05 June 2003
Bolton Says Some Weapons Transfers Continue in OSCE States
(Sees positive non-proliferation efforts by most OSCE members) (2700)
Despite positive efforts by members of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to control the spread of weapons of
mass destruction, serious problems remain and threatening transfers
continue to occur, says the State Department's top arms control
official.
"OSCE member states have taken on special commitments to act together
toward the goal of nonproliferation, and their compliance in this
regard is of utmost importance to global security," John Bolton, under
secretary of state for arms control and international security, said
June 5 during a hearing of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. The
commission held the hearing to determine if any of the 55 states in
the OSCE have supplied arms to rogue regimes in violation of
nonproliferation obligations.
Bolton said that despite efforts by the countries over the past
decade, the record is mixed on enforcement.
"There have been some notable success stories -- countries that, with
U.S. assistance, have improved their export control systems," he said.
"On the other hand, there have been instances of OSCE member states
aiding rogue nations in acquiring sensitive or dual-use materials that
can be used toward nefarious ends."
Bolton told the U.S. Helsinki Commission -- which is an independent
U.S. federal agency charged with monitoring progress in implementing
provisions of the Helsinki Accords -- that there was little he could
discuss in an open, unclassified hearing dealing with individual
weapons transfers.
"Of the 55 states participating in the OSCE, only a small number have
been the source of the vast majority of the transfers we are talking
about," he said. "And of that number, there are some with which we
have made important progress, and some where progress has been
seriously disappointing."
Bolton told the commission that the United States' primary vehicle for
export control assistance efforts is the State Department's Export
Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (EXBS).
"The EXBS program was created to help address the proliferation
concerns primarily in the former Soviet states and neighboring
countries in Central Europe. But in light of the global nature of the
proliferation threat, we have expanded the program to include
potential WMD source countries in South Asia and key
transit/transshipment countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,"
Bolton said.
"We currently have active programs in 29 OSCE countries, each of which
is covered by one of the 20 EXBS program advisors serving overseas at
U.S. Embassies."
Bolton said that while the EXBS program has produced many successes,
some OSCE countries still need additional assistance in developing
legal frameworks and expanded enforcement capabilities. Among those,
he cited, are Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, largely because they
have retained significant numbers of WMD materials and expertise from
the Soviet era.
Following is the text of Bolton's prepared remarks:
(begin text)
Hearing: Arming Rogue Regimes: The Role of OSCE Participating States
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
June 05, 2003
Mr. John Robert Bolton
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
U.S. Department of State
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to
appear before the Helsinki Commission to discuss the progress of OSCE
member states in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
OSCE member states have taken on special commitments to act together
toward the goal of nonproliferation, and their compliance in this
regard is of utmost importance to global security.
OSCE Commitments
A variety of useful OSCE statements and efforts of the Helsinki
Commission can be highlighted that advance positive nonproliferation
policies and efforts.
In 1992, members reiterated their commitment to the "prevention of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of
missile technology" in the Prague Declaration on Non-Proliferation and
Arms Transfers.
In 1994 in Budapest, the OSCE resolved to promote and strengthen
multilateral regimes such as the BWC, the CWC, the NPT and the IAEA,
and affirmed "their commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons; to prevent the acquisition, development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemical and biological weapons; to control
the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction and their components and technology."
And the 2002 Porto Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism
reaffirmed the importance of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation and noted member states' contribution to reducing
the risk of terrorists gaining access to weapons and materials of mass
destruction and their means of delivery.
As encouraging as these declarations are, they are worth no more than
the paper they are printed on if member states do not take the
commitments spelled out within them seriously. And in this respect, I
must report that the record is mixed. There have been some notable
success stories -- countries that, with U.S. assistance, have improved
their export control systems. On the other hand, there have been
instances of OSCE member states aiding rogue states in acquiring
sensitive or dual-use materials that can be used toward nefarious
ends.
Strengthening Export Controls
The United States' primary vehicle for export control assistance
efforts, which has made significant progress toward meeting
nonproliferation objectives for many of the OSCE participating States,
is the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance (EXBS) Program. The EXBS program was created to help
address the proliferation concerns primarily in the former Soviet
states and neighboring countries in Central Europe. But in light of
the global nature of the proliferation threat, we have expanded the
program to include potential WMD source countries in South Asia and
key transit/transshipment countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle
East.
