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UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

BURUNDI: Halfway through transitional period, peace remains elusive

BUJUMBURA, 30 May 2003 (IRIN) - The second of two 18-month transitional periods has just begun in Burundi. In a long awaited ceremony, witnessed by leaders and dignitaries from all over Africa, presidential powers were transferred from a Tutsi to a Hutu. The questions are: How much was achieved in the first 18 months? And what is the new president, Domitien Ndayizeye, expected to achieve in his 18 months in power? So far, the most crucial elements of Burundi's peace process - ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed rebel groups - remain unimplemented on the ground. Commentators noted with optimism that the transfer of power was a real step forward, and a sign that promises were beginning to be kept in the Burundian context. The 30 April handover marked the mid-point of the implementation of the Arusha Accord that was signed in 2000, the country's roadmap to peace that was facilitated by former South African president, Nelson Mandela. The date was also symbolic as, for the first time since the 1993 assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye - the event that sparked the decade long civil war - a member of the Hutu majority was ruling Burundi. However, other commentators complained that 30 April merely marked a superficial alteration and little would change for most Burundians, as the political process was moving far faster than the reality on the ground. During Pierre Buyoya's 18-month tenure as president of the transitional government, peace continued to elude Burundi, and the war between the Hutu rebel factions and the government forces intensified. Agathon Rwasa's Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) is yet to enter into ceasefire negotiations with the transitional government, and a 3 December 2002 ceasefire signed between Pierre Nkurunziza's Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) and the government has not held. Amid the continued fighting, civilians continued to suffer at the hands of all the parties involved in the conflict; social infrastructure collapsed, humanitarian agencies struggled to deliver relief and, Burundians said, the country had never been poorer.
Little change with political transition

side from changes at the head, the transfer brought little structural change to the political scene in Burundi. President Ndayizeye made only minor changes to the cabinet that had served under Buyoya, introducing three new ministers from pro-Hutu rebel groups to take part in the next stage of the transitional process. These new additions to the cabinet were Gaspard Kobako, a senior member of the CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, who was appointed minister for public works and equipment; Cyrille Hicintuka, from the Forces nationales de liberation (FNL-PALIPEHUTU) faction led by Alain Mugabarabona, minister for civil service; and Rodolphe Baranyizigiye, from the Front pour la liberation nationale (FROLINA) rebel group led by Joseph Karumba, who was appointed minister for youth, sports and culture. This left Agathon Rwasa's FNL and Pierre Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD still outside the framework of the transitional government for Ndayizeye's 18-month term. FNL still seems a long way from joining the peace process, but in an effort to iron out issues not finalised in the 3 December ceasefire agreement negotiations with Nkurunziza have continued.

