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OSCE IN KYRGYZSTAN: ASSISTANCE OR THE LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY?

RIA Novosti

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Dmitry Kosyrev).

An article entitled "The Shoots of the Revolution Already Cannot be Stopped" by Dmitrij Rupel, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Slovenian foreign minister (Nezavisimaya Gazeta 05.04.2005), is an amazing piece. Rupel enumerates the priorities of the new government of Kyrgyzstan, which, it should be stressed, is a sovereign country: the drafting and implementation of a plan of economic restoration; the establishment of security bodies operating at the state level; and a competitive, pluralist yet stable political environment. All this is self-evident, provided we close our eyes to the author's paternalist tone.

Further, Rupel analyzes in detail "the strained relations" between Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Felix Kulov (the latter of whom is "a blend of Nelson Mandela and Vladimir Putin"). He describes the merits and shortcomings, and political interests and prospects of both men, but draws an unexpected conclusion: Kyrgyzstan needs a third party that could act as an intermediary between Bakiyev and Kulov. It is not clear, however, whether they (or some other Kyrgyz leaders) invited the OSCE to act as an intermediary and whether the OSCE member countries authorized the current president, who, in principle, must act on their behalf, to do so.

This article is amazing because one could hardly expect such initiatives from the OSCE after the confusion that arose both in its Bishkek mission and the numerous embassies there. For what happened in Kyrgyzstan was absolutely different from "the velvet revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine. The former opposition and now the country's authorities did not call on the people to take to the streets. The violence and looting occurred against the opposition's will and the main question then was whether yesterday's opposition members could control the beast they had not let out of the cage. Thankfully, they could.

My colleagues' and my own conversations with sources in Central Asia show that the top priority there now is preventing a repetition of those events. Although no one accuses the OSCE of organizing what happened, one can sense at least a condescending attitude toward the political naivety of this organization's representatives in Bishkek and other cities. They were simply wrong, whereas those who had warned them against offering prescriptions without examining "the patient" first were right. In other words, the OSCE might have been expected to learn the lessons from what had happened and start restoring its reputation. But what do we see in reality?

From its Vienna headquarters, the OSCE is seen as a coordinator or even the leader of international efforts (including those of UN agencies, the EU, and international financial institutions) to help stabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan. This list does not include, however, the regional organizations that Kyrgyzstan belongs to: the CIS, EurAsEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Is Russia, which promised to provide emergency humanitarian and economic aid to Kyrgyzstan side at its request, on this "coordination" list? Strangely enough, sources in Moscow can say nothing on this score.

The assistance the OSCE is offering with regard to holding the presidential election in Kyrgyzstan goes far beyond ordinary monitoring. It has produced a whole program of its "support", including recommendations to the Kyrgyz authorities on amendments to election legislation and even the country's constitution.

The OSCE is also planning to monitor the examination of losing candidates' complaints in 15-20 constituencies, thereby at the very least duplicating the functions of the local judicial authorities.

There are plans to expand the assistance the OSCE provides to train Kyrgyzstan's police forces. This is a separate matter. Bishkek has an OSCE Police Academy and the former authorities and the OSCE Secretariat were very proud of its work. However, the graduates of this academy could not be seen on the city streets during the recent events. News broadcasts showed marauders damaging and looting stores, not policemen. They were only persuaded to leave their homes and don their uniforms only several days after the drama had finished.

OSCE representatives also want to monitor official appointments at all levels - central, regional and local - to prevent clannishness, which is really important in Kyrgyz conditions.

Lastly, the OSCE plan includes a traditional area of work. The organization intends to assist the development of free media, especially the television, and maintain contacts with local human rights champions. This perhaps can be called an offer to assume a part of Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty. The question is: who made this offer?

Does the OSCE have the necessary powers, not to mention resources, to implement it? The 2004 budget for the OSCE Center in Bishkek was 1.8 million euros, but financing for all OSCE establishments, institutions and missions has now been trimmed because the 2005 budget for the entire organization has not been approved. By implication it seems that Western NGOs and charities will continue to work under the cover of the OSCE. They will play "the tune" paid for by sponsors, not the organization itself.

The scheme of this "extra-budget financing" is simple: with the OSCE Permanent Council's agreement, the latest modest OSCE office with two or three staff members is set up and then, without any discussion with the OSCE member countries, "voluntarily donated" funds are attracted. This additional financing, which is both opaque and under no one's control, is tens of times higher than the budget of the OSCE's "legal" office. This it transpires is how the OSCE worked in Ukraine.

The conclusion is straightforward. This is not the activity the organization was set up to pursue 30 years ago to make our continent, divided between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a "common European home" where security was guaranteed for everybody and cooperation was maintained on an equitable and mutually advantageous basis. (The OSCE has fulfilled some of these tasks). The scheme that we are now observing, in particular, in Kyrgyzstan, looks very much like the use of the OSCE as a cover for manipulating internal political processes in a member country from overseas.

And this is not the first time. The organization is degenerating, contrary to its charter tasks, into a mechanism of "a democratic transformation" suitable for a group of its member countries - first the Balkan states and in the past two or three years, more and more of the former Soviet republics. Perhaps, it is too early to talk about giving the OSCE up as a lost cause. However, if its leaders intend to act in the Central Asian republics of the CIS, close to Russia, as they did in Georgia and Ukraine last year, and if they did not learn the lessons from their obvious failure in Kyrgyzstan, then one has to recognize the justification for posing the question in this manner.