BRIEFING BY U.S. AIR FORCE BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ALSTON, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ
Multi-National Force-Iraq
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL UPDATE
LOCATION: THE COMBINED PRESS INFORMATION CENTER, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
DATE: THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2005
GEN. ALSTON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thanks for coming.
Tuesday, Iraq recognized its first year of sovereignty. Much has happened since 28 June 2004. Perhaps the single greatest expression of sovereignty was the elections on the 30th of January, where 8.5 million Iraqis courageously chose democracy. That choice enabled a National Assembly to seat in March, and a government to form in May. Its citizens proudly watched its elected leaders of a sovereign Iraq on the world stage in Brussels last week outlining their vision of the future as dozens of countries stood in support.
Today, we are another day closer to the constitutional referendum in October and the elections in December that will establish a permanent government. The political process is clearly moving forward, and the momentum continues towards democracy. This political progress is matched by the significant daily progress being made with the development of Iraq's security forces, and our continuing collective efforts to pressure the insurgents from every angle. These forces have come a long way in a relatively short time, from four battalions a year ago to over a hundred today. There is still much work to be done, but progress is being made every day.
And with that, I'll take your questions.
Q Yesterday --
GEN. ALSTON: Could you turn your microphone on?
Q Sure. Sorry. Peter (Graff ?) from Reuters. Yesterday, U.S. forces arrested the brother of the head of the Muslim Clerics Association, held him during the day, and then released him. The statement said that he was released at the request of one of the vice presidents. I'm just wondering why he was arrested, what he was suspected of having done. If he did something wrong, why was he freed? If he didn't do something wrong, why was he arrested in the first place?
GEN. ALSTON: I will tell you that I don't have a lot of information on that right now. And I'll see if we can do something -- do a little bit of homework right now and see if we can get that before we go. And I'll try to help you with that. I'm sorry.
Next question.
Yes, sir?
Q Andy Mosher, Washington Post. What's the security situation out in Karbala now? And with Operation Spear over, who, among the coalition or Iraqi forces, is in town? What's the sort of troop level there? How is the town being secured?
GEN. ALSTON: Well, I can't tell you exactly what the troop levels are right now. The forces largely recovered back up the Euphrates Valley. We're satisfied with the progress that we made at that time. And once again, you know, went in and took the action that we had to, and achieved the limited objectives that we had right there.
But beyond that right now, I can't give you a troop -- a better troop distribution than that. And I better start getting good at this, so I'll try to -- let's start with question number three.
Yes, Tom?
Q Tom Watser (sp), Knight-Ridder. In -- speaking of Al Anbar, during the past couple of weeks, there have been several incidents in Fallujah. You had the VBID, you've had several attacks on U.S. forces there. And I was just wondering if there's any concern about that? And if you could talk at all about, you know, whether you see these as isolated incidents, or if this is, you know, signals to you a renewed insurgent push to get back into this city -- just sort of where things are there.
And if I could ask, secondly -- more U.S. soldiers have died this June due to hostile fire than June of last year, and, in fact, more than many of the months since June of last year. And I was wondering if that's a -- you know, what that tells us about the insurgency. You know, whether, you know, sort of how significant those numbers are?
GEN. ALSTON: Well, the first question with regard to Fallujah. Fallujah, I think, stands as a symbol for both the Iraqi government, the coalition forces as well as the insurgency and the terrorists. Fallujah was a safe haven until last November and Operation Al Fajr, where the insurgents were essentially cleared out and defeated in Fallujah.
So I do believe that there is a desire by the insurgents who continue to look at Fallujah as a symbol of loss, of failure -- and the value of having a presence in Fallujah again. This isn't going to happen, and we have seen a few -- an increase in attacks. We don't see this as reaching some threshold where we see any significant movement by the insurgency to move back into Fallujah.
But obviously, this is a situation both in Fallujah and throughout Iraq where you're continually evaluating the situation.
With regard to the losses of Americans in the month of June, we have seen losses due to IEDs. And some of these IEDs have been very potent IEDs that have been buried, or there have been a few examples of IEDs that have been roadside that have been lethal as well. I don't know that we've got enough data to substantiate that we have a trend in any particular direction at that time. We also have situations where, most unfortunate, last week's tragedy with the forces that were recovering from duty, on their way out of Fallujah back to Camp Fallujah, that the number of casualties was high. So we lost several troops in one very tragic event.
So I wouldn't say that we have a particular trend, but every one of these situations puts us into motion to take it apart, see what we can learn, see whether or not the enemy's adapting, see whether or not we have to adapt as well. And we're doing that particularly with the IEDs that we've seen.
