USEUCOM Defense Information Group Press Briefing
Monday, March 3, 2003 - 10:30 a.m. CET
Presenter: Commander, U.S. European Command, Gen. James L. Jones
Good morning everybody. First of all let me apologize for keeping you waiting. I normally try to be very prompt. I was in discussions with a visiting delegation and it ran on and those things are important. I apologize. These things are important as well and I'll take whatever time you need to get your questions answered. I'm very happy to be here and to meet each and every one of you.
By way of an opening statement, I'd simply like to start out by saying I think not only the European Command but the military capability of the Alliance of NATO literally stands and figuratively stands at a crossroads between two centuries.
On the one hand, in the 20th century we should celebrate and congratulate ourselves on the tremendous Alliance that virtually triumphed over the opposition, over the Soviet Union. In the 20th century, we built a primarily defensive Alliance. Our posture was always defensive in nature and we're now sitting astride a new century. We need to do some things that will fundamentally address our military capabilities both within the NATO Alliance itself and within the US European Command in order to more fully respond to the asymmetric challenges of the 21st century.
The good news is that all of this is imminently feasible. Some of this comes under the word, "transformation," which is a word that can mean a lot of different things to different people, so I'd like to tell you what it means to me.
Transformation to me means one of two things. Either by acquiring a new way of doing things or presenting something new that is something you couldn't do before. Or by substantially changing something you could do before. Either with a modification or different way of looking at things. You can do things exponentially better than you could do before. I would tell you that the Global Positioning System is transformation. Going from dumb bombs to smart munitions is transformation.
But it isn't just about technology. Transformation, as I think we're witnessing, literally stands in four different areas. Technology is one and that's the one that's most easily understood.
Operational concepts are also transformational and are transforming. To give you a snapshot of what I mean by that, I think that the infantry companies of the 21st century will be able to do what infantry battalions of the 20th century did. That's the kind of significant change that I think the military is undergoing.
In the 20th century we used to have massive headquarters-the requirement for massive headquarters-very people...population constrained...not constrained...but very population based-a heavy investment of people, large staffs.
The 21st century military headquarters operationally will be considerably smaller because of the tremendous reach back capability we have with technology. No longer will we be tied to the fixed stockpiles of logistics that characterize the 20th century-using an integrated logistics concept that will truly be transformational. Logistics will be more "just in time" logistics (to use a Fed Ex term) than it was in the 20th century. So those kinds of operational concepts, the fact that the world is a smaller place from the standpoint of getting from point A to point B, will dramatically change the way we think about our basing, our force employment, our utilizations, and to, I think, much greater effect.
The first pillar of transformation for me is institutional reform-institutional transformation of large static headquarters and the number of them that you have to have. I think there's great opportunities to change how we manage our manpower for example. I believe that the most transformational thing that's happening in the armed forces of the United States is now 27 years old. Although we didn't call it transformation, the advent of the all-volunteer force in 27 years has transformed the military. The fact that we've downsized the Army, Navy and the Air Force, roughly 40 percent following Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and we're able to multiply the effect of that downsizing into much greater capability is an example of the kind of sweeping transformation that is on going and that we must draw the correct reference from.
And the last form of transformation to me is an insistence that those of us who are privileged enough to lead in uniform have got to be also the advocate and articulators of how we spend our resources. It appears to me that there is much potential to transform the way we currently operate in terms of our business practices and the way acquire the equipment that we acquire. That's more of a domestic transformation, but the idea that it takes 10 to 15 years to field a major system; you have built in obsolescence in many of these systems by the time you field it. It's simply a product of the way we are required to do business. Some of our laws and some of our traditions with regards to acquisitions have got to be changed as well.
So those to me are the four pillars of transformation. A brief little definition of what it's about and the fact that it is definitely happening and going to happen in the near future and continue to happen within the European Command and I also think you'll see elements of that within the NATO Alliance itself.
