Speech by the Secretary General at the BMVG-FAZ Forum
Berlin, 24 June 2003
"The West after Iraq:
Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still Compatible?"
NATO
Minister Struck, Minister Szmajdzinski,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to be here and even more delighted to be able to answer
a simple question with a simple answer. The theme I have been asked to
tackle is whether after Iraq, the security strategies of the US and
Europe are still compatible. My answer is, yes they are.
That does not mean that the old cold war partnership between Europe and
North America is still alive and kicking. It is not. It is dead and has
been for some time.
However, it is being replaced by something very different yet, I believe,
equally robust. A partnership for the 21st
century based on security strategies which are at least as compatible as
those which saw us through the cold war.
Don't misunderstand me. There were deep differences over Iraq earlier in
the year, within Europe and across the Atlantic. There are still
differences on Iraq and a host of other security issues. That is neither
new or news.
It is also true that the transatlantic Alliance, NATO, was damaged, along
with every other multilateral institution. But NATO's damage was
superficial, above the waterline, and that damage was repaired quickly as
capitals recognised that what united them far outweighed their temporary
divisions over Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, we are now seeing the evolution of strategies which reflect the
unquiet post 9/11 world rather than the cold war or its aftermath.
Strategies which learn the lessons of terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
crisis areas as diverse as the Balkans and Central Africa.
Of course, we have not crossed all the ts. But we all agree on the
dangers. We all agree on what needs to be done, although we may sometimes
have differences on the tactics. We have even started to put strategy
into practice.
To be frank, my concerns are much less with common strategies than with
our capacity to finish the jobs we are starting or need to do. I will,
however, come back to that later.
Any credible security strategy must start from an analysis of threats and
challenges. This analysis is now essentially the same whether in NATO,
the EU or our member countries.
So I can quote with approval from the EU's new strategy paper which
highlights terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
failed states and organised crime. It concludes: "Taking these different
elements together terrorism committed to maximum violence, the
availability of weapons of mass destruction and the failure of state
systems we could be confronted with a very radical threat
indeed".
I could not put it better. And I would expect Javier Solana to be able to
endorse equally easily NATO's assessments, which say the same thing in
different words.
The next stage in an effective security strategy is to decide what to do
about these threats. Those who argue that America's Mars has a
fundamentally different approach to Europe's Venus have not been paying
attention.
Let me give you another brief quotation: "Outside our borders, within the
framework of prevention and projection-action, we must be able to
identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework,
possible pre-emptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit
and confirmed threat has been recognised."
Donald Rumsfeld or Colin Powell? Actually, the French Ministry of Defence
in September 2002.
Or what about this: "We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters
early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention". Not Tommy Franks
but the new EU strategy.
And my final quote comes from Minister Struck's own excellent Defence
Policy Guidelines: "defence can no longer be narrowed down to
geographical boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security
wherever it is in jeopardy".
NATO's Prague Summit commitment to deal with threats from wherever they
may come, hailed at the time as a radical new landmark, sounds almost
mild by comparison.
But that is because we have come a very long way since that summit in
November last year.
In large part, we have done so by putting strategies into practice, not
in war games or simulations but on the ground in the most difficult
real-world situations.
Take the war against terrorism. NATO warships are now on daily patrol in
the Eastern and Western Mediterranean to cut the flow of people and
supplies that Al Qaida needs to mount its evil attacks. Have we
completely stopped these attacks? Clearly not. But we have certainly
reduced them and as a spin-off cut the cost of maritime insurance
in the Mediterranean by 20%.
Take Afghanistan. Had I speculated two years ago that this would be
NATO's next mission, I would have been laughed at. A year ago I would
have received a storm of protests. And had I suggested that the driving
force for NATO involvement would be Germany, my sanity would have been
questioned.
But that is what is happening. The evolution from support to Germany and
the Netherlands in ISAF III to a NATO lead in ISAF is taking place. Not
for theological reasons but because it makes practical common sense
and is necessary if our strategies are to work.
The same applies to Alliance support for Poland in Iraq. If NATO is the
best military framework in the world, can we afford not to use it to help
bring stability to post conflict Iraq?
Perhaps most striking is the fact that these once unthinkable decisions
now appear quite natural. So that NATO Ministers can debate seriously the
pros and cons of a more direct Alliance role in Iraq, or even in the
Middle East, without storms of theological protest. This is real evidence
that our strategies have evolved but remained in step.
Finally, take the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. No longer in the
news, but the transfer of responsibility for this small operation from
NATO to the EU last March was the consequence of another common
transatlantic strategy, the development of a European Security and
Defence Policy compatible with, and reinforcing, NATO.
