Military

DATE=05/09/2003

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01324

TITLE=ROAD MAP FOR PEACE

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0038

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: Following the Road Map to Middle East Peace. Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: A road map outlining a path to Middle East Peace has been presented to Israel and the Palestinians. Drawn up by the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, the road map calls on the Palestinian Authority and Israel to meet a series of goals that would lead them to peaceful coexistence. Announcing the road map, President George W. Bush said that it "represents a starting point toward achieving the vision of two states: a secure state of Israel and a viable, peaceful, democratic Palestine." President Bush said that "implementing the road map will depend upon the good faith efforts and contributions of both sides. The pace of progress will depend strictly on the performance of the parties." What does the road map call on Israelis and Palestinians to do and will they do it? I'll ask my guests: Marc Ginsberg, former U-S ambassador to Morocco and Khalil Jahshan, executive vice president of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. Welcome and thanks for joining us today. Marc Ginsberg, Colin Powell is going to the region to try to work on this road map for peace. What's he going to be trying to accomplish?

Ginsberg: Well, I think he needs to come to a fundamental agreement with the parties over whether or not the road map as written is the effective document that will constitute the path to a viable creation of a Palestinian state within a three-year time frame. The Israeli government has suggested that the road map is open to amendment interpretation, the Palestinians insisted the document is the document. So we have strict constructionism versus, shall we say, a more liberal interpretation. And I think Secretary Powell is going to have to come to an agreement with the parties over precisely, what is the road map to the road map?

Host: Khalil Jahshan, is Colin Powell going to be able to get that kind of agreement on the groundwork for proceeding with the road map.

Jahshan: If anyone could, I believe that Secretary of State Colin Powell is as equipped as anybody else to do that, to take the parties to that stage of basically returning to the negotiating table. But to do that, I think he needs the serious support of the administration. He can't be left out on a limb in the region. I think the president has to be engaged personally. The administration has to be fully engaged. So, in that sense, I think the road map from our perspective is a welcome sign in the sense that this administration has not been as proactive as it should have been since assuming power here in Washington with regard to Arab-Israeli Peace.

Host: Marc Ginsberg, does Colin Powell have the backing of the administration for his efforts?

Ginsberg: I think the president is sincere in his commitment to wanting to see the road map implemented. But we've got a political dilemma here. His party is not supporting the road map. Some elements of his party, for example, Congressman [Tom] DeLay and the conservative wing of the Republican party have already considered and called this road map "dead on arrival." And so, he has within his own party significant differences. There are significant differences also in Washington over whether or not Secretary Powell has the full support of, for example, the cabinet to implement the road map. Look, we're going to have to get real here about whether or not we see Palestinian-Israeli peace as part of a broader solution to a successful war on terror. The region is crying out for American leadership. We can't let politics get in the way of implementing what should be a viable path to peace in the Middle East. And we're already seeing this happen in Washington right now and it's going to require the president to make a final fundamental determination that American security, homeland security is effectively dependent on bringing peace to the Middle East between Palestinians and Israelis.

Host: Khalil Jahshan, can the president make that case domestically here in the U-S?

Jahshan: Theoretically, he could. But his record thus far leaves a lot to be desired in that respect. If he changes his mind and if indeed, not only his mind, I mean, he has to change his modus operandi -- with all due respect. This is a high-maintenance issue. As Marc implied in his statement, it requires a real serious commitment on the part of the administration. Thus far, the president, for whatever reason, I mean there are all kinds of speculations why he did that since his election as president, but he chose basically not to be personally as heavily involved. But this issue, considering the fact that we have our plate full in Washington, we have Afghanistan, we have Pakistan, we have Iraq, we have the war against terrorism. This is the high-maintenance issue of war and it's going to take a lot of attention. It's going to require a lot of energy. I'm not sure the president fully understands that or is fully willing to put that investment into the process.

