Q: There is a report in Vanity Fair
today that just quoted you as saying that the
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was just
a bureaucratic reason. Can you respond
to that?
Wolfowitz: No, it’s a
misquote. In fact, the full quote you
can see on our website where the whole
interview is there. What I was trying
to explain – there’s a
complicated situation. We had, in fact,
three concerns about Iraq, from the
beginning, and it’s repeated in Colin
Powell’s statement in the UN. One
was weapons of mass destruction, about which
I’ve never seen as unanimous a view in
the intelligence community on almost any
issue. Second was the Iraqi connection
with terrorism, about which there is a range
of views, although everyone agrees that there
is a connection there. And the third
was Iraq’s mistreatment of its people,
which has unfortunately never been in any
doubt. But in many ways, it’s the
first two reasons that were crucial, and as I
said in that interview, there is really a
fourth reason, which is that connection
between weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism. That’s the axis the
President originally was talking about in his
State of Union message, is that connection
between terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. It’s complicated,
it’s not a simple issue, but when
people say our rationale keeps changing, its
not that keeps changing. We’ve
had all three of those reasons from the
beginning but people who often choose to
focus exclusively on the weapons of mass
destruction piece of it.
Q: Even this article seems to highlight
the distrust that’s around that.
The perception seems to be that weapons mass
destruction was an excuse to move in.
How did you respond –
Wolfowitz: I can tell you quite
emphatically it was not an excuse. What
really changed in our whole perception of
this issue was September 11. Before
September 11 terrorism was viewed as
something ugly, but you lived with it.
Saddam Hussein was viewed as something ugly,
something that was for the Iraqi people to
take care of. After September 11,
terrorism looked different. Saddam
Hussein, who played with terrorists, and had
weapons of mass destruction, looked much more
threatening to United States than just to his
own people. And so it changed the
calculation entirely. I mean, without
that perception of threat, I don’t
believe the President would have considered
it something that American lives should be
risked for, as terrible as the regime is -- I
mean there is no question the regime was a
horrible thing.
Q: The fact that there hasn’t
been substantial cache of weapons of mass
destruction -- is that an embarrassment?
Wolfowitz: No. Is it an
embarrassment to people on the other side
that we’ve discovered these biological
production vans, which the defector told us
about? Look, this dictator had twelve
years to develop innumerable ways to hide his
program, and we’ve said from the
beginning, the only way you get to the bottom
of it is when people start to talk to
you. That’s why we gave the UN
inspectors unprecedented powers to interview
people. I think it’s evidence in
itself that Saddam never allowed a single one
of scientists to go outside the country for
interview. In fact he never allowed a
single one of them to be interviewed in the
country without monitors present or at least
tape recorders present. So he was a man
with something to hide, and we’ll have
to find it.
Q: What kind of repercussions do you
think this will have now, in the Arab world
and in Southeast Asia?
Wolfowitz: I heard from one Arab
foreign minister that it’s a shame that
we weren’t able to do this for
ourselves, but it had to be done and thank
heavens you did it. This is an Arab
official. I think in the Arab world it
was actually not a surprise that thousands of
mass graves turned up. I think the Arab
people understand that this man was
responsible for killing more Muslims than I
think any other single individual and there
is an opportunity now to build a much better
Arab society and to demonstrate to the rest
of the world that Arabs are capable of
democracy. I believe they are.
Q: And yet at the same time as the
Senior Minister said last night, there also
seems to be a growing concern and in some
nations a fear that the US will go it
alone. Senior Minister Lee kind of
chided the US a little bit last night.
Wolfowitz: I found it surprising
frankly. Why don’t you chide
President Chirac for going it alone?
There were 15 NATO nations on our side and
France had Belgium and Luxemburg and Germany
with it, in what seemed frankly like a rather
cynical disregard of facts and disregard of
the suffering of the Iraqi people. In
all of this discussion about multilateral,
unilateral, we had 46 countries with
us. But more importantly, and I would
say we had 95% of the 20 million Iraqi people
with us and their voices ought to count for
something.
Q: So you don’t see it as a
unilateral action at all, do you?
Wolfowitz: No, I don’t. In
fact we had more international legal sanction
I think for what we did than for the action
in Kosovo that NATO did a few years ago, and
no one disputed that.
Q: How do you respond to things like
the Senior Minister and what other diplomats
have said?
Wolfowitz: First of all, to say that we
had a coalition of 46 countries, that we
weren’t acting unilaterally, that the
time came that some action had to be
taken. Frankly, it was I think
France’s action that has weakened the
United Nations. We’ve seen in
times past in history when the failure to
come together to act is terribly damaging to
the international community. And I
think we were acting not just in behalf of
our own interest, although our own interests
were definitely involved, but I think we had
very major regard (inaudible) quite
significantly. We had all the support
that we needed in the region. None of
the terrible things that people said were
going to happen -- there weren’t
terrible mass casualties in Iraq, there
wasn’t a food crisis or refugees
crisis. We, I think, did a lot to take
care of the concerns that people had.
Q: What about Iran? What policy
will the U.S. pursue?
