Military

Pacific Command Chief Calls Fighting Terrorism Top Priority

(Adm. Thomas Fargo's June 26 testimony before House panel) (9860)
Sustaining and supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is the
top priority for the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), says Admiral
Thomas Fargo.
Fargo, PACOM's commander, outlined U.S. efforts in the Asia-Pacific
region in testimony delivered June 26 before the House International
Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
According to Fargo, there are no government-supported sanctuaries for
terrorists in the Pacific. Nonetheless, "terrorist cells and
organizations that operate in the region provide unique challenges to
USPACOM and to the countries in which they proliferate."
"Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaida pose the
most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly interests in the
USPACOM Area of Responsibility," Fargo said. He noted that,
"[b]olstered by financial and technical support from al-Qaida, the
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the
southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S.
and Western interests."
"Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure these
terrorists do not destabilize governments in the region or threaten
Americans or our friends," the admiral said. "Regional alliances and
partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of
eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of
establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region
that rejects terrorism and addresses the underlying factors that breed
terrorists."
Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002, Fargo
said, adding: "We have credible information that al-Qaida has long
sought to expand its movement in Southeast Asia. By leveraging its
connections with sympathetic groups and individuals, some previously
trained in Afghanistan, al-Qaida seeks to expand its network and
obtain the support of local proponents in establishing a regional
pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic ideology."
To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have
strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year, the
admiral said. "Regional governments have made progress achieving
counterterrorism goals through legislation that combats terrorism and
its resource methods, by capturing and detaining terrorists, and
through interagency coordination and intelligence sharing."
More than 130 suspected members of the terrorist group Jemaah
Islamiyah have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia, the PACOM commander said.
Fargo said the United States "continues to support the efforts of
these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the effectiveness
of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals of pluralism
and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use international,
regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism through
coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and the use
of force when necessary."
The full text of Fargo's testimony is available at:
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/far0626.htm
Following are excerpts of Fargo's testimony:
(begin excerpt)
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL THOMAS B. FARGO, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
26 JUNE 2003
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, I
thank you for this opportunity to testify on security in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Having served as Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM)
over the past year, and previously serving as Commander, United States
Pacific Fleet for 30 months, has fortified my belief that a secure,
peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is of paramount
importance to our country and the world. In contrast, an Asia that is
uncertain presents grave dangers to our nation and to the security of
our friends and allies in the region.
We have a number of security concerns, and they are addressed clearly
in our national military strategy and supporting guidance:
Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
Miscalculation over the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir
Transnational threats like terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), and illegal drug trade
Instability associated with a failing nation-state or humanitarian
crisis, and
Ensuring the readiness of our forward-deployed forces in the region.
We are not facing these concerns alone. Since the terrorist attacks of
11 September and in the intervening months, we have had unprecedented
regional cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism and in efforts to
stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have
continued to build on the longstanding bilateral alliances and
friendships necessary to deter regional aggression and coercion,
dissuade military competition, and assure our allies and friends of
our commitment to them and the region. We've accomplished this by our
forward presence in the theater and by the actions of our forces as
they execute tasks and operations in support of our nation's security.
In short, we have begun a journey to "operationalize" the strategic
guidance we have received. Our destination is a peaceful, stable, and
prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
Last year during my confirmation hearing, I provided five broad
priorities for Pacific Command. Since then, I've used the priorities
as a roadmap for focusing the command, directing operational
initiatives and assessing progress. Today, my intent is to provide you
an update on these priorities as they pertain to the defense posture
of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
Sustaining and Supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
Our highest USPACOM priority is sustaining and supporting the GWOT.
This includes not only operations in the Pacific, but also as a force
provider to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM- Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or wherever international terrorism might threaten
our interests worldwide. Although we don't have any
government-supported sanctuaries for terrorists in the Pacific,
terrorist cells and organizations that operate in the region provide
unique challenges to USPACOM and to the countries in which they
proliferate.
GWOT Update. Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al-Qaida
pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly interests
in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bolstered by financial
and technical support from al-Qaida, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network
and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines have
demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western interests.
Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure these
terrorists do not destabilize governments in the region or threaten
Americans or our friends. Regional alliances and partnerships are
critical to achieving both our short-term goal of eradicating regional
terrorist groups and our long-term goal of establishing a security
environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region that rejects terrorism
and addresses the underlying factors that breed terrorists.
Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002, including
the bombings of tourist nightclubs on the Indonesian island of Bali on
12 October that killed more than 200 civilians, including seven
Americans. The Philippines have also experienced a series of terrorist
bombings, including an October 2002 attack in Zamboanga that killed
one U.S. serviceman and a March bombing at Davao airport on Mindanao
that killed 23 people and injured over 100 others. Coincident
investigations and arrests in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia have revealed an extensive,
sophisticated network, centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah, that
continues to plan attacks against U.S. and Western diplomatic
interests and less defendable commercial or tourist venues across the
region. We have credible information that al-Qaida has long sought to
expand its movement in Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections
with sympathetic groups and individuals, some previously trained in
Afghanistan, al-Qaida seeks to expand its network and obtain the
support of local proponents in establishing a regional pan-Islamic
state supportive of radical Islamic ideology.
