13 March 2003
U.S.-European Relations Called Strong Despite Iraq Debate
(Assistant Secretary Jones briefs House Europe subcommittee) (7060)
"While we are seriously concerned by differences between the U.S. and
some European countries on the best way to achieve our agreed goal of
Iraqi disarmament, it is also fair to say there are many areas in
which the U.S.-European relationship is as strong as ever," Assistant
Secretary of State Beth Jones told Congress March 13.
Jones, head of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, was
testifying before the House International Relations Committee's
Subcommittee on Europe.
She cited the U.S.-European partnership against global terrorism; $2
trillion [$2 million million] annually in trade and investment;
milestones in U.S.-Russia relations; joint efforts in the Balkans, the
Middle East and Africa; and joint efforts to promote regional
stability in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
"The tensions with some of our traditional Allies are acute, but our
longer-term common interests remain," Jones said.
She went on to take as her major topics Iraq, NATO, the European
Union, the OSCE, counterterrorism cooperation, Russia, Ukraine,
Turkey, the Balkans, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the Caucasus, the
Baltics, global issues, and State Department resource needs.
Among her prepared remarks to the Subcommittee:
- Iraq: "There is sharp disagreement among European and Eurasian
countries about how to enforce [Iraq's] compliance with the Security
Council," Jones said. "We have held private talks with many European
governments about possible coalition action. In a number of cases,
acting on a bilateral basis, we have requested and obtained base
access and overflight and transit clearances. Some countries are
already committed to providing military forces to participate. Should
military action prove necessary, we would also look to our Allies and
friends in Europe for post-conflict support, including humanitarian
assistance and reconstruction."
- NATO: "It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies
chose, at least initially, to confuse the obligation of the Alliance
to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey with the broader
debate over the question of what we should be doing about Iraq in the
UN and elsewhere," Jones said. She also remarked that the United
States would like to see NATO "do more to reach out" to Central Asia
and the Caucasus, given their importance as frontline states in the
war on terrorism.
- European Union: "Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Kyoto, ICC
[International Criminal Court], steel, FSC [Foreign Sales
Corporation], beef hormones, and biotech are the most contentious
issues," she said. "For all the differences, our areas of common
belief and objectives with the EU remain greater than with any other
potential partner. A perception of fundamental divergence is neither
in our interest nor accurate."
- Russia: "Russia continues to be a key partner in the global war on
terror, and we have cooperated in important ways on key regional
problems, such as supporting the Middle East Peace Process in the
'Quartet' and defusing tensions between India and Pakistan. On some
other international issues, Russia's support has not been as solid.
Thus far they have not been helpful on Iraq in the UN ... [a]nd we are
urging Russia to engage more actively on the DPRK [North Korea]
nuclear problem."
- Ukraine: "Despite the Kolchuga [radar sale to Iraq] authorization
and serious concerns about democracy and human rights, we are
convinced that we must maintain our broad-based engagement with all
segments of Ukrainian society, and especially with those promoting
political and economic reform," Jones said. She also revealed that
Ukrainian authorities have "indicated that they are actively
considering deploying a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)
defense battalion to the Gulf, in case frontline states are targets of
attack by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction."
- Turkey: "We still hope we will be able to stage a Northern Option
through Turkey. We are discussing options with the Turkish
authorities. In any case, we are also making clear that Turkey must
not move into Iraq unilaterally."
- Cyprus: "We were deeply disappointed that the [U.N.] Secretary
General's talks with the two leaders in The Hague did not result in an
agreement to put his plan to referenda in both communities. We regret
in particular that Mr. Denktash refused to allow the Turkish Cypriots
to decide for themselves on their future."
Following is the text of Jones' written statement:
(begin text)
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
March 13, 2003
TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY BETH JONES BEFORE THE HOUSE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE - SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
Written Statement
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today
to review with you the Administration's priorities in Europe,
including Russia and the Caucasus. At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I want
to congratulate you on becoming chairman of this subcommittee. Mr.
Gallegly, we appreciate your past work on the subcommittee and we look
forward to working with you on the Subcommittee on International
Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights.
As you suggested in your invitation letter, it is a timely moment to
assess the health of the overall trans-Atlantic relationship. While we
are seriously concerned by differences between the U.S. and some
European countries on the best way to achieve our agreed goal of Iraqi
disarmament, it is also fair to say there are many areas in which the
U.S.-European relationship is as strong as ever.
