10 July 2003
Transcript: Bush Could Make Decision on Liberia in Next Several Days, Powell says
(Briefs reporters in Pretoria after daylong trip to Botswana) (6580)
Briefing reporters in Pretoria July 10, Secretary of State Colin
Powell said he expects that President Bush will "be in a position to
make a decision" on whether or not to send peacekeeping troops into
Liberia in the next several days.
"As we finish the assessment in Monrovia and get that report from the
military assessment team working with ECOWAS (the Economic Community
of West African States) over the weekend, the president will be in a
position to make a decision," Powell noted.
Powell said President Bush has discussed a number of regional issues
with the presidents he has visited so far in Senegal, South Africa and
Botswana on his July 7-12 trip. "He (Bush) looks forward to continuing
those discussions in Uganda and in Nigeria," Powell said.
"I'm sure when we get to Nigeria, there will be an opportunity to
discuss Liberia in greater detail with President (Olusegun) Obasanjo,
who has indicated a willingness to help resolve the crisis that is
unfolding in Monrovia," he added.
Reviewing the trip so far, Powell said the administration is "very
pleased" with what has been accomplished and the issues that have been
discussed -- trade, regional issues, HIV/AIDS -- "all key elements of
the president's agenda for Africa."
Following is the transcript of Secretary of State Powell's briefing:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary (Pretoria, South Africa)
For Immediate Release July 10, 2003
PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL
Holiday Inn
Pretoria, South Africa
8:04 P.M. (Local)
SECRETARY POWELL: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I'll just say a
few words, and then I'll be prepared to take your questions. The
President had a very moving day in Botswana and he enjoyed the
conversations with President Mogae, and had a chance to discuss
regional issues with the President and compliment the President and
his government on their commitment to democracy and all the successful
economic development that has taken place in Botswana.
I think now, several days into the trip and with three countries under
our belt, the President has been able to demonstrate to Africa and the
rest of the world that he considers Africa to be a priority of his
administration. It's not any surprise or news to me because from the
very first days of the administration, the President made it clear
that he wanted Africa to be a priority.
And if you look at what we have done over the last two-and-a-half
years, whether it's with respect to the expansion of AGOA, whether
it's with respect to all of the African leaders who have been to the
White House and seen the President, whether it's what we've done with
the Millennium Challenge Account and the focus that that account will
have on developing nations in Africa, and what you've seen the
President do at the encouragement of the Southern African Customs
Union and the United States Free Trade Agreement, and especially what
he has done with respect to HIV/AIDS, the programs that we have on a
bilateral basis now, some $350 million over the current year to
African HIV/AIDS programs, and how we are trying to ratchet that up
with the emergency fund and what we did a year or so ago with the
global fund -- all of this, I think, is evidence of the President's
priority and the President's commitment.
And he was able to discuss a number of regional issues, as you know,
with the Presidents that he has visited so far in Senegal, South
Africa and Botswana, and he looks forward to continuing those
discussions in Uganda and in Nigeria. And I'm sure when we get to
Nigeria, there will be an opportunity to discuss Liberia in greater
detail with President Obasanjo, who has indicated a willingness to
help resolve the crisis that is unfolding in Monrovia.
So we're very pleased with the trip to this point, focused on trade,
focused on regional issues, focused on HIV/AIDS, all key elements of
the President's agenda for Africa.
With that, I'd be delighted to take your questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, even here in Botswana, in this country, which has
one of the most aggressive AIDS programs in Africa -- the President
had praised it, even promised them free drugs -- they haven't been
able to reduce their infection rate since 2001. Is there a chance that
the kind of programs that we're looking at are not effective for
cultural reasons and de we need to refocus? And a second related
question -- the House Appropriations Committee today cut back the
first year's funding from $3 billion to about $2 billion, and we know
that the administration said they can live with this, but Democrats
and AIDS activists say it's not enough. Do you think that this cutback
may damage the program?
SECRETARY POWELL: I would, of course, have preferred full funding of
the President's request. We will make the best use of the money that
Congress has provided to us. And I'll wait and see the completed
action and see how this ultimately emerges from the Congress.
