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KYRGYZSTAN: VELVET COUNTER-REVOLUTION

RIA Novosti

MOSCOW/BISHKEK. (RIA Novosti commentator Pyotr Goncharov)

Although Bishkek has been talking a great deal about the threat of "a velvet revolution" in Kyrgyzstan, another danger has suddenly emerged: "a velvet counter-revolution." And the more the authorities and the opposition argue about the results of the recent election to the Kyrgyz parliament (Zhogorku Kenesh), the greater both threats are becoming.

That the election returns did not end in a landslide for the party in power serves as "a revolutionary precondition" for the former threat. An unbiased observer can hardly claim that "the absolute majority of the population" consciously and unconditionally supports the incumbent government and President Akayev, the current guarantor of the country's constitution.

The point is not parliamentary arithmetic, although it does show some interesting things. Of the already elected 71 deputies out of 75 in the unicameral parliament, a mere 19 belong to the party Alga, Kyrgyzstan! (Forward, Kyrgyzstan!), formally led by the president's 32-year-old daughter, Bermet Akayeva, while another five deputies represent the pro-government party Adilet (Justice). In other words, the authorities, which the opposition accuses of using dirty tricks and falsifying the vote count, and some cases have been confirmed, received a mere 24 seats in comparison with the opposition's seven. The rest of the elected are mostly businessmen who ran as independents. No one yet knows whose side they will take.

The most important point is that there was a high level of protests in district and especially, village polling stations. People here voted primarily against poverty, injustice, and corruption, projecting all this on to the powers that be. It is no coincidence that Alga, Kyrgyzstan! representatives largely ran all but incognito in these election districts, while party observers tried not to publicize their candidates.

Valentin Bogatyrev, the director of the International Institute of Strategic Research, which is attached to the republic's president, believes all these factors should not be associated with Askar Akayev as the head of state. This is true. But there is another factor, "the psychology of the street," which the opposition will try to use to transform the "revolutionary precondition" into an "orange" revolution.

In a conversation with me, Kyrgyz State Secretary Osmonakun Ibraimov agreed that the elections had been held against "a protest background." However, he believed the "protest electorate did not exceed 30%." If this is true, then the specter of "a velvet revolution" will not materialize.

But what if this is inaccurate and the "protest" electorate is much larger? Where are the guarantees that the nationwide assembly (kurultai) created in Jalal-Abad to govern the region will not become the "orange" virus of a "revolution" and what will the authorities do to render it harmless?

The opposition wants Akayev to resign, the old parliament to retain power and mid-term presidential elections to be held. Will the authorities take counter-measures, in particular, a referendum to announce the people's verdict in favor of extending Akayev's presidency? They will most likely do this, because the opposition's slogans of "Down with Akayev" are no less anti-constitutional and anti-democratic than a pro-presidential referendum. Ibraimov seems unlikely to be ruling this option out when he says, "The people will have the final say."

However, this option will hardly help solve the problem either.

There is sometimes the impression that the authorities and the opposition are acting under an agreed scenario, because they seem to be equally interested in bringing the situation in the republic to a critical point. They strongly object to drawing parallels between "a pre-velvet" situation in the republic and "the velvet revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine. In particular, they are especially vocal about the lack of any "anti-Russian drive" in Kyrgyzstan.

While talking about the Russian factor, it would be appropriate to recall that the status of relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan differs in principle from Russia's relations with Georgia or Ukraine, first of all, in the contractual obligations fixed in the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization that stipulate reciprocal assistance in the event of an obvious threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of either state. Moscow would hardly be happy if Russia had to fulfill its obligations whether in the conditions of "a velvet revolution" or, on the contrary, of "a velvet counter-revolution." Would it not be better for the authorities and the opposition to try, at least, to sit down at the negotiating table instead of increasing the tension?