The incident in Fallujah, of course, last week was a suicide car bomb that attacked that particular vehicle. And obviously, those very lethal precision weapons that the enemy uses have caused great concern and have significant effect wherever they're employed.
Q If I may follow, General. How would you compare where the insurgency was June of last year to June of this year in terms of lethality, sophistication, organization? And your understanding of that insurgency, how has that changed since then? Do you have better intelligence on it, on who's involved, on how it's organized? And I know the different groupings that comprise insurgency, but just whether there's more specific information on, you know, again, how it's organized.
GEN. ALSTON: Certainly I don't think we can look at this from one point in time last June to this point in time this June. There's a lot that transpired across those 13 months. We found an insurgency that was aggressive in several cities, frankly culminating in Fallujah back in November. At that time, the attack levels were in the 900s per week. There was some ability of the insurgency and the terrorists to surge for the elections because of just how much that loss was going to mean to them. And we have seen nothing like those levels of attacks to date since that time frame. So I think that the ability of the enemy to sustain high-volume attacks is just something that we haven't seen them to be able to reconstitute.
We have seen, this spring, a move towards car bombs because of the high payoff. You know the other day in Iraq there was a single day where there were eight of them. That's not remarkable by itself, and of those eight, five of them caused no damage, no casualties. That's not uncommon as well. The success rate per car bomb is, you know, it's not that -- it is -- you know, they don't score every time they employ a VBIED or a suicide VBIED, and that's due to good procedures that interdict them before they get to their target and cause damage; that is a consequence of us rounding up bomb-makers and poor quality in the production; that is -- and those -- sometimes, that is, they detonate when they're supposed to, but they don't cause any damage, and in some cases, people blow up before they can employed the right way.
So they've gone to more spectacular systems that can inflict more casualties per attack, likely because they can't sustain high-volume attacks. So that shift to the car bomb is certainly a distinctive shift that we've seen. So we have seen an enemy, I think, that has adapted, trying to be as productive as they can with the limited capacity that they're able to sustain.
Yes, sir?
Q Hi. Chris Albritton with Time Magazine. We've been seeing the press releases come over the wire about Operation Sword, Operation Spear, Matador, and they all seem to involve about a thousand U.S. troops and about a hundred Iraqi troops. Last year we saw a massive attack on Fallujah involving thousands of U.S. troops. Why the change in strategy, to use these smaller operations? And why aren't you using more of the 168,581 Iraqi troops?
GEN. ALSTON: Okay, let's start with what you perceive to be a change in strategy from using -- from massing larger amounts of force to using smaller amounts of force. Fallujah was a unique operation, a unique challenge, and we applied the force that we needed in order to do the urban combat that needed to be done at that time to meet an insurgency threat that was numbering in the thousands.
Now we don't find the enemy in those kinds of numbers. So we are matching -- using the force that's required to meet the needs for that particular operation. And we are using operational intelligence to turn on the enemy where we find him. So their numbers are smaller. The size of the operation that we have is well suited to the forces that we have in the west.
The size of the Iraqi forces that we have out there is the -- it's the number of folks that we have right now that are embedded with those forces out west. There will be more forces from the Iraqi army that will be deployed out there over time, but right now this size force is what's there. It's matched very well.
The Iraqi forces perform -- not only do they contribute to the combat capability, but they have other capabilities that help us a great deal. If we get into sensitive targets in areas such as mosques, they're the right folks that would perform the lead. They also have the language skill that obviously is a fantastic benefit to successful operations as well, a great enhancement. And so that package that we have up there is the right kind of force to bring for those kinds of operations.
So I wouldn't try to compare them to something as substantial as in Operation Al-Fajr last fall.
Yes, sir?
Q Patrick McDonnell, Los Angeles Times. Are there any -- or maybe you can give us some number of Iraqi army or police battalions that are currently capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations without U.S. logistical or operational support. How many battalions are in that category?
GEN. ALSTON: I can't tell you how many battalions are in that category, all right? And we don't want to talk about the specific capabilities, either the numbers or the actual rating for the particular units. That information's classified. So I wouldn't want to reveal something that we think could be an advantage to the enemy.
I think it's an important point that you bring up. And, you know, I've been reading the press as well lately, and I know that we're trying to devise a way where we can find the mechanism that will allow us to share more of that information so that we can frame for the American people and the Congress just how to quantify that in an unclassified fashion. But right now, today, I can't do that for you.