With respect to the programs in South Africa, Ambassador Hume and I
have spent a great deal of time over the last two days discussing the
South African programs and how we want to work with them to make sure
that as the money begins to flow from the emergency fund, that we have
solid programs that focus on all parts of the problem: education of
young people; providing anti-retroviral drugs; making sure that
systems are in place for the delivery of those drugs.
I can't comment on any specific program that the South African
government is implementing right now. But we certainly are going to
have a very aggressive effort as these monies become available to work
with the countries in Africa, the 12 countries we've identified, and
the two in the Caribbean, to make sure that the money is used for
worthwhile programs that deal with education; deal with teaching young
people to abstain, be faithful; the use of contraceptives; the ABC
program that you will hear more about in Uganda tomorrow; and the
provision of anti-retroviral treatment for those who are in need --
all aspects of the program. We're only going to be investing in those
programs that will have a demonstrated payoff and we can see results.
Q. When I said this country, I'm sorry, I meant Botswana.
SECRETARY POWELL: Oh, I'm sorry.
Q-- in terms of Botswana's program as being one of the most aggressive
ones.
SECRETARY POWELL: Oh, I'm sorry, excuse me, I misunderstood. We've
been in two countries today. It is an aggressive program. They have an
enormous problem. In fact, in my discussions today with the Foreign
Minister, I said, how did the infection rate get so high in such a
short period of time that you are now faced with this problem of the
38.6 percent, roughly, infection rate?
And to some extent, it was caused by people who came to Botswana to
help with some of the construction activities and other infrastructure
development activities of the last 15 years, or so. And so they are
now getting on top of it, and they are starting to at least cap out
the rate. President Mogae said to President Bush that he is not
satisfied with what they have done so far, but they believe they have
started to bring the rate into -- let me put it this way -- tolerance,
so that it is not growing, and it can start, now, to decline.
But it is a major tragedy facing Botswana. And I think the President
of Botswana's commitment is total, and we're going to help them in
every way that we can.
Q. Would the United States be prepared to send peacekeepers to Liberia
to ensure Taylor's departure? Is this something the President will be
discussing with Obasanjo? And then I have a second question.
SECRETARY POWELL: Yes, the President is examining all of his options
with respect to how we can assist in the transfer of power in Monrovia
as President Taylor leaves. President Taylor has reaffirmed that he is
prepared to leave the country upon the arrival of peacekeepers.
I just got off the phone with Kofi Annan to review the current state
of play. Our assessment team in Monrovia has about finished its work,
and I expect that we'll be getting a full report from them on the
humanitarian situation in Monrovia. And this weekend, in Accra, Ghana,
a U.S. team will be meeting with the ECOWAS military leaders to assess
what will be required to move the ECOWAS troops into Monrovia and to
support them, and as part of that assessment, what role the United
States might play or ECOWAS thinks we should play. The President
hasn't made any specific decisions on the level of support or actual
participation -- boots on the ground combat units, is the essence of
your question.
And I expect that over the next several days as we finish the
assessment in Monrovia and get that report and the military assessment
team working with ECOWAS over the weekend, the President will be in a
position to make a decision.
Q. And on Iraq, does the United States think NATO should increase its
military or economic contribution to the Iraqi --
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, NATO really doesn't make an economic
contribution, but we think the European Union should and will. And
we've been in touch with our European friends.
With respect to NATO as a military alliance in Iraq, let me back up
for a minute and point out that Poland, a NATO member, has one of the
division zones in Iraq. Other NATO members, such as Spain and other
nations, will be working with the Poles. And so many of the
constituent members of NATO are making their contribution now: the
United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, Italy, others are
making their contribution now.
Whether there is a specific role for the Alliance at some point in the
future, we're examining, as an alliance. Right now, NATO as an
alliance is concentrating on helping the Poles deploy into Iraq. And
then in the course of this summer, we'll be discussing with NATO
whether there is a broader role that the Alliance can play. But most
members of the Alliance are doing something now.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been some comparisons made between this
presidential visit and that visit of Mr. Bush's predecessor, President
Clinton. For all the attention that Mr. Clinton got, in your
estimation, was that a matter of maybe more style than substance that
you're trying to achieve during this visit?
