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Official Says Terrorism, Weapons Threats Guide Force Structure

(Assistant Secretary of Defense Rodman's June 26 testimony) (2970)
The threat of international terrorism and the danger of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction will play an important part in
determining how the United States will structure its forces in the
Asia-Pacific region, according to Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Peter Rodman.
In prepared testimony for a June 26 hearing of the House International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Defense Department
official told lawmakers that deterrence is a key concept in U.S.
strategic planning, but there is also the need to be able to defeat
any adversary if deterrence fails.
The Bush administration's goals in realigning U.S. forces around the
world are to "tailor the mix of our military capabilities stationed or
deployed in key regions to the particular conditions of each region,"
and to strengthen U.S. capabilities "for prompt global military action
anywhere in the world," he said.
Rodman stressed that the defense posture of the United States in the
various regions needs to be based "on global considerations, not just
regional" ones, and said "existing and new U.S. bases overseas will be
evaluated as combined and/or joint facilities, given the new premium
on combined and joint operations."
According to Rodman, there are "more than two dozen unresolved
territorial disputes left over from historical conflicts" in the
Asia-Pacific region.
"By far the most serious threat from East Asia is that posed by North
Korea," he added.
"The conventional military threat to South Korea on the peninsula
remains undiminished," the defense official said, and Pyongyang "has
been caught in the act of building a highly enriched uranium
production capability."
The communist regime has also repeatedly stated it has nearly finished
reprocessing the spent fuel at Yongbyon," and "has threatened to
transfer nuclear weapons to others," Rodman continued.
Another threat to international security is "the rise of Islamist
extremism," which "has introduced new challenges to stability,
especially in Southeast Asia, but also on the Eurasian mainland," he
added.
Despite those dangers, Rodman said, the United States is "well
positioned to play a positive and effective role for stability and
freedom."
Among the strengths the United States possesses are its five treaty
allies -- Japan, Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and the
Philippines, as well as "other close partners, such as Singapore," he
said.
With respect to Indonesia, Rodman said both the United States and the
Asia-Pacific region as a whole have "a great stake in Indonesia's
success as a modern and stable democracy."
"Reform of the Indonesian military is an essential piece of that
effort," he said. "Indonesia is a crucial player in the global war on
terrorism, and an important friend."
Following is the text of Rodman's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0128
Prepared Statement for the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
House International Relations Committee Hearing:
U.S. Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region
By Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
Peter Rodman
June 26, 2003
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you very much for
this opportunity to join you in addressing some of the most important
security challenges before us in the Asia-Pacific region.
U.S. Defense Strategy
U.S. defense strategy today, broadly considered, is a response to a
variety of security challenges, many of which are new challenges that
may well dominate the first decades of the 21st century:
-- the threat of international terrorism; 
-- uncertainty about where new security threats will arise, and the
need that this creates to be prepared to respond quickly to problems
around the world;
-- the growing challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), including the threat arising from the nexus of WMD
proliferation, rogue states, and terrorists; and
-- advances in technology and asymmetric threats at the hands of
potential adversaries, which, for us, place a premium on knowledge,
precision, speed, lethality and surprise in the conduct of military
operations.
But not everything changes in a new era. In the Asia-Pacific region,
while the war on terrorism has affected many relationships and
redefined many requirements, there are also some enduring strategic
factors-our solid and vitally important alliances and some enduring
requirements of deterrence.
Thus, the four key tenets of our defense strategy today are:
-- to assure allies and friends by strengthening existing security
ties and developing new partnerships;
-- to dissuade military competition by influencing the choices of key
states, raising the costs of military competition, and experimenting
with transformed forces overseas;
-- to deter aggression and coercion forward by increasing our
capabilities for swift military action within and across critical
regions; and
-- to defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.
Let me apply these principles to the Asia-Pacific region.
U.S. National Security Strategy in Asia
Security and stability in Asia remain a vital U.S. strategic interest.
Some critical facts about Asia illustrate why:
-- More than 50% of the world's economy and more than half the world's
population reside in Asia.
-- U.S. businesses conduct more than $500 billion in trade with Asia
each year.
-- Half a million U.S. citizens live, work, and study in the region.
-- Asia is home to four of the seven largest militaries in the world,
some of them nuclear powers.
-- Real defense spending has risen 30 percent in the region since
1985, despite the end of the Cold War and Asia's economic crisis of
1997-1998.
-- There are more than two dozen unresolved territorial disputes left
over from historical conflicts.
Unlike Europe, the Asia-Pacific region has few, or only rudimentary,
integrating institutions. U.S. bilateral alliances make up most of the
regional security structure that exists. Whereas Europe was a
principal beneficiary of the end of the Cold War, settling into a
broad stability, the Asia-Pacific region in contrast finds its
geopolitics all the more fluid after the Soviet collapse. For example:
-- The rise of China is a major new factor, economically and
strategically.