Q Is the problem that the enemy may seize on this number? Tell me, what is the -- maybe you can talk about why it's classified, as opposed to giving us a number, then.
GEN. ALSTON: Well, I'll give you my experience when it comes to what I think is a decent parallel, and that's how we manage the readiness of American forces. We have our Status of Readiness and Training reports and system, and within that we have classified ratings for all of our combat units, and they're classified in order to deny the enemy access to that information. It has to do with numbers, it has to do with quality of equipment. There's a variety of categories that are a part of that assessment. And to give -- it really wouldn't take that much to give enough granularity where someone would find that information to be useful. So, you know, any singular piece you and I might find debatable, but collectively, we would find that to be a problem. So we choose to protect all the information.
Q But it's certainly fair to say when you say "fully trained" in these various handouts, that does not -- that's not the equivalent of being able to act without U.S. logistical or operational support? GEN. ALSTON: That is correct.
Q Thank you.
GEN. ALSTON: Yes, sir? Yes, sir?
Q Paul Nynunsa (sp), New York Times. Is there any kind of help that the coalition forces can do, regards the blocking the borders before the foreign terrorists, rather than chasing them inside cities, and rather than developing a hatred relationship with Iraqis?
GEN. ALSTON: And -- what was the last part? I'm sorry.
Q Rather than developing hatred relationship with Iraqis over the people living in these cities.
GEN. ALSTON: Okay. And you use the word "hatred relationship?"
Q Yeah.
GEN. ALSTON: Okay. Well, I don't think I'll speak the last part of the question. That would be, I guess, your opinion.
But with regard to securing the borders, that is a large challenge in Iraq, and we will -- we talked earlier about the 168,000 Iraqi security forces who eventually are going to reach a point where they're going to be sufficiently integrated with coalition forces and able to conduct operations on their own, where they're going to contribute significantly to that part of the challenge here in Iraq, for securing Iraq.
You make it sound like it's a simple proposition; that if we could put people at all the borders, we would be able to rectify the situation internally in Iraq. Certainly, that would contribute to it. It also would not solve the problem completely.
So the borders are very challenging. The border forts -- part of the reconstruction program -- are being improved and forces are being deployed. But these borders are porous, and it requires more than just posting guards on the Iraqi side of the border. It requires support from Iraq's neighbors. And the Iraqi government has petitioned all of its neighbors to do more to secure their borders. And so with good support from the neighbors, coupled with the growing capacity of the Iraqi security forces, this problem will be solved.
But it is a challenge. Right now, we have security operations in the Northwest that are working very aggressively in support of border operations. And there's more work to be done, and we'll get there. And we're making progress there. Yes, sir?
Q A question about suicide bombs, particularly in and around Baghdad, but, really, anywhere. Who handles forensic investigations, gathering of evidence and so forth afterward, if anyone? And if information is gathered, where does it go?
GEN. ALSTON: Coalition forces come in and contribute to the forensic -- piece this to get as much evidence as we can to work that particular -- to work that problem. It -- there is a challenge, of course, in -- with the conditions that we have. We're finding that these -- sometimes they're singular events, where the weapons system would be employed and the devastation would occur.
Emergency response forces would go forward. There could be secondary devices. There could be small-arms fire that would also follow on. So we don't have the same process that another city with less of a challenge would have because we're conducting these operations in Baghdad.
The extent to the forensic process, though, is something that I'm going to have to get back to you on. I just don't know the answer to that, other than the fact that we get engaged, we come to the scene, and we collect a certain amount of evidence. But I don't know what the limitations are, and I'm not familiar enough with how those processes work to know what the delta is between how we're doing in Baghdad and not.
Yes, sir.
Q Is it your estimation that there are as many insurgents this June as there were last June, less insurgents, more insurgents? And again, do they -- you know -- they've started using more car bombs, but overall do they seem more effective, less effective in their attacks on U.S. forces, their attacks on Iraqi security forces, their attacks on Iraqi civilians?
GEN. ALSTON: Your question is specifically about -- kind of the Zarqawi piece of this, the Islamic extremists, the foreign fighter component to this. I don't know what the numbers were back in June of last year. I know right now we loosely characterize it as about 5 percent of the enemy as foreign fighters.
Q I mean all the insurgency. Is there a sense that the insurgency en masse is as big this June as it was last June, or that it's smaller, or that it's more?
