their terrorist activities that U.S. officials can actually verify.

MR. ERELI:  Right.  I mean, that's -- a couple of points to make.  I don't think the number is that large.  I think it's smaller than that.  But yes, and we've made the point that some -- and I'm not sure if they were transferred or released, but some have -- some of the 270 -- a very small number -- have gone back to their nefarious ways.  And I think we're mindful of that.  It informs our discussions with the host country when we talk about and try to reach these agreements -- I'm sorry, these understandings.  And, you know, it -- we do everything we can to prevent it from happening.  But at the same time, we want to maximize the number of detainees that are transferred to host nation control and, frankly, it's up to our partners to step up to the plate.

QUESTION:  Could you come up with a precise figure, or as close a figure as you can get, with respect to the number of people who have gone back to their nefarious ways?

MR. ERELI:  Yes, I'll try.

QUESTION:  Please.

QUESTION:  Can you also tell us have any actually been -- are any still detained by the host country?

MR. ERELI:  Sure.  What do you mean?  Sure.

QUESTION:  Of the 70.

MR. ERELI:  Sure.

QUESTION:  How many?

MR. ERELI:  That number, I don't know I'll be able to get for you.

QUESTION:  Change of subject?

QUESTION:  Can I ask just one more?

MR. ERELI:  Wait.  I think you had a follow-up, Saul.

QUESTION:  Sorry.  This is probably stupid as well.  What's the difference between a transfer and a release?  Is the release just that you send them to a country and nobody has responsibility for them?

MR. ERELI:  Well, the release is that it is determined that they don't need to be held anymore because the original reason for incarceration has been determined that they are no longer a threat, so they're released.  A transfer means that there's still a threat, that the grounds for detention remain valid, but instead of being held in one location they'll be transferred to another location.

Yes.

QUESTION:  The press account about this suggests that perhaps the objective of this is to reduce the number of detainees at Guantanamo to a hard core of about a hundred.  Would you say that's in the right ballpark?

MR. ERELI:  Without getting into specific numbers, because I don't think, frankly, we've reached that degree of specificity, it is accurate to say that there are going to be a number of detainees in Guantanamo who are not eligible for transfer.  And this is what, you know, we would call the worst of the worst, those that continue to pose such a threat to the international community that their continued detention in Guantanamo is necessary.

QUESTION:  Change of subject?

MR. ERELI:  Same subject or different subject?

QUESTION:  Same subject.

MR. ERELI:  Yes.

QUESTION:  These discussions with -- toward an understanding with these countries have to do with U.S. aid or support for the prison systems or the incarceration systems in these countries?

MR. ERELI:  I don't know whether I'd put it that way, but certainly there is -- one issue here is the infrastructure and the logistical technical capacity for the host country to handle detainees of this nature.  So one consideration is obviously training, getting the security forces up to the level where they can handle these kinds of detainees.

Change of subject.

QUESTION:  The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

MR. ERELI:  What about it?

QUESTION:  Well, we're six days away from the beginning of the withdrawal, yet there is a good deal of lawlessness in Gaza.  It seems that the Palestinian Authority forces are not really in control of the situation.  That's on the one hand.  On the other hand, we're not hearing anything about what's going on as far as the U.S. is concerned --

MR. ERELI:  That's because you weren't at the briefing yesterday.

QUESTION:  Okay.

MR. ERELI:  We talked a lot about the withdrawal and what the U.S. was doing and --

QUESTION:  A lot.  A lot. I missed a lot yesterday.

MR. ERELI:  Yeah, I know.  How about the transcript?  (Laughter).

Anyway, for your benefit, I will encapsulate what we said yesterday because it remains very much the case today that all parties have -- are moving forward to fulfill their responsibilities and their stated objectives with respect to Gaza -- withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

We continue to assist them in every way that we can, particularly through the efforts of Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn and General Ward and Deputy National Security Advisor Elliot Abrams who is in the region.  And, you know, obviously, there's still a lot to be done, but there's certainly a clear desire and, I think, commitment by the parties to do everything they can to make this a success.

