20 June 2004
Special Operations Forces Follow Geneva Conventions, General Says
Brigadier General Harrell clarifies applicable rules of engagement
The rules of engagement remain the same for special operations forces (SOF) as for regular troops, even when dealing with high-value targets, according to the commanding general of the U.S. Special Operations Command.
Brigadier General Gary Harrell, speaking in a June 19 interview, said, "We follow the applicable law of armed conflict and we basically have the same set of guidelines [as conventional forces]."
Clarifying his unit's mission in Iraq, Harrell stated, "Our task, like everybody else's task, is to try to bring this to a close and get a new Iraq stood up with Iraqi answers to Iraqi problems."
Harrell denied that SOF handling of prisoners, even in the first 24 hours following capture, differ from procedures followed by regular forces.
"One of the things we cannot do is any form of abuse. ... We also attempt to treat them just like we would want our soldiers to be treated," he said.
"We don't abuse people, we're not allowed to torture people them, we basically follow the applicable portions of the Geneva Convention[s]," the general explained.
Harrell asserted that approach also had been taken during operations in Afghanistan, describing it as "about the same."
Injuries can occur during capture, the general acknowledged, stating, "The capture process can be physically tough because you're trying to make sure that you minimize the threat to the United States forces, to our forces. But there's a difference when it's over."
Once capture is complete, prisoners -- even high-value targets -- are not abused, Harrell asserted.
Even though U.S. troops are highly motivated to produce actionable intelligence as quickly as possible, "you can't break the rules to make that happen," the general said.
"[W]hen it [potential abuse of prisoners] comes up everybody up and down the chain of command knows they have a responsibility to enforce the standard," Harrell concluded.
Following is the Defense Department transcript of Harrell's interview:
(begin transcript)
United States Department of Defense
News Transcript
Presenter: Brigadier General Gary L. Harrell, Commanding General
Special Operations Command, Central Command
Saturday, June 19, 2004
Interview with Brigadier General Gary L. Harrell, Commanding General
Q: My understanding is that your unit's main targets if you will are the HVTs [high-value targets], and I wanted to see if you could define for me as I've had others find, the different categories of HVTs and then talk about, again, my understanding is you have a different ROE [rules of engagement] or authority for interrogations. Even if we can't talk in detail maybe you can just describe whatever you can about that.
A: The first thing I'd tell you is we don't have a different set of, and it wouldn't be [inaudible], but we don't have a set of different rules for SOF [special operation forces] interrogations.
Q: Can you move up to the phone a little bit?
A: Is that better?
Q: Yes. Okay, you don't have a different set of rules, so you operate under the exact same rules as the conventional forces?
A: We follow the applicable laws of armed conflict and we basically have the same set of guidelines. There's an Army field manual called 3452 and an Army regulation called 190-8 that can be augmented by, for example, General Sanchez's headquarters' perhaps some guidance. Basically we all have to follow the same guidance.
Q: Do you have a set of augmented rules that are different than the conventional forces? Do you have another augmented version?
A: No.
Q: You do not.
A: No, ma'am. We do not.
Q: Okay. Am I correct in saying that your main task is to work on the HVTs that I talked about?
A: I don't want to quibble with you, but that gets into current operations and I won't go there.
Q: But if I write it on my own I won't be wrong.
A: Our task, like everybody else's task, is to try to bring this to a close and get a new Iraq stood up with Iraqi answers to Iraqi problems. There are some people out there that are against that and we're focused against all of them.
Q: Does your job include both what I would call take-down, but if there's some term that's better than that I'd love to know what it is, but also interrogation on the teams that you have? Do you do both?
A: It's not really interrogation, although if somebody is captured certainly there is a period of time there when they're no longer charged so the situation has changed drastically for them. It is possible to gain tactical intelligence. So we do ask questions after we initially capture them.
Q: But you don't have specifically identified interrogators to do that, it's just people that are part of the team anyway?
A: That's correct. It would be people that are part of the team that captured them.
Q: Okay. Do you have, I understand the first, that 12 hours or 24 hours are the most critical. Do you have any sort of different guidelines that you can use in that period of time immediately after that?
A: One of the things that we cannot do is any form of abuse. We try to treat people as humanely as possible. One of the guidelines we use is to tell commanders to treat them like they would want to be treated if the roles were reversed. We also attempt to treat them just like we would want our soldiers to be treated.
Q: How do you take advantage of that short window? Especially if you're talking about, for instance, insurgents who are actively involved against U.S. troops. How do you in that first period apply a little more pressure?
A: Just by directly asking them the questions that we want to know. Again, we don't do anything special during that time period. We don't have any special authorities or privileges other than the normal ones that are established.
Q: Is your ROE or I don't know I may use the wrong terminology, is it any different than it was in Afghanistan?
A: First off, ROE, I'm not sure what you're asking about about --
Q: What I mean is just the actually capture, confinement and interrogation in your hands. Is that any different? The guidelines that you're operating under, are they any different than the guidelines you operated under in Afghanistan?
A: Basically my experience has been about the same.
Q: Are the legal rules different? The reason I'm asking is in Afghanistan the government decided that those were, the al Qaeda and the Taliban were terrorists who fit in a different category than others. And in Iraq we hear often used the term terrorists, so I'm trying to figure out if there are people in Iraq who fit in that same category as those that did in Afghanistan?
A: I guess I would just tell you that's a legal nuance that you need to take up with the DoD General Counsel. My experience and practice is we've treated them the same. Basically it's the same guidelines. We don't abuse people, we're not allowed to torture them, we basically follow the applicable portions of the Geneva Convention[s]. That's been my experience as a practice of the folks that I know of that have done that.