At the same time NATO has received a tremendous boost of adrenalin, if you will, after Prague by signaling to the political Alliance that it is willing to stand by seven members. The military capability that undergirds the Alliance has got to also change-and go from a 20th century defensive Alliance with heavy forces positioned throughout the Alliance and all member nations to a new capability that may not nearly be as robust in terms of the number or size of the army committed to it. But it needs to be more capable in terms of the effect it can deliver. The vehicle that I see that is the most visible and has the most potential is the NATO Response Force. The NATO Response Force if its done well, and I think it will be, could very quickly give NATO an expeditionary capability of light, agile, mobile, sustainable, immediately usable forces that will be absolutely perfectly suited to our international commitment to a global war on terrorism. This is a force that can be built out of existing assets that can be operational and functional in a very short period of time and it will perfectly compliment what the United States' concerns are on the global playing field with regards to the many missions we find ourselves faced with and challenged by.
The US European Command's part of that, of course, is to also reassess where we are in terms of the Alliance and how we best support it. With an Alliance that's moving to the east then it seems to me eminently logical that we as a nation will have more contacts with the new members and allies to the east. As you know, EUCOM comprises 93 countries now and part of the transformation and change for the future will be to try to figure out how best to do that. We have a potential to apply 21st century technology and 21st century transformation to still what is, for us in Europe, a 20th century basing strategy.
And over the next several months we will be looking at ways to translate some of the investment we've made in our infrastructure to a more effects-based strategy for the future which allows us to be more flexible, perhaps more agile and to engage in more areas of our standard area of responsibility to the east and to the south. By the south I mean sub-saharan Africa and the southern rim of the Mediterranean.
And so this is, to me, not revolutionary but evolutionary. It's something I believe theater components will sign up to and support and we're working hard at it. And we will do our best to propose to our national leadership and to the NATO Alliance how both of those things can happen simultaneously and virtual real time.
With that as an opening introduction, I'll close by saying I'm extraordinarily happy and proud to serve as the commander of US European Command and the Allied Commander in Europe and look forward to the next few years and try to do something good for the Alliance and for the very important role that the United States has placed in Europe since World War II.
With that I'll take your questions.
Q: Yesterday the Turkish parliament voted to have 50,000 American soldiers not to deploy in Turkey. What does that mean for EUCOM?
A: It means that for the near future, and by that I mean for the next several days, that the dialogue that will go on between the United States and Turkey at the diplomatic level, at the highest levels. We, as the military community, that were moving in a certain direction will have to wait and see how the diplomatic dialogue resolves itself so we can take the guidance we need to do the things-to either continue on or do things differently as the case may be. I don't have any better answers than that at this point.
Q: There is talk that there will be another vote in the Turkish parliament what will happen if Turkey keeps up these deployments to Turkey? What would this mean for EUCOM?
A: As you know, the European Command is supporting the Central Command in these issues so General Franks is the overall military commander for whatever happens with regards to the situation with Iraq. I wouldn't want to speculate on what his recommendation might be in what we might do and not do in that event and I think we'll just wait and see what happens.
Q: The Bulgarian Defense Ministry last week said that there has been discussions with US that there might be basing there. There is continued speculation in the Polish press that the US may use former Soviet bases. Die Welt has been reporting today that Heidelberg could be shut down. I was wondering if you can get into any specifics on the move and what effects and when it would have any effects on forces deployed in Germany.
A: The first thing I would want to say is that whatever we are doing is not any way connected with the current political situation with regards to us. It should never in any way be characterized as a knee-jerk reaction to disagreements at the political level. This is tied to things that we should do regardless of whether discussions on Iraq are on going or not. I would characterize it as an effort to maintain the traditional and historical ties that we have within the Alliance, in the great relationships that we've had with Germany and all of our traditional partners in the Cold War. But the recognition that we have to move in certain directions in order to carry out the engagement strategy that is required for a fundamentally healthy Alliance.