Wolfowitz: We have concerns about
Iran. It’s sort of actually a
welcome development that our concern about
Iran’s nuclear program is now finally
being shared by other countries that were
dismissive about that concern for a long
time. We have a big concern about Al
Qaeda in Iran. We are not quite sure
whether the Iranians hold them or don’t
hold them or what they are going to do with
them if they are holding them. We are
concerned more generally Iran’s support
for terrorism. But I believe that one
of the ways that we can help to influence
Iran to a different kind of policy is by
getting things right in Iraq, because the
example of a free and democratic Iraq I think
is going to increase the pressure the Iranian
regime already feels to its own people and
that’s a good thing.
Q: Is the threat of military action a
possibility in Iraq?
Wolfowitz: You know, I think you know,
we never rule out that kind of thing.
But let me put it this way. I think the
most effective way we have to persuade the
Iranian regime to change is the fact that
some 75 percent of the Iranian people voted
few years ago for a different
government. They didn’t get the
government they voted for, but nevertheless
this is a regime that is susceptible I think
to some extent to pressure from its own
people.
Q: The thoughts of Senior Minister Lee
have been mirrored often by other Muslim
leaders in Southeast Asia, by the Indonesian,
by the Malaysians. And within the
Muslim world, it seems to be amplifying into
a paranoia that the U.S. is going to attack
and pick them out one by one.
I’ve heard that said also. How do
you respond to something like that –
this growing paranoia in the Muslim world
that the U.S. with its power can pick them
out one by one?
Wolfowitz: I think there are many
Muslims, like the foreign minister I referred
to earlier, including many Arabs, who welcome
the positive change in Iraq. They wish
that they had been able to do it and
didn’t need us to do it. But they
don’t see it as “picking
off.” They see it as liberating a
major important Arab people. I do think
it is important to make progress now in the
Arab-Israeli issue. That is something
that will do a great deal to balance the
concerns that we are one-sided and that we
only worry about one kind of
justice.
I
think it is very important also to see this
Iraq thing through to success, and while
we’ve had some spectacular gains --
it’s barely two months since the war
began, let’s remember that -- there is
a lot of work to be done. I think those
are two very positive contributions that
when, if we can achieve them, I think the
whole issue will look different. Nobody
likes war. It’s not a pretty
thing. It’s only compared to mass
graves and the kind of terror that Saddam
Hussein was putting forward that you can say
it’s the lesser of two evils.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Well we have an opportunity
now. The President is meeting in Sharm
El Sheikh, I think Monday, with leaders of
three Arab countries and with Prime Minister
Sharon and the Prime Minister of the
Palestinian Authority, and then he’ll
go on to Aqaba to meet with just the Israeli
and Palestinian.
There is a new atmosphere there. There
was a new atmosphere there, it’s worth
remembering, in 1991 after the defeat of
Saddam Hussein that I think is what opened
the way to the Madrid conference, opened the
way to the Oslo agreements, which were two of
the most positive steps that we have seen in
that process.
Removing the neighborhood bully has got to
improve the environment. But also the
United States now goes into this with a
credibility we didn’t have
before. And I think that’s going
to make a difference for everybody.
Q: Do you think that that is the source
that fueled a lot of the extremism? Do
you agree with that analysis of it? The
Middle East?
Wolfowitz: I think it’s
overstated. There’s no question
that if fuels extremism. But the idea
that if you take that away, none of the
funding of Madrases would take place –
nonsense. None of the hatred of the
United States would be there –
nonsense. In fact, let’s be
clear, if you read Bin Laden’s
proclamations, the thing that he most
complained about was the presence of American
forces in Saudi Arabia as part of the
containment of Iraq. So that I believe
is progress also -- that the Saudis have no
longer have to carry the burden of large
American forces on their territory, bombing
Iraq almost daily, to support a containment
policy that was failing.
Q: But wasn’t the U.S. in its own
way supporting the Saudis who were also
exporting Wahabism. Isn’t that
going to be changing?
Wolfowitz: Well, it doesn’t mean
we are supporting the Saudi export of
Wahabism. It does mean there are worse
things than the government in Saudi Arabia,
and we certainly didn’t want to see it
taken over by a hostile neighbor. I
believe in fact that the bombing that took
place in Riyadh about two weeks ago, ten days
ago, was a kind of wake-up call for Saudi
Arabia just as I believe Bali was a wake up
call for Indonesia, and 9-11 was a wake up
call for us. And while the terrorists
achieved a certain, from their point of view,
tactical success, I think it was a strategic
failure and I think the Saudis are much more
serious now but dealing with their own
problems than they were before. And
they have a much freer climate to do it
because Saddam Hussein isn’t over their
shoulder and the Americans aren’t on
their doorstep.
Q: In Southeast Asia, there has been a
lot of arrests over the last month.
Intelligence reports are saying that there
were really two main places Al Qaeda
operatives fled to post-Afghanistan -- there
were five areas where Al Qaeda was operating
– but two main places – the Horn
of Africa and southeast Asia, southeast Asia
having the most Al Qaeda operatives coming in
here. How large of a threat remains
here in your perception?
