23 May 2003
Transcript: State's Haass Says U.S. Foreign Policy Will Be Tailored to Realities
(He outlines several maxims for foreign policy success today) (4990)
The United States does not have a "one-size-fits-all" approach to the
world, and Iraq "should not be over-interpreted as a rigid template"
for U.S. policy toward countries that pursue weapons of mass
destruction, support terrorism, or deny basic liberties, a key State
Department official says.
Richard Haass, director of the Office of Policy Planning, outlined
several themes that mark a successful U.S. foreign policy in today's
world during remarks at the Kennan Institute 2003 annual dinner in
Washington May 22.
In the case of Iraq, he said, "we used force as a last resort" against
a country with a clear record of aggression and "after a large degree
of international consensus had developed about what Iraq needed to
do."
But he said "we will have to put together different policies, tailored
for local, regional, and international realities, to meet other
challenges -- whether in North Korea, Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere."
Haass also discussed these other foreign policy themes:
-- "No one tool can do it all." He said the United States faces "a
panoply of threats" to its national interests, and "we need the right
tools for the various jobs. This implies an entire toolbox --
including diplomacy, development and democracy, assistance,
intelligence, sanctions, incentives, and trade policy."
-- "Partnership is essential." There is little the United States can
do in the world "that it can't do better with the active participation
of others, be they governments, international organizations, or NGOs,"
he said. Partnerships help share burdens, find solutions to problems,
and "enhance the acceptance and legitimacy of our undertakings."
-- "Institutions add value." International institutions often advance
U.S. national interests, he said, "provided they are effectively
organized, are given realistic mandates, and contain members committed
to common aims and norms."
-- "Multilateralism comes in many forms." Multilateral cooperation is
most successful when it is built on "a real convergence of interests
and values," he said. But when the United Nations or other global
frameworks "are unwilling or unable to move against dire threats, we
reserve the right to act in less encompassing alliances or flexible,
ad hoc coalitions of the willing -- as we did in Kosovo and most
recently in Iraq."
-- "We ignore failing states at our peril." Among the most pressing
tasks today is "to prevent the weak or brittle states from imploding
entirely," he said. Another is to assist in the recovery of countries
that have collapsed into violence.
Haass also gave a brief overview of today's primary U.S. foreign
policy challenges, including Iraq's recovery, the Middle East peace
process, support for terrorism by Iran and Syria, North Korea's
nuclear weapons program, U.S.-Russian relations, the administration's
"ambitious trade agenda," the Millennium Challenge Account, and the
threat of infectious disease.
Following is the text of Haass's remarks:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC
Planning Policy in Today's World
Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Remarks at the Kennan Institute 2003 Annual Dinner
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, DC
May 22, 2003
Thank you Mr. Langdon. I am pleased and honored to be here tonight,
speaking at a dinner that aims to support work being carried out in an
institution so closely associated with George Kennan -- actually, two
George Kennans. The Kennan Institute is a model of a modern think
tank. As might be expected, it produces top quality work that reflects
deep thought. But it also shows real creativity in finding ways to
link the worlds of thought and action by convening academics,
policy-makers, business people, and private groups from both the
United States and the former Soviet Union. As someone who has divided
his career inside and outside government, I know how hard it is to
produce timely, useful advice. I applaud your ability to do this.
I know that many of you are experts on Russia, and I will have some
things to say about Russia and U.S.-Russia relations. But since my
link to George Kennan -- the ambassador, not the explorer -- involves
his contributions to policy planning, I will devote the lion's share
of my remarks to the broader planning and conduct of American foreign
policy. And as you might expect, my interest is not purely historical.
To the contrary, I believe we are at a juncture when Americans need to
think bigger and more long term about this country's role in the world
than is often the case.
Policy Planning
The policy planning staff dates back 56 years this month, to May 1947.