What that will mean is emphasized at this point, because at this point it's very much embryonic. It's conceptual in nature right now. That it means an evaluation of all of our infrastructure and our commitment to that. And to see if there is a more agile way to keep the absolutely enduring bases that we must have and we do have presently and yet transform the forces in such a way that it becomes more agile so that it has the opportunity to predict perhaps from some of those bases with speed and with the kind of organizational construct that allows us to be more agile. It means probably creating smaller forward operating bases like, for example, the Camp Bondsteels of the world. Where you can have a small presence and it has a certain elasticity to it-that can contract and expand as you might need it. National sovereignty is a recognized obviously international paradigm and the United States as a global power requires a "21st" basing strategy that allows us to do with some agility and speed the movement of our forces. It has been shown militarily that if you're able to respond quickly to an emerging crisis, most of the time you can defuse it. But an inability to respond to it, has a corresponding growth to the degree of difficulty and sometimes by the time that you get there it's already out of control.
We have had an East-West orientation for a long time. It still is a strong orientation for us, but the realities of the 21st century will cause us as a nation to develop, perhaps to consider what our role might be in support of the Alliance and our own national needs with regards to the southern region more so that we've done in the 20th century. So the new more modern basing paradigm has got to be recreated so that we have a flexible footprint that's based on the substance that we need-an ability to be able to displace ourselves and to engage at the operational end of the inventory in ways that will allow emerging militaries to be like us and be interoperable with us, and to create the peaceful conditions that allow for economic benefits and cultural understandings and political stability throughout the area that we're interested in.
I come back on the central point that the reason we do this is so that we don't have wars, not in case we do have wars. Because the fundamental purpose of our being here, or anywhere else, and the thing that I'm most proud wearing an American uniform is the fact that where the American military has been engaged generally good things have happened. Like, giving you the western European results of the past 54 years is the fact that ... an example of the great things that can happen with American engagement.
Q: [inaudible]
A: I think that it's likely that American forces will have an engagement strategy that will include our emerging and eastern European allies. Whether that means that we will build new bases and close bases in Germany to respond to your question is speculation at this point. Frankly, I don't think that we will build the same kinds of bases that we built in the 20th century-complete with base housing, schools, hospitals, and mini-America in other countries. But I do think that we'd be interested in being able to develop a series of military-to-military relationships that will bring our militaries closer together. You can only do that if you can actually engage there. Now, whether those forces are projected from bases Germany on a temporary basis and do their work and come home, we will have to wait and see. But we are looking for more flexibility. We are looking for a more modern approach to how you deploy and sustain your armed forces throughout the European theater and the African theater which is part of our responsibility-and in support of the world's most important Alliance, which is NATO.
Q: Can you give us a timetable? Can we expect this to happen in two years? A decade?
A: The conceptual work is going on as we speak. Obviously there is an awful lot of consultation that we have to do-this is not going to be done in isolation of our allies. United States Congress has to buy the concept. And we need to do the detailed work. My honest response to you is that I would think that between now and the next couple of years we would certainly have the conceptual direction down and we'll have done all of the consultations and I would think that by the time...within a year...within the next year...that we should be able to do that and maybe begin some small implementations very soon thereafter. But it's too early to tell to put a precise timeline on it. But it's not too early to tell that we're actively working on it.
Q: Are there any conclusions that you've already reached about basing structure in Germany? The US has spent a lot of time and money to modernize the Air Force facilities at Spangdalem and Rhein Main. There are questions about combat units leaving. Can you talk to us a little bit about what you already know about the structure and what you've already decided on.