SECRETARY POWELL: We're not here for style, we're here for substance.
And I think the substance of this trip will compare to any previous
trip by any former President. We have put before the people of Africa
a solid agenda that talks about aid and trade, talks about investment,
talks about the greatest threat to Africa right now and, frankly, to
many parts of the world -- that's HIV/AIDS -- talking about expanded
opportunities for investment. And so I think as the people of Africa
examine the results of this trip, but more importantly, as they see
the programs that we are putting in place and start to benefit from
those programs, if there is any suggestion of not enough style, it
will come.
And I think people have seen in President Bush's stops so far -- Goree
Island, in his visits in Senegal, in Botswana today, and in South
Africa -- a leader who is committed and we're not just here for show.
Somebody asked me earlier, is this a PR (public relations) exercise?
Not in the slightest. This is a trip that the President has been
wanting to take for a long time, would have taken earlier this year if
it had not been for the situation in Iraq, and he is here for
substance. And I think that is demonstrable.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that some may think this is a PR
exercise. You talked about what you have seen and what you believe to
be a real commitment to Africa. But there is a political question.
What effect do you hope this trip and this commitment has for African
American voters back home that the President will likely face, will
face in a reelection bid?
SECRETARY POWELL: I hope that all Americans back home, to include
African Americans, will see the trip for what it's all about, what the
purpose of the trip was. The purpose of the trip was not a political
exercise and was not designed to influence the election of next year.
It was designed to deal with real problems facing people in need in
Africa. It was designed to reinforce our relationship with those
countries that are moving in the right direction through dealing with
the crisis of HIV/AIDS and to improve their economic situation. It was
intended for the President to speak to leaders who are trying to
resolve regional conflicts here in the continent.
And I hope that all Americans will see a President who is not just
focusing on one part of the world, but realizes that America has
leadership responsibilities around the world, and nowhere is that more
important than here in Africa. Just like last month, nowhere was it
more important than it was in the Middle East, when he went to Aqaba
and when he went to Sharm el-Sheikh and we got the road map started.
So this is a President with a broad agenda and he is executing that
broad foreign policy agenda. And I hope that next year the American
people will recognize that, admire it, appreciate it, and respond
accordingly.
Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding that erroneous report last January that
Saddam Hussein tried to buy uranium in Niger, does the administration
owe Americans and, in fact, the world an apology for making that
statement? And should the administration beat Congress to the punch by
making a detailed investigation and a detailed explanation of how
something so important and so wrong got into a presidential address?
SECRETARY POWELL: I think this is very overwrought and overblown and
overdrawn. Intelligence reports flow in from all over. Sometimes they
are results of your own intelligence agencies at work. Sometimes you
get information from very capable foreign intelligence services. And
you get the information, you analyze it. Sometimes it holds up,
sometimes it does not hold up. It's a moving train. And you keep
trying to establish what is right and what is wrong. Very often it
never comes out quite that clean, but you have to make judgments.
And at the time of the President's State of the Union address, a
judgment was made that that was an appropriate statement for the
President to make. There was no effort or attempt on the part of the
President, or anyone else in the administration, to mislead or to
deceive the American people. The President was presenting what seemed
to be a reasonable statement at that time -- and it didn't talk to
Niger, it talked specifically about efforts to acquire uranium from
nations that had it in Africa.
Subsequently, when we looked at it more thoroughly and when I think
it's, oh, a week or two later, when I made my presentation to the
United Nations and we really went through every single thing we knew
about all of the various issues with respect to weapons of mass
destruction, we did not believe that it was appropriate to use that
example anymore. It was not standing the test of time. And so I didn't
use it, and we haven't used it since.
But to think that somehow we went out of our way to insert this single
sentence into the State of the Union address for the purpose of
deceiving and misleading the American people is an overdrawn,
overblown, overwrought conclusion.
Q. So can I follow that up -- some British officials apparently think
that what will happen in the end is weapons of mass destruction will
not be found. There may be evidence that Saddam Hussein, before the
war, either hid or destroyed weapons of mass destruction. Is that now
what this administration thinks?