QUESTION:  Can I follow up?

MR. ERELI:  Yes.

QUESTION:  Adam, as -- yesterday, you talked about how the United States sees the Gaza process as just the beginning of a process that would get us on to the other issues in the roadmap.  There has been some suggestion that --

MR. ERELI:  A historic opportunity is, I think, what we've referred to it as.

QUESTION:  Excuse me, you're right.  A historic opportunity to get down to other aspects of the Middle East settlement.  There has been some suggestions in Israel that the political situation is so roiled and so raw there after the Gaza withdrawal that there's going to be a need for a hiatus before that they get on to other issues or get back onto the roadmap.

Does the United States see the need to get back very quickly onto the roadmap after Gaza, as the Palestinians want?

MR. ERELI:  Well, we remain -- obviously, President Bush's vision of a two-state solution is the goal that we're working toward and Gaza withdrawal can help us get there.  And what's important to the United States is that all parties do everything they can not only to make Gaza withdrawal a success but also to build on that withdrawal to move forward to address the other broad fundamental issues related to achieving the President's vision.

And, you know, I think what's an important part of that is as the Israelis withdrawal that the Palestinians be able to effectively fulfill their responsibilities for the areas under their control.  And that's something, you know -- and that's something that as the Israelis withdraw and the Palestinians take over, we're going to be very engaged with in terms of helping make this a success so it can serve as a positive experience and a good foundation on which to build and move toward addressing the outstanding issues under the roadmap.

QUESTION:  If I could just follow.  And it's quite clear -- I think you've said that many times and at the podium.  My question is whether or not do you think after Gaza withdrawal the situation is going to so raw for Prime Minister Sharon's government that you're going to need a bit of a hiatus before you get on to other aspects and get back to the roadmap.

MR. ERELI:  I guess that's -- first of all, it's pretty hypothetical and I don't know that I would accept the hypothesis.  But second, I think there are -- following withdrawal, there will be opportunities for both sides to take steps and -- take steps that support forward movement toward fulfillment of the President's vision.

QUESTION:  Is there any particular next step that comes to mind?

MR. ERELI:  No, nothing -- I don't have anything more sort of specific than that.

QUESTION:  Okay.

MR. ERELI:  Yes, ma'am.

QUESTION:  A question on Mauritania.  There's some suggestion from unnamed Western diplomats that the coup -- the new council that took over may actually get diplomatic recognition.  Do you know where the U.S. stands on this?

MR. ERELI:  We often get this question about, "Do you recognize, do you confer legitimacy?"  I would say simply that, you know, we condemn the -- we join the African Union in condemning the way -- the latest transfer of power in Mauritania.  We also join the African Union in making it clear that we want a -- we, like they -- like they or like them?  We, like them want to see a return to constitutional rule in Mauritania.  They have sent a mission there to pursue that objective.  We are supportive of that mission.  We look forward to their helping move the Mauritanian leadership in that direction.  And we will working with our partners in the international community and in the AU toward that goal.

QUESTION:  What do you mean by the Mauritanian leadership?

MR. ERELI:  The people who are running Mauritania now.

QUESTION:  Right.  Okay.

QUESTION:  Are you saying that the question of diplomatic recognition does not arise?

MR. ERELI:  I'm saying it's -- you know, we were asked the same question, I think it was with Kyrgyzstan.  Was it with Kyrgyzstan?  Anyway, we were asked the same question, you know, when you've got a government that's arrived in power by other than constitutional means, do you recognize it?  And the answer is always the same -- or not always the same -- (laughter) -- but the answer is very often that the issue is not one of diplomatic recognition and non-diplomatic recognition. We're going to -- this is a government that is in power.  We're going to work to -- with all parties to bring about a resolution of the problem in a way that meets international standards, the aspirations of the people and a concerted view of the region and the international community.  That's the best way to put it.

QUESTION:  Are you still calling for the return of President Taya?

MR. ERELI:  As I said yesterday, we are calling for the return of constitutional rule and a government that is representative of the people and answerable to the people.