Reasons for continued fighting

However, following the FDD's bombardment of Bujumbura in the lead-up to the 30 April handover, and the subsequent successful transfer of power, pressure mounted on CNDD-FDD to clarify its political position. Many analysts saw the continuation of the war, despite the December ceasefire, as a result of wrangling for positions in the transitional government. "The problem that remains is political," a regional analyst who requested anonymity told IRIN. "CNDD-FDD is not prepared to integrate into the existing political framework. They want a new constitution so they can start again from a new agreement." The analyst added, "They are going for very high positions - maybe even the vice-presidency." There was some concern over the 28 March agreement, signed between Buyoya and Ndayizeye to confirm the transfer of presidency, which some observers said left Ndayizeye with his hands tied and saw him devolve the main thrust of negotiating with the rebels to his vice-president, on the grounds that it would be easier for a Tutsi to negotiate with Hutu rebels. However, in the brief period since he has been in office, Ndayizeye himself has taken the lead and actively rekindled negotiations, travelling regionally and repeatedly telling the CNDD-FDD that the door is open for them to participate in national institutions. But Nkurunziza has made it clear that, unlike Ndayikengurukiye's CNDD-FDD faction and Mugarabona's FNL, his group is not prepared to enter into the transitional government just yet. Nkurunziza argues that the lack of implementation of the 3 December ceasefire agreement, and the need to renegotiate the make-up of the transitional government, makes his group's entry into government institutions impossible. "This accord was signed between two belligerents who are the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD movement and these two belligerents have to be treated equally," Nkurunziza told IRIN recently. "If arrangements must be made in the composition of the transitional government, they should be negotiated," he said. "It is out of the question that we adhere to the transitional government. The issue here is to negotiate together the composition of a responsible transitional government," he added. In the weeks following the change of president, it emerged that another regional summit would be called, most probably in the Tanzanian commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, and the CNDD-FDD would get the negotiations they wanted. Pressure has also mounted on Rwasa's FNL, the only remaining pro-Hutu movement yet to sign a ceasefire with the government, to at least enter into negotiations with the government. In a statement issued on 30 April, the UN Security Council warned the FNL that sympathy for the movement was scarce. "The FNL's unwillingness to date to seek a peaceful resolution of this conflict makes it difficult for the international community to accept the legitimacy of its concerns," it said. The government's position was somewhat stronger, and in the 28 March agreement, Ndayizeye vowed to sideline FNL and impose sanctions "if the group continued its policy of violence". However, Ndayizeye neither specified the sanctions nor how he intended to go about them. This is a threat that has been used before, albeit without success, but the consensus was that if Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD joined the process, Rwasa would be left with little room for manoeuvre and would also be forced to sign up. However, according to FNL spokesman Pasteur Habonimana, because they were not signatories to the Arusha accord, they were not part of the peace process; therefore, negotiations with a Hutu president "are impossible" and the only possible course for dialogue would be in the ethnic context, with a Tutsi. "We will talk with the vice-president, but only if he comes as a Tutsi and not as the vice-president," Habonimana said. While believing that the change of presidents had been symbolic, many Burundians said that, as political wrangling continued and deals were made and broken daily, they continued to feel increasingly separated from those in charge. Jan van Eck, an analyst who follows the Burundi process closely, agreed. "There is a disconnection between the population and the peace process," he said. "The process is like a train that is trying to meet all the deadlines. The locomotive is moving on, regardless of the situation on the ground, and other elements are being left behind." Other critics argued that while South Africa was breathing life into the process, some aspects of its approach were not suitable to the Burundian context. They said that South Africa "oversimplified" the Burundian problem, and was trying to address it in the same way that it addressed apartheid. Meanwhile, politicians within the government said that there had been significant collaboration between Tutsis and Hutus, and that progress had been made in changing the political mindset on ethnicity. They also felt that the strategy adopted by the ruling party, the Front pour la democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), to join the transitional government - within the framework of the Arusha accord - was realistic and sustainable, whereas the rebels who have remained in the hills would soon be a spent force. "If the rebellion doesn't come to the table, it will be crushed," a FRODEBU member said. "If this change really brings even more progress, then the rebellion will have lost its raison d'etre." However, sceptics suggested that the political class, whether Tutsi or Hutu, was in collusion and the change in mindset would only accentuate the difference between those within and those outside the process. "Now they [Hutu politicians] have had a taste of power, they are protecting each other, Eugene Nindorera, a former Burundian minister for human rights, told IRIN. "There are so many divisions, that it can't merely be put down to the simple Tutsi-Hutu split. It is a war of a different nature." Nindorera said that Burundians were waiting for a leader who would deliver peace and govern according to the wishes of the people, rather than for personal interests. "We will judge the change on what he [Ndayizeye] delivers. If he brings peace and kicks the bad people out - whether Hutu or Tutsi - people will understand and respect him for it," he said. "However, the reality is that there is a lack of confidence between the parties. This is not only within the context of the ceasefire negotiations, but also within the government itself." In his speech at the inauguration, Mandela put the burden of change on Burundi's political class, urging them to put the good of Burundians before their own personal interests - something many Burundians outside the process agreed had not been done.