The staff was the creation of Secretary of State George Marshall --
not the last former Army General to hold down the job, I might add. It
was a time of turmoil and ferment, as we brought the world war to
closure and embarked on what became known as the Cold War. Marshall's
instructions to Kennan on setting up the new planning shop were
typically straightforward: Avoid trivia. Trust me when I say this is
more easily advised than done.
A more expansive description of what Marshall had in mind when he
created a policy planning staff came from his successor, Dean Acheson.
The General conceived the function of this group as being to look
ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the
operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle;
far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and
outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them. In doing this
the staff should also do something else -- constantly reappraise what
was being done.
Acheson goes on to say that these two tasks are extremely difficult to
perform. Indeed, all planners face what another observer calls the
planner's dilemma, i.e., the need to focus on what lies ahead without
becoming irrelevant to what is of pressing concern to policy-makers.
I find it noteworthy that George Kennan himself came to the conclusion
that success as a planner had eluded him. In his memoirs, Kennan
writes, "Pondering today the frustration of the past week, it occurred
to me that it is time I recognized that my Planning Staff, started
nearly three years ago, has simply been a failure, like all previous
attempts to bring order and foresight into the designing of foreign
policy by special institutional arrangements within the department."
The intellectually honest Kennan was being a bit too tough on himself.
Kennan's tenure is widely and justifiably viewed as the golden era of
policy planning. It surely was a golden era of U.S. foreign policy.
What distinguishes the years after World War II is not so much that
the United States held a preponderance of power, but that it used its
advantages wisely. We formed lasting alliances, built effective
institutions, reformed and ultimately reconciled with former
adversaries. Acheson's title for his memoirs, "Present at the
Creation," may have suffered from immodesty but not inaccuracy.
Today, too, the United States enjoys overwhelming primacy. We do not
face a single rival with global reach, but we do face numerous
challenges all over the globe. Like the postwar generation, we have
emerged from epic events, including 9/11 and the campaign to liberate
Iraq, and are involved in an open-ended twilight struggle -- namely,
the war against terrorism and rogue regimes developing weapons of mass
destruction. The challenge for us, as it was for Kennan, Marshall,
Acheson, and Truman, is to use our power so that it safeguards our
interests and promotes our values for years and even decades to come.
In the balance of my time this evening, I will review some of our
objectives for U.S. foreign policy at this historic juncture -- inside
Iraq, in the wider region, and elsewhere in the world, including
Russia. And I will close by offering a few maxims for U.S. foreign
policy at this pivotal juncture.
Inside Iraq
We owe a great debt to the brave men and women of the American and
coalition militaries who laid their lives on the line to free the
Iraqi people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein and his gang of thugs.
But as President Bush said when he addressed the sailors on the deck
of the Abraham Lincoln, "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. The
transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is
worth every effort."
What we accomplish in Iraq -- or more accurately what the Iraqi people
accomplish in their own country with our help -- will determine the
future of one of the key countries in the Middle East. But it will
also help determine the future of the wider region. An open,
market-oriented, peaceful Iraq could advance growth and reform in the
entire Middle East; an Iraq that resembles Saddam Hussein s, at war
with its own citizens and its neighbors, would set back prospects for
peace, prosperity and freedom in the region.
What needs to be done in Iraq? The challenge there has four
components: humanitarian, security, economic and political. The
humanitarian challenge has been less than anticipated, thanks to
advanced planning by the United States and the world community and to
the rapid, focused, and discriminate way the war was fought by
coalition forces. Some pockets of humanitarian need remain, but the
massive, anticipated crisis thankfully never materialized. Refugees
and internally displaced persons are relatively few; supplies of food,
water and medicine are mostly adequate or at least improving. The U.S.
government has provided some $600 million through UN agencies and NGOs
to meet immediate humanitarian needs.