SECRETARY POWELL: No. And I cannot speculate on what an unnamed
British official may or may not have said, or does or does not
believe. Let's start at the beginning. I don't want to take you
through the whole history, but it's instructive.
This is a regime that developed weapons of mass destruction, had them,
used them, and in 1991, when we went to war, and I was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, we were concerned that they would
use those weapons against them -- against us, and everybody knew they
had them.
When the first Gulf War was over, Desert Storm, we found them, and we
destroyed some. And we looked for more. And the U.N. took it over, and
for years the U.N. kept searching for more. And they never were able
to get a full accounting and could not find them all. Resolution after
resolution was passed, agreed to by the entire international
community.
In 1998, Saddam Hussein created conditions that caused the inspectors
to have to leave. They were getting close, and they had to leave.
President Clinton was so concerned at time that he bombed. What did he
bomb? He bombed for four days, in Operation Desert Fox, facilities
that were believed to possess or developing or producing weapons of
mass destruction.
The entire international community has felt, over this entire period,
that Saddam Hussein had these weapons, and there was sufficient
intelligence available to all the major intelligence agencies of the
world that they existed. And they do exist. And when we went to the
United Nations last year, when the President spoke to the United
Nations General Assembly last September, he put the charge to the
General Assembly: you have been saying; put the charge to the Security
Council as well, you have been saying for all these years that this is
a nation that has not come clean, here is one last chance.
And in resolution 1441, 15 nations unanimously approved that
resolution that begins with a statement that Iraq is in material
breach. So everybody had reason to believe, good reason to believe --
not figments of the imagination ?? that they had weapons of mass
destruction and had programs to develop more. And if there is anybody
who thinks that Saddam Hussein had ever lost the intent to have such
weapons, then I think that is the most naive view imaginable. And he
had the chance to come clean to the international community; he did
not take that chance, he did not take that opportunity. And the war
followed.
And we have now removed a tyrant, a dictator. We have freed people. We
have found the mass graves. We have found ?? we are starting to find
evidence that I think will make it clear that there was a more than
adequate justification for this war and more than adequate authority
for it under Resolution 1441.
Q. Mr. Secretary, many of your critics in America, African Americans,
and many that are here are saying that President Bush and the Bush
administration went into Iraq for oil. Many people are saying ?? those
same critics are saying that you're coming in for substance for Africa
and trying to secure the west coast of Africa, Liberia, for that same
situation, oil. What do you say to those critics?
SECRETARY POWELL: We have not taken one drop of Iraqi oil for U.S.
purposes, or for coalition purposes. Quite the contrary. We put in
place a management system to make sure that Iraqi oil is brought out
of the ground and put onto the market in order to generate revenue for
the Iraqi people. And we have put in place an auditing system and
people who can oversee what we are doing. And the United States
government is spending a great deal of money to support our forces
over there. It cost a great deal of money to prosecute this war. But
the oil of the Iraqi people belongs to the Iraqi people; it is their
wealth, it will be used for their benefit. So we did not do it for
oil.
By that same token, we did not come to Africa -- the President did not
come to Africa on this trip for the purpose of taking anyone's oil or
imposing our will on anybody. We are here to visit friends. We are
here by invitation. We have been welcomed by the governments. And
there has -- in the three days that we have been here, we have not
participated in one single discussion with any leader about oil in any
way, shape, manner, fashion or form.
And the people of Liberia are suffering under a terrible dictatorship.
The United States has been asked by the international community, by
ECOWAS, by the United Nations, we have been asked by President Taylor,
we have been asked by the organizations opposing President Taylor to
play a role in bringing this crisis to a solution. And we are
examining what we should do.
So we are not here for any other purpose than to demonstrate our
friendship, to demonstrate our commitment, and to see if we can help
people in need.
Q. Can you please tell us the purpose of the upcoming meeting with
Kofi Annan? Is it going to be Liberia? Is it going to be AIDS? Is it
going to be WMD (weapons of mass destruction)? Tell us a little bit
about that, please.
SECRETARY POWELL: The Secretary General is coming to Washington on
Monday. He comes on a regular basis to meet with the President. And
I'm sure we will talk about Iraq and we will talk about the
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. He and I talked about it just a few
minutes ago. And I'm sure we'll talk about Liberia.