To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have
strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year. Regional
governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals
through legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods,
by capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency
coordination and intelligence sharing. To date, over 130 Jemaah
Islamiyah suspects have been arrested or detained, primarily in
Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia. The U.S. government
has designated JI, the ASG, and the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This
action enables us to identify and freeze the financial assets of these
groups and sets the conditions for their isolation. Governments in the
region are also increasing their cooperation with regional
counterparts - forming bilateral and multilateral alliances to combat
terrorist activity. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
plan to establish a regional Counterterrorism Training Center in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia is a noteworthy example. USPACOM continues to support
the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve
the effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic
ideals of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is
to use international, regional, and local relationships to defeat
terrorism through coordinated diplomacy, education, information
operations, and the use of force when necessary.
We've learned a great deal about terrorism in Southeast Asia over the
past year: how these entities organize, how they operate, and what
they seek to achieve. We realize we have much more to learn and to
accomplish. I am convinced that our best approach is to disrupt
terrorist activities where we can while helping build our regional
partners' capabilities to do the same. It is a team effort.
To better synchronize our efforts in combating terrorism in the
Pacific, we have assumed the offensive while putting in place an
"active defense." Offensively, we established a full time Joint
Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG-CT) at
USPACOM Headquarters. Defensively, we designated our Army component,
U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), as our joint commander for Homeland
Defense/ Civil Support/ Consequence Management. His area of
responsibility includes Hawaii and all U.S. territories in the
Pacific, as well as the Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, and
Federated States of Micronesia. Commander, Alaska Command (ALCOM)
executes these responsibilities as Joint Task Force-Alaska. These
command and control constructs are successfully prosecuting the War on
Terror while protecting our forces and critical infrastructure.
JIACG-CT. We have established a Joint Interagency Coordination Group
for Counter Terrorism (JIACG/CT) to coordinate DoD and other
government agency (OGA) activities in USPACOM AOR, develop targets for
future military or OGA operations, plan USPACOM regional and country
counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, and enhance U.S. and partner nation
CT capabilities in support of national objectives in the GWOT. It is
an all-encompassing and focused effort, where we are now integrating
our Theater Country Teams to assess host-nation concerns and necessary
conditions to proceed with our CT campaign. This team endeavor has
been extremely successful as demonstrated by the actions of regional
countries that are supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and
regional operations, like those in the Philippines, while conducting
CT operations in their own countries - all in the past year.
Forward and Deployed Forces. Within the last 15 months, the USS KITTY
HAWK, JOHN C. STENNIS, CARL VINSON, CONSTELLATION, and ABRAHAM LINCOLN
battlegroups; maritime patrol aircraft; USS PELELIU, BONHOMME-RICHARD,
BELLEAU WOOD, and TARAWA Amphibious Ready Groups with the 11th, 13th
and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units; 5th, 11th, and 13th Air Forces;
and the 509th Bomber and 40th Air Expeditionary Wings have deployed in
support of major roles in OEF-A and OIF. Further, many USPACOM
countries continue to provide tangible support to both operations
within their means. Australia, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all contributed
support ranging from overflight, access and basing to escort,
logistics, and troops on the ground. Many are actively participating
in the reconstruction of Iraq. We appreciate their many contributions
and valuable cooperation.
Regional Counterterrorism. Information sharing between countries in
the Pacific has provided unprecedented insights into the Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaida networks in the Asia-Pacific region. As a
result, Singapore and Malaysia have arrested dozens of members of JI,
the primary transnational terrorist organization in the Pacific with
links to al-Qaida. And Indonesia has arrested and is prosecuting
suspected terrorist leaders and bombing suspects since the October
bombings in Bali. However, Indonesia faces a difficult situation,
including factions that do not want to aggressively investigate
domestic groups sympathetic to al-Qaida. We need to cooperate more
effectively at all levels with Indonesia on terrorism. An
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for
Indonesia remains key to our engagement effort.
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues to
attack terrorist infrastructure and capabilities in the Philippines
and throughout the region. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is firmly
on our side in the GWOT - strongly supporting the effort. Our advice
and assistance, including our maintenance and training packages
provided under security assistance authorities, are improving the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) CT capabilities. Operation
Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for
U.S. forces to advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills
necessary to fight terrorists. Additionally, the infrastructure
improvements to roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of
water wells on Basilan Island under DoD's humanitarian and civic
assistance program provide positive impacts on local communities -
highlighting America's positive role while assisting the Philippines
in dealing with the socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised
Filipinos to support terrorist activities. As a result of this well
integrated operation, the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its
influence with the local populace there has been dampened.
We also continue our active Security Assistance program to help the
Armed Forces of the Philippines build both the capabilities and
capacity necessary to continue the courageous struggle against
terrorism. Following this SA effort later this year, we will evaluate
the effectiveness of our training, and feed back those results into
our planning.
USPACOM's Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its
approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific.
It is an "active defense" because it has offensive qualities. Since 11
September, we have come a long way in better protecting DoD personnel
and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.
Our joint commanders for HLD/CS/CM in Hawaii and Alaska and Joint Area
Coordinators in Korea and Japan are the focal points for force
protection, coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion
among the different services in their AORs. They provide the command
and control construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force
protection (AT/FP) efforts for military installations and property
with federal, state, and local agencies and with the host nations in
the cases of Japan and Korea. We are working continuously with US
Northern Command to standardize and synchronize our efforts and
procedures.
USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that covers
DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that are
not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to
ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive
antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their
Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is
adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the
latest AT/FP procedures.
Force protection is "operationalized" in USPACOM. Our staff
continually monitors threat information and the environment in which
our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection
Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as
necessary. Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate
terrorist planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program,
providing a tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof
"off-limits" to DoD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In
addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our
AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource
drain from increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower
limitations and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your
continued support is necessary to sustain the progress we are making
in this area.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland
Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base
security efforts primarily through Information Analysis,
Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The
Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to
improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing
processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our
theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) was submitted to the Joint Staff on
30 April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation
Order (OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final
staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the
Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures to develop
and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database.
Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS). With the recent direction
to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the homeland, we
are working to integrate existing functions as well as expanded
mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM Homeland
AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam and
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Missions such as HLD/CS/CM, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS),
Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support
Operations are but a few of those being combined into one plan to
maximize our capabilities and still refine the use of our resources.
USPACOM's HAS mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats
and aggression directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S.
territories within USPACOM's AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges
from ballistic missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise
missiles and radio controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a
terrorist to gain this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed
this challenge with close integration, cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration among international, federal, state, local agencies, and
governments. This fusion of individual agency capabilities, including
our military, into an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our
collective success.
USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil
Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic
Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to
securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the
impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we
quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery
efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a
good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort
with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
will build on our processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP,
CBRNE and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the
civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam,
and all our territories in the AOR.
Information fusion. USPACOM's Counterintelligence Program remains the
key link between DoD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the Pacific
Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts of the
Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group-Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) and
counterintelligence missions with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines, we
are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion to
connect local, state, national, and DoD intelligence,
counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts,
coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing
asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great
promise in developing an "actionable intelligence" capability.
Personnel Requirements. Legislation mandates reductions in Higher
Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified
commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the
impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis,
production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and
capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater
than ever. Adequate personnel resources are essential to mission
planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of
forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing
effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on
our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.
The GWOT has created additional personnel requirements. Increased
security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to
enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment
teams; 24/7 coverage for Crisis Action Teams; and the already
expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few
examples of personnel generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are
needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism,
and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the
Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for
enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management
resources for CBRNE events....
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). USPACOM
received $4 million in CbT RIF funding in FY02. The FY03 worldwide
allocation stands at $47 million. This initiative provides the
Geographic and Functional Commanders additional avenues for resourcing
against emergent and emergency terrorist threats. USPACOM received $4
million (10 projects) of the $32 million available in the first
allocation of FY03 funding, not including $2.5 million (14 projects)
for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include
emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a
perimeter wall for the new USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and
barriers for Tripler Army Hospital; mass notification system for
Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan; closed circuit television for Fort
Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan flight line; barrier gates for
Fort Shafter; crash barriers for Camp Zama, Japan; and a standoff
initiative with HQs security upgrades for Yokota AB.
Special Operation Forces (SOF). Through Special Operations
Command-Pacific and JTF-510, USPACOM maintains the ability to deploy
SOF under the command of a general officer to any location to combat
terrorism. We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom
- Philippines and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This
capability, however, depends on building and maintaining relations
with supporting allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain
these relationships through our Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look
forward to working with the Congress to ensure these activities
continue to receive future resource consideration....
Reinforcing the "Constants" in the Pacific Region
Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our
friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces
continue to be the foundation of the region's peace and stability. One
of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing
multinational efforts that support the region's mutual interests. Our
forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to
deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our
overseas posture.
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events of the past 2
years have brought into focus new and challenging national security
demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional
threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security
and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that
evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to
ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we
"operationalize," national and defense security strategy with regional
emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives in the
Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat
capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and
a well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial
security cooperation.
Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean
Peninsula (where although the likelihood of war is low, the stakes are
high); miscalculation in places such as the Taiwan Strait or Kashmir;
transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation,
drug-associated violence; and instability from failed nation-states.
Although we anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security
concerns in places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and
Kashmir, the strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and
elsewhere mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening
our current security relationships and military capabilities while
developing new relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and
dissuade would-be regional competitors.
The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the
overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S.
operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and
forward-based combat forces, and increasing interoperability with our
coalition partners to support potential efforts across the spectrum of
military operations. Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our
joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure
friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security
Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training
and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the
link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional
security.
The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear - our treaty
allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF, OIF, and
the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security
assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan,
and execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen
military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their
prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge. We appreciate
your continued interest and support of our Asia-Pacific Regional
initiatives.
Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the
outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the
action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening
ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel
are stationed in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site
for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5
billion in annual host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S.
ally. Without these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it
would be much more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and
defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The
U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to security and peaceful
development in the region.
Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly two years ago, PM Koizumi
has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move
Japan's security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership
in response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for
the GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly
passed legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that
provides the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force
contributions to the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan
reacted is unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S.
security relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the
provision of over 80 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air Self-Defense
Force has provided over 1700 flight hours moving tons of important
cargo and passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity
to express our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11
September.