Host: Well, Marc Ginsberg, the president did make one particular effort with regard to Middle East peace, which was to say that he felt there needed to be new leadership in the Palestinian Authority to really get things moving. And perhaps, due to that effort and due to the efforts of Palestinians looking for more democratic accountability, there's now a new prime minister in the Palestinian Authority and Ariel Sharon, the prime minister of Israel, has said that he will meet with the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Does that show some real progress now?

Ginsberg: It does. And the president's determination to, in effect require that the Palestinian Authority be reformed and that it begin making the hard choices that it was unable to make or unwilling to make that led to the intifada is essential. But let's understand also that my good friends in Israel are also going to have to make the same type of commitment. The president made it abundantly clear, not only in his June 24th speech, but in his rose garden with [British] Prime Minister [Tony] Blair, where both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made it an essential component of a broader policy in the Middle East: Israel is going to have to stop settlement activity. And it's going to require the president to tell his good friend Prime Minister Sharon that under the circumstances in which we want concessions from the Palestinians -- they're going to have to make the hard choices to end the role that Hamas and Islamic Jihad will play as spoilers of peace -- that Israel is going to have to recognize that the experiment of colonizing the West Bank needs to come to an end. And it's going to require that leadership and the president, I think, is going to want from the prime minister of Israel a demonstrable indication that he is willing to make that very important political concession to help get this road map on the way.

Host: Do you think he's likely to get that?

Jahshan: Well, I think it comes down to whether or not this president is prepared to exercise the type of leadership that my friend Khalil indicated is necessary. Because the Israelis, particularly this government -- and I understand the dilemma that the Israeli government has -- the Israeli government is a coalition where the parties in this right-wing coalition will not support the prime minister making that determination. It's going to require the president to call on Israelis to make that type of compromise and concession in order to show, not only to the Palestinians, but to the international community that the Israelis are prepared to step forward and make those concessions and also to improve the lives of the Palestinians.

Jahshan: And Eric, if you don't mind, I don't think it's going to be necessarily that difficult for Ariel Sharon to be responsive on this specific point. Public opinion surveys released this week in Israel show that a majority of Israelis are willing to take that risk and willing to go in that direction. So, the difficulty Sharon is going to face is not necessarily with his public as much as with his own coalition within his own government. So, he has to make tough choices in terms of who are the partners that are willing to make that commitment with him, are now willing to move forward. But the public, I believe, it's funny, there's kind of a similar percentage on the Israeli side and on the Palestinian side, are showing basically interest and support for the road map as a way out of this hug of death on which they have found themselves over the past thirty months.

Host: Let's talk about this a little bit. You say also the Palestinian public opinion is in favor of this. One of the key things that has to happen over the road map for it to really get rolling is an end to violence coming out of the Palestinian territories. What is the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, trying to do to accomplish that and what are his chances of achieving it?

Jahshan: Well, Palestinian public opinion is basically uncomfortable with the status quo. They would like -- similar to, in a way, the Israeli public opinion -- they have suffered on the humanitarian level, on the economic level, and on the political level. They would like a way out, a return to the negotiating table if possible. There is the issue, from the Palestinian perspective, there is the issue of disarming of the militias or the armed groups.

Host: Now this is something that the prime minister has specifically called for.

Jahshan: Has explicitly called for and so has the road map, clearly. But the implication here is that it is being demanding from the Palestinian side early on in the process. To proceed with a serious step, in a sense that, it is a lot more serious than Washington anticipates. This step could lead to an internal armed conflict within Palestinian society. Let's assume that these groups, whether it's Hamas or Islamic Jihad or others, refused to turn in their weapons and fight the authority back. That would lead to a civil war. So there is apprehension on the part of public opinion.

Ginsberg: But that's the choice, Khalil, that Yasser Arafat refused to make himself. And Hamas and Islamic Jihad have strengthened themselves. Obviously the occupation and the resulting shutdowns and the enforcement by Israel, its military control over the West Bank and Gaza, has contributed to this. But let's make it abundantly clear. While I've said that the Israeli government has to, in effect, make the important concession to stop settlement activity and to begin rolling them back, let's make it also abundantly clear, it's a choice the Palestinians have got to make for themselves -- that the armed struggle of Hamas and Islamic Jihad represent an effort to sabotage any hope for peace that would lead to the creation of two states. Islamic Jihad and Hamas do not want two states living side by side and the Palestinians are going to have to make that choice sooner rather than later.