However, let me now return to my concerns. Because the picture is not
entirely rosy. While transatlantic strategies are in my view compatible,
there are still real challenges to be overcome if we are to implement
them successfully.
In the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa and the war against terrorism,
we do not at present have the capacity to finish the jobs we have
started. When I say "we", I mean we Europeans. Because this is
essentially a European problem. And it is not simply a question of
capabilities, although that remains of critical importance.
I will however start with capabilities. First, let me say that since
Prague the picture is much improved.
The Prague Capabilities Commitments are being delivered. I pay tribute to
Minister Struck for his leadership of the consortium on strategic
airlift. There is also good news on other initiatives such as sealift,
air tankers and precision guided weapons; and national commitments are,
for the most part, being met.
In parallel, we have much quicker progress than I had expected in
streamlining NATO's command structure and setting up the cutting-edge
NATO Response Force. And the new Transformation Command, created last
week in Norfolk, Virginia, will enable the Europeans to tie into the
dramatic changes in US high-technology capabilities evident in the Iraq
war, while at the same time feeding in their own expertise in other
military fields.
All of this is positive. But it is not enough. Because most Europeans
defence budgets continue to stagnate or even to fall. Because progress on
key capabilities such as ground surveillance and logistic support is much
too slow.
Because nations are still spending too much on cold war legacy
capabilities and unnecessary prestige projects, and not enough on what
really matters today.
This is not just a matter of political and military taste or fashion. It
really matters now that we Europeans have demanding commitments from the
Straits of Gibraltar, through the Balkans to Kabul and Baghdad, and down
into the Congo.
In theory, the availability of relevant resources should not be a
problem. The 18 countries of NATO's Integrated Military Structure in
principle declare around 240 combat brigades to the Alliance, each about
5000 strong. A huge figure.
But fewer than half of that number are declared as deployable, and
therefore usable for today's real-world operations. And when you subtract
the US contribution and those forces which NATO assesses to be
undeployable in practice, the number of usable brigades falls to fewer
than 50.
Factor in the need to train, rotate and rest your troops, and the
absolute maximum NATO's members, less the US and France, can sustain is
around 16 brigades or some 80,000 soldiers. Even this would require
larger European countries such as Germany to be willing and able to keep
two or three brigades deployed at any one time.
Does this seem militarily possible? Or politically credible? If its not,
we face a growing disconnect between our collective aspirations in
Europe, and our willingness and ability to deliver the forces needed to
meet them.
Usability will, in my view, become as great an issue as capabilities in
the coming months and years. It is not a matter of conscripts against
professionals. My perspective on that is well known but the question will
be as difficult for countries with professional forces as it will be for
those who retain the draft.
The same criteria of relevance and usability affect NATO's Strategic
Partnership with the European Union.
What we call the Berlin Plus arrangements, completed with too little
publicity earlier this year, finally set the stage for NATO to support
EU-led operations. They will allow the EU gradually to do more, including
in the Balkans, and to become an effective security actor.
As one of the authors of the St Malo initiative from which Berlin Plus is
derived, I strongly believe that this is in everyone's interests. It
allows for more equitable burden sharing, and a better balanced and more
sustainable transatlantic partnership.
But having agreed the framework and launched the first Berlin Plus
operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we must not sit
back on our laurels.
NATO and the EU must build on that success, using the linkages so
painstakingly agreed to cooperate across the whole spectrum of shared
interests, not just on Balkan crisis management.
Not every EU operation will necessarily need NATO support. However, we
cannot afford to revert now to the theology of so-called autonomy,
especially if it puts European soldiers at risk when operations go wrong.
Nor can we afford any unnecessary duplication of resources, efforts or
headquarters. Which, for those of you who know Brussels, means that I am
querying the need for a second white elephant in Tervuren.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Despite these caveats, the tone of this presentation is one of optimism.
We are dealing with the consequences of success, not of
failure.
Prague was hugely successful in charting the Alliance's latest
transformation. We survived the damaging differences over Iraq and
met our Washington Treaty commitments to Turkey more quickly than in
similar but less contentious circumstances in 1991. We have built the
foundations of a genuine strategic partnership with the EU. With the EU,
we are pushing ahead to close the transatlantic capabilities gap. And we
are beginning to use NATO's strength and capabilities to help bring peace
and stability beyond Europe.
Is this the record of an Alliance which cannot even agree on its
strategies? My answer is certainly not. I hope that your discussions
today will lead you to the same conclusion.
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