I've talked to the Secretary General every day this week. We almost
have a nightly check-in now to see what's going on in Abuja or Maputo,
where he is today, or in Accra or in Monrovia. And so it will be a
continuation of that regular dialogue. And I think Monday will be a
good chance for the Secretary General and the President to really
review where we are, with respect to Liberia, after the African Union
meetings this weekend and the assessment teams that finished their
work both in Accra on the military aspects of the ECOWAS mission, and
our participation in that, and what level of participation, and the
assessment team coming out of Monrovia.
Q. So they will have finished that work before the meeting?
SECRETARY POWELL: I know that -- I'm quite sure the humanitarian team
will be finished by then. I'm reasonably sure of that. I can't be sure
that the military team will be finished, because -- they're arriving
now, but I don't think there meeting is until Saturday. So I can't be
sure of that.
Q. To follow on Liberia. Since there's growing pressure for something
to happen, is it your expectation that the African troops would go in
first, if Taylor is awaiting a peacekeeping force -- they're closest,
they could get in their more quickly, and Taylor could exit the scene.
Do you expect that to be the way things play out -- they go in first
and the U.S. role would be fine-tuned later? And I have one follow-up.
SECRETARY POWELL: I don't want to get too deeply into the -- how it
might be synchronized. I think the preference would be for Mr. Taylor
to leave at about the time that an ECOWAS force is arriving. The
arrival of the ECOWAS force would have to be facilitated and supported
in some way by the United States. Whether that is just with logistics
units or command-and-control units or communications facilities or
support of that kind, or whether there would actually be U.S. troops
on the ground, the intention right now is to lead with ECOWAS. And the
Secretary General has been quite clear about that.
The preference is to lead with ECOWAS, with the U.S. essentially
playing a role of support. And if it's participation, then we'll make
a judgment as to what the level of that participation is. But the
chronology is -- or the synchronization and chronology in terms of who
arrives on what day, that's all going to be worked out in the days
ahead.
Q. To follow, if I could, in the international community and some
folks at home view Liberia not just as potentially a domestic
political issue for this White House, but as an international one --
that despite the President's rhetoric on nation-building here, after
Iraq, after so many frayed relations, that the international community
reached out to us, this is a unique country, this is a chance for all
those things to come together and for the President to send a
political message through Liberia. Do you think that there is a
message being delivered here?
SECRETARY POWELL:
Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe you mentioned that the President in the
State of the Union didn't mention Niger; he mentioned Africa.
SECRETARY POWELL: Right.
Q. Do you think the other intelligence that was involved, has it stood
the test of time? The Niger didn't. Did the other intelligence that
went into that, did it stand --
SECRETARY POWELL: I think so. The definitive presentation of our
intelligence case, frankly, was the presentation I made on the 5th of
February. I spent an enormous amount of time with many of my
colleagues and with a large part of the top leadership of the CIA, as
well as a lot of the working-level analysts of the CIA, closeted in
Langley at CIA headquarters for four days and three nights -- or it
might be four weeks and three months -- it felt like it. And we were
there well into the night, until midnight, 1:00 a.m. every morning,
going over everything. We had lots and lots of information. The
challenge was to get it down to that which was absolutely supportable
and we were confident of.
There were a lot of items of information that I could have used if I
had had three hours or three days. And there were other items of
information that were pretty good, but maybe we didn't have a second,
third, fourth source on, so let's not lead with that.
And the case I put down on the 5th of February, for an hour and 20
minutes, roughly, on terrorism, on weapons of mass destruction and on
the human rights case -- a short section at the end -- we stand
behind. And the credibility of the United States was at stake when
that presentation was put forward. And I spent the afternoon waiting
for the reaction -- not just your reaction, as important as that might
be -- but I wanted to see what the Iraqis were going to do. I was
interested to see what their response was going to be.
And I waited that afternoon and the next morning, I waited to see what
their response was going to be. The first response was predictable:
it's all a bunch of lies -- just as they'd been saying for 12 years,
all a bunch of lies. And then I waited for, okay, hit me on something,
attack some part of the presentation. Well, they're phony intercepts
-- nonsense, they're real. I heard the actual -- you heard the voices.