Wolfowitz: It’s hard to know
because if we knew it, we’d pick them
up. So we are guessing about what we
know we don’t know. And by the
way you have to count Pakistan and Iran as
two other major places. And
northeastern Iraq, by the way, which is no
longer a sanctuary. So it wasn’t
one place.
My
sense of the Al Qaeda problem here is that it
was more indigenous, not so much that people
fled from Afghanistan into southeast Asia,
but that the penetration into southeast Asia
was more extensive than we had understood at
least before 9-11, and in some ways we first
started to get an inkling it from materials
we captured from Afghanistan that led us to
that group in Singapore and those
arrests.
But
Bali brought home just how bad it is
here. The fact it is doesn’t take
more than a few hundred people of that kind,
in a country if 200 million to create a
serious problem. But I’m very
impressed by the professionalism with which
the Indonesian police gone after the Bali
bombers. I think there is a new spirit
in Indonesia. The Philippines and
Malaysia and Thailand were already quite
serious and of course Singapore -- well they
were a little shocked that terrorists could
be even in this nice tightly controlled
little country.
We
are not going to eliminate terrorists
overnight or with one magic bullet but I do
believe that the last year has been much more
a series of defeats for them with minor
tactical successes here and there.
Q: Despite that there has been a lot
said about Indonesia doing a lot to dismantle
the network, but the network still
remains. As late as April you still
have JI and Al Qaeda still meeting in
Indonesia. I guess from you, a sense of
how this network that’s here, JI, how
large a threat of --
Wolfowitz: Look, there are still
terrorists operating in United States and in
the UK and in Europe. Particularly I
think in democratic countries, it takes time,
and you have legal restrictions on what you
can do and political constraints on what you
can do, and even in less democratic countries
these people go underground. So
that’s why our President had said from
the beginning it isn't going to be long war,
it’s not going to be won with one
victory in Afghanistan or a second one in
Iraq. It’s not going to be won
just by arresting 3,000 people, although we
have done that. It’s going to
take time and I do believe it’s also
important during that time that we build up
the positive forces.
Q: Redeployment of U.S. troops.
Looking at the threat, and then bringing the
troops. Where in Southeast Asia are we
looking at? We know they are coming to
the Philippines, but where --
Wolfowitz: No they are not. Here
is the basic thing. We are looking at
our military posture worldwide including in
the United States, Congress has given us
authority and it’s not easy to get that
authority to do a base realignment and
closure commission in the United States
starting in 2005. That's a big
thing. We are doing it in United
States, we are doing it worldwide, because we
have to figure out how to make the most
effective use of our military forces. I
know we have a lot, but the requirements are
large as well, and the threat has
changed. The threat turns up in places
in the world we had never imagined we’d
be in before.
But
the technology has changed also, and allows
us to do things with an efficiency and an
effectiveness and a reach that didn't exist
when we set up many of these bases. So
we need to approach our posture
differently. But some of these
announcements in the press that come if
anything from some ninth level bureaucrat,
and I'm not even sure that it came from
there.
We
are not about to move our Marines from
Okinawa to Australia -- that's wrong.
We are not about to base forces in the
Philippines -- that's wrong. And in any
case we are not going to make any of these
changes without consulting with our Congress
and consulting with our allies and our
friends in this part of the world. So,
the general principle is correct, most of the
details that I have read or either inaccurate
or extremely premature.
Q: What are the key ideas that are
going to motivate this new change?
Wolfowitz: I think there are really
three things. One, that we can do
things at long range with precision in a way
that was never possible before.
Secondly, the same sort of internet
revolution that you can see on your home
computer brings together disparate forces
with an effectiveness that never existed
before. But the third thing is that the
threat is so dispersed that you need a kind
of mobility and flexibility in how you move
your forces around.
It’s very different from old Cold War
posture in Germany, where you thought you
knew exactly what the Soviet war plan was,
and exactly what you had to do to meet it, or
the threat you face on the Korean
Peninsula. Those are very fixed, they
are very calculable. You need a very
big force in place to deal with them.
The new threats are unpredictable, widely
dispersed, and what you may need is a much
smaller force, much more quickly.
Q: There is a growing paranoia or fear
among the Muslim nations that the U.S. power,
will result in them getting picked off one by
one. How do you respond to that?
Wolfowitz: I think by my count, seven
times in the last ten years or so, U.S.
military forces have gone into harm’s
way to rescue people from aggression or from
ethic cleansing or from war-induced
famine. I'm thinking about Kuwait, I'm
thinking about northern Iraq after the Gulf
War, I'm thinking about Somalia, I'm thinking
about Bosnia, I'm thinking about
Kosovo. I'm thinking of
Afghanistan. I'm thinking
Iraq.
All
seven of those countries were majority Muslim
populations. We were there helping
Muslims who were suffering, not because they
were Muslims, but because our interests were
engaged and because in many cases our moral
impulses were engaged as well. I think
what we're trying to accomplish in Iraq is to
help the Iraqi people build a free and
democratic country which I think will have a
powerful political effect throughout the
Muslim world and the Arab world. Not
all change is accomplished by the use of
force.
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