A: First of all, I've only been here about 45 days so it's not enough time to do all of that work. But there will be a significant number of bases that have enduring value. And use Rhein Main as an example or Ramstein as an example. Closing Rhein Main accentuates the necessity of a base like we have at Ramstein. So there will be obviously a good many bases over the years that still have strategic utility and would be silly to close just because you want to move it several hundred miles to the east and that's not a rationale. The rationale for any base is that it serves some military utility and strategic utility and it has to pass the test in the 21st century against the 21st century requirements that are levied upon it. And so nothing is off the table or on the table, but there are some major installations obviously that we'd be hard pressed to recreate elsewhere and we wouldn't want to do that unless there was a compelling need to from a strategic standpoint. So, what I'm looking for primarily is some economies of scale at the manpower end of things where the units that we have can be the right size, the right type of units, and the units that can have great effect regardless of where they're based from. I would remind you as an example that in Bosnia right now the American units on the ground are National Guard units. Now here is a force that is deploying from the United States that comes over for a fixed period of time that's doing astoundingly good work with very little infrastructure build up associated with it and at the end of their rotation, presumably, they could be conceptually replaced by another unit from somewhere in the United States. It's that kind of forward basing and flexibility, whether it comes from Germany or from the United States or elsewhere that we're looking to recreate without the tremendous investment that typically accompanies a 20th century basing model. It's not that the bases that we have are not necessary it's how we flow forces from those bases and how useful they are in relation to the strategy we'd like to have and the engagement we'd like to have in the 21st century and the challenges that we're going to have to respond to.
Q: Can you go over your concept more fully of "Lily Pad" bases-How those bases work and how they strategically better and some of its uses?
A: I'll give you a classic case of one that is not in Europe, but in the Pacific-if you look at the island of Okinawa for example. On Okinawa you will see the home of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and when you look at that force and look at how it's constructed you'll see that a lot of the force comes from the United States on a rotational basis. All of the infantry battalion for example rotate in and out of Okinawa as part of the force and they're always there it's just that they don't have the footprint that those traditional, what I call traditional basing paradigms that cause you to build housing and schools for the families, and so on and so forth. And expeditionary forces which is one of the directions that all of the Armed Forces in the United States are going towards-that's really what transformation is. If you look at the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps and the Navy have been fairly expeditionary in terms of rotational concepts for a long time. In the Army...part of Army transformation is to also become that way. And so that gives you some opportunities to do things differently. To get back to Okinawa, for example, think of Okinawa as a hub in the center. And on that landmass you have those things that are just not necessarily easy to transport, quite as easily as infantry battalions and squadrons are to support. So you have kind of your heavy logistics hub if you ever need it-for example in support of the defense of Korea or things of that nature. But the manpower that does the warfighting or the presence or the engagement comes from different parts of the world to great effect. So a typical battalion would fly over from say, Camp Pendleton, California, on two 747s and the first 747 would pick up from Okinawa the elements of the relief battalion that are now going home. And so in the space of a week you'll have accomplished two battalion swaps 100 percent, the new battalion falls in on the old battalion's equipment, and they take two weeks to climatize to the new environment, and so on and so forth and then they embark on a four month swing through the Asia-Pacific doing a series of operations and visits and mil-to-mil engagements from Korea to Thailand and or the Philippines and the like and at the end of those six months and come back to Okinawa, turn in their equipment, conduct a post-cruise shakedown, get on the airplane that's bringing their relief back in and they go back to the United States. It's that kind of flexibility that we can do more of. The 20th century paradigm requirements were based on the symmetric challenges that we faced ... and that was that you have everybody here all the time and all the equipment you needed because it was, after all, going to be a major war, and it didn't happen. And that threat has now receded a little bit and has been replaced by a more asymmetric world of challenges which in many different ways and yet we have to change that force to make sure that it can be more agile-so that it can be in more places simultaneously. All the while maintaining the core competency-the core enduring value-of some of these very, very important bases that have been built up since the end of the war. So that's kind of how I think we're moving. I know that this isn't limited to this theater. I know that Admiral Fargo in the Pacific is also looking at different ways. We need to ask ourselves on the Korean peninsula for example. Do we really think we'll be based in the heart of Seoul Korea if reunification takes place, and if not, then what is the next alternative-that's what we're doing.
Q: So what you're saying is that you're looking at hubs like Okinawa in Bulgaria and Romania, is that what you're talking about?
A: Have you been Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo?
Q: No.