And then the only thing that came up over the next several days was a
debate about one of the pictures I showed, as to whether those were
chemical weapons bunkers or not. And that pretty much was it in the
way of a counterattack.
One item I showed was cartoons of the mobile biological van. They were
cartoons, artist's renderings, because we had never seen one of these
things, but we had good sourcing on it, excellent sourcing on it. And
we knew what it would look like when we found it, so we made those
pictures. And I can assure you I didn't just throw those pictures up
without having quite a bit of confidence in the information that I had
been provided and that Director Tenet had been provided and was now
supporting me in the presentation on, sitting right behind me.
And we waited. And it took a couple of months, and it took until after
the war, until we found a van and another van that pretty much matched
what we said it would look like. And I think that's a pretty good
indication that we were not cooking the books.
And what I keep saying to people is, if that was really a hydrogen
maker for a weather balloon, and I'm Saddam Hussein or the Minister of
Information we all got to know and love so well, that van would have
been pulled out the next morning and they would have tried to blow us
out of the water as they blew up a weather balloon. They didn't, they
couldn't, they never wed -- they brought other vehicles forward; they
never brought that one out.
And so it stood the test of time. It stood the test of time a couple
of weeks ago, when, if you'll go back to the presentation on nuclear
capability and weapons, I said that they had the brainpower, I said
they had the infrastructure, and they've never lost the intention, and
they have hidden components of their program. I talked about the
centrifuge. And I made the point then that there was a difference of
opinion about the centrifuge and let's continue to study it. I didn't
use the uranium at that point, because I didn't think that was
sufficiently strong as evidence to present before the world. And what
did we see two weeks ago? An Iraqi scientist coming forward with a
bunch of diagrams and blueprints and some centrifuge parts that he dug
up out of his yard.
And so I think as you let Mr. Kay and the ISG that support the team
that's out there looking at this stuff continue to look, continue to
interview people, continue to pore through all the documents that we
have, I think the case will no longer be in doubt.
Q-- describe the process you went through on Niger, was it just that
they only had a single source? It appears from what we've heard, the
British had some report and they kind of went on a single source. Is
that what it turned out to be --
SECRETARY POWELL: What I had available to me, as we went through this
-- I can't recover all from my failing, fading, aging memory, but
there wasn't enough that would say, take this one to the U.N. next
week. So we didn't. We weren't trying to over-sell a case.
Now, the British, as you noticed in the last day or two, still feel
that they have enough information to make the claims that they have
made. And I would not dispute them or disagree with them, or say
they're wrong and we're right, or we're right and they're wrong. I
wouldn't do that. Because intelligence is of that nature. Some people
have more sources than others on a particular issue; some people have
greater confidence in their analysis. And what I've found over many
years of experience in this business is, at the end of the day, you're
essentially making -- very, very often -- judgment calls, as opposed
to an absolute, 100-percent certain fact. When you have 100-percent
certain fact, it's great. But very often, you're making judgment
calls. And, you know, remember, the reason they call it intelligence
is that people are working very, very hard to keep you from knowing
the truth.
Q. If I could follow. I mean, let's say the American people assume
that the administration was not intending to mislead or misinform. Why
doesn't the administration see it as an issue of credibility when it
comes to the President's State of the Union address? I mean, this is a
statement of record. The President used this, he used the facts to
make the case that Saddam Hussein was trying to build up his nuclear
weapons arsenal, and making a case for war to the American people. Why
is this not an issue of credibility when it comes to the President's
delivering his State of the Union address and using that
misinformation?
SECRETARY POWELL: I think the President in the State of the Union
address had this sentence in there and it talked about efforts on the
part of Iraq to obtain uranium from sources in Africa. There was
sufficient evidence floating around at that time that such a statement
was not totally outrageous or not to be believed or not to be
appropriately used. It's that once we used the statement and, after
further analysis and looking at other estimates we had and other
information that was coming in, it turned out that the basis upon
which that statement was made didn't hold up. And we said so. And
we've acknowledged it and we've moved on.