We currently have active programs in 29 OSCE countries, each of which
is covered by one of the 20 EXBS program advisors serving overseas at
U.S. Embassies. In a number of countries, officials trained by the
EXBS program or using EXBS program-provided equipment have seized
sensitive goods or weapons components bound for programs of concern.
U.S. export control assistance is largely responsible for over a dozen
European and Eurasian countries adopting comprehensive export control
laws that meet international standards. I should also mention that the
Department of Defense has its Congressionally-mandated International
Counterproliferation Program (ICP), which is coordinated with EXBS and
focuses on counterproliferation training and equipment provision in
the Former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe, and the Baltics.
Although the EXBS program has produced many successes, a number of
OSCE countries still need additional assistance to develop appropriate
legal frameworks and increase enforcement capabilities to combat the
transfers of sensitive goods and technologies. Among them:
Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have retained significant WMD
materials and expertise from the Soviet era. The EXBS program
continues to work with these countries to enhance enforcement
capabilities and promote industry compliance with national laws.
Countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus are high-risk transit and
smuggling routes from source countries. We continue to work with them
to build effective legal control and enhance border control
capabilities.
Certain Mediterranean countries handle a significant volume of
transshipment trade that has not historically been subject to
effective control.
The Balkan states are main transit routes from the countries of the
former Soviet Union to Europe, and recent arms transfers have
highlighted the critical need to strengthen their export control
policies and procedures.
In a more narrow context, we have specific concerns about the
proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANDPADS) and have
initiated a worldwide effort to dramatically reduce the risk of
MANPADS falling into the hands of terrorists. This initiative was
first presented to the G-8 and members of the Wassenaar Arrangement in
January 2003. During the June 1-2 G-8 Summit all Partners agreed to:
provide assistance and technical expertise for the destruction of
excess MANPADS; adopt stringent national export controls on MANPADS
and their essential components; ban transfers to non-state actors;
exchange information on uncooperative countries and entities; and
examine for new MANPADS the feasibility of adding specific technical
performance or launch control features that preclude their
unauthorized use. We have also presented this initiative at the ASEAN
regional forum in March 2003. The OSCE offers a forum to bring the
MANPADS initiative agreed by the G-8 Partners to all 55 OSCE
countries.
Curbing Illicit Transfers
Notwithstanding those efforts, and the efforts of like-minded
governments, serious problems remain and threatening transfers
continue to occur. Mr. Chairman, as you know well, there is going to
be relatively little I can say here in an unclassified setting about
individual transfers.
Of the 55 states participating in the OSCE, only a small number have
been the source of the vast majority of the transfers we are talking
about. And of that number, there are some with which we have made
important progress. And some where progress has been seriously
disappointing.
Progress is particularly evident in many parts of Eastern Europe.
Since early 2001, coordinated diplomacy, information-sharing, and
assistance to strengthen border security and export control mechanisms
have led to significant strides in interdicting or preventing weapons
transfers from Eastern Europe and the Balkans to Iraq and other rogue
states. Our efforts with Albania, the Baltics, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovenia, and Slovakia have developed into effective partnerships,
buttressed by cooperation from traditional allies such as the UK,
Canada, Spain, Germany and Italy.
Serbia and Montenegro offers a specific case of very recent and
concrete progress. As has been reported publicly, there is clear
evidence that the Orao aviation firm, in cooperation with the firm
Yugoimport, was involved in arms transfers and sensitive assistance to
Iraq. Under sustained diplomatic pressure following the disclosures,
Belgrade has agreed to cooperate fully and transparently in examining
military links between Yugoslav defense-industrial entities and Iraq
(and also with other countries of concern). The Government of Serbia
and Montenegro dismissed the director of Yugoimport and a deputy
Minister of Defense in October 2002. U.S. experts visited Belgrade in
late 2002 to confer on nonproliferation and export controls. Belgrade
also has appointed a high-level commission to review current laws
regulating arms sales, explore converting military industrial
production to peaceful uses, and scrutinize Serbia and Montenegro's
military cooperation with other countries. We will continue to work
with the government in Belgrade to assist in its implementation of
these laws and help it abide by its commitments.
In the case of Russia, I personally have engaged senior officials in
order to convince its government of the need to play a responsible
role in solving nonproliferation problems. Russia is showing growing
recognition of the seriousness of our concerns -- particularly
regarding Iran's developing nuclear capability. But we do remain
concerned that the nuclear and missile programs of Iran, and others,
continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise.