A: Well, if you were to do that you would probably have a good example of what a future operational base for the 21st century would look like for the United States Army for example. Substantially lower costs and not much infrastructure there except for the base-that's geo-strategically located in an important area where you want to execute your missions in terms of the Alliance if it's a NATO mission or unilaterally in terms of American policy. And wherever forces come from should be flexible, if it comes from Europe, if it comes from the US, it could come from other theaters. You might want to deploy forces having a lighter footprint...but yet to great effect with the host nation militaries that we want to engage with. Fundamentally the paradigm shift of the different basing strategies of the 20th century to the 21st century. And I think the intellectual rigor that goes into that has still got to be developed and we've got to be able to make the case and show that it's not only more useful in relation to how we pursue the challenges and how we respond to it-but also a better use of our resources in that sense perhaps even more affordable. But that's work that has to be done.
And by the way, part of the transformation, I'm talking about the landmass here, but I think part of the transformation is also with regard to our sea basing concepts. I think that is also an answer to the sovereignty challenges which was re-learned in Operation Enduring Freedom when virtually, with the exception of special operations forces, most of the air support for the first several month to Operation Enduring Freedom came from naval platforms. And it took us a long time, for example, to work out the modalities of bilateral accords with several nations to the north of Afghanistan. It was only several months later that we were able to actually base there and work with them. And so it's not just about landmass, it's about doing things in a much broader way that gives us a chance to do what we need to do without any one area-from someone-being able to shut down the entire operation.
Q: Can you talk about the responsibilities of EUCOM with response to a war in Iraq? How would you support CENTCOM and the importance of bases in Germany?
A: Well we have a supporting-to-supported relationship with United States Central Command. I think that the importance of European Command to any future engagements in Iraq is very critical. As you know it's been our desire to establish a northern front. That still remains our goal. It's not absolutely critical to the success, but it's an important piece of it I think. Fifth Corps as you know is deeply involved in supporting CENTCOM. As are many of the European based assets that contribute on a regular basis to what we're doing. Operation Northern Watch is still a EUCOM mission. And we have been actively engaged for several months now in trying to work out the modalities of a basing construct in southern Turkey for the conduct of an eventual operation if it should come to be required. The fact we have a very impressive European capability, and the fact that it is of great assistance to the Central Command is beyond question.
Q: Would your involvement shift if there is no agreement with Turkey?
A: I think that the European Command would be used to great advantage if we had an agreement and we could execute at the times that are currently able to execute. If that should not be possible then General Franks will have to give us guidance on how best to use the capabilities that we have. For instance to decide whether to take the ships that have the 4th ID with equipment on it flow it through the Suez Canal and use it in the Gulf if it turns that we can't employ it through Turkey. This is very much a "wait and see what's going to happen" moment. But, in any event, European Command will continue to support as possible not only in terms of the equipment that we have, but the people that we have and we're using a lot of our energy to make sure that our national strategy is a successful on in support of the Central Command.
Q: To go back to the original question, as part of your perceiving that your possible basing, have you had any direct talks with governments of Eastern Europe? And secondly, at the time of the first NATO expansion, the Russians I believe they believed that the US by taking in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary would not at a later point create bases in those countries. What will you be saying to the Russians with regard to their understanding of that commitment?
A: For the part of your question, I am in the process of going to the capitals of those members of the Alliance and I'm explaining the theoretical behind our efforts with a view to reassuring them that this is not a major departure or wholesale change that's going to be imposed on them immediately. And obviously we want the dialogue as we walk down this road. We want it to be in real-time, we want to make sure what we do, in fact, contributes to the greater capability of the Alliance and the expanded role of NATO as it develops a NATO Response Force and we want to make sure that nobody draws the wrong conclusions too early for what this is and what this isn't. With regards to the Russians, the depth of the relationship between EUCOM and Russia, to me, is a very important one. And we have already talked to the Russians by mail in a letter from me to the CHOD (Chief of Defense). We solicit their on-going partnership and explain what this is and what this isn't. This is not about building up Eastern Europe in the same way that we built up Western Europe in the 20th century. It's about engagement. It's about trying to bring to Eastern Europe and beyond as peaceful as possible climate so that good things can happen economically and internationally between this developing part of the world. That Russia could play an important part of that development is beyond question and what were seeking here is a partnership and we will make sure that we communicate well and capably so there is no surprises with the Russians and that we live up to the spirit of the agreement when NATO expanded to the east.