GEN. ALSTON: Well, Tom, just -- with your last question about comparing June to June, I think we're losing track of what happens in between, and I think the continuum is more important than the two single data points. I think that the insurgency may have reached its high watermark last fall when they could mass forces in Fallujah, but we also had work to do in Najaf and Samarra. It wasn't just a singular large-scale effort in Fallujah. So I think that there was a serious ebbing and flowing of the insurgency over the course of the year.
So I don't know what we were estimating the size of the insurgency to be last June. Looking at what we're facing right now, I think that we size this as between 15,000 and 20,000 at large, with a lot of that being folks that don't choose to fight every day, and the core piece of that to be measured more in the hundreds.
So when you get -- now to continue on with your question about foreign fighters, suicide attacks, which they are principally responsible for or at least they play a large role, if not a singular role, in driving suicide car bombs, we -- I can show you statistics that clearly the targets are Iraqi security forces and civilians, and not coalition forces, when it comes to suicide attacks.
I think that's for a variety of reasons. I think that our force protection is stronger than the Iraqi security forces'. I think that the civilians certainly -- it's not my opinion; it's a fact -- the civilians have been targeted by the insurgency. And when they can do something spectacular and kill a lot of civilians, obviously that suits their goals to promote their cause by -- you know, with something that's big -- with a burning hulk and lots of death, exposed on television.
So I don't know how much that answers your question, Tom, but I would -- that's how I'd characterize it.
Yes, sir?
Q What's -- obviously, a pillar of your plan is that the long-term plan is that the Iraqi security forces will be able to take over from coalition troops at some point. I guess General Casey has talked about a draw-down some point starting next year. What happens if it doesn't work? What happens if they're not able to fight a counterinsurgency war? What other plan is there? Just continued coalition presence? I mean, what's -- what happens if that plan doesn't work?
GEN. ALSTON: I'm having trouble thinking for reasons that it wouldn't work. We've already -- we've been at this now for about a year and a half, training these forces. We are building an army from scratch a year ago. They have made significant progress over the course of this year.
When I look at the quality of the force that we have across this continuum, the small number that are able to do independent counterinsurgency operations, the large number that are somewhere in between, and then of course those units that are the weaker across that continuum, we have made very strong progress, with as much work to do as we know we have. But this is working. We see the progress. We -- you can look out on Haifa Street and find Iraqi security forces doing their job. You will see other parts of Baghdad that will be taken over by Iraqi security forces. We will start to see -- you will witness it yourself -- parts of Iraq begin to transition over to Iraqi security forces.
So we have every confidence in the world that this strategy is the right strategy. It's going to work. What's difficult for us to gauge right now is exactly what -- when these units are going reach those particular levels. But I think as the day goes by, we get -- as days go by, we get better clarity on their progress down that road. And I think with that clarity is going to come better predictability in terms of their ability to achieve this capability.
Q A different question, a numbers question. There's a lot of numbers on this fact sheet. I know you guys track this closely. Do you have numbers for car bombs for April, May, June, and for suicide attacks April, May, June? Is that something you have at the top of your head?
GEN. ALSTON: I don't have it off the top of my head. (Pause.)
Q Perhaps one of your aides could get that for us? Is that a possibility?
GEN. ALSTON: Perhaps. Yes, I think we can.
Q Perhaps.
GEN. ALSTON: Sorry. Yes, sir?
Q Peter Graff from Reuters. Trying to figure out how to put this. You made clear that this tactic of car bombs and of suicide car bombs is one that the insurgents are getting better at and they're getting more spectacular, and that their main targets are Iraqi civilians and Iraqi security forces, and they're killing more of them with these more spectacular attacks. You are also saying that you're making progress by training Iraqi security forces, who will eventually be able to restore security to the country.
But so what we see then, I think you're saying, is that the insurgents are getting these new tactics, are getting better at killing people; you're getting these new Iraqi security forces that you say are getting better. Who's getting better faster? Is the situation for Iraqis going to be getting worse in the next few months before it gets better, or is it going to be getting better? Are you at the point yet where you can say that Iraqis are going to be safer from these suicide car bombs in the next few months, or are they going to have to go through some period where it's going to be less safe and increasingly less safe before it can get better? Do you have that kind of clarity?
GEN. ALSTON: Well, if we look at what it takes to drive a bomb- laden vehicle into a crowd of people, it is not that challenging to perform that function, especially if you're willing to give your life. So the enemy gets to pick the time and the place in order to achieve the effect that they're trying to achieve. That is a challenging problem to solve. We attacked that problem with the Iraqis during Operation Al-Barq. And for the 25 days prior to the commencement of Al-Barq, we had -- I'm not going to be specific -- we had a number X, and then in the 25 days after Al-Barq, the number was less than half. So Al-Barq itself, by its --
Q (Off mike.)