The significant progress in building national support against
terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military
activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance
remains high, about 70 percent -- a majority of Japanese citizens --
would like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The
normal range of base-related issues, including constraints on training
and concerns about crime and the environment require continued careful
management.
Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been
completed, 12 (2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release
initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S.
SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ
approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF
highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to
emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a
complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma.
The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same
time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S.
interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team
perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will
ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security
dialogue with Japan will continue to advance beyond the discussion of
current issues related to bases and training to address our
longer-term interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look
to expand and improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries
within the region to address regional security issues.
Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest allies.
The new Korean government is committed to the alliance. Unfortunate
incidents marred the relationship this past year - the most tragic was
the June 2002 death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving
a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every
level offered our profound sympathy and condolences.
The late Fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean people
feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK-U.S.
relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought
by most Koreans or the Korean government. The Korean people in general
recognize the great contributions made by the United States to their
nation's security and believe the relationship is in their interest,
as it is in ours.
In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we
continue to review our Northeast Asian force presence with both Japan
and the Republic of Korea. We seek an enduring force posture that
takes into account the changing threat, our enhanced capabilities, and
the improving contributions of our friends and allies.
As a partner, the ROK has been steadily increasing its regional
security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure
our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one
another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, the ROK
supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional
cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies.
Korea's contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly
demonstrated this past year in Timor-Leste, where ROK Army troops
participated in UN peacekeeping efforts to support the region's newest
nation. This growing regional role for Korea contributes to the
security of the region while not detracting from its peninsular
defense responsibilities.
The ROK continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts. The
Korean Armed Forces are with us in the GWOT, from Guam to Central Asia
and on the ground in Afghanistan, supporting our efforts with
transportation and medical support. In the USPACOM area, the ROK Air
Force has flown over 2000 hours moving tons of important cargo and
passengers throughout the AOR. Similarly, the ROK Navy has provided
important sealift to bolster our efforts in South Asia, moving 3500
tons of material. In the aftermath of Typhoon Cha'taan, the ROK
Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) provided emergency sealift of over 350 tons
of bottled water and other disaster relief supplies and materials to
Guam. The ROK Army deployed a Mobile Surgical Hospital initially to
Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently to Bagram, Afghanistan. A civil
engineering battalion will soon join these forces to assist in
rebuilding the infrastructure of that emerging nation. Similar
contributions have been provided for the reconstruction of Iraq. These
contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to the
success of OEF and OIF, and we thank the Korean people for their
support.
The events of 2002 remind us of the dangers posed by the Kim Jong-Il
regime and the threat our ROK-U.S. combined team faces on the
peninsula. The conventional threat from the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains unabated, illustrated by the
unprovoked naval attack on 29 June 2002 on an ROK Navy vessel that
resulted in the loss of five young ROK sailors. The DPRK maintains
more than 60 percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its "military
first" policy, providing sufficient resources to keep its large force
fed, equipped, and exercised, while its citizens face deprivation and
starvation. The DPRK has so far not broken its self-imposed moratorium
on conducting ballistic missile test flights, it continues development
efforts including static engine tests. Additionally, the DPRK exports
missiles and missile technology, posing a grave counter-proliferation
concern. Finally, the Kim regime continues to engage in nuclear
brinkmanship, with the disclosure of its Highly Enriched Uranium
program and recent announcement on the resumption of their plutonium
production and reprocessing programs. These actions are in violation
of the 1994 Agreed Framework, DPRK pledges to the IAEA, and the 1992
North-South Basic Agreement calling for denuclearization of the
Peninsula. The DPRK is not above precipitating a crisis to strengthen
its bargaining position. Now more than ever it is critical our
ROK-U.S. partnership stand firm.
The Korean people are looking for ways to foster reconciliation with
the DPRK. We recognize the importance of these efforts to the Korean
people and their government. Moreover, we agree on the crucial role of
the Armistice Agreement in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula,
and we are committed to ensuring that efforts at reconciliation do not
increase risk for the security of the ROK or the United States.
In sum, through continuing support to the coalition to combat global
terrorism and efforts to participate fully in regional security, the
ROK plays a very positive role in the region. U.S. and ROK forces
remain prepared, and we are looking for ways to strengthen the
alliance to deal with current and future challenges.
Australia. Our strong ally and partner, Australia has demonstrated
steadfast commitment and bold leadership in the GWOT and in
essentially every other security endeavor in the region. Its military
contributions to the coalition against terror are substantial and
include Combat Air Patrols (CAP), tankers, Special Air Service (SAS)
troops, guided missile frigates and, most recently, support for Sea
Swap, our USN initiative to exchange crews of select vessels forward
in theater. Additionally, Australia has become a regional leader in
pursuing multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia
by signing counter-terrorism MOUs with Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand while pursuing others. USPACOM remains focused on maintaining
strong levels of interoperability with the Australian Defence Forces
across the full spectrum of contingency operations including
counter-terrorism. Support for legislation to improve the arms export
process will improve interoperability with this important ally.
Australia continues to lead international support for the struggling
nations of the Oceania region, providing humanitarian assistance and
training. Australia is the southern anchor of our security
architecture in the region, and we will maintain the vibrancy of this
strategic relationship.