Humanitarian situation deteriorates

Despite the change in president, fighting has continued in parts of the country. There is little doubt that though a few may have benefited, the large majority of civilians continue to suffer, and providing humanitarian assistance remains difficult for the agencies involved.

Most humanitarian agencies agree that their main problems are the lack of security on the ground and lack of government clearance to access war-affected populations, and, frequently, a combination of the two.

"The political changes that are taking place are positive steps, but at the end of the day, security on the ground and access to people are our main concerns," Antoine Gerard, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Burundi, told IRIN.

"We want to see these steps translated into tangible benefits for the population, otherwise we run the risk of there being two tracks of development - while the political process continues, the population continues to suffer," he said.

Poverty increases

In a country that was already extremely poor before the war, the humanitarian situation in Burundi has declined drastically over the last decade during what aid workers called "the silent emergency".

By 2001, the Human Development Index for Burundi had dropped to the third worst in the world, reflecting the accumulating impact of the collapse of indicators such as vaccination coverage, which, according to OCHA, declined from 83 percent in 1993 to 54 percent in 2001. Primary school attendance, which declined from 70 percent in 1993 to 48 percent in 2001, served as another indicator of Burundi's decline.

"Burundi is on its knees," Cyrille Barancira, an official at the Banque Commercial du Burundi, said. "If this war doesn't end now and the international community doesn't come in, this country could simply implode."

Aid workers, who often complained about the lack of political will on all sides to bring about a lasting solution to the problem, said that the only thing that would change the lives of Burundians for the better was lasting peace.

According to Action Contre la Faim, an organisation overseeing emergency food distribution and nutrition programmes in Burundi, there have been fewer beneficiaries recently despite the large numbers of internal displacements. However, the organisation was looking to see whether rain in May would be sufficient to ensure that the June harvest eases food security concerns.

During the decade of war, basic health care deteriorated so drastically that, according to a recent report issued by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an NGO that works in the health sector, disability in Burundi is often the result of the lack of primary health care and the subsequent non-treatment of minor problems rather than a result of war injuries.

Civilians bear the brunt of human rights violations

Furthermore, civilians are increasingly on the receiving end of wide-scale human rights violations as a result of what many see as the "paralysis of the justice system".

In a recent statement, the UN Security Council welcomed the approval of legislation on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and "looked forward to their implementation". But many Burundians felt that, in reality, this was a distant dream.

"These laws are being introduced, but how, in the situation that the country is in, are we really going to impose these laws?" Nindorera, the former minister for human rights, said. "They give the impression of moving forward without addressing the real problem, which is the need for peace."

In early May, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Burundi, Marie-Therese Bocoum, completed a trip around the country and echoed Nindorera's concerns. "With the war [between rebels and government forces] continuing in Burundi, I don't see how we can talk about the improvement of the human rights situation, human rights violations are committed daily," she said.

Some observers have said the answer lies in an international tribunal similar to the Arusha-based tribunal for the Rwandan genocide. Others have called for increased references to the Geneva Conventions in the ceasefire agreements signed, so that all sides become more aware of the violations that they commit. Some Burundians are even hoping that the African Union (AU) force in Burundi would impose peace on their country.

But many observers agree that, over the next 18 months, Ndayizeye's ability to bring a lasting ceasefire would be the only way to begin resolving Burundi's humanitarian problems.

Military concerns

The humanitarian situation in Burundi has remained precarious because, despite a brief lull in hostilities immediately after the signing of the ceasefire in December, both sides have largely ignored the agreement. Soon after the formalities of the change in president were over, there was yet more fighting. On 5 May, the army launched heavy offensives against the FDD rebels in central and northern Burundi, leaving more than 100 dead.

The rebels said that civilians were the victims, but the army said that it had killed rebels that had tried to occupy areas in Bubanza and Mwaro provinces. Meanwhile, the new president suggested that the army's attacks were in response to the bombing of Bujumbura by the FDD during the lead-up to the 30 April power transfer.