Jahshan: Yes. My point, Marc, is the fact that if the Palestinians see the light at the end of the tunnel, if they indeed see some serious support for the road map, that Washington means business, that Tel Aviv and Jerusalem means business, I think you will find that the Palestinian side would move forward in a much quicker and much more decisive way to do that. But, again, the distinction here, in the context of a continuing occupation, in the context of the fact that Israel today is not only in occupation of the external boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza, but even area A that's assigned to the Palestinians and it has rolled back, if you will, the gains of the early peace process. Palestinians find it very difficult to endorse the notion of ending all forms of violence. They have no problem with ending all forms of terrorism. But if you notice in the language of the road map, it mixes the two together. Does that mean, I mean the question that is being asked by the Palestinian public: Does that mean that I as a Palestinian give up my right to resist occupation through lawful means rather than acts against civilians which are clearly considered terrorism and the Authority had. So, that's where the struggle right now in the Palestinian mind, if you will, is taking place.

Host: Let me ask you a question though, about this prospect of some kind of civil war within the Palestinian territories. If you have the government of Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas calling for the disarmament of Hamas, Hezbollah. And if you have public support for that disarmament, if there is this glimmer of hope, if Palestinians recognize and decide they think that that's the best way to go forward with this broad public support. Can Hamas and Hezbollah still resist and mount some kind of fight against the Palestinian Authority?

Jahshan: In practical terms, of course they could. They are armed. They have meant business in the past. If they remain as opposed to this process as they were opposed to previous peace processes, one would expect that, yes, they will be able to mount such a challenge to the new cabinet. But again, the way to defuse that is for the new cabinet, the new prime minister to show results quickly. If we end up spending, as some anticipate, the next, you know, we end up again violating the deadlines that are specified within the road map and end up in three years, as we did with Oslo, engaged in Talmudic discussions, endless ones with regards to who does this first and who follows and what have you, and the momentum is lost, then, Abbas and the new cabinet would basically find it very difficult to move forward and deliver a one-sided, if you will, commitment without showing the Palestinian people the fruit of their compromise.

Host: Marc Ginsberg, does that mean though that these terrorist groups have the power to derail this road map before it even gets started?

Ginsberg: It comes down to, and I am impressed with Prime Minister Sharon's reaffirmation of a long-held Israeli policy. We don't expect a hundred percent success against terrorist groups. What we want is a one-hundred percent effort. If the new cabinet is empowered and given a new police authority and actually supported by the United States and by Israel and wanting to see the road map implemented -- the quartet. And if it is shown to the Palestinian people that the quartet is behind this, the Israelis are behind this, that the United States is lending the support, then, indeed, you will see perhaps Hamas and Islamic Jihad recognizing the reality on the wall that they can either fight to the death or concede the point that they are going to be vanquished and that they might as well join in a political process. Now, if they refuse to join in a political process, then they need to be vanquished. But at the same time, the Israeli government cannot use the pretext of continued suicide attacks by these groups as a justification not to engage in peace if Mr. Abbas is engaged in a one hundred percent effort to try to end terrorism. That's the key.

Jahshan: In other words -- I think we're both in agreement that even though these groups do not necessarily have a veto power on any process, sometimes the behavior of the parties delegates to them that veto power by assigning maybe too much significance or too much importance with regards to their acts of violence.

Host: Marc Ginsberg, one of the other issues that Khalil Jahshan brings out is the way in which the Oslo talks started to get bogged down on who's going to do what and when and how. And it seems that part of the idea with the road map is to get away from endless negotiations and say: "Do this. Do this. Do this." And the parties can go after those things. But how do you avoid, in that process of the road map, it getting bogged down and recriminations over: "Well, you didn't get this done when you were supposed to. And the other side didn't get this done." And how that plays out?