Our European Allies and friends are vital partners in the campaign
against global terrorism. We are opening new markets for U.S. goods
and services and addressing barriers to American exports and
investment. We have achieved important milestones in our relationship
with Russia. Progress in the Balkans is ongoing. Our efforts continue
to promote regional stability in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Europe is changing in momentous and important ways. Thus, our
relationship with Europe will continue to evolve as we adapt to, and
in some cases participate in, these changes. Both NATO and the EU are
expanding eastward, bringing in countries that are embracing democracy
and market economies. These twin expansions bring us closer to
President Bush's vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. The
invitees bring a new perspective and a new energy to the EU and NATO.
These expanded boundaries challenge European nations to build a new
concept of themselves. They challenge the U.S. to work constructively
with this new reality.
The tensions with some of our traditional Allies are acute, but our
longer-term common interests remain. Our economic relationship with
Europe amounts to about $2 trillion [$2 million million] in trade and
investment. Millions of travelers cross the Atlantic each year. We
cooperate closely on matters of regional and global significance, from
trafficking in persons, to trade liberalization, to terrorism
financing. Europe remains our most important partner in promoting
human rights, Europe joins us in seeking peace in the Middle East and
supporting development in Africa.
We recognize that the bonds forged so firmly in the Second World War
and the Marshall Plan's reconstruction of Europe are matters of
history to the younger generation of Western Europeans. For those in
Central Europe, Russia and Eurasia, however, Cold War traditions of
conflict and confrontation are legacies they would like to leave
behind. The Secretary, Department Principals, my colleagues in EUR,
and our Embassies abroad are actively using public diplomacy and other
tools to reach both of these generations, in order to lay the
groundwork for strong and vibrant U.S.-European relations for decades
to come.
Iraq
The most pressing challenge for U.S.-European relations today is how
to ensure that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein complies with the
requirements of more than 17 UN Security Council resolutions and fully
disarms. Plainly, there is sharp disagreement among European and
Eurasian countries about how to enforce compliance with the Security
Council.
Some European countries, especially the United Kingdom, Spain, and
Bulgaria, agree with us that Saddam Hussein has missed his final
opportunity to disarm. They and others understand that the
international community must be prepared to back up its writ with the
use of force, as anticipated by UNSCR 1441. A number of countries in
Central Europe and Eurasia have pledged forces and specialized units
to the coalition we have assembled.
At this juncture, however, other European countries -- notably UNSC
members France, Germany, and Russia -- favor giving the inspection
process more time. These countries generally acknowledge that the
Iraqis engaged only in limited and truculent compliance, but hope that
more time and intensified inspections can achieve results. The German
government insists that force should not be used under any
circumstances.
We believe that, in the absence of a genuine commitment by the Iraqi
regime to disarm, more time for inspections or more inspectors -- as
proposed recently by France -- will not solve the fundamental problem
of Iraqi non-compliance.
We know what genuine disarmament looks like. We have seen it in
Ukraine and in Kazakhstan. Governments that accept the priority of
disarmament don't dribble out concessions. They take on obligations
and make commitments willingly, and they list their weapons sites
freely.
We welcome expressions of support for our policy on Iraq from a number
of European leaders. This includes the January 30 letter signed by
eight European leaders (from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary,
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK) and the February 5
statement by the "Vilnius 10" (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). We also
appreciate the statement of the EU Summit on Iraq on February 17,
emphasizing the focus must be on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 1441.
In the United Nations, we are working intensively with the UK and
Spain to ensure broad support for our draft resolution. We would like
to see the Iraqi threat addressed through the Security Council, thus
strengthening its credibility.
Should military action against Iraq take place, we are seeking the
broadest possible international coalition. We have held private talks
with many European governments about possible coalition action. In a
number of cases, acting on a bilateral basis, we have requested and
obtained base access and overflight and transit clearances. Some
countries are already committed to providing military forces to
participate. Should military action prove necessary, we would also
look to our Allies and friends in Europe for post-conflict support,
including humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.
NATO
For over fifty years, the United States and its European Allies have
been joined in a common cause through NATO. We have been working hard
since the September 11th attacks to transform the Alliance to address
these new security threats. The Summit meeting of heads of state and
government in Prague last November represented an historic milestone
in this process. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity
to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly and to thank you for your advocacy of U.S. interests in that
organization. I also want to applaud your deep engagement at Prague
and your continuing support for NATO's transformation.