I'm not troubled by this. I think the American people will put this in
context and perspective, and understand perfectly why the President
felt it was necessary to undertake this military operation with a
willing coalition, in order to remove this tyrant from office, to make
sure there are no more questions about weapons of mass destruction,
because the regime that was determined to have them is gone. And we
now have to focus on the future, and that is to build a better Iraq
for the Iraqi people, and help them put in place a representative form
of government that will make sure that there are never any more
weapons of mass destruction in this country, and that it's a country
that will live in peace with its neighbors. And we can chew on the
sentence and the State of the Union address forever, but I don't think
it undercuts the President's credibility.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the point is, I think, that very little time passed
between the State of the Union address and your presentation to the
U.N., little more than a week. You know as well as anyone how
carefully a State of the Union message is vetted, there are
speechwriters and agency people from far and wide fighting to get
their material into the speech, to make it a priority. This was
clearly one of the keynote aspects of the President's speech, the case
against Iraq. It's in the speech, it's in the State of the Union. Yet
eight days later, you go before the U.N. and it's not credible any
longer. How quickly does information, intelligence, whither away? And
does the fact that it withered away to the point where you wouldn't
use it eight days later suggest -- with the benefit of hindsight --
that there should have been more questions about it?
SECRETARY POWELL: Well, with the benefit of hindsight, as we have
said, it's a statement that, upon reflection and the test of time,
we've acknowledged that there was trouble with it. And so -- yes?
Q. But does intelligence usually get reevaluated so quickly?
SECRETARY POWELL: At the time it was put into the State of the Union,
my best understanding of this is that it had been seen by the
intelligence community and vetted. But on subsequent examination, it
didn't hold up, and we have acknowledged that.
Q. Who at the State Department vetted the President's speech with that
line in the President's speech? Can you give us their names and their
recommendations to the President?
SECRETARY POWELL: I saw the speech and I don't remember the specific
line in the speech, but we all at a senior level get a chance to look
at a State of the Union address. I saw it, and -- the whole speech --
and it was my understanding that it had been seen and cleared by the
intelligence community.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked about intelligence being a process of
judgment often. And I think what we're trying to get to is an
understanding of the sense of urgency that the administration
portrayed about the Iraqi threat before the war began. Was the
underpinning of that intelligence making statements that were not
totally outrageous? Or was it a determination to find the most
credible understanding of the threat to present to the American
people? In other words, we're looking for why a statement that is
simply not outrageous would have been included in the President's
State of the Union address, and not something that was thoroughly
vetted and known to be true?
SECRETARY POWELL: I can't tell you more than what I've said to you,
that the sentence in the State of the Union was not put in there
without the knowledge and approval of the intelligence community that
saw the speech. And what level and who, I don't know.
Okay, one more.
Q. Mr. Secretary, one more question. On Zimbabwe, the administration
now seeks to have endorsed President Mbeki's quiet diplomacy despite
your public call for a more robust approach to the problem. But there
seems to be now, in the wake of that blessing, some confusion over the
state of play, because the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
has disputed President Mbeki's assertion that the two sides were
talking and that there's no political stalemate. So what is your
understanding of the state of play in Zimbabwe? And if the two sides
aren't talking, is quiet diplomacy really still the best way to go?
SECRETARY POWELL: I think the President and President Mbeki yesterday
made clear that they both have a similar goal and that's to see the
democratic process undertaken in Zimbabwe, where the opposition is
allowed to openly present its point of view and work with the
government in finding a way to move forward. With respect to what
negotiations may be going on between parties, I can't speak to that.
And what President Mbeki's role may be in it and what he may be doing,
I can't speak to that either.
The leader of the opposition made a statement today with respect to
not having negotiations underway at the moment. Others in the
opposition have said there are some statements going -- discussions
going. So I can't answer the question as to what might be taking
place.
Our rhetoric has been rather direct and sharp. We appreciate the
efforts of President Mbeki and we appreciate the commitment he has to
our shared goal of seeing a solution to the problem in Zimbabwe. And
he has focused on quiet diplomacy. My first visit to South Africa two
years ago, when I spoke at Wits University, I was quite harsh with the
regime in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe, and remain so to this day.
And as the President said yesterday at the conclusion of his press
conference with President Mbeki, he will continue to speak out
strongly, and so will I.
Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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