Ginsberg: Look, I have no illusions. The main reasons why Oslo failed could very well resurrect their ugly heads again in implementing this road map. I've read the road map enough times to know that you can interpret this and start requiring all sorts of side agreements and this agreement and that agreement and all of a sudden, the next thing you know, all of the parties are finding excuses not to move. Look, if the United States considers it to be an essential component in the war on terror to help bring a solution to the Palestinian suffering, which I believe is essential, essential not only for the Palestinian people but for American credibility in the Middle East, that my good friends in Israel will support their strong ally in the United States in helping to implement this, there are going to have to be painful compromises. And it's not going to be enough for the Israeli government to say: "Well, we have to interpret this and we have to interpret that." Or for the Palestinians to say we have to do that. The parties are going to have to recognize that there's a new era and that we cannot go back to the old modalities of Oslo. How are we going to do this? It's going to take strong presidential leadership.

Host: Is there anything that's going to be a key sticking point in this road map? Perhaps the issue of the right of return for Palestinians?

Jahshan: Sure, I think a key issue might actually surface in the next few days after the secretary of state begins his conversation with the Israeli side and the Palestinian side. The Israelis seem to be adamant that they would like to amend the road map. And the administration as the president has indicated before and others in the administration have indicated before, it can't be amended. So, if Israel insists on amending it, I think that's a deal breaker in the sense that three or four clusters of issues that Israel would like to reintroduce into the plan, if you will, or use to amend the plan are very serious matters that wisely, in a way, have been postponed to a later phase within the roadmap. So if Israel brings them up right now and insists on changing them, who knows if we can proceed?

Host: Marc Ginsberg, is that a deal breaker?

Ginsberg: Look, yes. There are plenty of possibilities for deal breakers here. But in order to recognize that the road map was put together by the quartet, the parties didn't have as much of a role to play in the creation of the road map as they did in the creation of Oslo. So, you have clearly here, two parties that may have significant amendments and changes that they want to make. I think it comes down to a question of good faith at this point. Is there enough good faith rather than a determination to somehow put camouflage of good faith before the American people and before the American government and the quartet and the rest of the international community? If the parties have the intention to get themselves out of the intifada and to bring about a change of the status quo, then they're going to go forward and recognize that concessions are going to have to be made equally by each party. If both parties see this merely as an opportunity to sort of demonstrate that they're trying to do something in good faith but not acting in good faith, well then we'll be back to where we were with Oslo. And so, the violence will go on and the United States will have a continuing mess on its hands and the Israeli people will not have security and the Palestinians will not have their state.

Host: Khalil Jahshan, what role is there for Arab states to support this process?

Jahshan: Well, the plan itself, the road map, indicates in several of its provisions the role for the Arab side, which is rare in a way. This was not the case in previous peace processes, including Oslo. The main role that has been basically added to this road map refers back to the Saudi Initiative, if you will, that Crown Prince Abdullah initiated at the last Arab summit, in which he offered diplomatic recognition by all the Arab signatories to that summit in return for Israel reaching a final peace agreement, a permanent peace agreement with the Palestinians. And there were also several other provisions calling on the Arab side, if you will, to normalize relations with Israel. Those who had relations before the collapse of the Oslo process to restore diplomatic relations. And they will have also a role to play in the third phase, if you will, the endorsing of the final product, which is the creation of two states.

Host: Marc Ginsberg, we only have about thirty seconds left. What do you think is going to be the key role for Arab countries?

Ginsberg: Without the Arab states showing to the Israeli people that they are prepared to enter into and support the implementation of this road map, put the best foot forward to show the Israeli people that this time they are prepared to recognize Israel and not merely pass Arab league resolutions, but to go to Jerusalem and convince the majority that they should make these concessions, I'm all in favor of that.

Host: Well, that's all the time we have for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Marc Ginsberg, former U-S ambassador to Morocco and Khalil Jahshan of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. Before we go, I'd like to invite you to send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to ontheline@ibb.gov

For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.