Q: I would like to come back to the question on the possible war on Iraq. What kind of situation will arise for the headquarters of EUCOM when the war starts? Particularly security questions. Will there be a comparable situation to what we had in the first Gulf War in '91 or will this be a completely different situation?
A: Well I think what's certainly changed...what's different between now and 1991 is the fact that the even in the United States we no longer deploy leaving our bases vulnerable. So force protection is very much part in parcel of anything we do-whether we deploy or whatever military mission we take on. And we're very grateful to the German Armed Forces for their assistance in providing their significant force protection capabilities. So, I would say to you that the answer is that this is different and we know that terrorists can strike virtually anywhere and we take the security of our installations wherever they may be, in Europe or in the United States very seriously. You have to consider with the seriousness that it deserves because it's very real. This is new for us in the United States. In 1990 when we went off to Desert Shield and Desert Storm generally commanders did so determining that the base would be fine. We can't do that anymore back home and we're not doing it and force protection is here to stay as long as the global war on terrorism continues.
I like to make sure that everybody has a chance to ask questions, and so is there someone of the hands that just went up...is someone that didn't? ...
Q: Already some members in Congress have said that an appropriate response to Germany's lack of support is a draw down. Is there a danger that this debate can be hijacked regardless of your original intentions?
A: I suppose anything is possible. Timing is everything as you know and unfortunately for those who want to believe that they'll be dissuaded. I would like to say that underneath this political dialogue on this particular issue that German has been steadfast in its support for all things military that we've tried to do. I mean the operational debate, the thoughtful assistance on force protection-at the military level we still have great relations with our friends and allies throughout the theater. It is my hope that once this moment passes traditional dialogue will resume and we'll get on with the important business of contributing to our common defense and for the Alliance in a very thoughtful way and I think hopefully when this moment passes that will recede in the distance. But I have to agree with you that the potential for people to come to different conclusions is probably there. I will do everything I can to dissuade them because that's not a basis from which we're operating.
Q: There have been demonstrations at Camp Darby in the recent past. How have those affected your operations?
A: Demonstrations of those types are always to be regretted, but they are expressions of free governments and free people. At one point we celebrate their right that they have to express themselves that way. But I don't think that any one instance that I could see, not just in Italy but any other place in Europe, has really made a huge difference in what we're trying to do. And we thank ... we're profoundly grateful to our Allies for quickly resolving these minor delays and getting on with the business at hand. So, it has not been terribly disruptive. And the second part of your question had to do with the pace of transformation. I would say by way of an answer to that that our political leadership has sent us a clear message by expanding the Alliance by seven countries that they are interested in transformation. I believe within NATO we can do that...we can do a lot of that...very quickly. We recognize that at the higher end of the operational art there has been some lack of investment. But there is also some good news. And the good news is that in terms of the manpower pool and the resources that are available that are already bought and paid for, most of...80 percent...of the NATO Response Force already exists. It's just in a different way. And so it's just a question of reshaping things. This will be an extraordinary capability which I'm hopeful will be announced in the near future. And I think that this is every bit as transformational as whatever the US European Command might look like in three or four years. So the two things side-by-side...and I would submit that both should be considered in tandem...because we benefit from both. If you do one without the other it's not terribly useful. So the evolution of the US European Command should be seen as a subset of the willingness of NATO to transform itself in the military capability standpoint. And what we are looking to achieve in NATO in particular is economies of scale by shrinking the enormous investment we've made in infrastructure and focusing those resources to better effect the operational end of the scale.
Q: In these "Lily Pad" type bases and operations...
A: I've got to find another word other than "lily pad." It's not really a military kind of term.
Q: Is NATO also going to be part of what is going on?
A: Of course. As a matter of fact I would say that we should do whatever we are going to do in the U.S. relationship and footprint with that in mind. So yes.
Q: I'd like to ask the next question focusing on the political situation. Could it actually work in your advantage, given the negative outlook, to work more quickly on this issue in Congress?