At the Prague Summit, NATO members agreed on an ambitious program
proposed by the U.S. to develop "New Capabilities, New Members and New
Relationships" to transform the Alliance. Our European Allies agreed
to improve their military capabilities, through resource pooling and
specialization, helping NATO to undertake collective action against
the new threats that we face around the globe. The Allies also
endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force, which
will give the Alliance a cutting-edge land, air and sea capability. We
agreed to streamline the NATO command structure to make it more lean,
efficient and responsive to today's threats. Work on implementing our
new capabilities initiative is well underway.
Our decision to invite seven new members to join the Alliance will
extend the zone of NATO security and stability from the Baltic to the
Black Sea, helping to further secure a Europe that is whole, free and
at peace. We are pleased that each of the seven invitees has already
made significant military contributions to the war on terrorism and we
will look to them to provide specialized niche capabilities to the
Alliance in the future.
Prague also celebrated the establishment of a new relationship between
NATO and Russia. NATO states and Russia are working together in the
NATO-Russia Council as equal partners on selected projects aimed at
expanding and deepening our mutual cooperation. Current projects are
focused on peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, non-proliferation
and missile defense. I am pleased to report that so far the
NATO-Russia Council has been relatively successful. Russian
participation has been constructive and cooperative. As this process
continues, we will seek ways to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russia
relationship. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at Prague provides a
roadmap which, if implemented by Ukraine, will draw Ukraine closer to
the Alliance and bolster internal reforms.
It is a source of some regret that last month some Allies chose, at
least initially, to confuse the obligation of the Alliance to provide
purely defensive assistance to Turkey with the broader debate over the
question of what we should be doing about Iraq in the UN and
elsewhere. This is not the first time NATO has experienced
disagreement on a difficult and important issue. One only has to think
back to the debate over the INF deployment in the 1980s. The fact is
that NATO remains the fundamental means by which the Allies guarantee
their common security and the indispensable defense link that binds
North America to Europe.
NATO is also outward looking. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
and Partnership for Peace are important tools in enhancing cooperation
with the Eurasian countries. Given the increased importance of Central
Asia and the Caucasus as frontline states in the war on terrorism, we
would like to see NATO do more to reach out to these countries.
EU
While NATO forms the foundation of the trans-Atlantic security
framework, our relations with the EU underpin our economic and
political relationship with Europe. The European Union has become
increasingly important to our interests. As the only entity on the
world stage with an ability similar to ours to project economic,
political, and cultural power, the EU has an important influence on
the environment both within and beyond Europe.
Some observers suggest the gulf dividing the U.S. and EU has never
been wider. Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian issues, Kyoto, ICC, steel, FSC,
beef hormones, and biotech are the most contentious issues. Putting
the situation into context, we have been here before, with the Soviet
pipeline, Helms-Burton and ILSA. Our common interests, bonds, and
values proved stronger than these divisions. For all the differences,
our areas of common belief and objectives with the EU remain greater
than with any other potential partner. A perception of fundamental
divergence is neither in our interest nor accurate.
Over $500 billion in trade between the U.S. and EU takes place each
year, creating jobs and boosting growth on both sides of the Atlantic.
We are also each other's largest foreign investors, and those flows
continue. The vast majority of trade and investment occurs without
headlines, without rancor, without dispute. At the Doha meeting of the
WTO, the U.S. and the EU came together to launch a new round and
provide new momentum for free trade. At the last U.S.-EU Summit, we
agreed to develop a Positive Economic Agenda. This is a mechanism to
find common approaches to regulatory issues across a broad range of
sectors, and to advance our active dialogue on access to financial
markets. While these efforts hopefully will minimize areas of future
trade disputes, where we have disagreements now, such as over
agricultural biotechnology, we are pressing the EU to open its markets
to us without delay. We will use all available tools, including where
appropriate the WTO, to protect our interests.