GEN. ALSTON: No, I'm talking about car bombs themselves that detonated, talking about successful detonations of car bombs, both suicide and regular VBIEDs.
And this operation involved a very deliberate planning process to try to analyze and then attack the sources of the car bomb -- where they might be manufactured, where they might be staged -- and tried to take that intelligence, that analysis, and predict where these acts were being finalized in order to try to interdict them.
So we have had success where we have found cars, and because of successes, perhaps, out west, there were no foreign-fighter drivers to drive the cars. We picked up several bomb manufacturers. We took out VBIED-making cells. So we had some degree of success with this deliberate operation that was a partnership between Iraqi security forces and the coalition forces. So that is the good news, is that we have had some measurable success.
The challenge remains, and that is, you know, the adaptive enemy trying to find a way to not lose this highly valued weapon system that it has. It is so highly valued that it has distributed this skill in ways that certainly make it a challenge for the Iraqi security forces and the coalition to rectify, you know, this problem in any easy number of steps or in any short period of time. So as long -- and he doesn't have to have success a hundred percent of the time. If he's willing to try to put together these operations, these attacks, a variety of them, and if he fails four out of five times, but the one time is in the marketplace where a hundred people -- a hundred soft- target civilians are killed, he has achieved a great deal of what he's trying to achieve.
So that is still a challenge, and it's not just a challenge in Baghdad, it's a challenge in Iraq. So I think that the payoff that the enemy gets for this particular weapon system is still attractive. And our ability to adapt and challenge him has continued -- with Iraqi security forces, has continued to improve and we're seeing some success. But I think that the problem with VBIEDs and suicide VBIEDs will continue in Iraq for a period of time.
Q (Off mike) --
GEN. ALSTON: Right --
Q -- that's just for Baghdad?
GEN. ALSTON: That's right. The Operation Al-Barq was a Baghdad- centric operation; that's correct.
Q So it could be very well that they just went someplace else to blow themselves up? I mean --
GEN. ALSTON: I mean, I'm trying to guess what your point is. I mean, there have been -- you know, there are hot spots in Iraq, and in all those hot spots VBIEDs or suicide VBIEDS certainly are a part of that process that the -- part of enemy operations. Were some VBIEDs -- did they not come into Baghdad and go to another location?
Absolutely possible that that happened.
STAFF: We have time for one more question.
GEN. ALSTON: Yes, ma'am?
Q Alisha Ryu, with VOA. I was wondering, General, if you could have any -- do you have any updates about what Secretary Rumsfeld said the other day about getting in contact with some of the more moderate Sunni insurgent leaders? Do you have any information about who they might have met in the past few days -- what kind of contacts may have been made, with whom, and if there had been any progress?
GEN. ALSTON: Okay. I'm not able to speak on any particular meeting, and I would say that there has not been a lot of activity in this regard. I will tell you that we -- coalition forces are not negotiating with insurgents. We do think that it is important that we have dialogue with those who would choose the political process. And the Iraqi government is on record to say that those who would lay down their arms, and those who want to become part of the political process, that they are open to that dialogue.
If there is a way for coalition forces to facilitate that, if we are approached and folks say that they would like to -- and there are those out there that want to become part of the political process, we will -- we would meet, we would see whether or not there is the necessity for additional discussion, and we would inform the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi government would take the lead.
But it is important that those who would like to lay down their arms and to stop being a part of the -- and to become part of the political process, that that will separate some of these elements of the insurgency, and that progress would be good. Any move towards the political process and away from the insurgency and the terrorists' effects is -- you know, would be productive. And the Iraqi government would lead that discussion.
And if we can facilitate, we will facilitate that.
Yes, sir?
Q Mr. al-Samarraie said that there were meetings in just the past week. Can you tell us whether American forces met in the past week with some of these elements? And can you just clarify -- General Webster gave us the figure of half -- halving the number of car bombs. You used 25 days. What about in the last 15, 16 days? Well, it's actually been about 13, 12 days since General Webster said that. And doesn't that kind of change those statistics a little?
GEN. ALSTON: Well, I -- the only statistics I had handy were the 25 days before and the 25 days after. So I don't have updated numbers for you, and I'm not able to comment on any meetings that would have occurred recently.
STAFF: Sir, thank you.
GEN. ALSTON: Okay. Thank you very much.
END.
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