We also need to restore basic order in Iraq. As we have learned in
other places, security is the absolute precondition for sustainable
recovery from conflict; without it, people cannot rebuild their
country or return to school or work. The removal of Saddam's regime
sparked a wave of looting, lawlessness, and score-settling. The
immediate priority is to put an end to this violence. Beyond that
objective, international forces face multiple challenges: to secure
and eliminate all weapons of mass destruction; to prevent ethnic and
religious tensions from erupting into violence; to make sure that none
of Iraq's neighbors exacerbate an already difficult situation; and,
over time, to help Iraqis rebuild their police and military forces so
that they can look after their own safety and security in a way that
threatens no one.
Economic reconstruction is more accurately thought of as economic
renewal, given the better than expected state of physical capital and
the deep reservoir of human capital that is modern Iraq. Unlike many
recent post-conflict situations, there is lots of raw material to work
with. The United States is making available more than $2 billion to
support early reconstruction efforts. Oil is beginning to come on line
in meaningful quantities. Longer-run challenges include not just
increasing oil output but tackling the problem posed by huge amounts
of outstanding debt. Today's vote by the U.N. Security council to
remove sanctions is a welcome step.
If establishing conditions of security and stability is of supreme
urgency, assisting Iraq's political regeneration may be the most
difficult. It will be necessary to overcome the many religious,
ethnic, geographic and political divisions that characterize Iraqi
society. Still, the cynics and skeptics are wrong. Our goal -- an Iraq
that is intact, possesses a representative government, and adopts the
rule of law -- is no pipedream. It is a realistic vision, particularly
in view of the country's educated population and sizeable middle
class. It is a goal that the international community can realize if it
is prepared to stay the course and work with Iraqis until the
fundamentals of a democratic society take hold. There is tremendous
political ferment going on in Iraq today. Our mission is to help
responsible Iraqi leaders channel it in a constructive direction.
The Larger Region
Let me now turn to the larger region. Secretary of State Powell has
recently returned from his second trip to the Middle East in a month.
The issues he tackled -- relations between Israelis and Palestinians,
challenges posed by Syria and Iran, and enduring obstacles to working
democracies and open markets -- are familiar. This familiarity is
another way of saying that these problems have resisted solution for
too long.
It is difficult to think of another foreign policy issue that has
preoccupied and polarized world opinion as much as the Palestinian
question. It was nearly one year ago that President Bush declared his
goal of bringing about a democratic Palestinian state, one prepared to
live in peace beside Israel. In order to make this vision a reality,
the United States, working in tandem with Russia, the U.N. and the EU,
developed a roadmap designed to take us in stages toward this goal.
The emergence of a new Palestinian Prime Minister and government
constitutes an important opening. The task now is to persuade
Palestinians and Israelis to begin the process, to start doing things
to improve the situation on the ground so that they can tackle more
far-reaching matters at the negotiating table. Terrorists cannot be
allowed to forever frustrate the search for peace.
The challenges posed by Iran are clear-cut: a country developing
weapons of mass destruction and with a history of supporting terror.
Such behavior flouts the norms and rules of the international
community and isolates Iran and its people. And it will have
consequences if it continues. In contrast, if Iran turns away from
terror and its pursuit of catastrophic weapons, it will find a United
States prepared to revise its policy and recast the relationship. The
United States is similarly prepared to respond if Syria demonstrates
far-reaching changes in its behavior.
A third issue is the relative lack of openness in the political
systems and economies of the region. For too long, the United States
tolerated what has been called a "democratic exception" within the
Muslim Middle East. The implication was that as long as governments
were friendly and backed regional stability, there was no need for
outsiders to encourage representative government. We have learned the
hard way that closed political systems breed resentment and extremism
that are not in America's -- or the world's -- interests. That is why
we are supporting democracy and political reform through the Middle
East Partnership Initiative launched by Secretary of State Powell in
December 2002.
Closed economic systems also pose a danger. As last year's Arab Human
Development Report made clear, the Arab Middle East has lagged far
behind other regions in key measures, including individual freedom,
women's empowerment, and economic and social development. For too
long, these countries have watched by the side of the tracks as the
freight train of economic prosperity rushes past. President Bush is
determined to help Arabs get on board so that they can share the
benefits of economic liberty. This explains why earlier this month he
proposed the establishment of a U.S.-Middle East free trade area
within a decade.