-- Japan is taking important new steps in the security field. 
-- The Republic of Korea is assessing its security and diplomatic
requirements in new ways.
-- The North Korean threat has grown. 
-- The end of the Cold War has freed India and the United States to
rediscover options towards each other, including in the security
field.
-- The rise of Islamist extremism has introduced new challenges to
stability, especially in Southeast Asia, but also on the Eurasian
mainland.
In this complex new environment, the United States is well positioned
to play a positive and effective role for stability and freedom.
We start with our strong security cooperation with our five treaty
allies-Japan, Australia, South Korea, Thailand, and the
Philippines-and other close partners, such as Singapore.
Their support for a strong U.S. military presence, and our bilateral
military cooperation with them, allow us to maintain a strong
deterrent posture. Even broader cooperation, bilateral and
multilateral, has characterized the Asia-Pacific dimension of the war
on terrorism.
Australia has long been a steadfast ally and partner, and recent
events have only magnified the value of our alliance with it. The key
role that Australia's brave forces played in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
its commitment to a leading role in regional security, only
demonstrate Australia's growing importance.
Our alliance with Japan has long been the anchor of stability in
Northeast Asia. Our security relationship with Japan is now evolving
into one that is relevant globally. Japan's support in Operation
Enduring Freedom has been unprecedented; its refueling operations for
coalition ships in the Indian Ocean, for over 18 months now, have been
invaluable, as have been some strategic lift missions it has
undertaken. Japan has strongly supported us in Operation Iraqi Freedom
and is considering ways to send its military there as well. We have
also been cooperating with Japan in the area of missile defense.
In the Republic of Korea, where our alliance has endured for over 50
years, we and our Korean allies have launched a joint review of our
military posture. The process is guided by how best to take advantage
of new technology to counter North Korean capabilities and strengthen
deterrence in new conditions. Modernization of our combined forces -
transformation - is a necessity and also an opportunity. Our two
Presidents have pledged to work closely together on what they called,
in their May 14 joint statement, "the transition to a more capable and
sustainable U.S. military presence on the peninsula." We have also
reached agreement on plans to expand the role of ROK forces in the
defense of the peninsula, to relocate the garrison at Yongsan, and to
consolidate U.S. forces in Korea around key hubs.
U.S.-Philippine relations have grown closer in recent years. Our two
governments share concerns over growing evidence of links between
Philippine and international terrorist organizations, including Jemaah
Islamiyah. We are providing security assistance to enhance the
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to counter
terrorism. We are currently planning a combined training exercise,
Balikatan 03-1 in the 4th quarter of this calendar year.
Thailand has provided critical support for Operation Enduring Freedom
and has cooperated with us on all aspects of the war on terror. Its
commitment to support postwar reconstruction efforts in Iraq is a
positive reflection of our ability to work together on issues of
global importance. Thailand's willingness to afford us unimpeded
access to valuable facilities enables us to maintain a high level of
readiness in the region. Cobra Gold, the centerpiece of the US-Thai
annual training and exercise schedule of over 40 activities, is now
focused on peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Our training
relationship has expanded over the last decade to include cooperation
also on counter-drug matters, disaster response, humanitarian
assistance, demining, and now counter-terrorism.
Singapore has been a strong supporter of the U.S. presence in Asia.
Singapore has provided the U.S. with essential access to ports and
facilities, including Paya Lebar Airbase and Changi Naval Base. A U.S.
Navy logistics unit of approximately 160 people was established in
1992, in part to facilitate over 100 U.S. naval ship visits per year
in Singapore. Singapore has been one of our strongest
counter-terrorism partners and a leader in multilateral
counter-terrorist efforts in Southeast Asia. It has made a number of
high-profile arrests of suspected Jemaah Islamiyah members and has
disrupted terrorist plots targeting U.S., British, and Singaporean
interests.
The U.S. and the region have a great stake in Indonesia's success as a
modern and stable democracy. Reform of the Indonesian military is an
essential piece of that effort. Indonesia is a crucial player in the
global war on terrorism, and an important friend.
Our relations with China have improved in recent years. We seek a
constructive and candid relationship with this emerging and important
power. President Bush has met four times with top Chinese leaders, and
relations have improved in the military-to-military sphere as part of
the overall normalization of our relations. We look to China as an
important interlocutor on a number of strategic issues, including the
current tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
Taiwan is a success story-a thriving democracy with a resilient
economy. We have a firm commitment to Taiwan's defense embodied in the
Taiwan Relations Act. The United States is concerned by the trend in
the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. Most disturbing is
China's missile build-up, which is proceeding at a pace of 75 new
deployed missiles a year. Our task is to assist Taiwan to improve its
deterrent capability, which we consider essential to the maintenance
of peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Realigning the U.S. Military Footprint in Asia
There has been much discussion lately of the changing U.S. military
"footprint" in the Asia-Pacific region. Let me explain our basic
thinking.
