Takahashi: Thank you Mr.
Secretary. First of all let me ask you
about the Iraqi reconstruction process.
Now there is intense discussion in Japanese
Diet about how can we help the Iraqi people
by sending not just money but also personnel,
like Japanese Self Defense Force.
Now, would you give us a sense from your
point of view what contribution that Japanese
Self Defense Force can make to stabilize the
situation in that country without engaging in
combat situation?
Wolfowitz: There are I think a variety
of tasks, and of course the recent resolution
of the UN Security Council I think also opens
the way to encouraging all members of the
international community to contribute to the
stabilization and it’s really
construction. You know, the war
didn’t damage Iraq but 30 years of this
dictator has really set them back a long
way. And I think there are a variety of
things that Japanese peacekeepers could do
from simply providing a stabilizing presence
in areas that are not any longer hostile or
providing medical support in parts of the
country, helping to train the Iraqi police
and security forces. So there’s I
think going to be right now, there are parts
of the country where we’re still
engaged in something that has to be called
combat but there are other parts of the
country where it’s already quite
peaceful and I think there would be many
roles for Japanese peacekeepers.
Takahashi: But would you specify what
kind of activities are helpful from US point
of view?
Wolfowitz: Medical units, engineer
units, simply the kinds of peacekeepers, I
think that for example Japan sent to East
Timor. That will undoubtedly be helpful
in parts of Iraq. I believe, but
I’m not sure about this, that you have
a liaison officer who works with Central
Command, and we’re really waiting to
hear what kinds of discussions come through
military channels. We really need the
experts to sit down and talk with one
another. But certainly a Japanese
contribution would be very positive and very
welcome.
Takahashi: Second question is the
rebalancing of US defense posture in the
region and the LA Times story. But
would you tell us where exactly we are in the
discussion into rebalancing the US forces in
the region especially in Okinawa. Is it
one of your options to reduce the heavy
burden that Okinawa?
Wolfowitz: Well, first of all, while
there’s a certain general truth in the
LA Times story, many of the specifics are
sensational and not accurate, particularly
the idea that we’re about to remove our
Marines from Okinawa and move them to
Australia. That has no foundation that
I’m aware of, in any serious
discussion. Obviously, we’ve been
working for some time with your government,
with the people of Okinawa, to find ways to
reduce the burden there. We’ll
continue to work in that direction. We
haven’t made any decisions beyond where
we are already, and I think the important
thing now is actually implementing some plans
that we already have developed with your
government.
Takahashi: Mr. Secretary, a month ago,
Secretary Rumsfeld said that he talked about
US forces in the Korean peninsula, and of
course of the DMZ, and he tried to more
(inaudible) or more air oriented and sea
oriented, and that that kind of discussion
and impression for Japanese that the United
States have been thinking about to increase
the presence in Okinawa.
Wolfowitz: No, it’s rather,
we’re still doing our thinking, so I
don’t want to say that we’ve come
to conclusions. But the thinking
I’ve seen about Korea involves
rationalizing our posture in Korea, not
shifting our posture from Korea to
Japan. I think in fact in some ways it
would be to give our posture in Korea a
little bit more of the character that it
already has in Japan, which is not so focused
on heavy ground force deployments and a bit
more outward looking, a bit more of a
maritime orientation.
Takahashi: And fifth question is North
Korea. This morning you sounded a
little soft spoken (laughter).
I’m sorry to say that nobody expect
that Mr. Kim Jong Il suddenly become a
reformer like Deng Xiao Ping in communist
China. Why don’t we seek a regime
change in that country like we did in Iraq
and if not, why can’t US give the North
Koreans the security guarantee they
ask? That non-aggression pact or some
such kind of guarantee.
Wolfowitz: Well, I’m not quite
sure what anyone thinks that by itself is
going to accomplish. It’s not --
if we were talking about it in the context of
the kind of major change that I talked about,
there are many things that could be on the
table, but if take a view that North
Korea’s never going to change, that Kim
Jong Il will continue to rule the country and
continue to pursue the insane policies
he’s pursuing, then it’s hard to
see any successful outcome other than that
country increasingly heading towards
collapse. But I think what is essential
is for everyone in North Korea to get a
message that comes not just from the United
States, but from all the regional powers,
that they face a fundamental choice.
Now it’s true, maybe there are only a
few people in North Korea who have any
ability to make that choice, but I think the
clearer it can be presented to them including
to Kim Jong Il, the better chance there is of
a peaceful outcome and I think we all want to
see a peaceful outcome because war in Korea
would be quite a terrible thing.
Takahashi: But if they were to escalate
the situation again, would you specify that
what is the additional step that we can make
to stop them from exporting nuclear reactive
materials?
Wolfowitz: Well, there’s a great
deal we can do in that regard. In fact
this wasn’t the purpose of our
operation in Iraq, but we’ve just taken
one customer away from them. There are
a lot of other things that can be done to
prevent the export of those materials and it
will be important, because as I said in my
comments, I think the greatest single danger
posed by what they’re doing is in fact
the potential export. But, look, the
further North Korea goes up this escalatory
road, the further it’s going to have to
climb back down at some point.
They’re not improving their security by
what they do and they’re wasting their
limited national resources and what they need
to understand very clearly, and that message
has to come not just from the United States,
but from Japan and South Korea and Russia and
most of all from China, is that the help that
they are getting now is going to dry up if
they keep going down this road of provocative
behavior.
Takahashi: If I may ask one last bonus
question about missile defense, would you
give us your thoughts on how US-Japan
cooperate to study and developing the missile
defense capability in the near future?
Wolfowitz: Not so long ago people were
saying missile defense was a fantasy and
nothing could be done. We just saw in
the Persian Gulf the enormous advances have
been made in missile defense in just the last
ten years. I remember during the Gulf
War in 1991 when we shot a lot of Patriots at
Scud missiles, but even though we at the time
thought maybe they were being effective, we
realized that afterwards it was not an
effective system. Now we have a more
effective version of the Patriot that can
literally hit a bullet with a bullet, and
we’re increasingly developing the
capability to do that against longer range,
that is to say faster systems.
Takahashi: Is that also then the case
of Japan?
Wolfowitz: I think it’s important
for Japan and Japan is increasingly
threatened by the developments in North
Korea, and we’re not talking about
coping with the kind of very sophisticated
missile threat that the old Soviet Union
presented which probably wasn’t
possible at (inaudible). We’re
talking about something that I think our
technology and your technology co-operatively
should find a way to make a difference.
We’re planning ourselves to have a
deployment in Alaska completed within a
couple of years that will give us a limited
capability against long range missiles and I
think we can find ways to work together with
Japan, if that’s what Japan wants to do
to improve your capabilities.
Takahashi: Thank you.
- END -