Increased U.S.-EU cooperation receives little publicity in
non-economic areas. In counterterrorism, we negotiated an agreement
that facilitates the exchange of information between EUROPOL and U.S.
law enforcement. We have concluded negotiations toward a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty/Extradition Treaty, which must now enter the
approval process. Coordinated U.S. and EU diplomacy and assistance
have been key to Balkans stabilization. In Afghanistan, we jointly
prevented a humanitarian crisis, and we continue to work together to
build democratic government, infrastructure and jobs. Another example
of EU-U.S. cooperation is the joint application of visa restrictions
on the leadership of the secessionist Transnistria regime in Moldova.
Together, we are sending a strong signal to the Tiraspol regime that
it must negotiate seriously to bring this longstanding issue to a
rapid settlement.
The accession of ten new countries to the European Union in 2004 is a
significant EU achievement. It has also been a longstanding U.S.
policy objective. EU enlargement will cement these nations, most of
which were members of the former Soviet bloc, into the West. The
accession process and adherence to the EU's body of law will also
improve and standardize regulations, resulting in better business
climates, improved human rights standards and treatment of minorities,
and stronger capacity for law enforcement cooperation.
We are also working with the EU to encourage more engagement with the
nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, all of whom will become
Europe's "new neighbors" after EU enlargement. We are seeking EU
political engagement as well financial support for the kinds of
reforms that will make these nations stable, democratic and prosperous
members of Europe.
Finally, we support the EU's efforts to establish a European Security
and Defense Policy that is closely coordinated with NATO, and that
would allow the EU to take on tasks such as peacekeeping and other
humanitarian missions in which NATO decides not to be engaged. We were
pleased that in December last year the long-standing impasse over the
participation of non-EU NATO Allies in ESDP operations was resolved.
Since that time, NATO and the EU have been working to finalize other
elements of "Berlin-plus" arrangements that will set out the basic
elements of cooperation between NATO and the EU. We expect that the
Berlin-plus package will be completed in the next few weeks.
Once all arrangements are in place and NATO decides to end Operation
ALLIED HARMONY, we will welcome the EU's assumption of that mission at
the request of the Macedonian government.
The OSCE
For the United States, the OSCE serves as an invaluable forum for
protecting security, economic well-being, and human rights and
democratization throughout Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Let me recognize the U.S. members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
from this Chamber, who have also used the OSCE with profound impact to
advance U.S. values and interests.
The OSCE is engaged in improving the lives of citizens in numerous
countries, with programs that range from election observation, to
police training, to promoting civil society. OSCE human rights
rapporteurs serve as beacons of credibility and frankness. This
spring, at our urging, the OSCE will tackle the troubling increase in
anti-Semitic violence throughout Eurasia with a special meeting on
anti-Semitism.
In the aftermath of September 11, our partners at OSCE have also
focused on combating terrorism. Through the OSCE we are assisting our
most critical partners -- the Central Asian and Caucasus nations -- in
the War Against Terrorism to address an entire agenda of measures that
will help secure their regions and all of Europe against the threat of
terror.
Counterterrorism Cooperation
A year and a half after September 11, our European and Eurasian allies
continue to be strong supporters in the war against terrorism.
Most European countries, especially our NATO partners, acted quickly
to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and
the follow-on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The UK
in particular played a central role with the U.S. in rooting out the
Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan. Although the countries of
Central Asia are not part of the jurisdiction of this subcommittee,
they are part of my bureau, so I wanted to note their important
contribution to OEF as well, both in hosting coalition bases and in
working with us on infrastructure improvements.
The nations of Europe and Eurasia continue to play a vital role in
rebuilding a secure and democratically governed Afghanistan, with
contributions of funds, military assets, supplies, humanitarian aid
and infrastructure development.
There are 18 European coalition partners with forces deployed in
Afghanistan, with either ISAF or in support of OEF. European countries
have contributed air, sea and land assets, and have placed elite
troops on the ground. European units are taking part in maritime
interdiction operations. All of the countries that have led ISAF are
from the European region.
Afghanistan must one day be able to ensure its own security, and to
that end, European partners are center stage in building the Afghan
National Army (ANA). The ANA now consists of seven combat battalions,
with one more in training. Our European partners have trained four of
these battalions. A number of European countries have provided
equipment valued at over $20 million.
Afghanistan's shattered infrastructure is another essential element in
reconstruction and security. The European Union earmarked $93 million
for road reconstruction in Afghanistan for the next two years.
European countries both donated and transported large amounts of
humanitarian relief and reconstruction supplies. It has been a united
effort in every sense.