Q: I want to make sure I'm just not failing to ask the question in the right way. The people who I'm talking to who believe that you not only have the most high value targets to go after and also -- They also believe that you have authority that is very well regulated and monitored and all that, but it is differed*, gives you more leeway than the regular forces, and you're saying that's not the case?
A: I'd be glad to dispute whoever your source is, but that's not the case.
I will tell you that what our experience is -- is that the humane treatment works to our advantage because these folks don't expect it. They expect to be treated like they would have been treated under the previous regime or like they would have treated us if the roles were reversed. They're shocked, and I don't really mean shocked, but just the fact that they're treated humanely many times makes them very much more cooperative because they're surprised at being treated in such a different manner.
I'll also tell you that we got a whole bunch of good troops out there that work very hard every day, not only at the capture but also at making sure these folks are taken care of and treated just like they'd want to be treated if the roles were reversed. That's an important point to make.
Q: Brian probably told you about this slang term that people were using with me, break something. I'm sure it's got another term to it which is described to me as driving from a classic counterterrorism tactic that goes way back, I guess.
A: I can't tell you forever. I've only been doing this about 20 years. I've [never] heard of that before, and I will also tell you that as the guys go through the training process, the training and selection process, if we identify somebody that abuses personnel, mistreats hostages, mistreats other people, he doesn't make it through the selection process and we have people that watch for that and we have people that are plucked out of the process if we identify them as having those kind of characteristics.
Q: Do you have -- So there's nothing you know of that is by some other name a way to render somebody --
A: I understand what you are asking and there's no such thing. I'd be glad to debate whoever --
Q: In this case I actually witnessed the training down in Colombia and that was a [inaudible], so it's a mystery that it still was around then in a training situation.
A: Were you watching them during the capture process or after the person had already capitulated or surrendered? Because there is a difference.
Q: No, it's when they grab him and they're --
A: The capture process can be physically rough because you're trying to make sure that you minimize the threat to the United States forces, to our forces. But there's a difference when it's over. Then our troops are charged with protecting. I have never heard, seen or been privy to anything about [inaudible] want to break something when we take them down.
Now is it possible something gets broken during the capture? Yeah. But not because somebody was -- We don't have a team of nose men or ankle men or anything like that.
Q: Okay.
A: It's simply not true.
Q: I'm aware and others have written about these mixed teams with OGA and some of your folks so I want to make sure the questions I'm asking would also apply to that or are those in a different category all together?
A: I don't know. I can't answer for another government agency. If you've got a question about what they're doing, I don't mean to sound flippant, but you need to ask them. I'm just talking about DoD.
Q: I was actually asking about the teams that I understood were mixed teams so they would fall under some kind of joint or combined or something. So I just want to make sure that your answer to the other question, the original question about methods, would apply to those mixed teams as well if they come under your jurisdiction?
A: If they come under DoD jurisdiction the answer is the same as I already answered. I just can't answer for everybody else --
Q: Okay.
If --
A: I've never heard of that before from anybody.
Q: There have been reports from, that surfaced after the Abu Ghraib, attention given to Abu Ghraib, of some, and I know there's an IG [inspector general] looking at some alleged abuse, an IG at SOCOM was looking at some alleged abuse. Have you had, are you aware of some instances of that and have you been able to determine why they occurred?
A: There are some ongoing allegations. The investigations are still open, but I will tell you that every allegation that has surfaced has been looked at at a fairly high level. Most of them that I'm aware of are still open.
Q: How many are you talking about? Do you know?
A: No. But there are several different investigations.
Q: So several is like three or four. Is that right? Three or four? Or are we talking --
A: -- above several.
Q: A little above several, okay.
A: Something like 48,000 detainees or something like that and we've had a handful of allegations. These folks that are involved in this are some of our most [inaudible] or some of our most experienced military personnel that we've got around.
The average life of somebody on a stock team is probably at about the sergeant first class level at the lowest. You'll have a few sergeants, E-5s, but most of the guys are older, more experienced. They go through a very complicated process to [inaudible] this. So most of them are not willing to put all that at risk to do something that could [inaudible] good guy [inaudible] stupid is --
A: If they go there, it's not being looked at.
Q: When it became clear the insurgency was going to be tougher and kind of growing, I would put that in maybe the October time period last year, did anything change in terms of how you conducted the things we're talking about? We have all read and been told that the pressure was on to get better, quicker, more actionable intelligence against the insurgency so how did you carry that out and did that change anything you were permitted to do in terms of taking down people or interrogating them?
A: Yeah, is the short answer. But you're absolutely right. We always want to get better and more actionable intel but at the same time we have the same restrictions, legal constraints, regulations, and we have to follow them.
You might want to in terms of [inaudible], but you can't break the rules to make that happen. Like I told you, we've devoted quite a lot of time in looking at interrogation techniques and things like that. We think, and I'm talking about the lawyer/SOF community as a whole. If the most effective technique is the direct approach, and I'll say this, the good guys [inaudible], that's probably not --
Q: Say that one more time?
A: The best approach is to treat them humanely. Even if we wanted to put more pressure eon them, we don't think that's effective.
Q: Okay.
A: [inaudible]?
Q: No, I'm sure that in the vast majority of the cases, it's just the other cases that are probably the most frustrating to everybody.
A: They are, but I'll also tell you when it comes up everybody up and down the chain knows they have a responsibility to enforce the standard. The other thing I'll tell you is we have a very good command relationship and that most of the commanders are out, actively involved in going down and looking at what their subordinate troops are doing. Because we're smaller, SOF is a smaller organization it's a little bit easier for us to do that.
Q: All right, thank you for your time. I know you're busy.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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