UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Military

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

BURUNDI: 100 days of Ndayizeye's presidency

NAIROBI, 7 August 2003 (IRIN) - The unexpected happened and the expected did not. This is how an analyst described Burundian President Domitien Ndayizeye's first 100 days in power.

Ndayizeye, a Hutu, took over on 30 April from Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, as head of a transitional power-sharing government for the second half of its three-year team, which is to culminate in democratic elections and, hopefully, end 10 years of civil war. The war has displaced hundreds of thousands, of whom some 350,000 are refugees in Tanzania.

The change in the presidency is one of the terms of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed between Tutsi and Hutu political parties on 28 August 2000 at the end of two-and-a-half years of negotiations.

So far, Ndayizeye has fulfilled some of the key conditions of the Arusha agreement. A draft electoral law in preparation for the multiparty polls at the end of the transitional period is seen as one of the main achievements of his government.

Some politicians have claimed that the rival Front pour la democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), a mainly Hutu party, and the mainly Tutsi Union pour le progress national (UPRONA) colluded in drafting a law tailored to their interests. Opponents say conditions are not ripe for the multiparty elections because there is no ceasefire.

The response of the Ndayizeye government has been that the electoral law, drawn up by government-appointed experts from FRODEBU and UPRONA loyalists, would be reviewed by all national stakeholders.

"All politicians will be given an opportunity to criticise the draft which is yet to be debated by the council of ministers, the national assembly and the Senate," Salvatore Ntihabose, interior minister, said.

Genocide law

Another area of progress is the national assembly's enactment of a genocide law. This measure has partially satisfied the Tutsi community, some of whom had always seen Ndayizeye as a Hutu hardliner.

The new law states that an international commission is to investigate crimes committed between independence in 1962 and the date of the enactment of the law.

However, anti-genocide organisations, whose membership is mainly Tutsi, insist on the implementation of UN recommendations following an investigation into a 1993 coup during which Melchior Ndadaye, the country's first democratically elected president and first Hutu head of state, was killed. Tens of thousands of people died in subsequent massacres. The UN investigators recommended that a tribunal be set up to judge those accused of the crimes committed in 1993.

But powerful interests, because of their alleged involvement in Ndadaye's death and acts of genocide, oppose the idea of a tribunal. This, perhaps, explains why these erstwhile political enemies work together today.

Ndayizeye recorded another success when the national assembly voted 140:0 (with one abstention) for a law on the mandate and composition of a proposed National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Human Rights and Institutional Reforms Minister Alphonse Barancira said the commission's main task would be to "investigate and establish the truth on various crimes that befell the country, with a view to reconciling the Burundi people."

Ndayizeye's administration has also been able to get some rebel factions to encamp their fighters in designated areas. Analysts see this as progress in forming a unified national army as envisaged under the Arusha accord.

Beginning of cantonment

The country's two rebel factions, the Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Force pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) and the Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) are both split into two. The larger of the CNDD-FDD factions is lead by Pierre Nkurunziza and the larger FNL group by Agathon Rwasa. Neither of these has agreed to encampment, leaving only the fighters of the smaller factions - Jean Bosco Ndayikengurkiye's CNDD-FDD and the Alain Mugabarabona's FNL in the camps, although the process has lately been affected by lack of funds.

Moreover, Rwasa's faction is not party to the 2000 Arusha accord.

Nkurunziza's faction of the CNDD-FDD has, so far, refused to take part in a Joint Ceasefire Commission, although a delegation from this faction was in Bujumbura from 28 July to 2 August to discuss security and logistics before deciding on joining the commission, which was established by the government. Rwasa's FNL faction has refused to sign a ceasefire agreement with the government.

However, Nkurunziza's faction promised regional leaders at a recent meeting on Burundi, held in Dar es Salaam Tanzania, that its fighters would start cantonment before a summit to be held in the second week of August.

On assuming the presidency from Buyoya, Ndayizeye had promised "to make sure" the ceasefire agreements of 7 November and 2 December 2002 would be implemented, and to reform the security forces. He has not succeeded in implementing either because the government and the rebels disagree on which should come first: a ceasefire deal or military reforms. While the government wants a ceasefire agreement followed by talks on the implementation of army reforms, the rebels want the converse.

"What Burundians want to see is that the army, responsible for the killings that took place in the country, is reformed and made a national army. This has to happen if the peace agreement is to be respected," Hussein Rajabu, the CNDD-FDD secretary-general, said.

Difficulties likely to persist

Another difficulty for Ndayizeye is political jockeying for the post-war elections. Evidence of this tussle is already emerging between FRODEBU and the Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD.

Nkurunziza's faction has been complaining of FRODEBU encroachment on its territory for the purposes of campaigning. CNDD's recent abduction of four FRODEBU MPs in Ruyigi, exemplifies this tension. Analysts believe that this kind of action has everything to do with Nkurunziza effort to position his faction for the Hutu vote in preparation for an electoral showdown with FRODEBU.

In addition, Ndayizeye has not yet implemented a deal his party signed on 28 March with UPRONA, to which Buyoya and current Vice-President Aphonse Kadege belong. Under that agreement Ndayizeye undertook to organise a debate on the electoral system for the period, which follows the reign of the transitional administration.