In Georgia, Russian bombings of northern Georgia beginning in 2000
were a clear and unacceptable violation of Georgian sovereignty.
Russia accused the Georgian government of failing to control Georgia's
territory in the Pankisi Gorge and allowing the region to become a
safe-haven for criminals, terrorists, and Chechen rebels. The Russians
were demanding action against terrorism.
Our immediate response was to draw a clear "red line" against any
further violation of Georgian territory. We made clear to the Georgian
government that it could not allow its territory to act as a
safe-haven for terrorists and urged its support for the Global War on
Terrorism. We made clear to the Russian and Georgian governments that
Georgia should be left to resolve the problems within its own
territory.
As part of our effort to help Georgia develop the capabilities
necessary to face this problem and protect its territory, we developed
the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), which began in May 2002.
GTEP is designed to assist Georgia in border security, anti-terrorism,
crisis response and military reform. The goal of the program is to
train four Georgian Army light infantry battalions and a mechanized
company team. Selected elements of the Georgian Border Guards and
other security forces are participating with the goal of providing
greater interoperability with MOD in time of crisis. In December 2002,
the program graduated its first combat battalion, which is now ready
for deployment against international terrorists on Georgian territory.
In our view, the program is successfully addressing the need to
enhance Georgia's security and guarantee its sovereignty.
Efforts by coalition partners have helped thwart impending terrorist
actions against the United States. Our European counterparts are
sharing law enforcement and intelligence information, conducting
investigations into the September 11 attacks, and strengthening laws
to aid the fight against terrorism. Additionally, we are working with
the OSCE to improve the capacity of member states to fight terrorism.
In Greece, several members of the November 17 terrorist group are now
standing trial. In February the authorities arrested four suspected
members of the Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), another domestic
terrorist group.
European police and intelligence agencies have also provided
unprecedented practical help in investigating and bringing terrorists
to justice, denying financing to terrorists and their supporters, and
strengthening security against terrorist attacks. Many European and
Eurasian countries have joined with us to place several
individuals/entities on the asset freeze list maintained by the UN's
1267 Sanctions Committee.
On the Eurasia front, Russia has been generous in its support for the
coalition, from OEF planning to intelligence exchanges to support in
the UN. It has also changed its financial enforcement infrastructure
to block terrorist assets. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have also
provided vital support in the war against terrorism. They have offered
unequivocal political and military support, are playing critical roles
in OEF, and have provided vital intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation and information sharing on terrorist groups and assets.
Given the importance of European opinion in our counterterrorism
efforts, we plan to enhance public diplomacy efforts to boost support
for our policies and actions. We will reach out to the diverse Muslim
communities in both Europe and Eurasia in an effort to improve the
image of the U.S.
Russia
Over the past year we continued to develop strong cooperation with
Russia. Our relationship covers a broad spectrum. On strategic issues,
we reached agreement with Russia last May on the Moscow Treaty,
radically reducing strategic offensive weapons. We are pleased that
the Senate ratified this treaty last Thursday.
Russia continues to be a key partner in the global war on terror, and
we have cooperated in important ways on key regional problems, such as
supporting the Middle East Peace Process in the "Quartet" and defusing
tensions between India and Pakistan. On some other international
issues, Russia's support has not been as solid. Thus far they have not
been helpful on Iraq in the UN as noted earlier. And we are urging
Russia to engage more actively on the DPRK nuclear problem.
In law enforcement matters, new Russian legislation on money
laundering helped remove it from the Financial Action Task Force's
list of countries of concern. Yet corruption remains a serious
problem.
We strongly support democratization and economic reform in Russia,
largely through U.S. assistance under the FREEDOM Support Act. There
have been major advances in democratic freedoms in Russia, such as the
introduction of jury trials and reform of the criminal code. But media
freedom continues to be a problem, while the freedom of foreign clergy
to enter Russia became a problem last year.
This year we are witnessing what may be the first serious effort at a
solution to the Chechnya conflict, beginning with a constitutional
referendum slated for March 23. We are concerned over the security and
political conditions under which the referendum is being held.
However, we hope this can be the basis for a political solution to
that tragic conflict. As indicated by our February 28 designation of
three Chechen organizations as terrorists, there are definitely
terrorist elements among Chechen fighters. But our broader policy on
the Chechnya conflict remains unchanged. In addition to seeking a
political solution, the Russian government needs to exercise greater
discipline over its forces, and there must be meaningful
accountability for human rights violations committed by Russian forces
against civilians.