QUESTION:  But that's President Taya.

QUESTION:  And that was not the same language as last week.

MR. ERELI:  That's where we are.

QUESTION:  What happened in the interim to diplomatic status, U.S. diplomatic status vis-à-vis Mauritania?

MR. ERELI:  Well, we've got an embassy there.  Our ambassador is meeting with the people who are running the country and he's delivering a very clear message that you came to power in a way that we cannot condone; that we, like the AU, condemn the way you came to power; that it's important that you move quickly and effectively to restore constitutional rule, to bring about a government in Mauritania that is in power consistent with the constitution, consistent with international standards and is a -- and has the respect and credibility that constitutionality connotes.

And so I think that's the best way to explain it.  You've got to deal in some way with the authority -- authorities in place, but the message you can deliver to those authorities can be a very clear one, that we don't accept the way you came to power and that you've got -- it's important that you address this concern of ours and of the international community's.  And that's why, again, we keep emphasizing what the AU has said, because the AU is, in many ways, the -- a central actor in all of this.  Given that they represent for the continent and for the countries of the continent a diplomatic and political weight that needs to be heard and respected and understood, and that they are very much representative of a standard of democratization and a standard of legitimacy, that, I think, has a big influence on events.

QUESTION:  Adam, do you -- let's be very clear because you're talking about authorities in place and then but previously you said there is a government that's in power.  Are you saying that the military council there that is running the show now is now the Government of Mauritania?

MR. ERELI:  You know, I'm just -- I'm just not going to -- I'm not going to go down the road of giving you words that you're going to impugn with some -- or you're going to give some meaning that I may not -- and some legal basis that I may not be intending.  I leave it to what I said.  We are dealing with the authorities in power, the military council or whatever you want to call them.  The guys running the country right now are the guys we're dealing with because they're the ones making the decisions and we are trying to get them to make the right decision.  And that decision is restore power -- or not restore power.  That decision is put in -- have in Mauritania a government that is in power by -- on the basis of constitutional process and consistent with international standards and consummate with the desires and views of the African Union.

QUESTION:  Adam, but -- so it seems that if it's a constitutional process, it doesn't necessarily have to be President Taya if there's a new constitutional process which brings to rule --

MR. ERELI:  We're not prescribing -- we're not prescribing who rules or who runs Mauritania.

QUESTION:  Well, last week you did.

MR. ERELI:  What we're saying is that the Government of Mauritania needs to have constitutional legitimacy.  It doesn't have that now.  And it's important that it does have that.  And constitutional legitimacy means that you are in power based on constitutional processes, legitimate -- or respected in established institutions and in a way that is both reflective of and responsive to the will of the people.

QUESTION:  Okay.  If I might follow up, though.

MR. ERELI:  And that's as specific as I want to be.

QUESTION:  Okay.  But I'm not sure if it was last week exactly, but you did say you call on the military council to restore to power President Taya.  So have you given up hopes that this particular --

MR. ERELI:  I'm not ruling anything in or anything out.  I'm saying this is the process, these are the standards we want to see met.

QUESTION:  But, Adam, is that not -- that's on the record.  Not you.

QUESTION:  Tom.

QUESTION:  Tom, actually, is on the record as saying that the United States wants President Taya returned to power because he is the constitutionally elected leader.

MR. ERELI:  We are where we are.  That's all I've got to say on that.

QUESTION:  And where you are now is different from where you were last week?

MR. ERELI:  No, I think there's a consistency there that we want to see constitutional rule and a constitutional government in Mauritania.  And that's where we are.

Sir.

QUESTION:  Mr. Ereli, any update on the illegal visit --

QUESTION:  Sorry.

QUESTION:  -- to the Turkish-occupied territory --

QUESTION:  Hey, hey, Mauritania still.  This constitutional legitimacy, you say you -- they do not have constitutional legitimacy at the moment.  Does that mean it is -- they are an illegitimate leadership?

MR. ERELI:  I'm not going to elaborate for you --

QUESTION:  They're your words, Adam.  We're using your words --

MR. ERELI:  If you use what I said, you'll be just fine.