Ndayizeye also agreed to let Kadege finalise negotiations on ceasefire agreements with rebel movements in the country and the integration of rebel fighters into defence and security forces. Similarly, he agreed to let Kadege countersign all security related documents.

Ndayizeye pledged to contact mediators and the international community on ways to implement a global and permanent ceasefire or to call for political disqualification and sanctions against the FNL, and to give the army more money to crush the rebellion.

Moreover, Ndayizeye agreed to ask the UN to set up a judicial commission of inquiry and an international criminal tribunal to bring to trial people accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Burundi between 1 July 1962 and 28 August 2000.

Arusha accord

The Arusha accord signed in 2000 set the boundaries of the transitional period, stipulating its duration. In addition, the agreement called for the "repatriation, resettlement of Burundians living outside the country and the rehabilitation of war victims". Its recommendations included a call for the creation of an autonomous national commission for the rehabilitation of war victims.

UPRONA, FRODEBU's main partner in the transitional government, believes these to be the minimum needs to be met before it agrees to army reforms and democratic elections. Some UPRONA insiders say the objective of some of the conditions is to make sure "a Hutu does not hold discussions with Hutu rebels on the fate of Tutsis".

Analysts in Bujumbura fear there could be a constitutional vacuum if Ndayizeye fails to implement these key components of the Arusha accord during his term, and that it could plunge the country into deeper crisis.

Wary of becoming part of transitional institutions in which it does not have a say, Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD, with the support of Rwasa's FNL, has been calling for the setting up of new institutions to govern the transition period.

The Tanzanian connection

An understanding of Burundi's peace process would be incomplete without an examination of Tanzania's role in the evolution of political events in the country.

Dar es Salaam has been hosting hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees who have fled the war. Others have accused Tanzania of allowing the rebels to set up rear bases on its soil and feel it could end Burundi's misery if it wished by pressuring the rebels.

"Tanzania needs only to tell the CNDD-FDD to stop fighting and the war stops immediately," Thomas Bukuru, the secretary-general of the Parti pour la democracie et la reconciliation (PADER), told IRIN. "Tanzania has some interests in Burundi and until those interests are satisfied, the war will not end."

However, analyst Francis Grignon, of the International Crisis Group, told IRIN on 23 July that each time there were moves to reduce tension the Burundian government would argue that Tanzania was playing spoiler in the region.

"This is an easy accusation to make after six years of negotiations," he said.

"Tanzania does not have full control of its territory which would permit it to stop rebel activity on its soil," he said. "That is why one cannot rightly accuse it of allowing the rebels to do as they like in Tanzania."

Tanzania, for its part, has been adamant about the need to repatriate all Burundian refugees. The governments of both countries and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Burundi signed a tripartite agreement on 8 May 2001 to this effect. But most refugees are unlikely to return home until security improves.

The Burundi Ministry of Reintegration and Resettlement of Displaced People and Repatriates said that the number of returnees in May and June was higher than in the preceding period. The director general of the ministry, Zenobe Niragira, said the push factor was a reduction of food rations in Tanzanian camps and advances in the Burundi political process.

Plight of IDPs

Many refugees say they have been forced home due to the hash camp conditions and appear willing to risk the uncertainties of being internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their own country. The situation for IDPs has not improved. Hundreds of thousands have fled their homes since 1 May, especially following the 7-13 July shelling of the capital by FNL fighters.

Those displaced by the FNL attacks were from the predominantly Tutsi areas of Musaga, Gatoke, Mutanga Nord.

"The situation for the displaced varies according to regions," Fabien Yamuremye, a specialist on repatriation affairs within the ministry, said. "In some areas, people have been fleeing due to rebel activities such as Kayanza while in others, rebels attacked existing camps, forcing people to flee again."

FNL spokesman Pasteur Habimana said that if Ndayizeye resigned, "the situation will become much easier".

"We have called on Tutsis to chose elders for talks with us," he said.

"These are the people who will chose a president acceptable to everyone," he added.

FRODEBU President Jean Minani says if the government fails to oversee the holding of democratic elections at the end of the transition period, "it would be a catastrophe". The implication here is that finding another agreement to replace the Arusha accord would be difficult at best, but more likely to prolong instability.

"It will be an uphill task to fulfil all the conditions set up in the March agreement and in the Arusha agreement within the remaining period," Frederic Bamvuginyunvira, the former vice-president and chairman of the National Resettlement and Reintegration Commission, said.

However, other observers believe that Ndayizeye still has a chance to succeed, and that he has enough time to satisfy the conditions for the holding of the elections.

Some politicians contend that Ndayizeye will not be able to implement all that is laid down in the Arusha agreement during his presidency. But he does not seem to view this as a problem for the nation since the process could be continued.

"Eighteen months is a short period if one takes to account what has to be done," he said in a June visit to Rwanda. "We will do what we can, what remains will be finished by others."

Theme(s): (IRIN) Governance

[ENDS]

 

The material contained on this Web site comes to you via IRIN, a UN humanitarian information unit, but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post any item on this site, please retain this credit and disclaimer. Quotations or extracts should include attribution to the original sources. All graphics and Images on this site may not be re-produced without the express permission of the original owner. All materials copyright © UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2003



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list