In economic matters, the Russian government has made progress on
market reforms. Large Russian companies are adopting more Western
practices and becoming more transparent. But much remains to be done
-- the government must provide a more welcoming environment for
investors, crack down on corruption, continue reforms and enforcement
of the rule of law, improve IPR protection, uphold court decisions,
support the growth of small and medium enterprises, and pursue the
breakup of monopolies. WTO accession for Russia remains a priority, as
this will be a major force for reform. As we move to expand
U.S.-Russian economic relations, there is a natural fit between
Russia's desire to play a greater role in providing oil and gas to
global energy markets and our interest in diversifying supply.
Jackson-Vanik graduation remains an Administration priority. The law
has achieved its purpose, and we now have other more effective tools
to manage the U.S.-Russian trade relationship.
Ukraine
Our relationship with Ukraine has gone through a difficult period.
President Kuchma's authorization of the Kolchuga transfer to Iraq has
eroded trust. Yet Ukraine remains strategically important; its future
will have a significant impact on the future of its neighbors and
Europe as a whole. Despite the Kolchuga authorization and serious
concerns about democracy and human rights, we are convinced that we
must maintain our broad-based engagement with all segments of
Ukrainian society, and especially with those promoting political and
economic reform. This is in our long-term interest -- and Ukraine's.
Our agenda supports Ukraine's integration into European and
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whatever limitations Ukraine's leadership
has demonstrated to date in fostering economic and political change, a
new generation of leaders is waiting in the wings for a chance to give
reform new impetus.
Our goal is to confront bilateral problems and find practical
solutions that can inject positive momentum into the relationship. We
plan to pursue reform of Ukraine's export control regime as a way to
prevent future Kolchuga episodes. We have offered U.S. assistance for
this purpose. Outstanding questions on Kolchuga remain and might never
be fully answered. For now, we believe we should concentrate our
energies in helping to implement reforms that will head off
proliferation problems.
We continue to shift assistance resources from programs benefiting the
central government to those that more directly support civil society.
One of our particular areas of focus is media freedom, which we
believe has been under attack in Ukraine and which will be crucial in
helping to ensure free and fair Presidential elections in 2004. We
will be watching closely the Ukrainian authorities' treatment of
independent journalists and media outlets, particularly as the 2004
elections draw closer.
We will continue to deepen the good cooperation we have with Ukraine
on strategic issues. The Ukrainian authorities have indicated that
they are actively considering deploying a Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) defense battalion to the Gulf, in case frontline states
are targets of attack by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine
has also stood shoulder to shoulder with us in the war on terror. They
have allowed more than 5,000 overflights connected with Operation
Enduring Freedom, and have fully equipped a battalion in the Afghan
National Army.
We also want Ukraine's help in solving the Transnistria conflict in
Moldova -- one of Ukraine's neighbors. Ukraine has an important role
to play, both as a constructive mediator in the ongoing Transnistria
political settlement talks and as a partner for Moldova in increasing
security along their common border.
Turkey
Among our priorities in Europe is our relationship with Turkey. As a
key NATO ally located at the crossroads between Europe and Asia,
Turkey is always a top priority. We have strongly supported EU
membership for Turkey, and have worked hard with them in an effort to
resolve the Cyprus issue.
Right now, the focus is on Iraq. We are seeking Turkish cooperation
because the northern option can help shorten an eventual war, leading
to fewer casualties and lower economic costs to all. On March 1, the
Turkish Parliament did not approve permitting U.S. troop deployments
to Turkey for a possible conflict with Iraq. This can be attributed,
in part, to polling data indicating 90-95 percent of the Turkish
public is opposed to war in Iraq. In addition, there was a lack of
unity in the ruling party. This is a setback with regard to planning
for Iraq, but we are consulting with the Turks on next steps in the
spirit of the strategic partnership between our countries.
Both we and the Turks have very serious concerns over economic costs
to Turkey of a war, as in 1991. Turkey also cites to us concern over
northern Iraq, including Kurdish ambitions and the status of the oil
fields. Turkey feels that ethnic Turkomen are not sufficiently
represented in the Iraqi opposition leadership and we are working to
resolve this issue.
We still hope we will be able to stage a Northern Option through
Turkey. We are discussing options with the Turkish authorities.
