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Multilateral Arms Control: Time to Opt for Effectiveness

Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Statement to the First Committee of the 58th Session of the UN General Assembly
New York City
October 7, 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by congratulating you, on behalf of the United States Delegation, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. I am confident that your vast experience will be an asset to the work of this Committee, and I assure you of the full support of our Delegation in the discharge of your duties. I also would like to extend my congratulations to the other members of the Bureau.

Mr. Chairman, I would like today to share with the Committee my belief that this Committee can and must reshape itself into an effective multilateral body -- one that is relevant to the security threats of today and of the future, and that can meaningfully enhance international peace and security. In order to do so, we must be prepared to make some hard choices regarding our agenda and the way in which we do business

At a Crossroads

We meet, Mr. Chairman, at a crossroads for multilateral arms control. In one direction lies the old, Cold War-era thinking that has paralyzed achievable and practical progress in this field for far too long. In these dangerous times, too many nations still orient themselves by the anachronistic coordinates of the past; the results have been years of disappointing drift and growing irrelevance. In seeking to address today's challenges, too many nations continue to rely on the machinery endorsed a quarter-century ago by the First Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, SSOD I, with no consideration of how to adapt this machinery to address new and emerging threats.

The old direction also has led to impasses and deadlocks that have become routine in some multilateral arms control fora. It has become nearly impossible to deal with a given arms control or disarmament issue without facing demands that other, unrelated subjects be dealt with on an equal basis and at the same time. Recently, the Conference on Disarmament showed signs that its work program stalemate could be lifted. We consider this an encouraging sign, and are considering its ramifications. Obviously, 7 years of inactivity there have wrought damage to the reputation of the Conference.

Moving On

Some believe, Mr. Chairman, that the objective of consensus is to ensure that all proposals have equal weight or are deemed equally acceptable. That kind of thinking, over and over again, proved itself during the Cold War and beyond to be a recipe for inaction and failure, as subjects that do not enjoy consensus simply should not, and cannot, be given equal standing, let alone priority, over subjects that do enjoy consensus. Too often, a large number of issues are addressed only superficially, as in this Committee, or not addressed at all. While it is appropriate to address all issues of interest to Member States, we need to pay particular emphasis to those issues that can command consensus now. In that manner, we can build gradually and constructively toward the full achievement of our common goals.

Both of these factors -- Cold War thinking and linkages to non-consensus items -- contributed to the failure of the UN Disarmament Commission last spring, where we were unable to reach consensus on either of the two agenda items under consideration after three years of work. These factors also constitute the root causes for the multi-year stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament.

Now, more than ever, as we face together the many new challenges to international peace and security, the question is whether the UN and the international disarmament machinery can still make a contribution, or will be left behind. We must work to ensure that this Committee takes the road less traveled and becomes, once again, an effective multilateral forum.

Effective Multilateralism

The United States, Mr. Chairman, does not believe in multilateralism for its own sake. After all, the UN system itself is a creation of sovereign governments for specific, defined, and delimited purposes. Rather, the United States is committed to an effective multilateralism, properly targeted at today's security threats, contributing in real ways to enhancing international security, and free of political linkages or outmoded Cold War icons.

Please allow me to list a few examples of America's continued commitment to effective multilateralism in the field of arms control and nonproliferation.

• The United States supports efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, including efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. We led the effort to increase the IAEA budget, and continue to provide a sizable voluntary contribution to the IAEA. The United States has signed the Additional Protocol for the Application of IAEA Safeguards. President Bush submitted the Protocol to the Senate last year, and we look to formal consideration by the Senate. We urge all other countries to bring an Additional Protocol into force as soon as possible.

• We also continue to meet our obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The United States has dismantled over 13,000 nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. We have eliminated more than a dozen different types of warheads. We have reduced the number of nuclear weapons by 60%, including 80% of our tactical nuclear weapons. Now, with the entry into force earlier this year of the U.S.-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Moscow Treaty, we will cut the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads again, by about two-thirds to 1,700 to 2,200 by the year 2012. This represents the largest reduction in nuclear forces ever mandated by an arms control treaty. In two decades, we will have eliminated or decommissioned three-quarters of our strategic nuclear arsenal. Also, the United States and Russia will dispose of more than 700 tons of excess fissile material so that it is no longer useable in nuclear weapons, contributing to the irreversibility of nuclear reductions. In addition, the United States maintains its current moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. That having been said, the United States does not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and will not become a Party to that treaty.

• The United States has led efforts to pursue alternative approaches to strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, the BWC. These efforts resulted in an agreed work program at the 2002 resumed Review Conference that established annual meetings of States Parties and groups of experts. The inaugural Experts Meeting concluded at the end of August; preparations are under way for the Annual Meeting of States Parties in November. In our view, the exchange of information among experts on national implementation and biosecurity was valuable. We look forward to the November meeting, and welcome States Parties' efforts to fulfill their national responsibilities to implement and strengthen the BWC.

• The United States also is playing a very active role in efforts to ensure effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CWC, including efforts to strengthen the international organization responsible for verification, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW. We were pleased with the positive results of the first Review Conference of the CWC this past May, which reinforced the importance of the Convention and of compliance with it, and mandated several important Action Plans to enhance implementation, currently under preparation. Last year, we made a substantial voluntary financial contribution to enable the OPCW to carry out important activities in verification and implementation assistance. We also are very active in sharing expertise and experience, on request, with other member states as they work to fulfill their national implementation obligations.

• The United States actively participated in the 2003 Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The Group recently concluded its work by recommending, for the first time since the founding of the Register in 1992, substantive changes to the Register's existing categories. The Register has been expanded to include MANPADS and artillery between 75 and 100mm. These changes will increase the Register's relevance to international peace and security issues, including the threats of terrorism and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. We were very pleased that discussions in the Group focused on the need to ensure that the Register remains relevant to today's security concerns, and that the Group rose to the challenge.

• The United States also is taking a leading role in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the CCW, Group of Governmental Experts meetings to subject anti-vehicle landmines to the same restrictions as anti-personnel landmines, which are included in the CCW's Amended Mines Protocol.

 
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