The Rest of the World
There are any number of challenges in the wide world worth noting,
from helping Colombia's democratically elected government defeat
terrorists fueled by drug money to helping India and Pakistan
normalize their troubled relationship. Let me note a few, if only to
suggest the range of problems.
Today the most dangerous place in the world may be the Korean
peninsula. We are working closely with our allies and friends in the
region -- South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and others -- to make
certain that North Korea understands that its future relations with
the world hinge on abandoning any nuclear weapons ambitions. It must
terminate these programs -- promptly, verifiably, and irreversibly.
Last month my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly,
held multilateral talks in Beijing with North Korea and China. We made
plain then -- as we continue to do now -- that participation by South
Korea and Japan in future discussions will be essential to reaching
and guaranteeing an agreement. As Secretary Powell has said, it is
their neighborhood, and they have a manifest stake in the outcome.
Make no mistake: We have always stood ready to transform our relations
with North Korea and to work with it to end its self-isolation and the
abject conditions in which its people suffer. And we remain prepared
to do so today. But we cannot do so unless North Korea first makes a
fateful choice: it can seek nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, or it can redefine its place in the world by dismantling
these programs and broadening its diplomatic and economic interaction.
Pyongyang needs to accept that it cannot have it both ways.
Even as we handle the challenge of rogue states like North Korea, we
need to reinvigorate our bilateral relationships with important
partners and friends. Let me take a moment to single out Russia, a
subject of special interest to this audience. Since the end of the
Cold War, there has been a sea change in U.S.-Russian relations, so
that disagreement no longer creates crisis. But to be frank -- and
friends need to be frank -- our bilateral relationship over the past
two years has had setbacks as well as achievements. On the positive
side of the ledger, Russia has understood that NATO's enlargement does
not clash with its basic interests. Both of our countries have signed
the Treaty of Moscow, calling for deep cuts in our nuclear arsenals,
and we anticipate exchanging instruments of ratification at the St.
Petersburg summit next month. More broadly, our two presidents and
senior officials consult regularly on a wide range of issues, from
Afghanistan and terrorism to cooperation in space and trade.
On the negative side, we were disappointed at Russia's opposition to a
second U.N. resolution authorizing force to compel Iraqi compliance
with its disarmament obligations. That said, I want to applaud
Russia's vote earlier today in the Security Council on behalf of a
resolution that lifts sanctions and provides a foundation for the
rebuilding of Iraq.
Beyond Iraq, the United States is looking for solid Russian
cooperation in addressing other regional threats. We have made clear
our desire for Russian involvement in persuading North Korea to
abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons, just as we have reiterated the
dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program. I believe there is
considerable potential for future cooperation in meeting both of these
challenges. We welcome Russia's constructive involvement in the Middle
East peace process and look for their cooperation in advancing the
success of the road map. At a global level, we look to Russia to
assume its rightful role as a responsible international power, one
that avoids cultivating relations with rogue states and that resists
excessive nationalism or reflexive anti-Americanism.
It is also important that Russia continue to consolidate political and
economic reform at home. The last decade has been one of extraordinary
change and adaptation for Russian society, but much work remains to
ensure the emergence of a mature market democracy, particularly in the
areas of the rule of law and independent media. We encourage Russia to
take all the steps necessary for WTO membership. We also support the
search for a political settlement in Chechnya and call on Russia to
conduct its policy in Chechnya in a manner consistent with
international standards of human rights. Our goal is an ever-deepening
bilateral relationship based on partnership with an increasingly
democratic, market-oriented Russia.
As we address threats to global stability and improve international
partnerships, we must also seize opportunities to advance shared
prosperity. The Bush administration is pursuing an ambitious trade
agenda in the hopes of bringing all willing countries and regions into
the expanding circle of economic prosperity. Our regional trade
strategy aims for agreements in Latin America, Southern Africa, and
the Middle East, and bilateral agreements with Australia and Morocco.