In any case, we are also making clear that Turkey must not move into
Iraq unilaterally.
In addition to ongoing discussions on Iraq, we are working with Turkey
and international financial institutions to bolster the Turkish
economy. Turkey must take adequate measures to get back on track with
its IMF reform program.
The Balkans
Our goal and that of the Balkan governments is to promote democracy,
market orientation, regional stability and peace, and integration into
NATO and the European Union. While challenges remain, there is
progress. International troop levels are down. Refugee returns are up.
Zagreb and Belgrade successfully negotiated an end to their dispute
over the Prevlaka Peninsula without international mediation. Economic
growth in the region was good at around four percent last year. There
have been a number of successful elections in the region. The United
States' level of involvement is decreasing as our European partners
are picking up more diplomatic and military responsibility for the
region.
The overall military presence in the region has been reduced
significantly, with our European Allies now comprising over 80 percent
of the forces there. SFOR has declined from its peak strength of
approximately 60,000 to 12,000; KFOR from its peak strength of
approximately 50,000 to 25,000.
NATO's presence in the region remains under periodic review to ensure
that our forces are adequate but not excessive in light of conditions
on the ground. The Alliance should continue to play a role in the
international community's efforts in the region by gradually shifting
its focus from stabilization to long-term engagement through
institutions like the Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile, we are working
closely with the EU and with NATO to pursue the European Union's offer
to take on the military mission in Macedonia, once the important
details, as envisaged in the "Berlin Plus" agreement, are worked out
and NATO has decided to end its Operation ALLIED HARMONY.
The democratic process is taking root: elections were held in Serbia
and Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia, and were
considered free and fair by international observers -- although not
all ended in a conclusive result.
Providing real opportunities for refugee and IDP returns is important
for long-term stability and European integration. Refugee returns to
Bosnia have gained their own momentum, and minority returns to Kosovo
have outpaced minority departures. Still, refugee returns to Kosovo
and Croatia have been disappointing overall, and we need to continue
to press for progress.
Many countries in the region are reliable and vigorous partners in the
global war on terrorism and have taken close and cooperative steps
with us to combat proliferation and the gray arms trade.
Despite these positive developments, challenges remain. We seek to
help resolve remaining post-conflict issues -- including war criminals
and refugee return -- while we encourage the post-Communist transition
through political and economic reform. We are focused significantly on
building the rule of law through our assistance under the Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) Act. It is particularly important to
address ineffective law enforcement, corruption and porous borders,
which make the region attractive for organized crime, trafficking,
political extremism and terrorist activity, and unattractive for
legitimate investment and entrepreneurship. We continue to work
closely with the countries of Southeast Europe, our European Allies,
and the international community as the region moves towards European
integration. Much progress has been made since Milosevic presided over
wars, ethnic cleansing, and the forced displacement of approximately
four million people. But U.S. engagement in the region -- in
partnership with our European Allies -- will be needed for some years
to come.
Regional Stability: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Caucasus, Baltics
Outside the Balkans, we are promoting regional stability in other
areas. In Cyprus, we have strongly supported the efforts of the UN
Secretary General to achieve a settlement before Cyprus signs the EU
accession treaty April 16 so Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would
enjoy the benefits of EU membership. We were deeply disappointed that
the Secretary General's talks with the two leaders in The Hague did
not result in an agreement to put his plan to referenda in both
communities. We regret in particular that Mr. Denktash refused to
allow the Turkish Cypriots to decide for themselves on their future.
Despite this setback, the U.S. remains committed to seeking a just and
durable settlement to the Cyprus problem.
In Northern Ireland, we wholeheartedly support the UK and Ireland in
their efforts to push the peace process to a new level of stability.
Prime Ministers Blair and Ahern have just concluded marathon sessions
in this regard with the parties. Northern Ireland Assembly elections
have been rescheduled from May 1 to May 29 to give time for reflection
and discussion within the parties and communities. We urge the
leaders, communities, and people of Northern Ireland to seize this
opportunity to build on the success of the Good Friday Agreement.
In the Caucasus, the United States serves as a Co-Chair along with
France and Russia of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this role, the U.S.
continues to pursue actively a comprehensive, mutually acceptable
settlement to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijian over
Nagorno-Karabakh. With presidential elections in both countries this
year, neither side currently is willing to make the politically
difficult compromises necessary to negotiate a peace agreement.
