NATO Chapter Three
Secretary General's Manfred Wörner Lecture at the German Atlantic Treaty Association, Königswinter, 24 June 2003
NATO
Mrs. Wörner, Mr. Polenz,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am
grateful to the German Atlantic Association for its invitation and I am
happy to deliver this year's Manfred Wörner commemoration
lecture.
Like no
Secretary General before him, Manfred Wörner came to epitomise the idea
of change and transformation. So my speech today will be exactly
about that: change and transformation. Because in my view, NATO is
currently undergoing the most profound adaptation in its 54-year
history. It is entering the Third Chapter of its
evolution.
Chapter
One was the Cold War: four decades of a narrow, static,
territorial understanding of security.
Chapter
Two was the post-Cold War period: a period in which NATO became an
agent of positive political change, by looking beyond its own Treaty area
and into the wider Europe. This was the Chapter that Manfred Wörner
helped to open, through his relentless efforts to build bridges across
the continent, to open NATO's doors to new members, and to bring the
Alliance to bear on the Balkan crisis.
NATO is
now entering Chapter Three: It is rapidly transforming into
an Alliance that is fully geared to the new security environment after
September 11.
To some
here in the room this may sound a trifle optimistic. Did we not
face a terrible row over Iraq not so long ago? How can I speak
confidently of an Alliance taking on new demanding tasks far away from
home, when last February we could not even agree on when to start
planning for the defence of Turkey?
I accept
that the weeks of February were difficult. NATO took a serious
hit. But as I argued back then, the damage we took was above, not
below, the waterline. It was always clear to me that we would be
able to repair the damage.
And we
did. Within a few weeks, NATO was back on course.
Why?
Because in February, we all learned an important lesson: that NATO is too
valuable to be endangered because of the likes of Saddam Hussein.
And that despite the doomsayers, much more unites NATO's members than
occasionally divides them.
This
lesson has been learned -- painfully, but therefore all the more
deeply. It has given us new self-confidence in moving ahead with
NATO's transformation.
A key
element of that transformation has been to move beyond Europe. The
first step took place on September 12, 2001. As a result of the
attacks on New York and Washington, we invoked Article 5. By this,
we made NATO part of the struggle against terrorism. This is a
global struggle.
Then came
the Prague Summit last November. More than a year after
"9/11", we had the chance to show that NATO had learned the
lessons of the new security environment.
Prague
demonstrated that we had done our job. Because the Summit delivered
across the entire spectrum of NATO's agenda:
We invited
seven countries to enter into accession talks. Next year, when they
will become full members, Europe will be consolidated as a common
security space from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, and from the Baltic to
the Balkans. In short, Europe will no longer be a place where wars
start.
We agreed
a Military Concept for the defence against terrorism, which states that
NATO's military must be able to "deter, disrupt and defend"
against terrorism wherever required. Again, no geographic
limitations. NATO goes where the threat is.
We decided
to enhance the protection against the effects of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Our military authorities will be better able to
support civilian authorities if such attacks were ever to take place on
home soil. And NATO will develop collective capacities, including
mobile detection teams, mobile expert response teams, and vaccine
stockpiles.
We agreed
to set up a NATO Response Force. This NRF will give the Alliance a
high-readiness capability. It will help us to ensure that military
transformation is a transatlantic exercise. And it will ensure that
military responses across the crisis spectrum can engage all
Allies.
At Prague,
we also committed to enhance and modernise our overall military
capabilities. For NATO itself, that meant a new streamlined and
flexible command structure. For NATO's members, it meant hard and
fast commitments by Heads of State and Government to make specific
improvements, within clear time-frames, to their national forces.
These
improvements cover the key capabilities that have shown their worth in
the very different theatres of the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq:
long-range lift; protection against weapons of mass destruction; modern
command and control; and precision-guided munitions. I am delighted
to say that nations are already delivering on these Prague Capabilities
Commitments.
I welcome
for example the German initiative on strategic airlift, which Minister
Struck is carrying forward with great vigour, so that 12 nations were
able to sign a letter of intent at this month's NATO Defence Ministers'
meeting.
In short,
the Prague Summit last November demonstrated an emerging new
transatlantic security consensus. The Iraq crisis suspended this
new consensus for a while. But it did not eclipse it. The
transatlantic consensus is still there. It is growing. And it
allows NATO to enter this Third Chapter of its evolution with
confidence.
What are
the major features of Chapter Three?
There is,
first and foremost, a functional understanding of security, as
opposed to the geographical understanding prevalent during the
earlier incarnations of NATO.
Geography
is no protection from the spillover effect of
21st century challenges. Afghanistan
under the Taliban exported instability to its neighbours, drugs to
Europe, and terrorism and refugees throughout the world. To argue
that this country is too far away to be of concern to us would be a
tremendous mistake.
The
scale of threats has also increased. Today, terrorism is
more international, more apocalyptic in its vision, and far more lethal
than before. Terrorists have no territory that can be seized, or
army that can be defeated on the field of battle. That is why it is
all the more important that they know that there will be no safe havens
for them -- that there will be no sanctuaries.
The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, too, is a global
problem. Despite the best efforts of our diplomats and
counter-proliferation experts, the spread of chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons is a defining security challenge of our new century.
As the
technology of weapons of mass destruction gets ever cheaper and easier to
acquire, we face the prospect of more fingers on more triggers, some
belonging to people who do not respond to traditional deterrents.
This is a
far cry from the threat that brought NATO into existence: defending the
borders of Western Europe against the tank armies of the Warsaw
Pact. But it is a guaranteed supply chain of instability, a
security environment in which threats can strike at any time, without
warning, from anywhere.
We must be
able to respond effectively, on today's terms not yesterday's.