Republic of the Philippines. Our relationship with the Government and
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) developed and matured throughout
the last year. Through comprehensive security assistance packages and
focused security cooperation, the AFP has improved its ability to
fight terrorism on its homeland as demonstrated by the AFP Southern
Command's effective neutralizing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on
Basilan Island and the continuing fight in Jolo. This has not come
without cost. Both American citizens and service members have been
wounded, or lost their lives to the terrorists in the Southern
Philippines.
Despite these losses, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - Philippines (OEF-P)
has produced tremendous successes. The Joint Task Force advised and
assisted AFP forces in their mission to rid ASG terrorists from
Basilan Island. As a result, the ASG threat declined significantly on
Basilan Island. Although the road that circled Basilan was repaired to
support AFP/U.S. tactical mobility, it will also help the people of
Basilan in their economic livelihood as will the new water wells,
repairs to school buildings, critical hospitals, and other medical
treatment areas throughout the island. These humanitarian and civic
assistance program successes acted as force multipliers for U.S. and
AFP operations because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan
from supporting the terrorist threat.
To ensure the AFP can successfully respond to the terrorist threat,
the U.S developed a Security Assistance (SA) Program that will provide
the AFP with additional counter-terrorism training and equipment. This
program is well underway, including light infantry battalion, light
reaction company, night-vision, intelligence fusion, Non-commissioned
Officer, and Civil Military Operations training. These five SA
modules, funded through $25 million dollars in FY 2002 supplemental
appropriations, are occurring at various locations in the Philippines
to benefit the AFP beyond its Southern Command units.
When this first series of SA modules is complete later this year, we
will conduct a combined exercise (Balikatan 03-1) to evaluate our
progress and to inform of our plans for the next round of assistance
modules. This feedback mechanism is crucial to making rapid and
efficient progress in the AFP's CT capabilities.
Additionally, USPACOM is implementing a Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan that will sustain AFP critical
tactical mobility platforms, including UH-1H helicopters, C-130
transport aircraft, two-and-a-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol
craft. We seek your continued assistance in ensuring funding for this
program in the future. through the next 3 years. This will give the
AFP an opportunity to address current equipment maintenance
shortfalls.
Action has not been limited to the southern Philippines. We have
completed various large-scale exercises in Luzon and continue to plan
for security cooperation events in 2003. On 21 November 2002, the AFP
signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with USPACOM - a positive
sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship. We have already
used the agreement by leasing 500 pieces of body armor to the AFP.
This small gesture will improve the AFP force protection posture and
support Philippine efforts to combat terrorism.
The Philippines plays a strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. As training
areas for U.S. forces dwindle, excellent training facilities in the
Philippines remain available, though repairs are required.
We have accomplished a lot in the GWOT and in securing our strategic
objectives with the unwavering support of the Philippine Government.
The security situation in the Philippines needs continued improvement
to attract investments and promote economic stability. Continued U.S.
support through comprehensive, focused and timely SA funding is one
way we can influence the situation in the Philippines. Supporting the
GRP in their fight against the ASG is another way. A sustained GRP
counterterrorism capability is the goal.
Thailand. The Kingdom of Thailand is a treaty ally that continues to
have an outstanding military-to-military relationship with the U.S.
Exercise COBRA GOLD (CG) is a centerpiece of this relationship.
CG-2003 was our 22nd joint/combined bilateral exercise with Thailand,
and the 4th of the expanded observer program - making it USPACOM's
premier multilateral event. By adding this multinational exercise
dimension in an environment that trains for transnational issues,
Thailand is assuming an active role in promoting South East Asia
security.
Military-to-military policy with Thailand is managed through annual
Thai-American Consultations. Benefits to Thailand include U.S.
counterdrug/border security support, demining training, peace
operations training and support, and an extensive security assistance
program with a robust International Military Education and Training
(IMET) component. Thailand's contributions as a regional leader
include a peacekeeping troop presence in Timor-Leste, a commitment to
providing engineering support in Afghanistan to support the GWOT, and
an intent to contribute to the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia.
As a result of our strong relationship with Thailand, we have received
access to training facilities, ports, and airfields, and the granting
of overflight clearances in support of operational requirements. Our
ongoing security cooperation program, including exercises such as
COBRA GOLD, helps to address the security interests of both countries
and serves as a catalyst for enhancing our regional security posture.
Singapore. Our relationship with Singapore is one of the strongest in
the region. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, Singapore
provided access to airfields and naval facilities to U.S. forces,
detained 31 suspected terrorists, froze terrorist financial assets,
increased protection to shipping in the Strait of Malacca, and was the
first Asian nation to implement the U.S. Container Security
Initiative. Singapore's recently published White Paper on the Jemaah
Islamiyah terrorists and announcement to launch a terrorism research
center in 2003/2004 testifies to its comprehensive strategy for
combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. Our efforts with Singapore
focus on reinforcing our already strong foundation through improved
interoperability and cooperation.