Iran, considered the most active state sponsor of terror, is known to
be seeking dual-use materials, technology and expertise for its
offensive biological and chemical weapons programs from entities in
Russia as well as other countries. It is also seeking to upgrade its
large ballistic missile force with the help of Russian, North Korean
and Chinese firms. We have imposed sanctions, under various
nonproliferation laws and other legal authorities, on Russian entities
for providing assistance to Iran and other state sponsors of
terrorism.
On a more positive note, in 2002, we and the Russians agreed to a New
Strategic Framework that covers the issues of strategic offensive and
defensive systems, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. Within
the last several years, Russia has adopted comprehensive export
control legislation, incorporating advice from U.S. experts as well as
criminal and civil penalties for export control violations. It is up
to the Russians themselves, however, to demonstrate the will and the
capability to fully enforce this law over a sustained period of time.
That said, while there are serious concerns that must be discussed and
addressed regarding continued proliferation by some Russian entities,
we continue to pursue robust relations with Russia, and view the
context of our overall bilateral relationship as positive.
Although Western European countries maintain rigorous and effective
export controls on WMD and missile-related goods and materials,
proliferators and associated networks nonetheless continue to seek
machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely
available material, scientific equipment, and specialty metals.
Western countries also are an important source for the proliferation
of WMD-related information and training.
Regarding Ukraine, we have had serious discussions of, conducted a
policy review in response to, and sent a joint US/UK team to Kiev to
investigate, allegations of a possible transfer of the Kolchuga
passive detection system to Iraq. Although the issue of whether a
transfer took place was never resolved, the policy review concluded
that continued engagement with Ukraine was in the interest of the
United States, including engagement on proliferation issues. In the
wake of the review, we shifted some FY03 assistance to Ukraine away
from the central government and to programs that more directly promote
democratic reform with special emphasis on media freedom, while
preserving programs critical to U.S. national security, including
nonproliferation assistance.
Belarus is one of the least responsive OSCE member states, and has
done little to show it is serious about nonproliferation. We raised
allegations of arms transfers by Belarus with that government in
February 2002, reiterating the U.S. position that Belarus should not
be in the business of selling arms to countries with histories of
supporting terrorism or fomenting regional conflict. We stressed that,
if Belarus genuinely wanted to improve its image and end its
self-imposed isolation, it needed to make the right choices on these
issues. We have no direct government-to-government assistance programs
(aside from periodic exchanges) with the Government of Belarus.
One final example illustrates the difficulties between government will
and the challenge posed by unscrupulous entities. The Government of
Moldova has taken positive steps in the area of nonproliferation,
although its legal and export control systems are still developing. At
the same time, in May 2002, the United States imposed missile
proliferation sanctions on two Moldovan entities, Cuanta S.A. and
Computer & Comunicatii SRL, and a Moldovan national Mikhail Vladov,
pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. The sanctions were
imposed for the knowing involvement in the transfer of equipment and
technology controlled under Category II of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Annex, that contributed to MTCR-class (Category
I) missile programs in Iran. These same transfers also required recent
sanctions under the separate missile sanctions law.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11, 2001, changed the public
understanding of the nature of the security threat we face, and
highlighted for all the potential threats from weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of rogue states and terrorist organizations.
Still, the degree to which the international community has undertaken
to fundamentally address the threats posed by proliferation of WMD and
the means to deliver them remains uncertain. The Administration will
adhere to the dictum that actions speak louder than words, and will
not assume that a country's membership in multilateral regimes
automatically constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions and
commitment to enforce fully the requirements of these agreements and
regimes.
The maintenance of a functioning multilateral system to curb
proliferation will require responsible parties to demand full
compliance, and to advance credible enforcement responses when faced
with violations of legal obligations. If the international community
is truly serious about these treaties, common agreement on enforcement
mechanisms should cover a range of options from diplomatic actions to,
in some cases, multilateral sanctions.
The United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in both
bilateral and multilateral fora to stem the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, including robust
enforcement of U.S. nonproliferation laws. As always, the United
States will reserve its right to take whatever steps are necessary to
protect and defend our interest and eliminate the threats posed by
those who seek to develop and use weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I am available to answer any questions you
may have.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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