If
terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are global
threats, how can we fight them if we stick to self-imposed geographical
restrictions? If NATO is the best military planning framework in
the world, can we afford not to use it in Afghanistan and Iraq, or
wherever else our fundamental security interests are at stake?
That is
why NATO's recent decision to take the lead of the International Security
Assistance Force in Kabul is so important. With this decision, NATO
has finally shed its "eurocentric" focus.
Yet we
have done so not for theological reasons but because it makes practical
common sense. A NATO lead in ISAF means that we no longer have to
search for a lead nation every six months. This will give the
Afghans and their neighbours the sense that we are there for the long
haul. And it gives the remnants of the Taliban and of Al Qaida the
sense that their game is definitively over.
Shortly
after the ISAF decision, NATO took yet another pragmatic step into the
21st century. It agreed to provide
planning and other support for Poland as it prepared to take on command
of one of the divisions which will help bring stability to post conflict
Iraq.
For me, it
was striking that this once unthinkable decision now appears quite
natural. And that NATO Ministers can debate seriously the
possibility of a more direct Alliance role in Iraq, or even the Middle
East, without storms of theological protest.
Of course,
these missions are dangerous, and no one harbours any illusions about the
time and commitment it will take to make them succeed.
Three
weeks ago in Kabul, four German peacekeepers were killed and many more
injured in a suicide attack. I express my sincere condolences to
the victims and their families. We will honour their exceptional
commitment to the cause of peace and freedom -- in the only way such
commitment can and should be honoured: by continuing to do our job, until
that job is done.
A
willingness to take on new missions beyond Europe will be a key feature
of the new NATO. But mere willingness will not get us far if we
lack the capabilities to back up our policies. That is why military
capabilities must be part and parcel of our Chapter Three NATO.
There is
much good news. The first elements of the NATO Response Force will be up
and running by October. Two weeks ago, at the Defence Ministers
meeting in Brussels, we agreed on the radical overhaul of our military
command arrangements. The new structure has no more Cold War in it.
It is leaner and meaner, smaller and more flexible, with a new command
dedicated explicitly to transformation. And we were able to reach
agreement in just 9 months a record time.
Does this
mean that I am easing off on my call for capabilities, capabilities,
capabilities? Of course not. There is still much to be
done. All of the commitments made at Prague need to be implemented
vigorously.
As
Secretary General of NATO, I cannot force nations to spend more money on
defence. But I have a few tricks up my sleeve. Recently, I
decided to do what a teacher does to motivate his class: to give
them a score card. In other words, I graded the progress made by
nations in meeting the goals they agreed to at Prague.
I am happy
to say that work on precision guided munitions got 10 out of 10, and the
consortium on strategic airlift, led by Germany, got 8 out of 10.
That is pretty good. But on vital NATO ground surveillance and on
equally essential combat support I only gave 3s.
This is
still too uneven a picture. And that is bad for transatlantic
unity. How can Europeans complain about US unilateralism when they
cannot bring serious capabilities to the table?
NATO
enters the Third Chapter in its evolution, capabilities will therefore
be -- more than ever before -- the ultimate litmus test of
this Alliance.
A third
characteristic of the new NATO will be its strategic partnership with the
European Union. After years of hard work we have finally set the
stage for NATO to support EU-led operations by agreeing on what is called
the "Berlin plus" arrangements. This will allow the EU gradually to
do more to share our common security lead, including in the Balkans, and
to become an effective security actor. This is in everyone's
interest. It allows for more equitable burden-sharing and,
therefore, a better balanced and more sustainable transatlantic
relationship.
Last
Saturday, I took part in the EU's Balkan Summit at Thessaloniki.
This was an important demonstration of how far NATO and the EU have come
together in producing practical improvements in security and
stability.
We must
now build on this success and on the Berlin plus framework. That
means using the linkages so painstakingly agreed to cooperate across the
whole spectrum of shared interests, including terrorism, capabilities and
consequence management, not just on Balkan crisis management.
It means
putting real flesh on the bones of the Strategic Partnership enshrined in
December 2000 at Nice, not reverting to the theology of so-called
"autonomy". It means no unnecessary duplication of resources,
efforts or headquarters. And yes, for those of you who know
Brussels, that does mean that I am querying the need for a second white
elephant in Tervuren.
NATO's
Strategic Partnership with the EU shows that the relationship between
Europe and North America is changing. But these changes will not
mean we are drifting apart. Far from it. We have a
shared vision of the threats that we face in the
21st century, a determination to work
together not only within Europe, but beyond it and a shared
determination to build modern, effective military capabilities.
These are
the ingredients of a new, reborn transatlantic cooperation. Of
course, like any birth, it is marked by some struggle, some pain, and a
little mess but it will be well worth it in the end.`
The fourth
feature of NATO Chapter Three will be closer relations with our
neighbours and Partner countries. In the Balkans as well as in
Afghanistan, soldiers of many Partner countries are working side-by-side
with NATO troops. This demonstrates the enormous strategic value
that these Partnerships have acquired.
NATO-Russia
relations also made a quantum leap last year, after we set up the new
NATO-Russia Council. This is one of NATO's greatest success
stories, but one that still too few people know about. Once upon a
time, Russia was seen as part of the problem. Now Russia is
becoming part of the solution.
Ladies and
Gentlemen
For those
who have always equated NATO with tanks massed along the inner-German
border, the roles I just outlined for the Alliance may seem
over-ambitious. But they are not.
Twelve
years ago a NATO official argued that the Alliance had to take global
developments into account. He did not share the view that what was
happening in faraway regions concerned only those Allies with particular
links to these regions. He argued that "less today than ever
before can we see Alliance security as something that stops at our
borders".
That NATO
official was, of course, Manfred Wörner. So I have no doubt that he
would approve of NATO's course today.
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