Malaysia. Some of the most aggressive action against terrorism in
Southeast Asia has occurred in Malaysia. To date, Malaysian security
forces have arrested more than 70 suspected terrorists and have taken
the lead in several initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation in
combating terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. The proposed
Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur is one such
initiative and represents an important opportunity to enhance regional
efforts at combating terrorism. By providing expertise, information,
and funding when appropriate, we can assist Malaysia and other nations
of Southeast Asia in developing the skills necessary to defeat
terrorism. As a moderate Muslim nation with a secular democratic
government, Malaysia's influence extends beyond the region. Its
January announcement to discontinue funding for private religious
schools is an example of a government taking action against the root
causes of terrorism by not supporting deviant extremist teachings that
breed hatred. Currently, Malaysia holds the chairmanship of the
Organization of Islamic Conference and remains influential in the
Non-Aligned Movement. Malaysia's Armed Forces are professional and
committed. Together, we are cooperating in areas of mutual interest
and improving our ability to operate in combined regional efforts.
India. Based on the policy direction provided by the Indo-U.S. Defense
Policy Group, USPACOM embarked on an aggressive security cooperation
program with India over the past year. To date, our forces have
conducted a number of successful exercises - ranging from airborne
operations to surface warfare naval exercises - that have improved the
combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. Over the past 10 months, USPACOM
and its components have met with their Indian counterparts and
established a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial
activities. These programs will increase our interoperability with,
and access to, Indian forces. Our growing military cooperation
supports the transformation of our relationship with India and serves
to further this strategic partnership. This partnership was evident in
India's strong support for the GWOT, most notably its naval escorts of
U.S. ships transiting the Strait of Malacca last summer. As my recent
trip to the troubled state of Kashmir confirmed, terrorists also
menace India. Our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were
invaluable as we helped these rivals step back last year from the
brink of war. Recent overtures between the two countries give us
renewed optimism.
Indonesia. The government of Indonesia responded admirably to the
terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, arresting many key
operatives and developing information on the domestic and regional
terrorist threat. Globally, radical Islam continues to destabilize
Muslim countries and threaten the interests of tolerant, democratic
nations. Indonesia is a key battleground in the struggle against
terrorism and radicalism. In the face of economic turmoil, separatist
and communal violence, and political transition, the world's most
populous Muslim nation is struggling to maintain its secular,
democratic character, and to cooperate with the international
community in eliminating transnational security threats. The
Indonesian military (TNI) is also going through a difficult transition
from protector of an autocratic regime to defender of a popularly
elected government. This significant cultural and institutional
transition will not happen by itself, and is experiencing an immediate
test following the breakdown of peace negotiations in Aceh.
Accountability, essential to democratic civil-military relations, must
improve. Critical to the success of this effort is Professional
Military Education that exposes TNI officers to democratic norms and
modern defense management techniques while building personal bonds of
trust and goodwill. Particularly important is influencing the younger
generation of officers to support the struggle against terrorism.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another
important tool.
East Timor. This past May, Timor-Leste became the world's newest
democracy following 20 plus years of occupation and over 200,000
deaths. Though the greatest credit for this achievement goes to the
Timorese people, the U.S. military provided significant assistance in
Timor-Leste's transition to a democratic state. Our U.S. Support Group
East Timor (USGET) and Australia played a vital role in providing a
stabilizing military presence during Timor-Leste's transition to
independence. We conducted monthly ship visits, built schools and
roads, repaired water and electrical systems, and provided medical and
dental treatment for thousands of Timorese. We are proud of USGET and
our military forces that contributed to Timor-Leste independence.
Although USGET deactivated on 17 December 2002, USPACOM continues to
play a positive role in Timor-Leste's development as a democratic
state. Through IMET and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), we are funding
English language training, helping develop the Timor-Leste Defense
Force (ETDF) logistics system, purchasing basic equipment, and
designing training programs to help develop Timor's Defense
Secretariat and the ETDF. My key goals are to support the development
of a civil/military defense establishment subordinate to civilian
authority and the rule of law and help develop the ETDF as a credible
self-defense force.
China. We have a modest but constructive military-to-military
relationship with China. Our relationship is guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA
2000), which limits us to the areas of Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and other non-warfighting venues.
Our activities are part of ongoing DoD efforts to place such contacts
with China on a new footing since the April 2001 aircraft collision
incident. The USS PAUL FOSTER port visit to Qingdao in November 2002
and my visit to China from 13-17 December 2002 were the first USPACOM
bilateral military-to-military contacts with China since March 2001.
One objective of these exchanges is to demonstrate the quality of our
forces and our values by developing personnel exchanges between the
younger generation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and U.S.
military personnel.
Taiwan. For Taiwan, our actions are guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act. We have worked this past year to support self defense
improvements that can best meet Taiwan's identified defense needs. We
want Taiwan to remain stable, democratic, and economically prosperous
while it develops a professional, civilian-controlled defense
establishment with a modernized, joint operations-oriented
military....
Promoting "Change" and Improving the Asia-Pacific Defense Posture
Our country is undergoing the most fundamental transformation of its
defense strategy and Armed Forces since the Second World War. Guidance
for this transformation is clear and starts with the National Security
Strategy. At USPACOM, we are putting that guidance into action,
operationalizing it with Asia-Pacific emphasis. Our efforts include
strengthening command and control constructs, updating plans,
improving force posture, diversifying access and enroute logistics,
improving capabilities for immediate employment, and developing new
operating patterns and concepts.