A: I think so. I think there is great enthusiasm in NATO for the NATO Response Force. And frankly that's a charter assignment from Prague. And so we have a couple of choices here and that's why I say not only is European Command at a crossroads but NATO itself and the military capabilities are at a crossroads. Do we have the willingness and the courage to change? And if we do, and I think we do, what ought that change look like? And the NATO Response Force is the instrument of change. Just as the evolving footprint of our European commitment with our US forces is entitled to change. But the two can be very, very closely linked together and should be. And so this is really an exciting time. NATO at the crossroads, European Command at the crossroads, take that from me that it's an expression of optimism. I'm not at all pessimistic about the future-I'm optimistic. I believe in the Alliance, and I believe that even though it might look differently that the military could so dramatically in the 20th century and really here in the last 10 years. This change that we're embarked upon is going to really be exciting for the future and will give us a NATO capability that 50 years from now will be every bit as important as the one that materially affected the whole transformation of Western Europe after World War II. I think it's on that scale.
Q: Inaudible
A: The article that you quoted I disagreed with because I wasn't quoted correctly and you know that almost never happens.
Q: (Laughs)
A: But the context of my remarks were in response to a question, "Do you think that any potential war in Iraq would be resolved quickly?" And I said that I did not know and that I don't know. And I said that military planning should always plan for the worst case and so when you develop an operational plan for anywhere you should really consider the things that are the worst things can possibly happen. I also talked openly about the fact that weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and chemical weapons, and their potential utilization is a new paradigm for American forces-particularly if they were used on a wide scale. We train to it, we've got the equipment to prevail in it, but it is a different dimension that we're faced with if in fact Saddam Hussein uses those weapons. The second piece that is something that a worst-case planner has to worry about is combat in an urban area. The city of Baghdad has seven million people, maybe more, and urban combat is very, very intensive in terms of human capital generally speaking. So you have to think about that and you have make your plans accordingly if in fact a determined defense of a city takes place, how are you going to deal with it? I don't ... I just do not want to align myself with a school of thought that suggests that the military planners are thinking that they're planning their forces based on a perceived easy or quick victory, by that in a matter of days. As an example of that, no one thought that Kuwait would fall quite as quickly as it did in 1991, but it did. My feeling is that if you plan correctly for the worst case as we did for that fight and you get the best case then it's great cause for celebration. You will have good things, you achieved the goals, and everybody can go home and life can get back to normal. But you always have to plan for the worst case and so that was the concept of my response and that still the way I feel and I'm absolutely satisfied with our plans for combat. I just didn't want to send the signal that we had planned on good things happening and discounted the hostilities as less difficult. And you had a second part to your question...
Q: About your northern front...
A: Oh. Any military planner would like to have options, more options than just one. And although I don't think it's absolutely a showstopper in terms of whether you have a northern front or not, I think the ultimate success in future conflicts will be ... we're going to be successful regardless what we're limited to. But to have a presence along the northern part of Iraq would definitely have a military advantage of splitting and he'd have to pay more attention to the north rather than be able to concentrate his forces to defense of the south or any other direction he might think we could be coming from. And I also think that in a post Iraq scenario you will have to have at least some sort of presence in the north anyways and so the best way for me would be to have done it, and still remains, to have done it through Turkey. Which was the experience that I had in 1991 when I was up there with the 24th Marines Expeditionary Unit as part of Operation Provide Comfort where I spent four and a half months in northern Iraq during the Kurdish relief operations. I learned a lot about the geography and the people, and the issues in that volatile region.
Q: Can you rule out any bases? And what coordination have you coordinated with other countries?
A: We have not, and I want to absolutely make sure that what I've told you is exactly correct in what we've done with our colleagues in Russia-we've expressed a desire to have a dialogue with them. And so we are very much at the embryonic stage. There is no particular installation anywhere in Europe that is on my list or anybody else's list right now for any kind of closing. We have not done that level of work. And what we're talking about is trying to get agreement of a concept. And the concept is pretty much what I've tried articulate to you for the better part of an hour is that no bases have been identified or proposed for closing and with regard to our engagement with both our allies and our friends to the east, including the Russians, this is still all very embryonic and very initial at the outset, consultational and very much in the embryonic stage.