President Bush recently signed a free trade agreement with Singapore,
and we expect to sign a similar one with Chile in the near future. We
are committed to concluding the Doha Round of the WTO by 2005. The
global elimination of all barriers to trade in goods, services and
agriculture would increase global income by an estimated $800 billion,
of which almost two-thirds would flow to developing countries, lifting
an estimated 300 million people out of poverty.
Our commitment to development does not end with free trade. The
Millennium Challenge Account represents a unilateral U.S. commitment
to increase development assistance by 50 percent over three years,
with this new aid being targeted to those countries that govern
justly, invest in their people, and promote economic liberty. It
represents a new approach to foreign aid, based on the principle of
developing-country responsibility.
Another challenge to U.S. foreign policy is a less traditional one:
the threat of infectious disease. The recent SARS epidemic has
reminded us of a grim reality of globalization: in a borderless world,
where distance is made irrelevant, problems spread easily from one
region to another. But the impact of SARS pales in comparison to the
gravest international public health crisis we face today -- HIV/AIDS.
Secretary Powell has called the HIV virus the greatest weapon of mass
destruction on the face of the earth today. It has already killed more
than 42 million -- and is killing another six people every minute.
President Bush recognizes that the battle against AIDS is a moral
imperative and an issue of national security. He has responded with an
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which will provide $15 billion over
the next five years to save many millions of lives.
Requirements for Success
What emerges from this quick tour d' horizon are a number of themes:
Inconsistency is no vice. To the contrary, when it comes to foreign
policy, inconsistency is often a virtue. I speak not of principles,
but of policy. The United States does not have a one-size-fits-all
approach to the world. Iraq, for example, should not be
over-interpreted as a rigid template for U.S. policy toward other
countries that pursue weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism,
or deny people their basic liberty. In the case of Iraq, we used force
as a last resort, against a country with a clear record of aggression,
and after a large degree of international consensus had developed
about what Iraq needed to do. We will have to put together different
policies, tailored for local, regional, and international realities,
to meet other challenges -- whether in North Korea, Iran, Syria, or
elsewhere.
No one tool can do it all. Our armed forces are the envy of the world
and constitute an essential background to much of what we can
accomplish internationally. But defense policy is only one component
of foreign policy. We face a panoply of threats to our national
interests, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to
global financial crises, from the collapse of weak states to the
spread of infectious disease, and from transnational terrorism to
global warming. Not all of these problems can be addressed with
military power. If all you have to work with is a hammer, as the
saying goes, every problem looks like a nail. To be successful in
foreign policy, as in carpentry, we need the right tools for the
various jobs. This implies an entire toolbox -- including diplomacy,
development and democracy, assistance, intelligence, sanctions,
incentives, and trade policy.
Partnership is Essential. For all of our power, there is little that
the United States can do in the world that it can t do better with the
active participation of others, be they governments, international
organizations, or NGOs. At their best, partnerships help us share
burdens we would otherwise have to bear alone, find solutions to
problems that defy purely national responses, and enhance the
acceptance and legitimacy to our undertakings. In the war against
Iraq, we relied on coalition partners willing to place critical assets
at our disposal, including armed forces, access to bases, overflight
rights, quiet diplomatic support, and emergency relief supplies. We
rely on partnerships in the global war on terrorism: foreign
governments are providing intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation; trading partners are ensuring the security of shipping
containers; and private financial institutions are helping us to track
the transfers of funds that sustain networks of terror.
Institutions add value. Provided they are effectively organized, are
given realistic mandates, and contain members committed to common aims
and norms, international institutions can and often do advance U.S.
national interests. Indeed, it would be difficult to carry out
critical dimensions of foreign policy -- from trade to
non-proliferation to environmental policy -- without them.