Our progress toward successful transformation of our force is the
result of a deliberate, iterative process of innovation and
experimentation. This process requires that we collaborate and stay in
close touch with service initiatives - ensuring they are synchronized
into the joint team. Likewise, we continue to build a collaborative
bridge between our experimental efforts and the experimentation
underway in U.S. Joint Forces Command, the lead command for joint
experimentation.
Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation Planning Guidance,
USPACOM has a multifaceted program covering a broad range of
technological, organizational, and conceptual initiatives. It is a
focused effort to explore and integrate innovative concepts and mature
technologies to address our toughest challenges to effective joint
operations.
Forward stationed or deployed military presence provides the leading
edge of U.S. combat power and forms the cornerstone of deterrence.
Within the Asia-Pacific region this equates to roughly 100,000
forward-deployed personnel located primarily in the Republic of Korea
and Japan. These forces deter conflict, dissuade competition, respond
to crisis, man the infrastructure to receive follow-on forces, and
fight if necessary. USPACOM is committed to developing the most
effective regional command and control constructs to maximize the
employment of our forward-deployed forces. In conjunction with ongoing
DoD restructuring initiatives, we are reviewing these command and
control structures and our force posture to ensure they are consistent
with today's operational requirements and geo-political realities. The
goal is to consolidate and transform our headquarters in Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and throughout the region to provide immediately
employable forces capable of decisive operational effects. Of course,
these improvements will be undertaken in close consultation with our
allies.
Prototype command and control constructs such as the Joint Mission
Force or Standing Joint Force Headquarters leverage both enhanced
joint warfighting equities and transformation dividends. Along with
our efforts to improve our command structure, we will continue to
develop diversified access throughout the region. We foresee ongoing
requirements to consolidate and improve our facilities in Korea,
Japan, and other locations in the region. We also expect to enhance
our access to facilities in Southeast Asia (SEA) and the South Asia
Indian Ocean (SAIO) area to meet regional and global requirements and
support the GWOT and other operational or contingency demands.
Our transformation and experimentation efforts are necessary steps in
advancing improvements to the speed of action and effectiveness of
joint operations across strategic, operational, and tactical force
levels. To date, our new standing operating procedures and
enhancements to collaboration have yielded as much as two weeks'
reduction in time to stand up and deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) in
response to a contingency. By experimenting with and fielding mature
technologies and prototype decision tools - placing them in the hands
of operators well within the traditional acquisition cycle time - we
have established information superiority and enhanced efficiency for
theater command and control. With continued support, we can zero-in on
even greater improvements to JTF effectiveness, such as integration
and synchronization of operational fire and maneuver, surpassing
information superiority with decision superiority, and expediting the
fielding of mature technologies and concept prototypes to
forward-deployed JTF commanders.
Within USPACOM, our Joint Mission Force (JMF) initiative provides the
coherent framework for experimentation and transformation to enhance
JTF operations across the spectrum of missions from forcible entry
through humanitarian assistance. This mature initiative has allowed us
to focus our transformational efforts toward a specific end-objective:
seamless joint operations. The JMF concept will serve as USPACOM's
segue to implementing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters as
directed by current DoD plans.
Each year during exercises such as COBRA GOLD, our multilateral
exercise co-hosted with Thailand, and TANDEM THRUST, our theater-wide
biennial joint exercise with Australia, we experiment with JMF
initiatives that address our "Top Ten Challenges" to enhancing JTF
speed of action and effectiveness. By experimenting while we exercise,
we can accurately assess the military utility of new technologies and
procedures. As a direct result of success during exercises, JMF has
fielded several key technologies within USPACOM's designated JTFs.
Over the past year, Bandwidth Monitoring and Control devices have
given our JTFs dynamic control of limited bandwidth for critical
communications. The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
(ADOCS) now provides USPACOM Headquarters Joint Operations Center and
our JTFs an interoperable tool for sharing a common operational
picture for dynamic tracking and targeting and for conducting
personnel recovery operations. JMF has provided our designated JTFs
with a suite of collaborative tools and the training required for
planning, executing, and assessing joint operations. Our design and
implementation of a standard JMF web tool provides an internet
"one-stop shop" for JTF real-time information sharing, planning, and
execution.
Additionally, JMF has operationalized other important command-wide
capabilities such as our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN)
for secure operations with our coalition partners, the Asia-Pacific
Area Network (APAN) for civil-military and non-government organization
operations with coalition forces, telemedicine for joint medical
operations (JMO-T), and language translation capability such as
DARPA's "Phraselators."
To bridge the gap between our major joint exercises, hone readiness,
and provide periodic spiral development opportunities, USPACOM
conducts routine command and control exercises (C2X). These short
duration, vignette-driven exercises not only test our JTF command and
control procedures, they also provide an important venue for spiral
technology and procedural development and fielding. This JMF
initiative has proven effective in USPACOM as a readiness-enhancer.
Over the next 2 years, with your support, USPACOM's Joint Mission
Force will integrate emerging technologies into information operations
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Our
transformation and experimentation initiatives include our coalition
partners.
In Korea, we have worked Integrated Total Asset Visibility and
language translators during exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS. USFK has the
lead for the Theater Precision Strike Operations ACTD and this year is
sponsoring the Theater Effects-Based Operations ACTD.