Q: I'm sorry to belabor this point, but some of your statements on the political actions concerning the basing seems kind of contradictory. One is acknowledging the potential danger but that two, that you also acknowledge that it could spark a quicker dialogue. Am I correct in that?
A: Well to be honest I don't know what it will do to be honest with you. I mean, I testify in front of the Congress at the end of this month. And part of my testimony will be, I'm sure, as the result the publicity this has had to discuss the theory behind the idea and what it is and to answer members questions that they will certainly have. And so whether the Congress itself chooses to accelerate those kinds of discussions, of course, they've already had a hearing on it at the House Armed Services Committee and that's how we do things. I wouldn't even want to speculate on whether it might accelerate things on the floor of the United States Congress. No, I'm frankly on a timetable, I don't have anybody saying get the plan by Tuesday. But we are going to have it done when we have it done and it'll be right and it'll be proposed in due course. In regard to the other part of your question-I cannot help what people are going to say about this. I cannot help the time that we're in. I can only stand up in front of you ladies and gentlemen and other forms of public opinion like the United States Congress, like NATO, and just tell you what it is and what it isn't. And what is not is a knee jerk reaction as a result of some sort of disagreement that we've had within several members of this wonderful Alliance. I think this is a temporary phenomenon, at least I hope it is. And I think that the health of the Alliance and the future of the Alliance is just too important. That it doesn't mean that we should go full stop in terms of talking about the way ahead. And most of the military discussions that I've had with my colleagues have been on that level-and very understanding, very thoughtful, very courteous and not at all...there's no trauma here that I've detected.
Q: Do you have a number of personnel that have deployed that are in support of a possible Iraqi war?
A: I'm sure we can...Wes are you still here?...
COL Weiner: We can provide that information.
A: We've got that information. If you don't mind, this will be the last one. Because I've given you back the half hour you lost.
Q: You said that you've been talking with the NATO allies and that you've visited the capitals...
A: Well I haven't visited them all, but those that I've visited I've brought this up.
Q: What I was wondering is, you've probably visited Berlin, and I was wondering how your talks went with Germany. How do they see this? And was the going difficult? Do the Germans see it the same way?
A: I've had telephonic discussions with my counterparts in Germany, and that I've not visited Berlin yet, I'm going to do that this month. As you know, the deputy SACEUR is a German Admiral, Admiral Rainer Feist and there are many Germans on the SHAPE staff, we also have the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Harold Kujat. And I've been in deep discussions with them on all of these issues, including the NATO Response Force, and the kind of the US thinking along those lines. It's been very professional, very cordial. And I'm certain after my visit to Berlin we'll have the same relationship, the same sharing, in Germany as well, as I have in Italy and with other members of the Alliance. I don't anticipate that from the military-to-military standpoint we're going to have any difficulty talking about this because it will be good for the Alliance, it will be good for the United States, it will be good for our partners, and it will be good for NATO.
Q: [inaudible]
A: Well I have not had the face-to-face meeting, but it's been discussed. As I've said it's because everybody understands where it is. There's no list out there, there's no pocket list of what bases might be closed or how they might be reduced or where we might even go. That's embryonic and to me that's the process that we're in right now. We're building consensus and we're discussing things at the same time as we're transforming NATO and I want to make sure that the cause and effect relationship of both what the US is doing and what NATO is doing is captured here in this meeting and very, very closely related and fundamental to the relationship of the Alliance of the 21st century.
Q: Very briefly, what eastern European countries, NATO members or potential NATO members have you visited to discuss this?
A: I have not visited any of the seven new members yet, but I will have completed visits to all 19 members of the NATO Alliance by the time I have six months in office and I will do the seven new members at the same time. So, the answer to your question is I have not visited those countries yet.
Q: You haven't been to Poland?
A: I have not. But I do have a scheduled visit to Poland in the near future.
Q: Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you.
A: Thank you.
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