However, the Co-Chairs continue their efforts in the hope that the
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships can find the political will
needed to reach a permanent solution to this conflict.
Regarding the conflict in Abkhazia, the U.S., as a member of the UN
Secretary General's Friends of Georgia Group (FOG), continues to work
with France, Germany, Russia, and the UK to pursue a comprehensive,
negotiated settlement that respects Georgia's territorial integrity.
At the other corner of Europe, we have been promoting regional
cooperation in Northern Europe under the Northern Europe Initiative
and the U.S. Baltic Charter. Active U.S. engagement in Northern Europe
will continue as the Baltic States move into NATO and the EU and the
region becomes more prosperous and secure. We are crafting an updated
U.S. approach that recognizes much has been achieved in the
Nordic-Baltic area through multilateral cooperation, and builds on
this success. We anticipate focussing on three major substantive
areas: political security, healthy societies/healthy neighborhoods,
and our trade, investment, economic and business ties.
Global Issues
As NATO and other European institutions enlarge, we have been acutely
aware that a Europe whole, free, and at peace can function only if it
is truly a community of shared values. For that reason, the United
States has pressed hard for continuing progress on issues left
unresolved from the Holocaust, World War II, and the Communist era. We
have encouraged property restitution, we recently assumed the Chair in
Office of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, and we
have strongly supported the holding this year of an OSCE Specialized
Meeting on Anti-Semitism.
Enhanced defense and security cooperation and intelligence sharing
must be buttressed by societies committed to democratic principles
such as those in the Final Act in the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. A number of European countries have concluded
agreements with us under Article 98 of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), ensuring that U.S. citizens would not be surrendered to
the ICC. Moreover, we are continuing efforts with our trans-Atlantic
partners to address problems that respect no borders, such as HIV/AIDS
and infectious disease, narcotics trafficking and environmental
degradation.
We are working with our partners in Europe and Eurasia to combat the
growing problem of trafficking in persons. This grave, transnational
human crime is something we can only eliminate by working together.
Governments from Western Europe to Central Asia have passed important
legislation to outlaw trafficking and have cooperated with each other
on the prosecution of these traffickers. We are also encouraging
prevention of trafficking through public awareness and protection of
victims, both in destination countries and upon return to home
countries. We have encouraged governments and NGOs -- both integral
partners in this fight -- to share expertise and resources to respond
to the criminal aspect of this tragedy as well as the needs of the
victims. Most recently, we concluded the congressionally mandated
international conference on sex trafficking here in Washington, D.C.
Over 300 participants from the region attended.
Success in addressing transnational problems is more important than
ever in pursuing America's trans-Atlantic agenda. Stable countries
able to withstand terrorist and other threats are based on respect for
the rule of law, human rights, religious freedom, and open media.
Stable countries have vibrant civil societies. They are committed to
the principles of free market economies.
Resources
On the management side, we are also addressing the needs of our
diplomats who represent us overseas. Appropriate and secure facilities
are critical to operational success. We continue our work with the
Bureau of Overseas Building Operation to press forward with building
projects in our region. In FY03 we expect that four New Embassy
Compounds will be occupied and four new projects initiated. As our
nation's priorities and policies develop and change, it is essential
that adequate funding be made available to allow flexibility in our
building plans. Rightsizing and controlling growth are an integral
part of our facility planning process.
As we further engage on the war on terrorism and as the number of EU
and NATO members and aspirants continues to grow, Mission activities
and workloads increase commensurately. Through the Secretary's
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), additional staff are being
deployed to posts throughout the region. In January the DRI provided
23 positions for EUR, and we expect to receive additional positions
when the FY03 phase of the DRI is fully implemented.
We have a highly dedicated group of people working in our missions.
They are keenly aware that their contributions to promote U.S.
interests are important, particularly during these challenging times.
Heightened worldwide tensions have increased the need for contingency
planning and actions, taxing already strained resources. Despite
facing greater personal security concerns for themselves and their
families, employee morale overseas is good. It is essential, however,
that we continue to support our staff and their families with improved
workplaces and housing and through incentives and other means of
recognition.
The entire State Department is carrying out this important work around
the world. To do the job effectively, we need adequate resources. I
appreciate your taking the time to listen to my testimony today, and I
will be pleased to address your questions.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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