We have installed our JMF Web tool on the Japan Self-Defense Force
bilateral secure wide-area network. We also have an information
sharing agreement with Japan, and Japan has used Coalition Rear Area
Security Command and Control in exercises such as KEEN EDGE and YAMA
SAKURA.
As COBRA GOLD 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal
Supreme Thai Command members were directly involved with our
initiatives for collaboration tools, virtual Civil Military Operations
Center, and COWAN. Additionally, Singapore is participating in the
SPARTAN ACTD and is pursuing involvement in other ACTDs, such as
RESTOPS and JTF WARNET (Wide Area Relay Network).
The JTF WARNET initiative approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) on 25 April 2002 provides organic, wireless secure
Internet Protocol-based connectivity among tactical components of a
JTF. WARNET applications, interfaces, and procedures enhance JTF
command and control by sharing tactical situational awareness data
among service command and control systems, enabling joint fires and
collaborative planning and execution. JTF WARNET provided
tactical-level force integration during MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002. We
will conduct WARNET regional tests and a pre-deployment exercise in
Hawaii and Japan in FY03 before WARNET becomes a JTF operational
capability in FY04, culminating in COBRA GOLD 2004.
USPACOM served as the host Combatant Command for the Joint Warrior
Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2002 and recently hosted JWID
2003 this June. For the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore were
invited to sit on the Coalition Task Force (CTF) staff. Their
inclusion in the traditional mix of U.S., NATO, U.K., Canada, and
Australia participants successfully pushed the envelope on coalition
interoperability, demonstrating challenges and developing solutions.
The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program complements
the IMET program. DoD funding has sent foreign military officers to
U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers for
non-lethal education. This program has provided regional combatant
commands with additional flexibility in executing our security
cooperation strategies and has had an immediate and positive impact in
encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in
addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.
The fellowship focus for USPACOM has been toward educational programs
that encourage these advancements among Asia-Pacific nations
addressing transnational threats with a focus on counter-terrorism.
Specific courses have assisted in minimizing terrorist threats in the
Asia-Pacific region, severing links between indigenous terrorist
groups and global terrorist networks, allowing the establishment of a
more professional military, developing stronger mutual security
partnerships, and enhancing theater security cooperation. We are using
the program to provide non-lethal training to Indonesian, Malaysian,
and Philippine military officers at U.S. military educational
institutions. U.S. military courses provide the basics for success in
any military operation. A secondary benefit is the exposure students
receive to the higher standards of ethics and behavior associated with
a professional military under competent civilian control. Your
continued support in providing this flexible funding alternative is
appreciated.
C2 for Coalitions. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)
Program involves a group of military planners from the U.S. and many
nations in USPACOM's Area of Interest. The purpose of MPAT is to
increase operational interoperability among participating countries'
interoperable planners who can rapidly augment a multinational force
headquarters in response to a regional crisis. Using multinational but
standardized skills and procedures, MPAT planners would plan and
execute coalition operations to support a multinational and
interagency response to a small-scale contingency. Through a series of
workshops and information exchange events, including four major crisis
action planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge
base of the various national crisis action planning procedures in the
Asia-Pacific region. They have also developed a strong working
relationship with each other. Military planners from over 25 countries
and representatives from the UN and various non-governmental and
international organizations have attended these workshops.
As part of the MPAT initiative, we and other nations in the region are
developing multinational force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP)
that any nation leading a coalition crisis response relief effort can
use. This MNF SOP has coalition/combined task force activation,
forming, and planning procedures focused on military operations other
than war (MOOTW), from humanitarian assistance through peace
operations, and includes counter-terrorism aspects. Planners from 30
nations practice and validate the MNF SOP during MPAT and other
multinational exercises each year.
Since the Asia-Pacific region does not have a regional NATO-like
organization, the MPAT and MNF SOP efforts represent the major
regional program aimed at developing multinational procedures and
maintaining a cadre of multinational military planners using common
planning and operating procedures for coalition operations. USPACOM's
Internet-based Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) enables the
working-level communications required to develop these procedures.
APAN's easily accessible collaborative capability enables us to extend
regional dialogues begun in functional forums such as CHOD conferences
into exercises and operations that improve our regional response to
the growing range of military missions we face today. The ability to
place instructional material on APAN for mutual benefit of the U.S.
and Asia-Pacific partners would enhance the USPACOM Theater Security
Cooperation program and U.S. national security interests. The
provision of internet-based training and education should include such
programs as Advanced Distributed Learning and similar internet tools.
USPACOM could thereby more effectively use focused military education
programs to develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative
security missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect
for human rights, and strengthen democratic principles....
Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
has reached agreement with the ROK government on an LPP that will
consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number of
major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 while significantly enhancing
training and combined warfighting capability - better supporting our
long-term regional strategy. The LPP will also have a significant
positive affect on the quality of life of our servicemen and women and
their families assigned to our forces on the peninsula. Our partner is
committed - the LPP has received the full backing of the Korean
government and its National Assembly. Further enhancements and
efficiencies are being discussed as part of the Future of the Alliance
Initiative. We are working closely with U.S. Forces Korea to ensure
our efforts result in enduring footprint improvements that meet both
peninsular and regional security goals....
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)