QUESTION:  But we don't know whether it's -- (inaudible) saying they're legitimate --

MR. ERELI:  I said -- I said they don't have constitutional legitimacy.  That's a statement of fact.

QUESTION:  But are you recognizing them even though --

MR. ERELI:  We're going around in circles here.  We're dealing with who we have to deal with in order to effect change in the right direction.

QUESTION:  One last one on this.  Is the U.S. still in touch or in touch now with President Taya?  And if so, what is the U.S. saying to him?

MR. ERELI:  Let me see what I can get you on that one.

Yeah.

QUESTION:  On Cyprus, Mr. Ereli.  Any update on the illegal visit to the --

MR. ERELI:  Done with Mauritania?

(Laughter).

QUESTION:  Sounds like you were.

QUESTION:  May I?

MR. ERELI:  Yes, on Cyprus and Turkey.

QUESTION:  Yes.  Any update on the illegal visit to the Turkish-occupied area of Cyprus by seven staffers of the U.S. Congress who arrived and they are going to stay by August 14, and who is paying their expenses of that -- the Turkish Government or the U.S. Government?

MR. ERELI:  Well, it's still legal, number one.  And number two, you'll still have to talk to the delegation for information about their trips since it's not -- doesn't have anything to do with the State Department.

QUESTION:  Yesterday I was in touch with ICAO in Montreal, Canada, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and I was told specifically that the Tymbou airport of Cyprus is illegal with capital letters.  How do you respond since U.S. is a member of this organization?

MR. ERELI:  I don't know what -- I mean, I don't know what the ICAO said.  What we say, sir, is that it's -- in our view, it's -- in terms of U.S. policy, it's legal for U.S. officials to travel to the airport, and as -- and moreover, we think it's important that steps be taken to ease the economic isolation of northern Cyprus.

QUESTION:  Would you allow anyone from abroad to fly direct, for example, to Enid of Oklahoma?

MR. ERELI:  Enid, Oklahoma?

QUESTION:  Yes.  Let me finish -- airport, which is not a legal entry point to the United States of America?

MR. ERELI:  I don't think it's comparable.

QUESTION:  Excuse me?

MR. ERELI:  I don't think it's comparable.

QUESTION:  Very well.  The U.S. --

MR. ERELI:  One last question and then we'll move to somebody else.

QUESTION:  Excuse me?

MR. ERELI:  One last question and then we'll move to somebody else.

QUESTION:  Why last question?

MR. ERELI:  Because you've already had four.

QUESTION:  Sir, the question --

MR. ERELI:  Okay, anyway.  Please, please --

QUESTION:  Why you don't want to -- if you want to eliminate this, I can stop.

MR. ERELI:  No, one more.

QUESTION:  Okay.  One more?

MR. ERELI:  One more.

QUESTION:  There are so many questions.  The U.S. passport of the staffer was stamped with a visa upon the arrival at the airport granted by the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."  Do you accept this as U.S. Government?

MR. ERELI:  Our views on Cyprus and the status of the different communities in Cyprus has not changed.

QUESTION:  No, no.  I'm saying about the stamps on this passport.

MR. ERELI:  I don't know what stamps, sir -- I don't know what stamp was done and all I can tell you is that our policies remain the same, there's no change.

QUESTION:  So can you take this question because --

MR. ERELI:  No, I can't.

QUESTION:  Why?  It has to do with the recognition.

MR. ERELI:  It has to do with -- any question dealing with U.S. policy, I'm happy to take.  Our policy hasn't changed.  I think I've answered the question.

Yes, ma'am

QUESTION:  I have a question.  This may be too domestic, but the case of five Cuban -- accused Cuban spies has been overturned in Miami.  It was said that they did not get a fair trial.  Do you have any reaction to that?

MR. ERELI:  I haven't seen it.  Don't think I would have any comment on it, given that it's a judicial and law enforcement matter.  But if that's not the case, I'll see what I can get.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:02 p.m.)

(end transcript)

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