Whatever the explanation, it was clear that a change in president was not going to bring an immediate end to the war.

Some claimed that this was proof of Tutsi Vice-President Alphonse Marie Kadege's hardline stance towards the rebellion, after he warned the rebels during his inaugural speech "as they have become militant, the government is willing to fight them, so they are forced to accept what they should have done willingly".

However, Ndayizeye considered an all-out war "unlikely" and observers said that both sides knew that an absolute military resolution of the conflict was impossible, as neither has the ability to ultimately defeat the other. The hostilities, they argued, were more an attempt by the government to assert its position before the pending talks with the rebels.

The African peace force

As the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) deployed by the African Union (AU) arrive in greater numbers on the ground, speculation mounts over the role that they would play.

According to Maj-Gen Sipho Binda of South Africa, the commander of the AMIB force, the AU troops have a clear mandate "to assist with the safeguarding of the terms of the ceasefire to enable the role players to implement what they agreed upon in Arusha".

However, sceptics have repeatedly questioned how peacekeeping troops, with a "non-combat" mandate, would operate when essentially there was no peace to keep.

According to the AU, 6 June is the date for the first cantonment area to be operational, and Binda said that, militarily, they would be ready to support the process, but there were still many other factors involved.

"We, as a military, have a plan. We have a road map to peace but when it comes to cantonment areas, we have a lot of people that must be brought on board," he told IRIN.

The main players, Binda said, had to be willing to stop fighting and, in the case of the rebel factions, have the confidence to come out of the bush and go to the cantonment areas "by themselves".

But none of the rebel factions seem prepared to take part yet. FNL and CNDD-FDD have repeatedly said that they have not been involved in the negotiations over the AU mission and the cantonment areas, so there has to be further negotiations over nearly every security issue before cantonment is likely.

"The points we still need to negotiate are the mandate of the AU mission, the training of the new defence force and the police, the establishment of cantonment zones for rebels and the barracking of government soldiers and the reintegration of combatants," Nkurunziza told IRIN.

From the army's point of view, chances of an end to the fighting also seem slim and they argued that they would not return to the barracks while rebel attacks continued.

"In the ceasefire it is clearly marked that so long as there is still fighting, the army will not return to the barracks," army spokesman Col Augustin Nzabampema told IRIN. "So, it is up to the rebellion to stop their attacks. In the meantime, we will continue our mission of maintaining security."

Nzabampema added that although the army did not oppose reform, and had been discussing it for several years, implementation was still a long way off, as the parties were "not yet agreeing on many things, so discussions on the future structure of the army will continue".

Other factors determining prolongation of war

But there are other factors in play that will continue to determine how long war will continue in Burundi despite the change in president.

Despite Tanzania's reassurances that it was not supporting rebels, there have been repeated calls from Bujumbura for Burundi's eastern neighbour to stop its support of the CNDD-FDD. Tanzania said it had nothing to gain from supporting the war and that western Tanzania's massive refugee population was proof of that.

But critics say that ever since former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's involvement in the Burundi peace talks, Tanzania has always been more sympathetic to the Hutu cause.

However, a diplomat in Bujumbura suggested that it was time that Tanzania was brought more closely into the Burundi process and, in return, it "came clean" on the issue of the rebels, known to launch their attacks from the bush in western Tanzania.

A further complication was the important role that key members of the armed forces played in politics, business transactions and government contracts in Burundi. Many observers suggested that real change in Burundi was unlikely as there were too many profiting from the status quo and in the near future, the real power would remain in the hands in those in power in the army, no matter what reforms were made.

"The power has never and will never leave the army," a local journalist said in Bujumbura. "They [the army] are the people deciding the policy so even if there is a change, the people that will have the influence are still Buyoya's men."

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Theme(s): (IRIN) Conflict

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