The Department of Defense has been examining the U.S. overseas
military posture and presence broadly, across the globe-in Europe,
East Asia, Central Asia, and Southwest Asia, as well as in the Asia-
Pacific.
Our goals in realigning our forces around the world are:
-- to tailor the mix of our military capabilities stationed or
deployed in key regions to the particular conditions of each region;
and
-- to strengthen our capabilities for prompt global military action
anywhere in the world.
As the threats of the new era are not confined to a single area and
often require immediate military response, the key to effectiveness is
capabilities, not particular levels of forces. We saw this
demonstrated in Iraq. Nor are forces expected to fight where they are
based. We don't necessarily know where the next threat will be coming
from. Mobility and speed of deployment are key.
Our working assumptions include the following:
-- U.S. regional defense postures need to be based on global
considerations, not just regional.
-- Existing and new U.S. bases overseas will be evaluated as combined
and/or joint facilities, given the new premium on combined and joint
operations,
-- Overseas stationed forces should be located on reliable,
well-protected territory.
-- Forces without inherent mobility must be stationed along major
transportation routes, especially sea routes.
-- Long-range attack capabilities need forward infrastructure to
sustain operations.
-- Forward presence need not be divided equally among all the U.S.
regional commands, because we are also striving to reduce the barriers
associated with the "seams" that separate those regional commands.
-- Expeditionary operations require a network of forward facilities
(with munitions, command and control, and logistics) in dispersed
locations.
A key objective of U.S. transformation efforts will be to increase the
capability of U.S. forward forces, thereby improving their deterrent
effect and possibly allowing for reallocation of forces now dedicated
to reinforcement of other missions. We can accomplish this by various
means, including:
-- Increasing precision intelligence and strike capabilities on a
global basis; operations in the war on terrorism, as well as a range
of other military challenges, reinforce this need.
-- Planning globally for U.S. forces stationed and deployed overseas
to take advantage of the superior strategic mobility of U.S. forces.
Any changes in overseas basing will be designed to strengthen U.S.
defense relations with key allies and partners and enable us better to
respond to unforeseen contingencies. The kinds of changes we have in
mind for our overseas presence include:
-- diversifying U.S. access to overseas bases and facilities, which
should allow for military presence in areas closer to potential
conflict regions and provide a broader array of military options in
crisis or conflict;
-- posturing forces overseas that are more flexible and capable of a
wide range of expeditionary operations, which will further broaden
options and strengthen deterrence; and
-- promoting greater allied contributions, which will make for more
durable U.S. defense relationships with allies and facilitate allied
roles in future military operations.
The U.S. will maintain its critical bases in Northeast Asia, which may
also serve as hubs for power projection in future contingencies in
other areas of the world. This is especially important on the Korean
peninsula, where we will maintain a strong deterrent capability and,
if deterrence fails, a more robust capability for swift military
operations on the peninsula.
We have not made any decisions about realigning U.S. forces in Japan,
South Korea, or elsewhere in Asia. We will do so only in close
consultation with our allies.
Our realignments will in no way lessen our commitment to our allies
and friends and to preserving security and stability in Asia. On the
contrary, they are conceived as part of a modernized and more
effective global posture - one that strengthens our ability to fulfill
our defense commitments. No ally or friend - especially after recent
events-should doubt either our capability or our political will to
defend our interests, our values, or our friends.
North Korea
By far the most serious threat from East Asia is that posed by North
Korea. The conventional military threat to South Korea on the
peninsula remains undiminished. With its "military-first" policy, the
North Korean regime continues to spend a disproportionate amount of
its scarce resources on maintaining a million-man army that keeps
tensions on the peninsula constantly high.
North Korea's recent advances in its nuclear weapons program have
created an increasingly serious situation. It has been caught in the
act of building a highly enriched uranium production capability; it
has repeatedly stated it has nearly finished reprocessing the spent
fuel at Yongbyon; it has threatened to transfer nuclear weapons to
others. By these and other actions, North Korea is posing a grave
challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime that
the world community has labored so hard to build up over four decades.
Reprocessing of spent fuel is of particular concern. North Korea could
recover sufficient plutonium from spent fuel at Yongbyon for several
nuclear weapons. This could lead to a larger North Korean nuclear
arsenal or the possibility that this economically desperate regime,
the world's foremost proliferator could sell plutonium, enriched
uranium, or even nuclear weapons to rogue states or terrorists.
The United States and its friends and allies are in agreement that the
Korean peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons, and that North Korea
must completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear
weapons programs. This is not a bilateral problem between the United
States and North Korea: it is an affront to the international
community. North Korea has violated explicit international
obligations. While President Bush has not taken any option off the
table, the United States is actively pursuing diplomatic solutions
through international institutions, such as the IAEA and the UN
Security Council.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)