Institutions provide standing capacity, so that we don t need to
reinvent the wheel every time a new problem arises. They also bring
multiple parties together to confer, encourage the rapid flow of
information, and provide economies of scale. The World Trade
Organization is a case in point. It provides a forum in which to
negotiate new trade liberalization agreements, to seek remedies
against protectionist and discriminatory policies, and to resolve
disputes with trading partners. In all cases, the United States needs
to ensure that existing institutions are adapted to current realities.
NATO, for example, is evolving from a Cold War alliance focused on
Europe to one suited to today's security challenges wherever they may
arise, such as in Afghanistan and possibly Iraq.
Multilateralism comes in many forms. Multilateral cooperation is most
successful when it is built on a real convergence of interests and
values. At certain times, the United Nations and other global
frameworks may be best placed to address U.S. foreign policy goals.
But when the United Nations or other bodies are unwilling or unable to
move against dire threats, we reserve the right to act in less
encompassing alliances or flexible, ad hoc coalitions of the willing
-- as we did in Kosovo and most recently in Iraq. No organization, not
even the United Nations, has a monopoly on legitimacy; rather,
legitimacy depends most on the rationale for an action and the manner
in which it is undertaken.
We ignore failing states at our peril. As President Bush said, the
events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states like
Afghanistan can pose as great a danger to our national interests as
strong states. Countries that disintegrate into anarchy can offer a
haven for terrorists, criminals, and drug traffickers and an
environment conducive to extremist ideologies. One of our most
pressing tasks today is to prevent the weak or brittle states from
imploding entirely. Another is to assist countries that have collapsed
into violence to begin the slow and arduous process of recovery. We
have renewed our commitment to rebuild Afghanistan, for example,
pledging $900 million this year -- on top of the $1 billion we have
already contributed.
Any U.S. foreign policy must combine interests and values. One of the
main impulses behind America's international engagement, and one of
the greatest sources of its global power, has been its enduring
impulse to make the world a better place. In this sense, the common
dichotomy between a U.S. foreign policy based on interests and one
based on values is misplaced. The American public has always insisted
that our national objectives be linked to our national ideals. And the
appeal of U.S. leadership abroad rests in part on the attractiveness
of our political institutions, society, and culture, and our
willingness to serve as both exemplar and champion for the concept of
human rights and democracy. Indeed, our democracy promotion efforts
are based not on naïve idealism but on the most hard-headed of
calculations: the realization that democracies rarely go to war
against one another, but rather settle their differences peaceably.
Today's world presents opportunities as well as problems. In our
preoccupation with the global war on terrorism, we should not overlook
so much that is right in today's world. From a historical perspective,
the most positive aspect of the current international system is the
absence of irreconcilable conflicts among the main concentrations of
world power: Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States.
Containment and confrontation, the hallmarks of the Cold War, have
yielded to patterns of consultation and cooperation. This considerable
congruence of interest and agreement on the rules of international
order offers a promising foundation for managing the common challenges
that confronting us all.
Our over-riding goal should be to create a world in which most
governments, organizations, and peoples embrace arrangements to allow
them to realize their shared interests and that reflect fundamental
values that are not simply American but universal. All nations and
peoples have a stake in a world in which force is used only as a last
resort, in which terrorism is regarded as beyond the pale, in which
weapons of mass destruction do not spread and are not used, in which
free trade becomes the norm, in which citizens enjoy basic liberties,
in which democratic values triumph, and in which the rule of law
replaces the way of the gun. Bringing about such an integrated world
may be optimistic, even idealistic, but it is in no way naïve.
Let me close by returning to where I began, to George Kennan. His life
stands out as a model to public service and provides a ringing
confirmation that in the realm of foreign policy, ideas matter.
Kennan's grand concept of foreign policy was containment. Our
challenge is to come up with a new vision for a very different era,
one that takes account of clear American primacy but also recognizes
that we live in an age of globalization characterized by transnational
problems requiring cooperative solutions.
Thank you again for asking me here to speak this evening at an event
that honors my most illustrious predecessor -- or at least someone
with the same name.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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